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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines Western views on the 
relations between the West and the rest of the world in 
order to discover explanations for the origins of the 
economic inequalities between nations as manifested in the 
contemporary division between the developed and the 
underdeveloped countries. This research is focussed on 
three distinct chronological and intellectual phases: 1)
"perception of differences" (from classical Antiquity to the 
18th century); 2) Eurocentrism and the anti-imperialist 
reaction (19th century and up to World War II); and 3) 
capitalist "developmentalism" and the Marxist general theory 
of economic imperialism (after WWII). The first two phases 
trace the sources and the evolution of the concepts 
underlying the theories analysed in the third part, which is 
the principal and most extensive of the three. The third 
phase also includes an investigation of the most recent 
reactions within the developmentalist and the Marxist camps 
against, respectively, the so-called orthodoxy of 
development economics and dependency theory. It synthesizes 
contemporary research on the development of West European 
capitalism insofar as it sheds light on long-term influences 
on the appearance of underdevelopment. Aside from the 
systematic discussion and criticism of the theories 
themselves, the research yields a "unified field" approach 
to the problems and issues of underdevelopment, and it 
further allows a summatory evaluation of the general 
question of the possibilities of over-all Third World 
economic development.
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INTRODUCTION
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The main purpose of this dissertation is the search for 
theories and explanations on the origins of the economic 
inequality between nations. Inherent to this search was the 
contemporary concept of underdevelopment, and this led to 
focussing on successive Western "systems of 
conceptualization" on the relations between the West and the 
rest of the world, which in turn determined the 
chronological structure and the final form of the 
dissertation.
It is divided into five chapters: the first two, which 
refer summarily to pre-19th century Western cultural 
relativism and to 19th-century Eurocentrism, are mainly 
devoted to the Marx/Engels theory of the Asiatic mode of 
production and its repercussions and to the anti-imperialist 
reaction against Eurocentrism, initiated and inspired by the 
theoretical synthesis of J.A. Hobson; and the last three, 
which cover the post-WW2 era, principally concern the birth 
and evolution of development studies and the different 
versions of the contemporary theory of economic imperialism 
or dependency theory.
Chapter 1 introduces the concept of perception of 
differences to define the dominant Western intercultural 
perception, going back to the Classical Greek cradle of 
European culture. Perception of differences engendered 
principally environmental theories to explain cultural 
diversity, although "ordinary" ethnocentricity was not 
absent from Western attitudes and it was best expressed in 
the valorative, political concept of Oriental or Asiatic 
despotism. From conceptual threads antedating the 19th 
century and with the active collaboration and support of 
F.Engels, K.Marx proposed the Asiatic mode of production in 
the context of his theory of historical stages to account 
for Asian, principally Indian, economic stagnation. The AMP 
was complementary to the Marxist idea that capitalism was a 
relatively progressive MOP and that it could be transplanted 
to pre-capitalist societies. These tendencies in Marx's 
thought were carried to self-defeating extremes by
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K.Wittfogel and B.Warren. At the end of chapter 1, we 
especially stress the importance of the theory of the 
environmental influence on economic performance.
Perception of differences and cultural relativism came 
a cropper with the rise of Western Europe to economic world 
hegemony significantly during the 18th century and 
decisively during the 19th century. In chapter 2, we 
explore briefly the implications of Eurocentrism as a 
tentative explanation of intercultural inequalities, as 
perceived from a strictly Western optic. Eurocentrism is 
grounded on the complementary ideas of racism and social 
Darwinism, but it is mainly a tautological affirmation of 
superiority, and as such it provoked a strong critical 
reaction in anti-imperialism and the specific theory of 
economic imperialism. This theory was virtually pre-empted 
by Marxist thinkers, who elaborated revolutionary theses 
based upon on it and on Marxist concepts, neither as Hobson 
expressed it nor in its Marxist formulations, however, was 
it very convincing in explaining the concrete process of 
late-19th century colonialist world expansion, mainly 
expressed in the European scramble for Africa. Economic 
imperialism became a communist political slogan and banner 
after the Bolshevik revolution in the deliberations, 
activities, and congresses of the Comintern, the Third 
Communist International, which fulfilled an influential 
bridging role between the specific theory of economic 
imperialism and the general theory elaborated after WW2 and 
known as dependency theory. In Europe and at approximately 
the same time as the anti-imperialist reaction, the process 
of the development of Western capitalism, perceived without 
the double intellectual stigmas of racism and social 
Darwinism, became a legitimate subject of research, and this 
has led in our times to an interesting and productive path 
in the exploration of international economic inequality.
Social Darwinism and racism, as the basic ideological 
components of Eurocentrism, were discredited by two world 
wars, one catastrophic world economic depression, and the
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brutal excesses of Nazism. After WW2, there was a rapid
acceptance in the West of the tendency to perceive the 
capitalist world as divided by economic rather than cultural 
or political inequalities. The expression of this attitude 
is best discovered in the concept of underdevelopment, which 
is the cornerstone of the academic discipline of development 
economics. Chapter 3 seeks out the origins and traces the 
evolution of development economics and of development
studies in general. In order to do this, it places the 
Western concern with underdevelopment and economic 
development in its necessary post-war historical context. 
It divides the process of development studies into various 
chronological stages embodying increasing degrees of 
disenchantment. On the question of the origins of
international economic inequality, "Western" development 
studies exhibit a tendency towards moderate and rational
Eurocentrism through an artificially ahistorical attitude 
which posits the endogenous causation of economic 
backwardness. Even though development economics was to a 
significant degree a Western capitalist strategy to combat 
revolutionary subversion in underdeveloped countries, it had 
been adumbrated in those countries before its formal 
configuration and furthermore theorists from those countries 
were influential during the period of gestation and all 
along the historical process of developmentalism, as the 
doctrine of development economics can be legitimately 
termed.
Chapter 4 has a necessarily contrapuntal relation to 
the previous chapter. Just as development studies were 
begotten as a humane, enlightened form of Eurocentrism in 
relation to underdevelopment, so dependency theory was the 
Marxist approach to Third World issues as derivation from 
the Marxist versions of the specific theory of economic 
imperialism. However, unlike development studies, where one 
can perceive a straightforward ideological trunk, Marxist 
theory presents complicated problems of classification. The 
concept itself of dependency has a long and ambiguous
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semantical history having been employed at different times 
and in different contexts to signify either total 
colonialist subjection or a status involving considerable 
margin for political action. Likewise, dependency theory 
has different, sometimes self-contradictory, avatars, and 
insofar as it postulates a structural view of economic 
retardation, it goes against the grain of the Marxist notion 
of the expansion and progressive impact of international 
capitalism. However, dependency theory, which can within 
reason be traced originally to the Russo-Americna economist 
P.A.Baran, is the paradigm for theories on the origins of 
international economic inequality in that it deliberately 
and purposively tackles the issues involved and actually 
proposes long-term historical explanations of economic 
backwardness. Perhaps more even than orthodox developmental 
doctrine, dependency theory was wholeheartedly adopted by 
Third World ideologues because it seemed to respond ideally 
to Third World queries and, possibly also, to Third World 
insecurities.
Developmentalism and dependency theory are 
fundamentally incompatible even when they seem to converge 
on certain policy issues concerning Third World economies. 
In addition, both developmentalism and dependency theory 
came under fire almost from their beginnings from critics 
within their own political camps, that is, developmentalists 
from capitalist critics and dependency theorists from 
Marxist critics. These diverse areas of discrepancy and 
debate came to a head during the 70s and they resulted in 
what we have termed in chapter 4 as the "overthrow of the 
orthodoxies". This chapter describes the different debates 
involving developmentalism and dependency theory. It also 
attempts a general critique of dependency theory. It does a 
brief survey of the Western alternatives to developmental 
doctrine. The chapter closes with considerations on long- 
view historical research into the development of the West, 
which, on the issue of comparative non-Western economic 
retardation, ironically leads back to two fundamental pre-
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19th century concepts associated with perception of 
differences: the concept of environmental causation or
Influence and the concept of political despotism.
The conclusion very briefly classifies and surveys the 
principal explanations advanced In the thesis on the origins 
of International economic Inequality and It deduces that 
nothing In them precludes the possibility of achieving a 
reasonable degree of economic development for today's Third 
World.
As the thesis unfolds, It attempts and hopefully 
achieves various objectives. The primary one Is
establishing the validity of the concept Itself of theories 
on the origins of the economic Inequality between nations. 
The foundation for this claim Is the parallel and often 
Interwoven Ideological histories of developmentalism and 
dependency theory. Nothwlthstandlng their radical
antagonism, their field of action Is the same. However, 
they are not to deal with conjointly In the literature, and 
that Is something we have tried to do on the basis of the 
Idea of the origins of International economic Inequality. 
In doing this, we have also gone back to search for the 
original, and In some cases, the genuine sources for those 
theories, which again Is not a subject that the literature 
usually undertakes In more than a summarlst or casual 
fashion. The thesis offers clarifications on the use of 
concepts and terms, some of which we anticipate In this 
Introduction, and In particular. It presents a "taxonomy" of 
the theories Involved In the Western concern with the Issues 
of International economic Inequality. Last but not least, 
at a juncture In time when the orthodoxies of 
developmentalism and dependency seem to have virtually run 
out to steam, the thesis proposes a rational and plausible 
analytical approach to this development and It provides a 
brief and direct but not uncritical analysis of the 
alternatives to those orthodoxies.
The question of a priori definitions Is crucial In a 
dissertation dealing mainly In Ideas and their evolution.
—  13 -
Certain concepts and some omissions from the start require 
and are susceptible to definition and justification. 
"International economic inequality" refers to the economic 
differences between the advanced capitalist nations and the 
vast, heterogenous intercontinental bloc of the "capitalist" 
underdeveloped countries, and not to issues of inequality 
between the capitalist and the communist blocs, or within 
the communist world itself. Underdevelopment is
conventionally defined in per capita income terms, as in the 
accompanying per capita GNP international statistical 
pyramid. (Table 1) The dissertation does not specifically 
deal with the complications involved in the concepts of 
human equality and inequality in general. It assumes 
equality for all peoples, by which we mean that any human 
group, whether nation or race, is capable of the highest 
achievements (conventionally defined) attained by any single 
one of them.
Two significant deliberate omissions from the text 
merit consideration: the anthropological concept of culture 
and the so-called communist world. The principal reason why 
anthropology is not considered as such in this dissertation 
on theories on international economic inequality, has to do 
with the fact that its two contributions to the subject: 
environmental theory and the concept itself of culture, are 
not original, and all anthropology does— in this specific 
connection, we must underline— is reinforce or document 
ideas proposed or elaborated in other fields of study, and 
these ideas are subsumed in the thesis in the explorations 
of disciplines and schools of thought that make higher 
cultures, nations, and blocs of nations their subject in a 
way that anthropology does not. The exclusion of communist 
nations can be justified on two grounds: 1) the relative
inapplicability to them of the theories defined and studied 
here, and 2) the prima facie special character of the 
problems of inequality within the "communist world".
To close this "Preface", we shall offer two useful 
comments on terminology. In dealing with the relations
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TABLE 1
THE PER CAPITA GNP PYRAMID (exc. Communist countries)
Countries with GNP/P of over $12,000 5
(exc. OPEC)
Countries with GNP/P between $6,000 and $11,999 15
(exc. OPEC; Inc. Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Trinidad and Tobago)
Countries with GNP/P between $1,500 and $5,999 19
(Inc. OPEC, Spain, Ireland, Israel, Greece,
South Africa and Yugoslavia)
Countries with GNP/P between $500 and $1,499 24
(Inc. OPEC)
Countries with GNP/P between $120 and $499 28
Over $12,000
Between $6000 and $11,999
Between $1500 and $5,999
Between $500 and $1499
Between $120 and $49~
Source : World Development Report 1985
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between the advanced capitalist countries and the rest of 
the world a considerable degree of ambiguity often
insinuates itself into the use of the related concepts of 
colonization, colonialism, imperialism, and economic
imperialism, a problem which is further complicated by the 
elevation in our days of the idea of dependence to the rank 
of a theory related to all the previous concepts.
Colonization is the least problematical of the lot as it has 
the relatively unambiguous sense of the peopling or settling 
of "new” lands and there exists besides the verb "to 
colonialize" in the sense of converting nations and 
societies into colonies. Since to justify our decisions on 
usages would mean going into another lengthy essay, and 
since they have the sanction of wide acceptance anyway, we 
shall simply state that by colonialism— always in context, 
in this case as in all the others— we refer to the practices 
of Western powers in colonialized lands since the beginning 
of European overseas expansion in the 15th century. We 
realize, of course, that England colonialized Ireland in the 
17th century, that the Hapsburgs and the Ottomans 
colonialized the Balkans, and that Russia colonialized 
central Asia, but, since for reasons beyond our choosing, 
most Western theory on colonialism deals only marginally 
with these historical expressions of colonialism, we must 
insist on our reference to Western overseas or 
intercontinental colonialist expansion, although we do not 
incline to apply the term colonialism to the former British 
colonies of settlement, including the Atlantic seaboard 
colonies of North America, which are colonies in the Greek 
sense, perhaps in the purest sense, of colonized 
territories. Over and above the use of "imperialism" and 
"imperialist" to designate late-19th century European 
colonialist expansion, we prefer the perfectly legitimate 
academic term "economic imperialism", which, however, we 
employ at times— in accordance with a line of argumentation 
clearly expounded in the thesis— in the same sense as
■” 1 6 ”
colonialism. We accept the standard definition of informal 
imperialism, but always with the economic connotation.
Finally, we use the terms "peoples" and 
"nations" interchangeably, but not extensively to "tribes" 
or "savages", and the concepts of "higher cultures", 
"hochkulturen", and "civilizations" as denoting the same 
formal reality, preferring the first two over 
"civilizations", which despite or because of the affinity 
for it of French authors, such as F. Braudel, and of world 
historians, such as A. Toynbee, reverberates with a 
solemnity that does not seem to accord with banausic yet 
rock-solid economic continuities.
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CHAPTER 1
PERCEPTION OF DIFFERENCES, EUROCENTRISM, AND MARX'S ASIATIC 
MODE OF PRODUCTION
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During most of recorded history humanity at any one 
time has been divided into a scattering of high cultures 
which competed or warred on their frontiers or when probing 
the interstices between them by sea or by land but which 
mostly kept to themselves in self-complacent if struggle- 
ridden isolation until the 15th century A.D., when the 
overall pattern started to crack under the weight of 
European expansion. Nevertheless, up to the 18th century 
Europe could not claim to be more than a primus inter pares 
with a towering but subjective sense of its own superiority. 
This had changed dramatically by the middle of the 19th 
century: Europe by then could not only back its pretensions 
to superiority with a string of conquests and armed feats 
stretching to the coast of China and the ramparts of Edo: it 
could and did arrogate to itself the condition of being the 
civilization par excellence. The matrix which gives form to 
the capitalist world system in our time became possible with 
the virtual completion of the process of world integration 
by the West towards the end of the 19th century. Western 
capitalist civilization had conquered the world and was 
imposing its values and mores on it. This was indeed the 
culmination of its ascent to absolute superiority. Even as 
it got there, though, it was already under fire from within 
itself and early into the 20th century it hived off what in 
Toynbeean terms is a related but antagonistic revolutionary 
society in Russia. At the same time Western supremacy was 
being resented, resisted, and sometimes fought in subject 
and dependent lands. In the aftermath of World War II, 
Western ethnocentricity had blended with the wider concept 
of economic development in the specific form of 
industrialization, and the rest of the world— with the 
exception of Japan and of the communist bloc— was being 
categorized under the general concept of underdevelopment. 
Development and underdevelopment, like world integration and 
the world capitalist matrix, are coterminous and mutually 
reinforcing, in fact, two sides of the same world historical
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process which seems to have been leading towards a synthesis 
of complex disparities.
The process had its beginning in the dawn of Classical 
Greece, around the 6th century B.C., when the first of an 
unbroken series of European cultural formations became 
intensely aware of the wider world around it. The Greeks 
themselves were a divided nation neighbouring on older if 
fragile empires. Greek Asia Minor was conquered by Persian 
satraps and on two occasions Greece itself almost succumbed 
to Persian invasion. The Greeks were hardly in a position 
to press claims of absolute superiority over other cultures 
and what they in effect perceived were the marked 
differences that separated their own politically disjointed 
culture from those of other nations. This "perception of 
differences" was to become the fundamental leit-motif in 
Western attitudes towards alien cultures until the onset of 
unchallenged Eurocentrism— the idea of the exceptionality 
and absolute superiority of Western civilization— in the
19th century. The fundamental reason for the durability of
this outlook in the West was the same as in ancient Greece: 
where there are no clear victors, there can hardly be loud 
boasting. Perception of differences, however, was in no way 
incompatible with what for lack of a better designation can 
be called normal ethnocentricity— the collective self-esteem 
which is part and parcel of every culture— and if the Greeks 
despite their vulnerability never renounced their claims to 
superiority, it is hardly surprising that this was also a 
constant parallel theme to perception of differences in 
Western civilization. In fact, the Western perception of 
differences emerges over a background cacophony of blasting 
and blustering only because of the clarity of its timbre and 
the force of its logic. Perception of differences led
directly to environmental theory, which affirms that human 
beings are influenced crucially if not actually determined 
by the physical world around them, and environmental or 
climatic theory held good in the West for the explanation of 
the intercultural perception of differences until it was
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superseded by the more gratifying and self-righteous notion 
of its own material and moral superiority. The point that 
should be emphasized is that the environment and the notion 
that it influenced human groups decisively was the one idea 
that was shared almost universally by intercultural 
observers and theorists in Europe during the long epoch of 
the perception of differences. When with increasing 
frequency during the 18th century and indubitably during the 
19th, the West categorised all cultures into superior and 
inferior, reserving for itself the former category, the 
environmental hypothesis lost a good deal of its relevance, 
just as in our times, when economic development became the 
basic module for international comparisons, the 
superior/inferior dichotomy fell into disrepute in deference 
to the idea and the desideratum of potential human equality,
ENVIRONMENT AND DESPOTISM
The general environmental hypothesis traces social 
behaviour patterns and modes of thinking to the physical 
conditions in which people live, specifically climate, soil 
and geography, A further, subordinate extension of this 
proposition contemplates the influence of the stars on human 
behaviour, and constitutes the basic principle of astrology, 
which however is a mostly discredited branch of the theory. 
From this general point of view, the effects of the 
environment are pervasive: they extend to physical,
intellectual, and moral qualities, and through these, affect 
politics, society, and history. Environmental thinking of 
this sort is both materialist and fatalist, for it is 
grounded on the efficacy of the palpable: given one sort of 
climate, you obtain certain precise moral qualities, 
although there exists some ambiguity as to whether climate 
imprints them indelibly or coaxes them out from people 
circumstantially. Again, no human community can escape the 
impact of its milieu and people are collectively determined 
by it, yet, for one thing, physical circumstances do not 
entirely cancel out individual free will, thus making moral 
judgement possible, and for another, within the purview of
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this theory it is often possible to modify that impact 
through wise choice in legislating. Although environmental 
theory stems from the historical occurrence of intercultural 
contacts, and therefore, is probably polygenetic, self- 
perpetuating, and self-reinforcing, it is also true that the 
strands of the theory that Classical Greece first spun and 
wove together have been influential, and sometimes decisive, 
throughout the intellectual history of the West. In the 
writings of Montesquieu can be found both the most 
intricately deterministic statement of the environmental 
hypothesis, and its most forthright limitation through the 
agency of human design, although it is not humanity freely 
shaping and modelling itself but observing and using the 
effects of the environment to its own ends. Human beings, 
in his view, can not make themselves. They can, however, 
legislate for their own good against the vices that nature 
cossets in them, as S.Bolivar, perhaps Montesquieu's most 
distinguished pupil, proposed to the Congress of Angostura, 
Venezuela, in 1820.^
If the theory of environmental determinism can be said 
to be the ideal intellectual instantiation of pre-19th 
century Western perceptions of cultural difference and 
cultural relativism, the concomitant and associated idea of 
political despotism probably best manifests the tendency 
towards forthright Western ethnocentricity. Montesquieu 
established the classical connection between the two with 
his speculations on the origins of despotism in the central 
Asian steppes— a concept so beguiling that the contemporary 
economic historian E.L. Jones has made it the core of his 
own disquisitions on the origins of inequality— , but the 
association between environment and Asian despotism goes as 
far back as Hippocrates, the Greek father of environmental 
theory, and the historian Herodotus. In post-Renaissance 
European thought the concept of Asiatic despotism became as 
firmly entrenched as the linkage between nobiliary feudal 
privileges and Western political forms, and the 
juxtaposition environment/despotism, even though these are
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Independent Intellectual strands, Is frequent in the 
literature on intercultural comparisons. An observer such 
as the 17th century French physician and traveller F, 
Bernier, who wrote an influential chronicle on Mughal India, 
cannot justifiably be excluded from the wide unbroken stream 
of Western authors who used climate to explain cultural 
traits, usually with a bias in favour of their own 
civilization. In any event, by the time A. Smith wrote his 
The Wealth of Nations (1776), and established therein a 
correlation between Asiatic governments and the maintenance 
of public, specifically hydraulic, works for the benefit of 
agriculture, all the elements were in place for an enquiry 
on the origins of the West's economic advance over all other 
cultures, once the evidence for this happening had become 
manifest and indisputable. (Table 2) But before any serious 
work on the subject could proceed, the West itself went 
through a prolonged intellectual phase of hubris and intense 
self-admiration.^
Despite the often explicit, but by no means unanimous, 
pre-19th century Western denunciations of Oriental or Asian 
despotism as a form of governance, despotism itself did not 
necessarily connote weakness and in reality despotic empires 
like the Ottoman were not up for easy grabs by Europe even 
at the start of the 19th century. By then, however, India 
had succumbed to British Power and J. Mill's celebrated 
History of British India (1816), in which Indian 
backwardness is confidently related to the deficiencies of 
its legal practices, manifested an assertive tone of 
absolute contempt. The idea that India was afflicted with 
both lawlessness and despotic excess had been advanced 
already by Bernier, who unlike Mill had actually been there, 
but in the pen of the British historian this perception is 
besmirched by vitriol and it stands as a monumental 
testimony not to its intrinsic scholarly achievements but on 
the historical circumstances in which it was written. What 
can be said unequivocally is that when Mill wrote on India 
the world balance of strength had been altered radically in
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favour of Europe and the case for Eurocentrism was in the 
way of obtaining a plea of nolo contendere from any rival 
outlook in the West on non-Western cultures. It is not 
unfair to say that the change from perception of differences 
to outright Eurocentrism was gradual, determined by events 
that seemed to occur in slow motion, but that, if the kernel 
of Eurocentrism was imbedded in the nebulous start of the 
process, the historical events that gave it definite 
sanction were probably lagging in respect to the European 
perception of its own superiority. By the time of the Opium 
Wars and probably long before them, the change to the 
unchallengeable Eurocentric vision had already been 
accomplished. In Goethe and Hegel, in whom Eurocentrism is 
perhaps less ordinary and less contemptuous than in Mill, 
this attitude has the disheartening plangency of a 
curtailmente of reason and yet it was as unavoidable as 
doom. It was the 18th century that consecrated the triumph 
of Eurocentrism with the accumulated evidence of centuries 
of European travels, commerce, exploitation, and conquest. 
The 19th century added the inflexion of self-righteousness 
and disdain. But what exactly is Eurocentrism?^
EUROCENTRISM: RACISM PLUS SOCIAL DARWINISM
The combination of Western ethnocentricity and Western 
material advantages over other cultures— expressed in 
economic, military, and, political terms-, engendered the 
cultural attitude which is known as Eurocentrism. In one 
sense, Eurocentrism is a circular and self-justifying 
affirmation of absolute cultural superiority. It has no 
other foundation than strength and the "rights" of conquest. 
In another, however, it is grounded on two signal 
intellectual manifestations of 19th century Western thought: 
racism and social darwinism, both again founded in part on 
the evidence of Western progress and Western expansionism, 
but with at least the semblance of rational justification. 
In this particular sense, Eurocentrism would qualify as a 
legitimate theory on the origins of intercultural and
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TABLE 2
MAJOR WESTERN HISTORICAL SOURCES FOR THE 
DEFINITION OF ORIENTAL DESPOTISM
State property of land B3, M2
Lack of juridical restraint Bl, B3, M2
Religious substitution for law M2
Absence of hereditary nobility Ml, B2, M2
Servile Social Equality M2, H
Isolated village communities H
Public hydraulic works S, M2
Torrid climatic environment M2, M3
Historical Immutability M2, H, M3
Key: B1 = J.Bodln; B2 = F,Bacon; B3 = F.Bernier;
H = Hegel; Ml = Machlavelll ; M2 = Montesquieu;
M3 = J.Mlll; S = A.Smith
Source: P.Anderson, The Lineages of the Absolutist
States (p. 472)
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international inequalities if it were not for its implicit 
proviso that equality, or some relativistic cultural 
definition of equality, is simply inconceivable, and where 
there is nothing to explain there can hardly subsist the 
need to explain. Finally, and perhaps most significantly 
over the long-haul, Eurocentrism embodies the universal 
creed of modernization and material progress. But this 
perception is something that the world has come to accept as 
gradually the more invidious aspects of Eurocentrism have 
fallen by the wayside of history.^
Racism offers at least two handholds for analysis, 
although the subject is admittedly too complex for facile 
summarization. There is racist thinking, which is a 
reflexive and patterned way of reacting to ordinary social 
relations, events, and processes. It can be found in 
association with normal ethnocentricity, and there probably 
does not exist a culture that has not indulged in it in one 
way or another. Western racial thinking, which derived a 
great deal of its strength and influence from slavery and 
slave trafficking, spread on the back of Western world 
hegemony and Western conquest, and thus became a force that 
far transcended the bounds of Western civilization. Racial 
thought and racial discrimination in the West— excluding, of 
course, certain notorious and isolated instances— no longer 
count with legal or overt social sanctions, and although by 
no stretch of the imagination can they be said to have 
disappeared, at least they are no longer as respectable as 
they once were. Doctrinaire racism, which for the sake of 
brevity can be identified with pseudo-scientific theories 
and world-historical interpretations that flourished in the 
19th century and survived in etiolated or aberrant forms 
into the 20th century, crumbled from the lack of solid 
scientific foundations and from the revulsion of humankind 
at the excesses that it nurtured and fostered. Social 
Darwinism was perhaps marginally less intellectually 
inviable than racism, although the indefeasible symbiosis 
between them virtually assured that it could not prosper or
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even subsist without racism. To put it in a nutshell, and 
as G. Lichtheim expressed it, social Darwinism is the 
proposition that the weak deserve their fate. It is founded 
on the ideas of the pervasiveness of struggle and of the 
survival of the best and fittest. It was a going 
proposition before the irruption of Darwin’s biological 
theories, but it gained considerable momentum from them, 
principally from their adaptation to social theory by H. 
Spencer although not insignificantly from Darwin’s own 
speculations on the ancestry of humanity. Social Darwinism 
developed two distinct branches: a social branch, which had 
a conservative tinge but became really influential only with 
the elaboration of the theory of Eugenics by F. Galton and 
K. Pearson, and an international branch, which was almost 
spontaneously incorporated into imperialist theory and 
doctrine. In considering the relevance of racism and social 
Darwinism to Eurocentrism, it is not inaccurate or 
unreasonable to posit that if racism was the invariant motif 
throughout the 19th century in all manifestations involving 
intercultural and international relations, then social 
Darwinism provided the intellectual mechanics or dialectics 
whereby racism was employed to proclaim Western superiority. 
Unlike racism, which had a deep anchorage in cultural 
prejudice, not to speak of human psychology, social 
Darwinism died of almost instant death in the indecisive and 
self-destructive carnage of WWl.^
As can be gathered from our reference to J. Mill, the 
prevalence of Eurocentrism concomitant with Western world 
hegemony did not signal the demise of the theories that had 
been used in more relativistic times to explain cultural 
differences, but there were important changes. What in 
Montesquieu and many other authors, had been a theory on 
environmental influence, in a 19th century writer and 
traveller like E.W. Lane it had become an intellectual 
reflex to categorize backwardness. The consciousness of the 
inferiority of non-Western cultures was just as automatic a 
response, and it overshadowed the importance of environment
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as a cultural determinant. The superiority of Western 
civilization, which was considered to be the result of more 
than sheer materialism, stood out so clearly that mere 
climate could hardly explain it; and when the environment 
did come up as a significant part of theory it had a very 
definite discriminatory rather than explanatory function. 
Apart from its inherent inconsistencies and logical 
failures, which were there, of course, before the 19th 
century, climatic theory ultimately had reached the end of 
its useful life in a predominantly Eurocentric context. It 
sounded superfluous when speculations revolved around the 
loci of race and social Darwinism, mission civilisatrice and 
manifest destiny. However, the environmental hypothesis was 
too powerful to disappear altogether, and come back it did 
before long. It returned in the challenge/response version 
in a world historical context, rather than in the vague 
geographic mould it was cast into before due to the limited 
scope of knowledge. And especially it returned in the 
developmentalist post-WW2 awareness that unequal economic 
development had somehow to do with the differences between 
the torrid and the temperate latitudes.^
The qualification of inferiority implied in the concept 
of Asiatic despotism did not necessarily indicate hopeless 
or eternal stagnation, and it is in this spirit that 
J.S.Mill wrote the following in 1859: "Despotism is a
legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, 
provided the end be their improvement, and the means 
justified by actually affecting their end. Liberty, as a 
principle, has no application to any state of things 
anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of 
being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then 
there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar 
or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one". 
This was consistent with the interpretation that his father, 
J.Mill, put on Indian history and society, and it was part 
of the utilitarian programme for the reformation and 
progress of India. It was on a vision of despotism not
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unlike this one that K.Marx and F,Engels founded their 
theoretical explanation of non-Western economic 
backwardness, which was the most rational and fecund 19th 
century elaboration of this type. Although imbued with an 
outspokenly Eurocentric outlook, Marx and Engels were also 
sincerely and passionately partisans of the idea of human 
equality. In less guarded moments, Marx occasionally 
indulged in racial and cultural slurs— and Engels once at 
least in print— , but they were never guilty of the 
catalogues of insults and derogations that apologists of 
colonialism were wont to prepare in their times about non- 
European nations and peoples. Marx's Eurocentrism had 
strictly to do with the fact that the objects of his 
research and observation were European history and European 
society. On the other hand, Marx never lost an opportunity 
to castigate colonialism and to express his support and 
admiration for nations who resisted European encroachment. 
Despite his belief that Europe had achieved a superior stage 
of economic development, he had no patience with all the 
cant about its civilizing function and its moral and 
religious duties. And in the final balance of his work, he 
could even be ambiguous about the universal validity of the 
West European historical model of socio-economic 
development.^
MARX, ENGELS, AND THE AMP
Between Marx and Engels there arose in the 1850s the 
rudiments of a theory to explain why Asia never produced 
capitalism and why it seemed to lag so pathetically behind 
Europe in economic achievement. Marx in particular was 
influenced in his attitude towards India by Hegel's dour 
Eurocentrism. In a crucial interchange of letters, Marx 
suggested to Engels the idea, which he had culled from 
Bernier, that economic initiative in India had been stifled 
by the absence of legal private property, and Engels replied 
by suggesting that the right of private ownership might have 
been surrendered in exchange for the state's supreme role as 
builder and administrator of waterworks for agriculture.
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which were vital in climates of unreliable hydrography. 
With these notions, all of which pre-dated the 19th century, 
Marx outlined what he termed the Asiatic Mode of Production 
(AMP) and incorporated this concept into various versions of 
his theory on historical and socio-economic stages. There 
does not exist one consistent or canonical definition of the 
Marxist AMP, but in general it can be said that it is 
predicated on a blending of the ideas of environmental 
determinism and of Oriental despotism, and that it 
manifested itself ideally in the British colonialist 
perception of Indian society as composed principally of 
myriad self-sufficient and immutable village communities in 
which the collective or communal ownership of land was 
paramount and over which all-powerful monarchs exercised 
absolute burocratic sway and appropriated by force the 
totality of potentially reproducible surplus, the sine qua 
non of economic progress. The AMP was then a construct 
specifically devised to give a rational and materialist 
explanation for the lack of capitalist development in Asia 
through the absence of individual enterprise in the void 
created by precarious or non-existent private ownership. If 
from nowhere else, you could derive form this sequence of 
ideas that Marx and Engels considered that capitalism was an 
engine of historical progress and that its functioning 
depended on private initiative. Marx's and Engels' use of 
notions from the time of perception of differences in a 
rigorously and justifiably Eurocentric context resulted in 
the first objective, non-parochial, non-superioristic 
attempt to build a theory on the origins of economic 
inequality among cultures. The asynchronous blending of 
outlook and concepts was not however the only potentially 
conflictual aspect of this elaboration, and the AMP was 
destined to become a notorious bone of contention among 
future Marxists. Its formulators themselves never felt 
totally comfortable with it and it is widely thought that 
they had a change of heart about it.^
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The nub of the conflict had to do with the dynamic 
conception of history that Marx had taken from Hegel and 
modified to suit his materialist philosophy, Hegel believed 
that ideas ruled matter; Marx, that material needs and 
conflicts determined events; both accepted that history was 
motion and change, and this was of the essence, even more so 
in Marx than in Hegel. In the realm of ideas, immobility 
was conceivable, and therefore, Hegel could claim that 
Asian societies were without history, without progress. The 
only negation of this proposition that he could have feared 
would have had to come from the facts and the facts were 
amenable, docile, for they spelled out one thing and one 
thing alone: European progress and European supremacy in the 
face of Asiatic stagnation and irrationality. But a 
materialist, committed as he had to be to equality of causes 
and laws, could hardly accept immobility as a valid 
universal historical principle, and that in effect was what 
Marx was doing in postulating, with Engels' connivance, an 
immutable, time-heavy, and politically infantile AMP.^
IMPLICATIONS AND CRITIQUES OF THE AMP
I. Habib has countered pour 1'honneur of Marxism the 
two most controversial and damaging implications of the AMP: 
that the Indian economy before British colonial rule was 
immobile and that colonialism in India, all things 
considered, was progressive. His refutations are based on 
Marx's ambiguous attitude towards colonialism and on his own 
researches into Mughal economic history. They also hew 
strictly to Marxist methodological assumptions on socio- 
historical analysis. Habib does not pretend to demonstrate 
that pre-colonial Indian society was advancing towards 
capitalism, but he does try to show that it was dynamic 
rather than static in that it had experienced changes in its 
socio-economic organization before the imposition of British 
political supremacy. Conversely, he has no doubts about the 
pernicious effects of colonialism, and in this connection he 
espouses the thesis, convincingly propounded by other 
Marxists, that Marx evolved from his Eurocentric stance of
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the 1850s towards a stance of anti-colonialism and of 
rejection of the unqualified idea that the capitalist 
destruction of pre-capitalist agrarian structures was 
necessary and inevitable. The latter attitude belongs to a 
phase towards the end of Marx's life during which he was 
influenced by Russian Narodnist ideas, although it cannot be 
affirmed unreservedly that Marx accepted those ideas as 
being more than specifically applicable to social conditions 
in Russia.10 There are, however, other bones to be picked 
in the theory of the AMP.
In the corpus of Marxist theory, mode of production is 
a complex analytical tool built on the concepts of relations 
of production, means of production, and forces of
production. In any given socio-historical situation, the 
relations of production determine the ownership of the means 
of production, and consequently, who benefits from the 
surplus value produced by labour power, that is, the effort 
expended on production over and above the effort and time
required to create the means necessary for the reproduction
of the labour power. The forces of production refer to the 
organizational and technological means applied to the 
process of production, and as such, they serve both to
characterize the process of production under any specific 
MOP and to create the conditions for change from one MOP to 
another. In the capitalist MOP, which is the Marxist 
paradigm for the definition of the general concept, a tiny 
minority of capitalists own the means of production—  
involving such forces of production as the concentration of 
workers in factories and the mechanization of the productive 
process— and appropriate surplus value from the labour power 
of workers, which, measured in time, is the final source of 
all the value incorporated into commodities for exchange. 
We shall see more on how, in Marx's view, the capitalist MOP 
evolves within itself from the operation of the forces of 
production inside the rigid mould of capitalist relations of 
production when we consider the theories on imperialism 
elaborated by R.Luxemburg and V.I.Lenin, but our concern
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here Is with the marxist use of the concept of MOP in a 
historico-analytical context.
According to Marxist doctrine, capitalism is the last 
of the antagonistic MOPs in the sense that from the 
contradictions inherent in its functioning the only possible 
issue is the social ownership of the means of production, 
but capitalism itself had emerged, by the same process of 
change through the tug of economic contradictions, from 
another, less efficient MOP. In other words, the Marxist 
vision of history was informed by a succession of MOPs in 
time, each of which constituted a distinct historical stage. 
The concept of historical stages came to Marx via Hegel, 
though Hegel did not invent it himself. The first Marxist 
elaboration of the theory of stages appears in The German 
Ideology, co-authored by Marx and Engels in 1846, and it is 
virtually identical to the prototypical Marxist historical 
model in Engels' Anti-Duhring (1876), a work renown for the 
clarity of its exposition of the Marxist materialist 
philosophy, of which it is virtually the pontifical source 
as Engels claimed that Marx gave it his approbation and no 
one has so far seriously disputed Engels' assertion. The 
same general formulation also corresponds to the outline 
mentioned in the Communist Manifesto (1848), and as it is
not contradicted by any statement in the Marxist canon, it
can rightfully be considered to be the basic scheme of
history advanced by Marx and Engels. In it the stages in
the evolution of society appear in this order: community,
antiquity, feudalism, and bourgeois society. The source for 
both the Marx/Engels theory on the origins of economic 
backwardness, i.e. the concept of the AMP, and of one of the 
most heatedly debated aspects of the theory of stages, is 
that, between 1848 and 1876, and especially in Marx's 
Grundrisse (originally written in 1857/8) and in the Preface 
to a Critique of Political Economy (1859), Marx initiated 
the series of socio-historical stages with the category of 
the AMP, and to complicate the issue even further, in the 
first volume of Capital (1867), although he emphasized the
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importance in India of autonomous village communities in 
lieu of the political despotism idea, he still retained by 
implication the concept of AMP, By the time of Anti- 
Duhring, Engels, under the influence of L.H.Morgan's 
evolutionary anthropological ideas and presumably with 
Marx's assent, had dropped the concept of AMP and had gone 
back to the more general idea of communal property with the 
observation that this social form, for environmental or 
other causes, could prolong itself indefinitely in time. 
(Table 3) Engels' tardy rectification notwithstanding, 
there was enough combustible material in all of this to fuel 
the prolonged controversy that in time ensued.
The different formulations by Marx and Engels of a 
materialist theory of historical stages has led to different 
contentious interpretations. A dogmatic unilinealist version 
of Marxism would have it that capitalism was preceded (and 
would always be preceded in pre-capitalist societies) by the 
feudal mode of production, and feudalism by an MOP based on 
slavery, and slavery by a still more primitive MOP 
characterized by the communal ownership of productive 
property. This is the orthogenetic view adopted quasi- 
officially by Soviet historians in a 1931 Leningrad 
ideological discussion, which rejected the thesis of the AMP 
for what some see as reasons of political strategy, 
concretely, the Soviet pursuit of communist alliances with 
"progressive" nationalist forces in less developed 
countries. At another extreme a multilineal reading of Marx 
(and in this case mainly of Marx) holds that it is not the 
order of succession of stages that matters as much as the 
formal sequence itself of a variety of possible MOPs in a 
dynamic historical context. This interpretation was 
proposed by E.Hobsbawm, who, however, coincided with Soviet 
orthodoxy in the rejection of the AMP as a viable socio- 
historical c a t e g o r y . I n  between these two extremes the 
consensual exegesis of the Marxist canon seems to be that 
since the Marxist theory of stages embodying successive 
MOPs was exclusively based on the interpretation of
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TABLE 3
THE EVOLVING MARX/ENGELS PRESENTATION OF THE STAGES 
IN THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SOCIETY
1845-1846 (1)
1. Tribal societies
2, Antiquity
3, Feudalism
4. Bourgeois society
1848 (2)
1. Pre-history
2. Antiquity
3. Feudalism
4. Bourgeois
society
1859 (3)
1. AMP
2. Antiquity
3. Feudalism
4. Bourgeois
society
1878 (4) 1884 (5)
1. Communal Property 1. Savage state
2, Antiquity
3, Feudalism
4, Bourgeois society
2. Civilization
3. Civilization
4. Civilization
Corresponding 
MOP for all 
outlines 
1• Communal
Property
2, Slavery
3, Serfdom
4, Wage labour
References: 1) German Ideology (Marx/Engels); 2) Communist 
Manifesto (Marx/Engels); ^  Preface to a Critique oT
Political Economy (Marx); 4) Anti-Duhring (Engels); 57 
Origins of the Family, Private,Property and the State 
(Engels).
Source: M.Molnar, Marx, Engels, et la politique 
internationale (p.233).
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European economic history, it is principally, and barely 
not exclusively, valid for the socio-economic analysis of 
European history, and furthermore, that of all the stages 
proposed by Marx and Engels, the only ones that can be 
placed in a necessary successive chronological order are 
feudalism and capitalism, and always in strict reference to 
the history of Western Europe. This interpretation can be 
found in its general enunciation in P.Anderson, G.Lichtheim, 
and others. On the whole it seems to owe as much to 
contemporary historical research as to direct Marxist
textual sources.
If the fundamental Marxist idea of a succession of 
different MOPs as the key to the interpretation of universal 
history has been whittled down to its bare bones, it was 
only to be expected that the concept of AMP, about which 
Marx and Engels had such strong latter-day misgivings, 
should have been cut to shreds by the same and other 
interpreters of Marx's thinking. The broadest possible 
refutation of the AMP is implicit in Hobsbawm's rejection of 
unilinearity on the colorable assumption that "Marxism has 
always held the view that all peoples of whatever race or 
historical background, are equally capable of all the 
achievements of modern civilization once they are free to 
pursue them". On this premise, also shared by Lichtheim, who 
characterized Oriental despotism, erroneously it would seem, 
as "theocratic monarchies", economic retardation had more to 
do with colonialism than with any endogenous feature of 
Asian societies. This is reinforced by Hobsbawm's categoric 
belief in the anti-colonialist Marx, a view which he 
expressed in this manner: "It seems probable that Marx, who 
had earlier welcomed the impact of Western capitalism as an 
inhuman but historically progressive force on the stagnant 
pre-capitalist economies, found himself increasingly 
appalled by its inhumanity." Admittedly, Hobsbawm's 
specific pronouncement could be subjected to a less radical, 
less anti-imperialist interpretation, but in the context of 
his wider historical views, in which colonialist
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exploitation contributed to the industrial breakthrough in 
England and the industrial revolution was the fulcrum of the 
division between the developed and the underdeveloped 
nations, it seems to discount the likelihood of Marx's 
belief in what Hobsbawm describes as a theory of "Asiatic 
exceptionalism", although, strictly speaking, the AMP would 
seem to be "exceptionalist" only in the absence of its basis 
on environmental determinism. Hobsbawm’s fellow Marxist 
P.Anderson finds that the AMP, which he describes as a 
"residual category", is not a sufficiently calibrated 
instrument of analysis, so that "a very great deal of 
further historical research is necessary before any true 
scientific conclusions can be drawn from the variant paths 
of non-European development".^^ Hobsbawm and Anderson would 
probably agree with Habib's critique of the thesis of 
Asiatic immutability. This point of view was endorsed also 
in F.Braudel's polymathic researches into the nature and 
evolution of capitalism.
There exist much more intricate refutations of the AMP. 
B.Hindess and P.Q.Hirst analysed it, as they claim, within 
the conceptual universe of MOP itself. This meant, 
according to the rules laid down in their scrutiny, that no 
touchstone other than the definition of mode of production 
was applicable, not even the evidence of history. They 
found, not too surprisingly, that the Asiatic mode of 
production as conventionally defined did not exist because 
"the appropriation of surplus labour by the mechanism of the 
tax/rent cannot define a set of relations of production". 
M.Rodinson made his critique on the distinction between mode 
of production and socio-economic formation. The latter is 
the result of the integration of the economic base— the 
essential concretion of mode of production in any given 
social situation— and the socio-political super-structure. 
The only mode of production which in his view actually 
engenders a super-structure proper to itself is the 
capitalist mode of production. All the other modes of 
production can function with a variety of different super-
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structures and that includes so-called feudalism, which he 
called a mode of production based on serfdom, hence not 
exclusively defined by its European social structures. 
Marx's Asiatic mode of production was based on the idea of 
communal or village property, and Rodinson considered this a 
universal predicate of any human group at an early stage of 
technological and social development. Furthermore, the 
Asiatic mode of production, which, always according to 
Rodinson, can best be described as "mode de production
communautaire primitif", is compatible with institutions 
other than those (Oriental despotism) which Marx conceived 
in combination with it, so there again Asiatic mode of 
production lacked precision and specificity. In an
exhaustive study of the international ideas and positions of 
Marx and Engels, M.Molnar found that the AMP "n'est qu'une 
porte d'entree sur la matière plus vaste des formations 
precapitalistes, finalemente très insuffisament définies par 
Marx et Engels", principally because their knowledge of such 
formations was based on their acquaintance with "les
ouvrages des spécialistes lus un peu au hasard". From these 
inklings to a fully formed theory, Molnar considered that 
there was "un grand saut" which he would certainly not dare
attempt. Molnar's main point, however, was that the
Marx/Engels outlook was totally Eurocentric from which he 
argued that they considered European world expansion a 
necessary part of the capitalist "civilizing" integration of 
the world.15 if then, as we have seen, Marx and Engels 
themselves, and the Soviets at a time when the Soviet word 
still carried the greatest authority amongst Marxists, 
disallowed the idea of the AMP, which subsequently has been 
demolished by specialists in different branches of Marxism, 
what is left, if anything, of the Marxist theory on the 
long-term historical origins of economic inequality among 
nations?
A HAVEN IN A SARGASSO SEA OF EUROCENTRISM
When inequality is alluded to here, it is the 
inequality of underdevelopment. The concept of
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underdevelopment in the sense of a condition which implies 
human equality but is refractory to a process of self- 
sustaining economic development, is of recent origin. It 
did not exist at all in 19th-century Western intellectual 
history, which oscillated from the majoritarian acceptance 
of extreme Eurocentric racial and cultural prejudices and 
the particular but implicit Marxist idea that the evolution 
towards capitalist development was inevitable once the dirty 
work of the colonialist destruction of traditional social 
formations had been achieved. The complicated contemporary 
diagnoses and issues of underdevelopment were unknown to 
Marx and Engels— perhaps even, in some respects, 
inconceivable by them— and in fact the economic stagnation 
of Asian societies commanded their interest only 
sporadically and briefly. They were committed to universal 
egalitarian ideals and therefore they spontaneously came up 
against the problem of Indian economic backwardness in 
comparison with Europe. The common Eurocentric explanation 
of inequality was a naked affirmation of superiority on all 
grounds, that is, it amounted to saying that Europeans were 
superior because they were. Marx and Engels accepted 
Europe's material and even intellectual superiority, but 
this did not square with their evolutive, orthogenic concept 
of history. In order to explain this paradox, they had 
recourse to environmental theory in the broad sense that 
climate conditions and determines social responses, and to 
the concept of an Asiatic or Oriental despotism superimposed 
on self-sufficient, unchanging village communities. To this 
socioeconomic formation in the Rodinson sense, Marx and 
Engels gave the name of AMP, a category which they later, 
and definitely it would seem, subsumed under the more 
general heading of communal or ancient mode of production. 
Subsequently critics have upheld the latter attitude by 
denuding the AMP of any singularity or usefulness. In 
addition to trying to find a rational explanation for inter­
cultural economic inequality, Marx and Engels condemned the 
brutal side of colonialism in no uncertain terms, recognised 
its violent destructive nature, and encouraged nationalist
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resistance to it. They could not go any further given the 
perspectival limitations of their times, to which they could 
not escape altogether.
It must be admitted that their rejection of the AMP did 
leave a gap in Marxist socio-historical analysis, but it is 
a gap which we perceive with the benefit of hindsight. 
Their concern was not inequality but the process of history 
as they saw it, into which it is not easy to insert the 
existence of an underdeveloped third world. On the other 
hand, too, Marx and Engels would probably have been at a 
loss to explain the appearance and co-existence of social 
welfare conditions in one part of the capitalist world with 
the simultaneous condition of sub-exploitation of the 
greater portion of that world, a paradox which clashes with 
the Marxist idea of forward, uniformizing historical 
movement. Any number of dialectical constructs and 
inferences could be derived from these two blind spots in 
Marxism. One important neo-Marxist alternative, favoured by 
critics of the AMP, is that capitalist development fed on 
colonialism and neo-colonialist exploitation and is 
therefore responsible for today’s underdevelopment. But 
Marx and Engels did not propose this theoretical solution 
and they could hardly have glimmered the theory of economic 
imperialism given the unresolved ambiguities of their 
varying criteria in judging colonialism. Their statements 
on the relations of the industrialized nations with the rest 
of the world run the gamut from outright condemnation to 
unstinted encouragement of colonialism, but the condemnation 
was usually based on humanitarian or moral grounds and their 
scattered negative judgements— with which today’s dependency 
theorists tend to make mountainous systems— must be 
considered against the fact that in Marx’s explicitly 
systematic writings nothing really gainsays the view that 
capitalism was an agent of universal historical progress 
whose contradictions eventually lead towards general misery, 
internal conflict, and collapse. On the question of the 
origins of international economic inequality all that can be
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said, in sum, is that Marx and Engels covered the territory 
superficially and in haste because it was not central to 
their studies and that if in the end they did not elaborate 
a finished theory, they at least proposed the rudiments of a 
rational explanation of the origins of international 
economic inequality and this makes them a safe haven in a 
Sargasso Sea of rampant Eurocentrism.
The relative fragility of the AMP theory, which can be 
traced to the difficulties in articulating it with Marx's 
fundamental perception of historical movement, does not 
invalidate the fact that Marx did contemplate it and that it 
had an undeniable if blunt-edged socio-historical foundation 
in the economic world hegemony of Europe. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that it retained a certain unpretentious 
prestige with Marxists even during Engels lifetime. 
Plekhanov and Lenin, although they differed on how 
applicable the AMP was to Tsarist Russia, subscribed to it. 
It had a period of dormancy in the years before and after 
the Bolshevik Revolution, but it came back into the 
mainstream of debate in the USSR after 1925 at least until 
1938 when Stalin definitely came down in favour of a 
conventionally unilineal schema of historical stages. The 
Soviet debate was about Asian societies, China in 
particular, and their historical evolution, and as such, it 
was not devoid of interest or merits. It can even be said 
that it established the agenda for all future discussions of 
the subject. The debate, which was rigged against the AMP 
starting in 1931, touched on such basic points as the 
Marxist legitimacy of the theory, unilinealism v 
multilinealism in history, the defining features of the AMP, 
its conceptual assimilation or incompatibility with 
feudalism, and the necessity of reconciling it with Marxist 
class theory and analysis. As far as it went, the debate 
proposed at least four basic features for the AMP: 
environmental or ecological determinism, burocratic 
despotism, the immutability of the autarkic village system, 
and economic exaction in the form of tax/rent. The issue of
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class remained undefined, but on the whole the defenders of 
AMP theory attributed to despotic burocracies the 
characteristics of a class of exploiters. The concept of 
AMP was especially controversial on two fronts: 
ideologically, because of its assumptions about Asian 
exceptionalism, and politically, because it went against the 
thesis of the progressive/nationalist front. One of the 
foremost participants in the debate— who entered into it 
through his affiliation with the Comintern— was the German 
Marxist theoretician and historian K.A.Wittfogel. It was 
Wittfogel who gave the thesis its most elaborate and 
systematic contours with the publication in 1957 of his work 
Oriental Despotism, unfortunately in the guise of an anti- 
Bolshevik Phillipic, for by then his recantation of 
Stalinism had led him to become a fanatical supporter of 
McCarthyism in the USA, Nonetheless, Wittfogel did single- 
handedly make the AMP an important subject of intra-Marxist 
discussion and his work is probably still the contemporary 
locus classicus of the thesis,
THE BLIND ALLEY OF ORIENTAL DESPOTISM
Wittfogel made the theory of the AMP his particular 
fief in various articles published from 1925 to 1962 and in 
his thick 1957 tome. In this book he asserted, first, that 
Marx committed a crime against objectivity by declining to 
develop the concept of AMP when he realized its affinity to 
his political programme, which supposedly prefigured the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, and second, Lenin and the 
Soviet state belittled and suppressed the thesis in the 
interest of Soviet legitimacy, because it constituted an 
indictment of Soviet totalitarian practices. In his large 
work on the AMP, Wittfogel brought together all the evidence 
he could find in history, anthropology, sociology, and 
politics on the characteristics and the prevalence in all 
non-Western cultures of the repressive, anti-individualist, 
and non-progressive despotic form of government. In 
Wittfogel’s vast and exhaustive summarization, the reader is 
laboriously and unflinchingly led on a journey through
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millennia of history and into the darkest cultural grottoes 
producing the deeply engraved representation of a hellish, 
tentacular, omniscient, and omnipotent monster called the
autocratic state, more powerful than society itself. The 
profligate and indiscriminate use of examples propounds the 
argument that despotism was of one piece from Cuzco to 
Samarkand, its frontiers beginning where those of Western 
Europe and its surrogates ended. This vast and multifarious 
yet curiously homogenous historico-political panorama had 
but a single cause: socially necessary, collectively-built, 
and burocratically-run hydraulic works requiring the 
efficient social disciplining of the masses. He retained 
the equivalence between burocracy and exploitative class, 
but this was only a feature in what was essentially a 
monolithic, inmutable organization. The roots of his
construct were decidedly Marxist, and Wittfogel never 
renounced his Marxist origins, but his obsessive 
concentration on a single theme, in effect, negated that 
Marxism was an instrument of integral social analysis, for 
it made most of its concepts irrelevant to the history of 
the majority of humanity. Since large-scale hydraulic works 
are hardly exclusive to Oriental autocracies, Wittfogel
claimed that the same sort of works undertaken in Europe did 
not produce the same sort of social consequences as in Asia 
because of the fragmentation of political power achieved 
under European f e u d a l i s m . T h e  waterworks motif in the 
Oriental despotism schema is indeed the weakest link in 
Wittfogel*s theoretical chain, and it in fact seems less a 
proof of the necessity and reality of Oriental despotism 
than a necessary escape hatch in order to avoid the "special 
mentality" cul-de-sac. After all, what if not some
psychological quirk could explain that tyranny flourishes in 
some lands and withers in others if a necessary explanation 
like hydraulic works fell by the wayside? The notion of 
Oriental despotism will always contain a powerful secret 
inducement to racism, which will certainly prevail if the 
only defence against it seems embarrassing and unconvincing 
as the reliance on hydraulic works often seems in Wittfogel.
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However, the weakness in the cause/effect linkage that 
Wittfogel established between hydraulic works and political 
despotism does not necessarily invalidate the individual 
elements in his analysis, and in assessing his fully 
elaborated theory it is possible to approach its two flanks 
separately.
Wittfogel's theory can be read as an explanation for 
non-Western economic backwardness in contrast to Western 
economic development, especially since it originates in 
Marx’s and Engels' attempt to explain Asiatic economic 
stagnation, but it would be distortionate to emphasize this 
aspect of it since it is primarily a political thesis about 
the origins of despotism, or as he himself called it in the 
subtitle of his major work: "A comparative study of total
power”. Therefore, since politics is its primary concern 
and since in politics lies the immediate determination of 
non-Western societies including their economic organization 
and performance, we shall start by considering the Wittfogel 
concept of despotism.
The idea fairly bristles with controversy. For one 
thing. Western history is not without its quota of despots, 
the word itself going back to the sources of Western 
civilization in ancient Greece. Wittfogel got around this 
with what in effect amounts to arguing from anomaly: if
despotism flourished in the East and not in Europe, it was 
because for some reason feudalism, which appeared in the
West but did not take root in Asia, laid the basis of 
Europe’s political liberties and in effect relegated 
despotism to exceptionality. Japan and the USSR present 
historical difficulties. If despotic pre-modernization 
Japan were anything to go by, despotism would be as
suffocating and inept at development as Wittfogel claims.
Since Japan developed from its own despotic roots with at 
most a moderate degree of external prodding, Wittfogel— and, 
obiter dicta, also P.Anderson and F.Braudel — endowed it 
with a truly feudal past. There is, however, a certain 
degree of inconsistency in this argument inasmuch as
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economic development did not do away in Japan with political 
despotism, an objection which both Anderson and Braudel 
anticipated and disarmed by ablating the concept of freedom 
from politics and fusing it entirely with the economic 
rights of private ownership and of private enterprise, while 
Wittfogel did not budge from his rigid political stance. 
How could Japan have developed under despotic political 
power both before and after industrialization? Wittfogel's 
attribution of feudal liberties to Japan seems forced and 
artificial from his premisses and definitions, the result of 
the post hoc necessity to explain its economic development 
rather than of consistent research criteria. The
explanation he gave of Japanese feudalism— that "Japan's 
irrigation agriculture was managed by local rather than by 
regional or national leaders"— would either invalidate the 
waterworks/despotism formula, or come perilously close to an 
exceptionalist, quasi-racist stance. In relation to Soviet
economic development, Wittfogel claimed that in 1917
absolutist, pre-Bolshevik Russia, which he compared
favourably to the successor communist regime, was on the 
verge of democracy after years of rapid economic
development, and that what the Bolshevik coup did was to 
bring back and perfect old despotic habits. He affirmed 
that despotism was extremely efficient at certain 
activities, like tax-collecting and the social control of 
the population of a country. Unfortunately, history tends 
to refute even these relatively unassuming propositions. 
The Ottoman tax-farming system, a prototypically despotic 
institution, was inefficient and originated in a lack of 
sufficient centralized political control. And China is a 
good example of social unity and stability only if one 
ignores its periodic political disintegrations.^^
Wittfogel was not unaware of the many historical 
inconsistencies involved in the abstract correlation between 
waterworks and despotism. In order to at least paper some of 
them over, he recurred to the idea, which can be found
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originally in Montesquieu, of the artificial (in the sense 
of not materially explicable or justified) perpetuation of 
social or political traits. According to this argument 
despotic habits acquired by a people in one environment 
could be carried to and imposed in a different environment 
by a conquering horde. This was particularly the case of 
Russian despotism, which originated not in the necessity of 
building hydraulic works but through Tatar imposition. This 
special line of reasoning was crucial to Wittfogel because 
it supported his contention that Bolshevism had adopted for 
its own ends the political system left in place by the 
Tsarist autocracy, which in turn derived from a dark and 
remote part of Russia's history. The affinity with 
Montesquieu of some of his arguments— including the 
association of despotism and nomadic peoples— reveals 
their ultimately 18th century rationaliste origin, although 
no doubt his immediate sources were Marx and Engels, but 
while their speculations on economic inequality were a 
tentative and relatively flexible adaptation of pre-19th 
century concepts in the age of capitalism's European 
apotheosis, Wittfogel's adoption and elaboration of the 
sketchy Marx/Engels thesis represented a rigid and 
unjustifiably generalizing attempt to carry the same ideas 
over into the 20th century, in order to do which he had to 
posit some dubious hypotheses about the mode of propagation 
of despotism. These hypotheses involved the perdurance and 
transference of social quirks in a manner suggesting, 
despite the ultimate appeal to the environmental causation, 
a special psychological tendency in peoples outside the 
pale of Western civilization, and this could have been 
interpreted as a reversion to some of the more suspect 19th 
century Eurocentric speculations on racism and 
polygenesis.
He was certainly not alone in denouncing Soviet 
autocracy, but from this to reducing its origins to some 
pristine Asiatic font and underestimating or neglecting 
other, perhaps more pertinent and immediate influences and
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circumstances, there is an inadmissible and vulnerable 
theoretical impulsiveness, to say the least. As we shall 
see, Braudel recurred to despotism as the final explanation 
for the failure of Oriental civilizations— specifically, 
Islam, India, and China— to reach the upper levels of 
capitalist development, but he posited despotism as such and 
did not attempt any further theoretical elaboration, 
certainly nothing like Wittfogel’s totalizing and subsuming 
vision of non-European cultures, and although this still 
leaves a blank area in Braudel's world-historical canvas—  
why was despotism so prevalent in the East? why did it not 
prosper in Europe?— , it is overshadowed by the richness of 
his total representation, in which those self same
Oriental cultures which Wittfogel relegated to absolute 
obscurantism had the potential for and showed signs of an 
incipient but eventually unavailing movement towards 
capitalism. The pretension that Wittfogel's appeal to 
despotism was at least rationally based on the determinism 
of the environment, which Braudel's is not, is invalidated 
by Wittfogel's frequent and arbitrary unmoorings of the
concept from its initial and fundamental environmental post, 
a theoretical looseness in his apparently rigorous 
correlation which comes out even more palpably in connection 
to its other flank, the one involving hydraulic works per 
se.
P.ANDERSON AND THE IMPORTANCE OF "SUPERSTRUCTURES"
On the assumption that all non-Western cultures and
civilizations were despotic and that the political system of 
despotism was configurated by the social necessity of
harnessing collective efforts to the construction and 
maintenance of agricultural waterworks, it is necessary to 
go one step further and prove that all despotic systems were 
based on the environmentally determined necessity of
hydraulic projects. Such, however, is not the case. 
Pharaonic Egypt did build some major canals— in fact, the 
extent of irrigation in modern Egypt is almost exactly what 
it was in ancient times— , but its sustenance depended on
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the natural rise and fall of the Nile and it probably 
dedicated most of its surplus and its physical energies and 
technical prowess to the edification of temples and 
monuments. Central Asia, where, both in Montesquieu and in 
Wittfogel, despotism incubated, and from where it supposedly 
spread to the Asian fringes, is notably devoid of waterworks 
and canals. The early conquering Arabs, purported
propagators of Islamic despotism, are reputed to have 
wrecked, or at least neglected, the irrigation canals that 
even the Barbarians spared in North Africa. In India, which 
was a centerpiece of the AMP for Marx and for Wittfogel, 
"centralized hydraulic agriculture" was significant neither 
for the Mauryan and the Vijayanagar empires, nor for the 
later Islamic social formations: the sultanate and the
Mughal Empire. Probably the most telling succint refutation 
of Wittfogel, in English at least, was accomplished by a 
fellow Marxist, P.Anderson, who, like Wittfogel, believes in 
the historico-political blessings of feudalism. Anderson 
found no basis in history for the waterworks-cum-despotism 
correlation. "Very crudely", he wrote, "in relation to the 
historical evidence with which they [Marx and Engels] were 
originally concerned, those countries which were marked by 
the absence of private property in land— Turkey, Persia, and 
India— never possessed any public irrigation works of 
importance, while that which possessed major irrigation 
systems— China— was vice versa marked by private property in 
land." Anderson perceived the disregard of property rights 
under Islam as a consequence of its nomadic origins, which 
also led to the "economic spoliation of agriculture: the
exact opposite of the European feudal order with its 
reliance on land both for power and wealth.
Anderson's refutation of Wittfogel was embedded in a 
theory on Western capitalist development which deserves 
mentioning for its own merits. In Anderson's view, feudalism 
as an economic system only begets more feudalism, as in 
Japan, and forward historical movement necessitates an 
impact external to the system itself. This impact.
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according to Anderson, can only proceed from the political, 
legal, and ideological superstructures: "What, then, was the 
specificity of European history which separated it so deeply 
from Japanese history, despite the common cycle which 
otherwise so closely united the two? The answer surely lies 
in the perdurable inheritance of classical antiquity." The 
instrument of this all-transforming influence— in fact, a 
product itself of it— was the absolutist centralized state, 
from which, again, Japan never benefited in the strictly 
Western sense. "The haphazard multiplicity of political 
unity in late medieval Europe", wrote Anderson, "became in 
the early modern epoch an organized and interconnected state 
system...The increase in the political sway of the royal 
state was accompanied, not by a decrease in the economic 
security of noble landowners, but by a corresponding 
increase in the general rights of private property".
Anderson's work adheres to an intellectual tradition—  
historicist, rationaliste and Marxian— in which Wittfogel 
also claims a place. When all is said and done, their 
essential shared position is that inequality is rooted in 
historical determinisms: it arises as a natural consequence 
of the economic development of capitalism but not because of 
the external economic and political repercussions of Western 
capitalist expansion. From their outlook, dependency 
theory, which affirms that the West produced under­
development in the rest of the world for its own economic 
benefit, inverts the order of things, because inequality 
already existed when Europe took the way of world expansion, 
and the proof of this lies in the possibility itself of that 
expansion. Marx and Engels, who, in the final reckoning, 
never really turned their back on their basic original 
persuasion that 19th century colonialism was ultimately 
progressive, would probably have accepted those ideas as 
fair and accurate enough. They were of a piece with the 
concept of Asiatic despotism, with which Wittfogel tried to 
go further than historical evidence allowed, but which 
Anderson, in applying a corrective to Wittfogel's excess.
-  49 -
did not disallow while preferring to concentrate, in 
connection with the general issue of disparities in economic 
development between East and West, on the beneficial social 
legacy of feudalism in conjunction with the bracing 
influence on Europe of its classical past. It can be said, 
therefore, that while Wittfogel, on the prompting of 
tentative Marxist texts, took a wrong turn into a 
theoretical blind alley, Anderson wisely cut the AMP down to 
size choosing instead the application to the question of 
inequality of a more flexible Marxist methodology based on 
the concepts of MOP and social superstructure. His emphasis 
on a specifically Western line of historical evolution can 
be considered part of a tendency of thought on intercultural 
and international inequalities that seeks primarily to 
explain the comparative reasons behind Western economic 
success while not neglecting the analysis of non-Western 
values and structures. It manifests an unmistakably but 
moderate Eurocentric attitude whose roots go back to pre- 
19th century assessments on the political significance of 
feudalism such as can be found, according to Anderson
himself, in N.Machiavelli, Francis Bacon, and Montesquieu.^2
As of the can of worms that Marx opened when he 
invented the formula AMP, it can be said of Wittfogel's 
Oriental despotism, which, on the whole, can be equated with 
AMP, that it set the cat among the Marxist pigeons.
Although some researchers tend to downplay Wittfogel's 
importance in the contemporary AMP debate, the fact is thta 
his mammoth work in comparative history preceded, in the 
West at least, most of the mainly intra-Marxist research
done on the subject. In the early 60s the French Communist 
Party spawned a brood of AMP theorists, who in turn
stimulated further discussion in the USSR itself. From this 
period, too, comes the main body of essays by the Hungarian 
F. Tokei vindicating the necessity of the AMP for a true 
understanding of history. In 1972, the Italian U.Melotti 
produced a much debated work defending multilinealism. 
There has been regular output of theoretical works in
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English since the 60s, of which we have mentioned concepts 
and arguments in Hobsbawm, Lichtheim, and Anderson, who 
placed the AMP in a wider context of historical and social 
issues. Other theorists have restricted their perspective 
to the idea of AMP itself and its place in the development 
of Marx's thinking. The principal points of debate have 
been whether or not Marx and Engels eventually repudiated 
their tentative formulation of the theory and whether it 
expresses a unilineal or multilineal approach to historical 
and social analysis. Among these writers, the consensus is 
that there was no repudiation, even when they allow that the 
theory was principally ancillary to the major concerns of 
its originators. In 1975, L.Krader did a thorough 
examination of Marx's sources for the AMP, and concluded on 
the basis of Marx's ethnological readings and notebooks that 
he had more a superficial commitment to it, but that it 
served principally to clarify his understanding and critique 
of "the political economy of capital as a whole". H.Lubasz 
ratified this approach when he wrote in 1984 that Marx's 
observations on India "are what one might call auxiliary 
statements whose purpose is to help Marx make a point about 
the capitalist, not the Asiatic, mode of production". In 
1977, M.Sawer made an appeal for the "openness of history" 
from her reading of Marx, which rejected the "quasi- 
teleological view...that world history consisted in a 
unitary process of development". In a doctoral dissertation 
published in 1989, B.O.'Leary expounded a systematic 
critique of the AMP both from histoiographical and from 
internal Marxist perspectives. He did a thorough job of 
demolishing Wittfogel's hydraulic hypothesis as it applies 
to India. However, his contention that neither Marx nor 
Engels abandoned the AMP was inferential and open to serious
questioning.23
AN IMAGINARY BUT USEFUL CONFRONTATION
According to M. Molnar, the AMP with its implication of 
historical immutability was a useful but not a necessary 
argument for Marx and Engels in their consistent view of
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colonialism as a callous but inevitable force for world 
progress. Pulling out that prop did not provoke the 
collapse of the other, wider, and more important idea. 
Lenin, who accepted the AMP theory up to a point, was 
particularly hostile to colonialism, as indeed was a strong 
current of opinion inside the Second International. In 
order to justify his position within an orthodox Marxist 
context, Lenin, always according to Molar, had to ignore the 
Marx/Engels texts, and moreover he had to affirm that "They 
had not lived long enough to fully observe the imperialist 
side of world capitalism", a demonstrably exaggerated claim 
in view of their perfectly explicit perception of the global 
nature of capitalism. Nevertheless, the Lenin view gained 
wide and forceful acceptance within Marxism, as we have seen 
in referring to opinions held by I.Habib and E.J.Hobsbawm, 
and it is, as we shall see in extenso, the cornerstone of 
dependency theory. Even if we were to consider Molnar’s 
view too extreme in the opposite direction, it would still 
be necessary to take into account that Marx's and Engels' 
critique of colonialism was halting and ethical in 
character, that is, not addressed to its transforming and 
dynamizing socio-economic impact, and this left open another 
tantalizing theoretical opening that, as in the case of the 
AMP and Wittfogel, could lead to another intellectual cul- 
de-sac. It was into this one that the British sociologist
B.Warren entered.^4
Warren was apparently a fully committed Marxist 
intellectual, who also managed to defend imperialism and to 
deny the existence of underdevelopment. In his posthumous 
and controversial Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism (1980), 
his main contention was that Marx had formulated a coherent 
theory according to which the inevitable spread of 
capitalism throughout the world by means of colonialism and 
of formal and informal imperialism represented a progressive 
movement and would in the end usher in the stage of world­
wide socialist revolution. He based his thesis mainly on 
Marx's early journalistic statements in The New York Tribune
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on the predatory but modernizing British presence in India.
He also cited other pronouncements by Marx along the same
lines, but he could not allege an actual body of theory on
economic imperialism in Marx’s works, and in fact his
dogmatic assertions rest on a glaring scantiness of sources
even in a field where each phrase from the master can be
stretched to inordinate lengths. Marx himself did not use
the word imperialism, and what later came to be known as the
Marxist theory of imperialism was an elaboration by Lenin of
J.A.Hobson’s idea that the flag follows capital, which flows
outwards when it finds obstructions in the way of its
gainful or profitable placement at home. Marx did believe,
of course, that capital sought outlets when profits fell but
he saw this as a general feature of capitalism and did not
relate it specifically to colonialism or expansionism, or at
least he did not expressly do so. There is no such a thing
as a direct or original Marxist theory of imperialism, but
on the other hand, there is a Marxist/Leninist theory of
imperialism that practically has acquired the status of
doctrine. Warren, who dissented vehemently from Lenin as
Wittfogel had from Stalinism, got around this orthodoxy by
arguing that Lenin turned his back on the pristine Marxist
doctrine for reasons of international political strategy and
later asked for and got sanction for his views from the
Comintern. What Lenin did that cleft him from Marx,
according to Warren, was that he chose to posit that
international capitalism rather than progressive or
modernizing was exploitative and retardatory. Lenin did not
actually espouse this view to the hilt, but he gave it
revolutionary bona fides and respectability. During the
20s, when communism was being blocked in Europe while
gaining adherents in Asia and Latin America, the Leninist
alternative, which from the start had been accepted by
intellectuals from economically backward countries, was
adopted and officialized for the revolution by Comintern 
25congresses.
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Despite his repetitive invoking of Marx, Warren had 
handicaps from the start in the defence of his thesis. Marx 
entertained few if any doubts on the cultural as well as on 
the material superiority of the West to the other important 
world cultures. This superiority had been possible because 
of the ripening of economic trends and forces, and the 
creation of a capitalist world market by hook or by crook 
contributed essentially to the righting of an historical 
imbalance. In that sense, and only in that sense, could 
Marx conceive of something akin to Warren's imperialism, 
and moreover, this was mostly implicit in his work. In 
brief, even if Marx's perception of colonialism had been 
unalloyed by misgivings and recriminations, which Lenin's of 
course was, it lacked the compulsive, specific economic 
motivation with which Lenin endowed late-19th century 
colonialism in transfiguring it, and capitalism as a whole 
in its alleged final phase, into imperialism. Warren seemed 
to be pushing Marx too hard in the direction of a fully 
developed theory of imperialism, in doing which he was also 
stretching too far Marx's supposed complacent attitude 
towards European colonialist expansionism. If Marx welcomed 
the capitalist world market, he could also be an implacable 
critic of colonialism and this always latent antagonism 
became more pronounced and more manifest with the passing of 
time and the intensification of colonialist pressures, which 
both Marx and Engels did live long enough to perceive.
It was once again I.Habib who took on the task of 
vindicating the anti-colonialist Marx. In the 1983 essay 
"Marx's Perception of India", he presented a convincing case 
negating the Warren version but not overly biased towards 
any specific theory of economic imperialism. Even thought 
there is no question of a deliberate confrontation, Habib 
and Warren have written as if they were aiming at each 
other, and their writings on the subject of Marx the 
imperialist and Marx the anti-colonialist can be usefully 
paired and contrasted. Warren affirms that Marx posited a 
progressive imperialism; Habib claims that Marx understood
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the imperialist nature of capitalism and that he condemned 
it as brutal, harmful, and reactionary. Habib quotes from 
Capital and from The Poverty of Philosophy, among other
Marxian sources. He also, like Warren, quotes from the
articles in The New York Tribune, but it is obvious that on 
the whole both Habib and Warren were rummaging in different 
Marxist sacks. In order to reach their conclusions, they had 
to purposefully reject each other's emphases. Who then is
right? Will the true Marx please stand up? Warren bases
his thesis on a few direct and unambiguous statements by 
Marx, but he tends to build too high on that minimal 
foundation. In order to do so he posits a once-for-all- 
times Marx, and then he has to do a lot of extrapolating on 
the strength of that static, unchanging Marx. Habib admits 
that there did exist a Eurocentric Marx who felt that 
colonialism though brutal fostered socioeconomic change, but 
he plausibly claims that Marx did not adopt Eurocentrism 
either as a banner or as a permanent intellectual attitude. 
With more material than Warren uses, Habib builds an 
evolving Marx sensitive to the implications and meanings of 
events and trends. Perhaps he cannot prove that Marx was a 
theorist of economic imperialism avant la lettre but he 
makes a good case for the idea that he was neither an ally 
of colonialism nor an unconditional believer in the 
generative powers of international capitalism. The least we 
can derive from the Habib/Warren textual confrontation is a 
healthy scepticism about the existence of a truly Marxist 
orthodoxy on the subject of economic imperialism.
THE STATISTICAL DENIAL OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT
Warren can be found even wider of the mark in the 
extrapolation of his so-called Marxist theory of imperialism 
to the post-WW2 period in specific connection to the Third 
World. To start with Warren denied the existence itself of 
underdevelopment. He took two lines of approach: one, the 
historical argument that colonialism and imperialism 
improved the over-all conditions of existence for humanity 
the world over; and two, the thesis that international
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capitalism has stimulated economic development in every 
society where it has been either adopted or implanted. To 
defend the latter proposition Warren embarked on a veritable 
statistical crusade against almost every flank and parapet 
erected by development studies in the last forty years. 
This is not necessarily proof that he is wrong, wrongheaded 
perhaps but not necessarily wrong. However, his statistical 
leger de main is self-defeating for the simple reason that 
what he specifically tried to demonstrate— that the non­
industrialized nations have been growing since WW2 at a 
faster clip than the developed capitalist nations— begs the 
issue in various ways: in admitting the statistical
functionality of the group he pretends to deny; in giving 
self-serving definitions of growth; and in using special, 
almost doctored series. In the end the reality is still 
there, for no amount of special pleading can modify the 
actual fact of the co-existence of capitalism and extreme 
underdevelopment. Warren's ultimate absurdity was his 
statement to the effect that the concept of underdevelopment 
was a product of the pseudo-Marxist theory of economic 
imperialism, concocted for strictly politico-subversive 
strategic p u r p o s e s . ^7 in point of fact, the concept of 
underdevelopment is if anything a child of a Western 
capitalist developmentalist outlook, and its implications 
are anything but revolutionary, close indeed to Warren's own 
position: that economic backwardness can be overcome, that 
it is merely an accidental historical lag, and that it can 
be made good without deviating from an essentially 
capitalist model.
The paradigmatic theory on the origins of international 
economic inequality between the contemporary developed and 
underdeveloped blocs of nations is the neo-Marxist/Leninist 
long-view theory of economic imperialism. It holds that 
underdevelopment is the direct, deliberate, and systematic 
historical result of capitalism operating on a global scale. 
No other theory besides this one, not even Marxist/Leninist 
theories prior to WW2, make such a categoric and sweeping 
statement. Basing his thesis on fragments of Marx's works.
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Warren made precisely the opposite claim: that the world
influence of the more developed Western capitalist countries 
was not retardating but stimulative of growth. Except by 
implication, there is nothing in this pertinent to an 
explanation of inequality. Since Warren, however,
proclaimed his faith in a pristine Marxist doctrine on 
expanding world-capitalism, it can be inferred that, like
the early Marx, he would have been inclined to attribute
backwardness to a combination of climate and despotism. At 
any rate, his dogged efforts to validate one arguable,
disputed, and limited side of Marx's thought, places his 
theory, in a general sense, on a very precarious footing, 
and although, as we shall see, there has occurred, in view 
of the deficiencies of dependency theory, a contemporary re- 
evaluation of Marxist MOP and class-struggle ideas which 
seems to contemplate the possibility of real capitalist 
development for the Third World, Warren's position is not 
welcome within this trend either because of its neglect of 
internal social processes in underdeveloped countries.
In closing our discussions of Wittfogel and Warren, we 
cannot refrain from wanting to emphasize how, despite the 
seeming disparity in their outlooks and approaches, they 
represent two aspects of the same Marxist construct and they 
are, therefore, closer to each other than they are 
individually to Marx, who proposed that construct with all 
the doubts and reservations in the world. The conceptual
and programmatic complementarity between the AMP and the 
transforming effects of Western expansion, like historical 
forces inevitably bound to confront each other, one timeless 
and immutable, the other dynamic and iconoclastic, presented 
two distinct avenues of research for these two authors, 
although in following them at different times and 
independently of one another they were never very far apart 
from each other, and what is really most crucial, the 
enticing vistas that attracted them were reduced at the end 
to what we have described as intellectual or ideological 
blind alleys. Both are zealous, and overzealous, Marxists, 
who fished in the same Marxist waters. Both have a driving
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sense of the virtues of Western ways. Both finally sinned 
through excess: Wittfogel by making too much of the Idea of 
despotism; Warren by unduly Idealizing the process of world 
capitalist expansion. Would It have made any difference If, 
rather than Oriental despotism and colonlallsm/lmperlallsm 
by themselves, these concepts had been taken up and used as 
Inseparable halves of one Integral historical vision? Marx
and Engels renounced this scheme. Others have found Its
Individual parts much too rough-cast to be able to assemble 
them smoothly. It does not do, however, to underrate
Wittfogel and Warren excessively. Political despotism has
been resurrected In recent research— perhaps also less 
politically prejudiced research than Wittfogel*s— as the 
only viable explanation of non-Western economic stagnation. 
And Marxists today are going back to the Idea that 
capitalism, devoid of Imperialist Intentlonallty, may Indeed 
be Inching towards the full Industrialization of backward 
lands. Therefore, It could be put, as a sort of Indulgent 
envoi to these authors, that they erred not In falsifying 
but In distorting reality.
TOYNBEE » S CKALLENGE-AND-RESPONSE
Up to well Into the 19th century, the geographic 
context of speculations on Inequality In the West was not, 
as today, the division of the world Into two blocs of 
nations, one developed, one underdeveloped, but a small 
group of different higher cultures with the West on a 
pedestal amongst them. The Integration of the world by 
Western capitalist forces did not, of course, effect an 
Instantaneous transformation of the political and cultural 
diversity of mankind, but It did propagate Ideas, values, 
and habits, and It did put In place the means for 
modernization and for Its further spread. Some traditional 
political and economic structures that functioned only In 
the context of non-Western cultures became obsolete or 
obsolescent as a result of world Integration. Despotism as a 
qulntessentlally non-Western political system retreated to 
the degree that Imperialism either Imposed Its own one-sided 
rule or was responsible for Indirect change In other
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countries. The adoption of Western practices and values did 
not mean the sudden suppression of despotic habits, but it 
modified them and tended to put them into a sine die legal 
limbo. In general, cultural relativism, or the Western 
acceptance of exotic customs and values as embodying a valid 
logic of their own, suffered grevious damage at the hands of 
Western world hegemony during the 19th century. These 
practical and intellectual trends were inevitably also 
damaging to the pre-19th century ideas on which Western 
thought had built its explanations and rationalizations of 
cultural differences and inequalities. Some of those 
concepts, like the ones that went into the Marxist 
formulation of the AMP, survived into the 20th century but 
mostly as relicts: the dying gasps of exhausted, wheezing 
analytical apparati. Although the direct and unadorned 
notion of despotic political power has been making a 
theoretical comeback, its more problematic juxtaposition to 
hydraulic works has been discredited. The multifarious 
group of theories on environmental influence that had
prevailed since the beginning of Greek classical thought, 
ceased to matter much during the 19th century, at least in 
their old physiological and cultural versions, as a result 
of Western intercultural ascendancy and of progress in the 
biological sciences. Nevertheless, of all the pre-19th 
century concepts used in the West in dealing with other 
cultures, the one idea that has retained a dogged,
polymorphous validity is that human behaviour has somehow to 
do with the place and the climate in which people live.
Closer to contemporary perceptions than the dubious 
arguments in Montesquieu is the cultural role of the 
environment in A.Toynbee's A Study of History, It is 
defined by the formula challenge-and-reponse, and although 
this is not entirely original— for what it does is reiterate 
the very old notion that cushy environments make for
decadence and hardscrabble ones for toughness— in the
flexible, probing Toynbeean grip it uncovers a plethora of 
examples and illustrations. In the end, though, what 
emerges is not the historical demonstration that
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environmental theory was lacking but a reaffirmation, after 
the long Eurocentric interlude, of cultural relativism, 
almost though not quite as it was practiced by the 
Encyclopedists, because the planet that Toynbee knew was in 
general more homogeneous, more integrated than before, 
closer to the notion of one world, and at the same time, 
more diverse, its corners and pockets less obscure and 
remote. Relativism had been a product of ignorance. It was 
rejected by and large by the West, whose espousal of it was 
never quite unreserved, as soon as it had demonstrated its 
own superiority over all other cultures. As Toynbee applied 
it (and it was a crucial aspect of his historical approach), 
relativism was post-Eurocentric. It was affirmed in the 
face of evident economic backwardness and on the basis of 
hard-to-define, non-material values. For our purposes, 
however, precisely because of his universal outlook, Toynbee 
has nothing to say on the origins of international or even 
intercultural inequality.^8 
THE COMEBACK OF ENVIRONMENTAL THEORY
Challenge-and-response need not be taken only in a 
context in which civilizations and high cultures form the 
irreducible units, the atoms themselves of history. In 
fact, it seems to be part of the general awareness that 
theorists on underdevelopment have that environmental 
influences are crucial in their field. The impartial and 
equable P.Bairoch had to fall back on climate in order to 
explain the origins of the "écart des niveaux de 
développement". Guy de Bosschere partly attributed
underdevelopment to "climats excessifs". The ultimate cause 
lay in what he called "la chevauchee aryenne", which 
parcelled the globe and the climates amongst the peoples and 
determined the eventual separation between the rich and the 
poor nations. More specifically, though less explicitly, 
Bosschere was claiming that the white races started making 
the world their own when they swept into and settled in the 
European extension of the Asian land mass.^9 He was not 
alone in claiming that the foundations of inequality were 
laid long before written history began, in the fate-ridden.
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unknowable, and probably fortuitous process by which the 
earth was originally shared out, but most speculation on 
climate has more immediate concerns. What A.K,Biswas called 
the "correlation" between climate and development has been 
made time and again by development economists. 
J.K.Galbraith did so in a 1951 article titled "Conditions 
for Economic Change in Underdeveloped Countries".
C.P.Kindleberger succinctly expressed it in Economic 
Development (1965). K. F. Boulding wrote in 1970: 
"Development, like Economics, has been very largely a 
Temperate Zone product". P.Streeten and C.Myrdal have both 
made the connection between climate and economic activity. 
The former in particular presented a book by A.M.Kamarck 
which makes explicit some of the crucial specific effects of 
the tropical climate on economic development: "Compared to
the Temperate Zones, there are certain effects of the 
Tropical climate that, up to the present, hinder 
agriculture, handicap mineral exploration, and make the 
population less vigorous through disease and, possibly, 
through the direct physiological impact of temperature and 
humidity". Kamarck states significantly: "The effects of 
Tropical climate are not absolute obstacles to economic 
development, but they do make many of the problems of 
economic development in the Tropics sufficiently different 
from those in the Temperate Zone countries so that an 
additional hurdle has to be overcome and, consequently, all 
other relevant factors being equal, the pace of development 
in Tropical countries tends to be slower".^0
The implications of these ideas are vaguely 
deterministic. P.A.Baran posited the notion that the 
environment merely retards development in a manner roughly 
analogous to the effects of the balance in a watch 
mechanism. In Baran the environment both explained 
underdevelopment and was a denial of its existence. It was 
the ultimate explanation of why the West surpassed all other 
cultures, but since its effects were retardating and not 
permanently handicapping, as some environmental theories 
would have it, development was inevitable everywhere and the
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persistence of underdevelopment could be explained only as a 
result of economic i m p e r i a l i s m , Climate theory is a vast 
non-specific awareness and claim, Biswas tried to pinpoint 
the influence of climate through a development strategy 
centered on agriculture. Implicit here was a theory of the 
purest environmental tenor. Its main contentions were that 
farming is fundamental to development and, obviously enough, 
decisively influenced by climate. Always as contributing to 
a development strategy, but giving support to environmental 
theory as well, Biswas handled figures and arguments showing 
the adverse influence of tropical climates on soil 
management, pest control, and human labour. He did not 
specifically trace underdevelopment and inequality to the 
environment, but the inference is inescapable.
We shall return to climate because we have only used 
these references to illustrate briefly the full circle of 
environmental theory from its robust Greek beginnings 
through its diverse and honest Western avatars to its racist 
Eurocentric misuse and finally back to its groping, 
tentative rebirth as a last resort explanation of the 
origins of underdevelopment and international economic 
inequality. Climate theory began as a human response to 
foreigness and diversity, and it fulfilled this role 
diligently up to the 18th century. When the perception of 
differences gave way to the superior/inferior dichotomy, 
climate was employed to support Western racism and cultural 
prejudices. Climate theory fell into disrepute amongst 
"Westerners" as amongst radicals and Marxists, Eventually 
however climate resurfaced on the strength of its 
theoretical legitimacy but it did so by allowing itself only 
very cautious generalizations and by eschewing a commitment 
to specific physiological explanations. Is climate theory 
then correct as the final instance on the issue of the 
origins of international inequality? To come out and say so 
without having explored other avenues would be overbold and 
prejudicial, but we can point out that the contemporary 
writers on underdevelopment who make use of the concept of 
the environmental influence on economic development do so as
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an ancillary, almost philosophical complement, and not as an 
end In Itself In their researches, with significant 
exceptions such as Kamarck, or the economic historian 
E.L,Jones, whose Ideas we shall discuss further on. 
Nevertheless, when climate does come up Its Implications 
belle the casual or even subordinate manner In which It 
tends to be put In context. Climate, In brief. Is In some 
manner related to Inequality, but It can be an awkward 
associate In an era of boundless faith In bounding 
technology. The environment today from a certain angle 
seems like a trifling manageable quantity, and yet It Is the 
environment that still scythes through communities and 
nations with a devastating force that Is a reminder of Its 
underlying empire, as when London built a barrier to stem 
flooding tides from the North Sea only to be hit by an 
unexpected hurricane from the south four years later. A 
more telluric perspective would have to admit that man's 
historical fate has always been bound to the environment, 
which to a considerable degree still remains attached to 
him, exerting Its forces pitilessly on him.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST REACTION AND THE MARXIST PRE-EMPTION OF 
ECONOMIC-IMPERIALISM THEORY
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The history of 19th century European economic and 
military expansion and conquest has an In crescendo quality 
that Is not easy to reconcile with Llttle-England and other 
theories about respites In the advance of colonialism. It 
Is this observable fact that makes Lenin's claim concerning 
Marx's and Engels' relative Ignorance of Imperialism seem 
rather limp, aside, of course, from the overwhelming textual 
evidence that, far from not being aware of European 
expansionism, they used this tendency as a recurrent motif 
In their writings on politics and on history. It was In 
fact Inescapable even In Marx's cold sober economic 
analyses, such as those In Capital. a work In which colonial 
Issues from the start of colonialism and onwards come up 
time and again to Illustrate technical arguments. Even 
though It Is true that after 1880 there was an Indisputable 
Intensification of colonialism coincident with a growth of 
nationalist tendencies In the major European powers. It Is 
not easy to find a lack of Ideological continuity In the 
history of European 19th century colonialism. For example, 
the altruistic "white man's burden" motif had never been 
absent from the literature of colonialism. In one way or 
another, before and after 1880, the violence of colonialist 
conquest always submitted to the gloss of world unification 
or of human progress or of some such fragile Idealization. 
However, the scramble for colonies In the late decades of 
the 19th century had produced Incidents and confrontations 
between powers and this presaged war, which 111 fitted 
anyone's definition of Idealism even If It was Itself a 
social Darwinist paradigm.
The Idea of the Inevitability of International rivalry 
and struggle led to the doctrine that has been dubbed social 
Imperialism, a phrase first used by the Marxist K. Renner In 
1919 although It applies to positions and Ideas that were 
very much In vogue In Western Europe from the 1880s onwards. 
Social Imperialism, which did away with the Idealistic and 
humanitarian jargon of colonialism and colonialist 
Imperialism, had as Its manifest Immediate objective the
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harnessing of mass support in the advanced capitalist powers 
to the cause of colonialist expansion and inter-imperialist 
contentiousness. The distinction is frequently made between 
social imperialism in an empire-building power like Germany 
and in a power like Great Britain with an already built-up 
empire: in the first, social imperialism, relying on social 
reform, funnelled national energies towards colonial 
acquisitions; in the second, it promoted belated social 
reforms in the métropole and high tariff walls all around 
the empire to confront the challenges to its existing 
position. The interwoven strands of social Darwinism and 
social imperialism can be observed in a writer like 
K.Pearson, for whom international struggle was the fons et 
origo of social reform and of a programme of applied 
Eugenics. For both forms of social imperialism, one of the 
crucial ideas was that colonies existed for the benefit of 
the imperialist centre rather than being in some degree the 
object of metropolitan care and concern. It was also a 
proclamation to the effect that the world at large— powers 
like the USA and Japan excepted— was to be the battleground 
of the European empires. Given the bluntness of its 
approach, social imperialism could never become the official 
state policy of any European power; it was a purely 
intellectual proposition. It became, however, politically 
influential, and it is probably no mere coincidence that it 
was at the height of the social imperialist movement in 
England that the theory of economic imperialism was launched 
by the liberal politician and author J.A. Hobson.^2
THE FOUNTAINHEAD OF ANTI-IMPERIALISM
Hobson's theory was expounded in his 1902 book 
Imperialism: A Study. His choice of title had to do with 
the fact that imperialism was the appellation that at the 
time was being given to rampant European colonialism all 
over the world, but it also signified that he wanted to 
attack not just colonialism but the whole complex of pseudo­
scientific ideas and cultural prejudices which underlay the 
imperialist project. Among other targets, for instance, he
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gave "biological imperialism" a prominent place in his 
polemic. But he muddled things somewhat by accepting the 
distinction, current in the 19th century, between 
imperialism and colonization. The latter term applied to 
such cases as the British colonies of settlement, which were 
considered legitimate expressions of nationality, whereas 
imperialism was the conquest of countries that had nothing 
in common with the imperialist power. He further 
complicated matters by also accepting the Eurocentric 
colonialist argument that certain very backward colonies 
could be legitimately held by their conquerors in a sort of 
humanitarian trusteeship. What these unnecessary
distinctions and qualifications did was to confuse the 
general issue of colonialism, its origins, history, and 
motivations, because he did not explore the continuities 
between the past of European overseas expansion and the 
imperialist present that he observed, a historical 
likelihood that he at least contemplated. Even if his 
perception of the special character of the self-governing 
white British colonies was justified, he was quite 
nonchalant and even sloppy in his general approach to the 
complicated and historically far-reaching issue of 
colonialism. His critical appraisal of imperialism applied 
specifically to colonialism of the late 19th-century 
variety, yet he decried British colonialist policy in India 
long before the appearance of what he called imperialism, 
and despite the obvious affinity between these two views, he 
seems not to have been tempted to exert a synthesizing or 
organizing intellectual effort on them. Likewise, it never 
dawned on him that if his critique of the British 
destruction of handicraft industry in India was valid, there 
was as well the possibility that analogous acts of cultural 
and economic depredation could have been committed in the 
case of Africa. In the end, however, it must be recognized 
that these were side issues for him and that his main 
contention was centred foursquare on the way the British 
capitalist economy functioned. Hobson's Imperialism, when 
all is said and done, was less about international
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inequalities than about social injustice at home, and 
perhaps the fact that this was his fundamental concern 
allowed him to disavow in 1938 a thesis which had so epochal 
and long-lasting intellectual consequences.^3
Hobson made the following fundamental claims. He 
reasoned that the unequal distribution of national wealth 
led to oversaving, which in turn resulted in overproduction 
inasmuch as workers were not being paid enough wages to 
permit a levelling out of supply and demand. Oversaving and 
overproduction together in one country created the necessity 
for foreign outlets, but since all advanced capitalist 
powers were in the same economic situation, the pressure of 
competing for external capital and consumer markets 
contributed decisively to the development of the political 
will for the acquisition of colonies which would function as 
the exclusive economic preserves of each imperialist 
power. This meant that imperialism was motivated by the 
capitalist pursuit of economic gain and that capitalism in 
each advanced nation employed politico-military means to 
ensure its profits. Behind this reasoning lay the notion—  
first suggested by A. Smith and later consecrated as a 
fundamental idea of political economy by an uninterrupted 
line of thinkers from Malthus to Marx— that over a period of 
time the rate of profits tended to decline, though generally 
not the absolute mass of profit, which thus created a 
problem of realization or investment. The culmination of 
the imperialist process was the conquest of overseas 
territories. Hobson used as historical examples the Boer 
War and the scramble for Africa. The latter was the sharing 
out of black tropical Africa amongst the imperialist powers, 
including tiny and backward Portugal, which was a dead 
giveaway on some of the historical and operational flaws of 
his thesis: Portugal's claims on empire long anteceded the 
imperialist grab and could not be easily accounted for in 
terms of internal capitalist pressures, and even less as a 
sign of British imperialist benevolence towards an old and 
weak ally if imperialism was being moved by capitalist
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cupidity. In judging Hobson's anti-imperialist stance it 
must be emphasized that he did not propose a wholesale 
condemnation of colonialism, although it has to be 
recognized that he was sensitive and sensible enough to 
condemn imperialism wherever it did more harm than good, as 
he saw it. He did not use British India to shore up his 
main arguments— which in effect put India out of the reach 
of the early, topical theory of economic imperialism, with 
important theoretical and ideological implications— , but he 
did blame colonialism for disrupting the potential for
development of its traditional economic foundations. He was 
not concerned with what we know today as underdevelopment, 
nor was he particularly interested in the origins of 
inequality. He attributed the differences in development to 
the environment without elaborating. He certainly did not 
blame economic backwardness generally on imperialism. But 
he did a sound solidly British job of debunking the hollow 
talk about the duties of civilization to the benighted
natives of the colonies. In a manner of speaking, what he 
said was: "Social imperialism is perfectly right, so let's 
one and all off with our masks and stop the cant!"^^
THE TWO SIDES OF HOBSON'S THESIS
There are at least two basic sides to Hobson's theory:
one is its humanitarian anti-colonialism and the other, the
logical, well-articulated connection that he established 
between economics and imperialism. There was nothing really 
novel about either proposition, and Hobson's prestige and 
influence have probably more than anything else to do with 
the way he combined them and with the sort of statistical 
and documentary support he proposed. On the issue of the 
colonies, there had always been in Great Britain a strong 
opposition movement with a powerful if not always pervasive 
moral component. After the 1830s, the little England 
liberals, led by J. Cobden and J. Bright, went foursquare 
against empire as a syphon of labour and capital needed at 
home. Cobden's main argument was that since empire could 
not pay for itself, it should be let go rather than be
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allowed to become an economic burden on the mother country. 
For this he was taxed with parochialism and petitesse 
d'esprit by the eulogists of the glories of empire-building. 
It must be said, however, that there were also humanitarian 
considerations associated with Cobden's views— notably its 
affiliation to the anti-slavery movement— , so that in spite 
of the overwhelming jingoist attacks against it, the anti­
colonialist critique never really lost the moral high 
ground, and over the decades, even as colonialist 
imperialism prospered, anti-colonialism itself gained 
momentum becoming particularly strong towards the end of the 
c e n t u r y . 35 Hobson's own critique was prefigured in all its 
parts by the socialist press of the times.
The other side to his theory, the connection between 
economics and imperial expansion and conquest, has an even 
older, in fact an ancient lineage. It had been adumbrated 
in Classical Greece and certainly by the time of the 
Cromwellian Navigation Act of 1651 colonies were 
forthrightly envisioned as strictly economic entities at the 
disposal of the métropole, which was really not much 
different from Spanish colonialist policy in America despite 
the often unctuous tone of the Leyes de Indies. In the
early 19th century the political economist E.G. Wakefield 
defended the convenience of transferring both money and 
populations from the home countries to the colonies as 
reciprocally beneficial. Wakefield belonged to the group of 
theoreticians who believed that a capitalist economy tended 
to produce excess capital. He went them one better in 
proposing that this excess could more profitably be invested
in colonies of settlement, and from this to applying the
same criteria to colonies of conquest the only thing that 
stood in the way was the quasi-semantical distinction 
between colonization and colonialism. Wakefield had the 
support of J.S. Mill, who in turn sympathized with Malthus' 
demographic catastrophism and impugned J.B. Say's theory of 
recurring equilibria in economic life. In Germany, the 
nationalist neo-mercantilist F. List expressed in 1841 the
—  70 —
Idea that colonies had a strictly economic function for the 
growth and greatness of the colonialist power. List also 
defined colonialism as the export of manufactured goods in 
exchange for raw materials, which was standard mercantilist
doctrine but as well as one of the basic definitions in
today’s dependency theory. In France, Leroy-Beaulieu, 
taking a cue from the Wakefield school, proposed colonies as 
logical and natural repositories of metropolitan capitals. 
His countryman J. Ferry conceived of colonies as necessary 
outlets for metropolitan production.Even though most of 
these theorists walked a thin line between economic 
expansionism as reality and as doctrine, between "what is" 
and "what should be", the net impression from them is that 
one can not separate colonialism from economic interests and 
considerations.
Hobson had already worked out the essential line of 
reasoning for his thesis in a series of articles which 
appeared from 1898 to 1902.^7 By then, however, the basic 
arguments were well-known. In 1890 the Socialist W. Morris 
had correlated "the appetite of the World-Market" with 
colonial expansion. B. Porter considers that Morris was in 
fact reiterating old arguments: "For years it had been the 
unblushing assertion of capitalists and traders, accepted 
and implemented by governments, that the 'flag* should be 
used in the service of commerce. Both had persistently 
stressed the necessity of finding new markets for British 
manufactures and new fields for investment." E.B.Bax wrote
in 1899, in the Socialist journal Justice, that "the one
hope of prolonging the existence of the present capitalist 
system lies in the opening up of new territories to 
commercial and industrial enterprise, in other words, in the 
extension of the world market and the acquirement of fresh 
sources of cheap labour", and therefore "it is a thing of 
vital importance to the early realization of socialism to 
stem the tide of annexation and colonial expansion without 
delay". According to Porter, "The theory was less 
sophisticated than the one J.A. Hobson was to develop a
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little later: it confined its attention to commercial
capitalism (not financial), and it was never worked out by 
Bax in any great detail." A similar call was emitted by the 
International Socialist Congress which met in Paris in 1900. 
In America C.A. Conant, among others, invoked in 1898 the 
surplus capital idea as the source of imperialist expansion. 
He was quoted by A. Thompson in the Socialist magazine 
Clarion. Porter perceives the influence of Marx over 
British socialist thinking on imperialism in two concepts: 
in the overproduction of capital and in capitalism's need to 
exhaust all possible means of surviving, which clearly 
pointed to imperialist expansion, although Marx had not made 
that specific connection.
THE PATTERNS OF COLONIALISM
Hobson had striven to demonstrate his thesis on the 
basis of a few examples of imperialist expansion, paramount 
among which was the manipulative and obviously economically 
motivated British aggression in South Africa. His original 
paradigm was the big-power China grab in the wake of the 
Japanese defeat of China in 1895, which also had self-
evident economic causes. On another tack, Hobson correlated 
statistics on capital outflows from Great Britain with the 
measurable growth of empire in terms of area and
populations. From the series he used, roughly from 1860 to 
1890, it has been supposed that he referred to the period 
embracing what was known as the scramble for A f r i c a . ^ 9
However, his theory eventually has had to withstand the test 
of the entire history of 19th century colonialism, and in 
fact it has been made extensive in radical contemporary 
versions all the way back to the start of European 
colonialism. This means that in effect there are two
theories of economic imperialism: one, the special theory 
that Hobson formulated, on which V.I. Lenin directly 
patterned his, and two, the general theory, which echoes 
parts of Lenin's distantly, and which went through the 
Comintern phase before being elaborated in its original and 
general form by P.A. Baran. We shall see gradually how
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Hobson’s theory mushroomed to the vast intellectual 
dimensions it has, including such forms as "world-system 
analysis". But in all propriety, it would seem as if Hobson 
should not be judged except within the confines of his own 
historical and geographical claims. On the other hand, 
since European expansion the world over, starting with the 
Portuguese exploration of the West African coast and the 
Spanish discovery of America during the 15th century, is all 
part of the same historical continuity up to the Boer War 
and beyond, if we think of it at least in terms of 
intercultural relations and confrontations, it would be 
helpful, before proceeding to examine the critiques of the 
specific Hobsonian thesis, to cast a sidelong glance at its 
possible correlation with the long and complex history of 
European expansionism.
A summary consideration of the latter reveals the 
emergence of at least four historical patterns of overseas 
colonialism: the commercial outpost or entrepot; the
Iberian, English, and French colonies of conquest and 
settlement in America; the plantation colonies; and the 
Indian colonialist pattern of gradual penetration from a 
peripheral foothold. Dutch Cape Colony and the British 
colonies of settlement in the South Seas can be reasonably 
considered to have been variants on the earlier settlements 
in America. These patterns demarcate overlapping periods in 
the history of colonialism up to 1870. The first warehouses 
or trading ports were founded during the 15th century, but 
they became the prevailing form of European colonialism in 
Asia until at least the mid-18th century, when Great Britain 
initiated the consolidation of her Indian possessions and in 
the process made herself the foremost power in the 
subcontinent. They were also the basic form of the European 
presence in Africa. The second period of colonial history 
is defined by the establishment of the Iberian and the 
English settlement colonies in the new World during the 16th 
and 17th centuries. The third period started with the 
Anglo-French rivalry for plantation colonies during the War
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of Spanish Succession (1700-1713) and culminated with the 
definite imposition of British ascendancy in India during 
the Seven Years War. Between 1775 and 1825 there was a wave 
of decolonization in America. During part of this period, 
the Napoleonic wars monopolized the attention and the 
efforts of all the European powers. After 1815, colonialism 
started anew and carried on to the end of the century but in 
two waves: during the first, the less rapid phase, variants 
on the Anglo-Indian pattern were applied in Africa and Asia, 
with Britain at the head and France a rather distant second; 
and the second, the rapid phase, was basically the scramble 
for Africa after 1870, during which a new pattern of 
colonialism appears. Even though there is not much 
controversy concerning the underlying economic motivation of 
European expansion overseas from its beginnings in the 15th 
century, the question concerning Hobson’s theory of economic 
imperialism really is how extensive it can be made to those 
historical patterns and stages without falsifying its 
import. Hobson was very specific in his formulations and 
this has been the cause of both their prestige and their 
vulnerability. It is one thing to try to prove with fresh 
and relatively reliable figures that the flag travels in the 
hands of Mammon; it is another to make the same assertion 
for colonial entreprise since Da Gama landed in Malabar. 
However, if one interprets Hobson as wanting to say that in 
a general sense individual and collective economic gain is a 
more potent motivation than politics or religion, or that it 
takes precedence over policy and over missionary zeal, then 
a case can certainly be made for a Hobsonian rendering of 
colonial history. All you need to do is command a 
sufficiently impressive array of facts and they are there 
for the picking.
The entrepot and the plantation were both strictly 
commercial in nature. The Portuguese and Spanish colonies 
in America were milked for taxes, profits, and raw 
materials. British America rebelled over taxes and 
commercial impositions it had not sanctioned. British India
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started as the East India Company, a joint-stock company 
definitely chartered in 1657 that prospered as long as it 
could set commercial policy for India. It gave up its 
rather shadowy control in 1857, but by the end of the 
century it was being claimed that the raj— the British 
Indian administration that had officially taken over from 
the East India Company— had been draining India of a yearly 
fortune for services the country hardly needed. In fact, 
the distinction between one British Indian administration 
and another was phantasmagorical, and the proponents of
"drain theory” were not inclined to accept it: under either 
regime, they said. Great Britain blocked Indian development, 
squeezed imports from India— which were "balanced" through 
the imposition of a common sterling-based monetary system— , 
extracted revenues, interest, and transfer payments, and
produced misery and famines. One limp response to these
charges was simply to deny them on the surmise that the 
traditional sector of the Indian economy had benefited from 
economic growth in its margins. According to I. Habib, this 
was tantamount to claiming that Indian living conditions 
under the raj were not so bad because they had not
appreciably deteriorated since Moghul times.^0
Another questionable distinction whose critique also 
points to the primacy of the economic motivation behind 
colonialism is that between the "old" and the "new" British 
colonial empires. It is predicated by K.E. Knorr on the 
parallel changes from mercantilism to economic liberalism 
and from political liberalism to strict, even despotic, 
political control, which became effective after the American 
War of Independence. However, this distinction can be made 
to stick only if British India is excised from the 
historical picture, and this can only be sustained on the 
fiction of an East India Company operating autonomously from 
British government control or interest. In fact, the only 
real change from one empire to another was the loss of the 
Atlantic seabord colonies of North America, whose bonds with 
Britain were significantly economic but mainly ethnic and
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political, and the strongest liens that go from one of those 
purported empires to the other, best exemplified by the 
British colonialist connection with India, were economic in 
nature. The economic bonds held true while the ethnic and 
political bonds were burst asunder in these historical 
cases. It would not be amiss to conclude on this issue that 
the empire held because Britain had the will and the 
strength to make it hold and that underlying these, 
regardless of political and policy changes, were strong 
economic liens and economic interests ultimately emanating 
in Britain.41
THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA
But if the bland general reading of Hobson poses few 
difficulties, such is not the case with the specific theory, 
which he strapped to a stern programme of proof and 
verification, and which therefore can not be carried without 
many qualifications beyond the limits he himself put on it. 
The rapid phase of European colonial expansion during the 
19th century, to which the thesis specifically applies, 
started by Hobson's reckoning around 1870. Objectively, at 
least two political trends were evident: one, empires
expanded dramatically in a short period of time; and two, 
imperialist governments seemed to take a more active, more 
direct role in the process of expansion. Hobson's 
explanation for this was that capitalist interests, both 
commercial and manufacturing, wanted imperial outlets and 
could make governments do their bidding. Populated, semi­
populated and even empty territories were reconoitered and 
acquired as colonies in lightning marches or campaigns. The 
military led the way, although they may have come after the 
trader or the missionary. The colonializers webbed out from 
enclaves to embrace as much territory as they could before 
encountering other European occupation or serious resistance 
of any kind. The French were very nimble at this sort of 
thing but they were also frequently checked. They were 
checked by the existence of Morocco during the conquest of 
Algeria in the 1840s and they were contained by the British
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in their dash to the Sudan in 1898. The Germans occupied 
Tanganyka in 1885 as far south as British and Portuguese 
zones of influence or occupation, north to British East 
Africa, and west to Leopoldine commercial occupation in the 
Congo. The Italians started from Eritrea and were actually 
defeated and contained by the Ethiopians in 1896. This 
pattern of colonialism differs from all the others we have
defined. The new, late-19th century colonies may have
started in many cases as entrepots but that is the only 
characteristic they retained from other colonial epochs. 
They were not settlement colonies and were never meant to 
be. They were not planations though they later in some
cases became one-crop economies. The analogy with India
only extended really to the entrepot origins of both, and 
they differed significantly in the speed and the mechanics 
of conquest: it took centuries to conquer India; the
scramble for Africa was over before 1900. British India 
grew by fits and starts depending on international 
conditions, on British home policies, on political 
opportunities, on strict commercial considerations, and also 
on man-on-the-spot initiatives. African empires grew in one 
fell swoop at one specific lapse of time and mainly either 
by political decision or with the active consent of policy. 
How does Hobson's theory stand up to the reality of the 
scramble for Africa? We shall consider first the 
alternative political theses and then the cliometric 
critiques of the theory.
We have used the reference date of 1870 as a kind of 
demarcation in the 19th century history of world 
colonialism. In fact that date is as controvertible as are 
the implications of the period which followed it. It was 
Hobson in his treatise on imperialism who used it as a 
convenient watershed for his statistical arguments, but in 
essence what he wanted to indicate was that after that 
approximate date it became apparent that there had been an 
increase in the colonialist activities of the European 
powers. That activity was generally called imperialism, and
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Hobson's interest lay in finding an explanation for it. 
What he thought he found was a ratio between a general trend 
of capitalism and the growth of colonial empires, and in 
particular, of the British overseas empire. In fact to him 
the exact date of the accelerated phase of colonialism was 
probably immaterial as long as it could be said that the 
phase existed. The date he singled out does have some 
outside support but most historians have contested it. 
R.Robinson and J.Gallagher consider the crucial events to 
have been the first Suez crisis and the British occupation 
of Egypt (1882) because of the consequences that derived 
from them. D.K. Fieldhouse prefers 1884, the year of 
"Bismarck's sudden claim for German colonies", in fact when 
Germany initiated the occupation of African territories. W. 
Baumgart did a comprehensive discussion of the issue. He 
starts by saying that at one time it had been generally 
agreed that the age of classical or modern imperialism began 
about 1880: "At the time [of the events in question],
however, the year 1885 was regarded as the starting point. 
That was the year the Berlin Congo conference ended, and the 
'scramble for Africa' supposedly got under way." He cites 
the authority of Lord Salisbury, who said that he found the 
European powers at loggerheads over Africa on his return to 
power in 1885. Baumgart also quotes K. Nkrumah as 
expressing the general opinion that "the original carve-up 
of Africa (was) arranged at the Berlin Conference of 1884". 
However, the emphasis has shifted: "Historians today have
concluded that this notion is incorrect. At first they set 
the year 1882 as the starting point of the scramble, citing 
the occupation of Egypt in July of that year, and the 
ratification of the Brazza-Makoto treaty by France in 
November of the same year, which touched off the struggle 
for the Congo. More recently the date has been revised 
backward by another three years to 1879 when the rivalry 
between Britain and France became especially intense in West 
Africa. Even those historians who see imperialism rooted in 
economic and social causes will agree on the years 1879-1882 
as the terminus a quo, because that was when they believe
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the European powers felt compelled to acquire colonies as an 
antidote for domestic and economic problems."^2 But 
whatever the exact date for the start of the European 
scramble for African territory, three Inferences are 
possible from the historians' discussion alluded to here: 1) 
that the accelerated phase of late-19th century colonialism 
probably began around or after 1880, 2) that since most of 
the lands acquired In Africa by the European colonialist 
powers after that date were hardly In a condition to start 
producing Immediate economic benefits, there must have been 
other than economic motivations behind their acquisition, 
and 3) that the latter conclusion Is supported by the 
historians mentioned, among other reasons, because when a 
specific date Is Identified for the Initiation of a 
historical process, the Implication In the nature of things 
Is that politics, which means deliberation and decision- 
taking, Is the underlying predominant force. Since the 
Gallagher/Robinson analysis of British rapld-phase 
colonialism Is possibly the most elaborate and consistent 
one ever attempted In view of Its consideration of all or 
most surrounding Issues and Its concentration on a concrete 
and likely explanation, let us have a look at Its date of 
1882 and at Its explicitly political explanation.
GALLAGHER AND ROBINSON
It Is well known that these authors believe that Great 
Britain's colonial policy during most of the 19th century 
was one of moderate expansion preferably through Informal 
Imperialism, which refers to all the means of keeping less 
developed nations docile to free trade and to Western 
financial practices short of outright military Intervention. 
All of this changed because of the Ottoman Inability to 
exercise adequate sovereignty In Egypt and supposedly to 
safeguard operations In the Suez canal, Britain's vital 
link with the Indian Ocean and the bulk of her empire. As a 
result, and without the hard-to-get cooperation of France, 
Whitehall unilaterally decided the occupation of Egypt In 
the hope that It would be lenient, beneficent, and short­
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lived. In the event, one thing led to another and from 
Egypt Britain went into the Sudan and France into Madagascar 
as compensation for the Sudan, and the division of West 
Africa entered the rapid phase, and so on and so forth. 
"Without the occupation of Egypt, there is no reason to 
suppose that any international scramble for Africa, either 
west or east, would have begun when they did. There seems 
to have been no fresh social or economic impulses for 
imperial expansion which would explain why the partition of 
tropical Africa should have begun in the early Eighteen- 
eighties", conclude most emphatically Robinson and 
Gallagher. But the logic of a statement like that under a 
magnifying glass is like a fading beauty with a face ravaged 
by wrinkles. They seem to be saying that without the 
occupation of Egypt there would have been no partition of 
Africa. If they are supposing that partition would never 
have taken place except in those or identical circumstances, 
apart from this being a trivial proposition, it practically 
puts the scramble for Africa beyond the pale of the history 
of colonialism, whose one irrefutable constant is that, 
given Europe's advantages, its outward expansion was 
inevitable whatever the special circumstances. If on the 
other hand they admitted it could have occurred in 
circumstances different from the point by point scenario 
they envisage, would they not be recognizing that the 
African grab could have been the product of forces other 
than the specific political ones that they seem to favour? 
Did not historical imbalances make partition inevitable at a 
time when European powers were indulging themselves in the 
reckless flaunting of their military strengths? 
Furthermore, if the imbalance that permitted Europe to 
intervene at will in Africa was the result of vast material 
inequalities, does not that make the authors* dismissal of 
"economic impulses" seem high-handed? What Robinson and 
Gallagher are saying finally is that for the period they 
chose (1880s) and with their preordained "frame of reference 
for colonialist motivations" (the "official mind"), they see 
no other political solution for the African grab but the
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specific time and the specific motives they have chosen. 
And as to what they call "the frame of reference for 
colonialist motivations", which in essence consists in going 
to contemporary evidence on the motivations of British 
politicians, and in particular the letter's own statements 
on their feelings and opinions— which Robinson and Gallagher 
claim to have put into perspective by taking such 
motivations as "one of the many objective causes of the 
partition itself"— , their reliance on this evidence is 
vitiated through the self-evident implication of parti
pris.43
In the final analysis, do Robinson and Gallagher 
achieve what they set out to do? What briefly can be said 
of their position in terms of their own avowed objectives? 
Their handling of the soul-searching and the interchange of 
ideas and feelings that went on in the British inner circles 
of government is scholarly but alive. It would take endless 
and probably fruitless arguing to refute all the evidence 
they amass to prove that imperialism was not just a matter 
of purely material calculations, or of heedless manoeuvering 
for territories and populations. They make Gladstone's 
transformation from passionate anti-imperialist to the 
invader of Egypt seem plausible and understandable. 
Likewise, the wrangling for West Africa is presented as an 
inevitable link in a powerful political chain. There were, 
of course, no immediate economic benefits involved, but was 
it not implicit somewhere that, as far as eventual profits 
were concerned, it was better to have more than to have less 
territory, especially when if not Britain then France would 
end up with the lion's share, or should we say, the 
cockerel's share? The question of 1882 is interesting 
because other historians that like Gallagher and Robinson 
interpret imperialism in political terms have chosen other 
incidents at other times as the starting point of the 
African grab. The point is that even from the fairly 
straightforward political perspective it is often not known 
when things begin and when they end, which is the sort of
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accusation that Is often thrown at economic imperialism. 
Gallagher and Robinson insist on their handling of political 
motives as causes among other causes, but they in fact do 
not deliver on this promise. At no point during their 
chronicle do they actually try to place the motives of their 
protagonists in a spectrum of causes, and in the end it is 
difficult to gauge from their book that any cause other than 
politics and political considerations came anywhere near 
these in influence and importance. This is so evidently true 
that it is towards the end of their work that they ask a 
direct question: "So much for the subjective views which
swayed the British partitioners. Plainly their
preconceptions and purposes were one of the many objective 
causes of the partition itself. Their remain the ultimate 
quêtions: how important a cause were these considerations of 
government? What were the other causes?" Their answer is 
brief, summary, and anticlimatic and does not right the 
imbalace in favour of political motivations that almost 
their entire lengthy treatise had previously created.44
THE FIELDHOUSE CRITIQUE: FOCUSING ON NUMBERS
The theoretical, as opposed to the semantical, 
distinction between colonialism and imperialism was 
originally proposed by the specific theory of economic 
imperialism. Its defense rests on precise statistical facts 
and series which respond to questions such as, why did the 
British empire grow by so many hundreds of thousands of 
square kilometre from such a year to such a year? Or, what 
was the flow of capital from Great Britain to the Gold Coast 
during the last decade of the 19th century? Post-WW2 
theories of imperialism, with pretensions to a much wider 
scope of applicability, have in general tended to ignore the 
distinction. It can not be ignored in considering Hobson's 
original theory, in which it is, however, one of the weaker 
flanks. D.K. Fieldhouse, one of the most comprehensive 
contemporary historians of colonial empires, reduced the 
central issue of the original restricted version of economic 
imperialism in this manner: "The question can therefore be
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redefined: what economic advantage did Europe extract from 
her colonies which she could not have gained from other 
countries, however similar in other ways?” With a 
superabundance of statistics, which others after him have 
also tracked down and reiterated, Fieldhouse proved that the 
imperialist powers did not trade preferentially with their 
possessions, and in the case of Great Britain in particular, 
with its African possessions. In the case of investments it 
was found that the colonies did not offer or provide any 
special enticements for metropolitan capitals. Furthermore, 
the investments that were made in the colonies were not 
particularly profitable, which answered the initial question 
to a fine edge and in the precise sense that Europe did not 
derive any special benefits from its colonies. Evidence was
dredged up by Fieldhouse and others that colonialists
frequently complained about the indifference of investors to 
their countries own colonies. Finally, it was averred that 
"not all imperialists were protectionists whereas all 
protectionists were imperialists" and that expansionism
always preceded protectionism, all of which showed the 
political primacy of colonialism and the unworthiness of the 
Hobson thesis.45 it was assumed in all these arguments 
that, according to the theory of imperialism, colonies were 
being deliberately acquired for investment purposes and for 
trade, which was not an unfair if strict reading of Hobson, 
one at any rate which showed how difficult it is to sustain 
it on its own strict conditions. However, Fieldhouse*s
refutation, perhaps the soundest ever written on the special 
theory of economic imperialism, was mounted on a circlet of 
considerations that did not sustain his basic allegations 
concerning the fundamental nature of colonialism.
Fieldhouse*s refutation of the specific theory of 
economic imperialism pose certain important questions 
concerning colonialism in general. Like Robinson and 
Gallagher he is a partisan of the peripheral theory of 
empire, which can be expressed as meaning that "no European 
government, political party or social group strongly or
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consistently demanded new empire building before the 
1880*s". This was different "both from the first expansion 
of the 15th and 16th centuries, and to some extent from 
events after 1882". His general rule is this: "Although
European attitudes were often influenced by domestic forces, 
the evidence suggests that positive action normally began as 
a response to existing peripheral problems or opportunities 
rather than as the product of calculated imperialist 
policy." Yet Fieldhouse admits that those slapped up 
empires of opportunity were profitable, some in the extreme: 
"The culture system became a scandal, but it was 
nevertheless a staggering financial success. Between 1831 
and 1877 it enabled Batavia to transmit a total of 823 
million guilders to the Netherlands treasury; an average of 
18 million a year when the Dutch budget was about 60 
million. This windfall was used in Holland to pay off debts 
left by the East India Company, reduce the national debt, 
and build public works. The Netherlands East India Co. was 
also quite profitable for most of the 17th and 18th 
centuries." The British colonies of North America by 
Fieldhouse's own criteria— which meant "how much less the 
colonist received for their products and how much more they 
had to pay for their purchases because of the Navigation 
Acts than...if their commerce had been unfettered"— produced 
"generalised" profits. The Iberian empires in America 
"obtained the greatest advantage from a monopoly system", 
and the Spanish economy was sorely tried when its American 
empire broke away. The Belgian Congo, closer to our days, 
was a constant source of benefits even if the rates of 
return were not spectacular, according to Fieldhouse. 
Despite this track-record of colonialism, Fieldhouse claims 
for the post-1880 period that "colonies were seldom 
deliberately acquired to produce wealth, and they were 
retained irrespective of their profitability". The queries 
that these statements provoke are rife. Fieldhouse like 
Robinson and Gallagher does not eschew controversiality. 
For him too the scramble for Africa was started by a single
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daring political initiative. The immediate cause of this 
new colonialist age was "Bismarck’s sudden call for German 
colonies". In Robinson and Gallagher the occupation of
Egypt leads to a chain of rivalries and confrontations. In 
Fieldhouse the offshoot is much more civilized: the Berlin 
conference of 1884-85, "which formulated rules for claiming 
possessions and precipitated a general grab for the vacant 
heart of Africa". Yet Fieldhouse’s summing up in 1965 was 
not quite as specific as would be expected from his 
explanation of the origins of the African grab: "The modern 
empires, however, were inevitable. At some point between 
1700 and the mid-19th century, the balance of power between 
the Western nations and the rest of the world shifted
decisively.
These diverse points of view— peripheral colonialism, 
refutation of the special theory of economic imperialism, 
the ultimate inter-cultural imbalance explanation— should 
have added up to a denial of the specific economic 
motivations of Western global expansion and their
substitution by a checkboard of different, mainly political 
explanations. Fieldhouse's own evidence, however, prompts 
two tentative inferences which seem to go against the grain 
of his arguments: one is that everything suggest a blurring 
of the distinction between the pre- and the post-1880
colonial periods, and the other, that it does not seem 
justified to abstract economics from the complex of colonial 
or imperial motivations at any time or juncture in the 
history of the West. If he admits the economic function of 
colonial empires before 1880, why does he deny it in 
colonial acquisitions after that date? Could Bismarck’s 
call, no matter how influential or stimulative, have 
sufficed to change colonial history so radically in such a 
brief time? Even assuming that German foreign policy was 
powerful enough then to get the rest of Europe jumping 
through a hoop, why discard the notion of potential or 
expected profits and advantages? This perfectly reasonable 
motivation, which has been called "the pre-emptive
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mechanism”, was described by M.W. Doyle in these terms: "The 
chance that those lands might prove valuable in themselves 
or to another power outweighed the prospective costs of 
management, and expansion was pre-emptive.” Lenin deduced 
from technological progress that colonies did not have to be 
profitable from the start and that their acquisition had 
probably more to do with future economic exploitation than 
with short-term profits. He certainly was not the only one 
to make that logical inference. In fact, Hobson himself 
must have seen that the logic of his thesis implies a 
certain degree of precariousness or of chance. No one ever 
invests a million dollars with the assurance of getting it 
back in five years, but if you are going to make a profit, 
there is always a chance your million dollars might go into 
a dud. This was not where the Hobson thesis went wrong. 
Where it distorts, and carries with it people like 
Fieldhouse and Robinson and Gallagher, is in its restricted 
definition of economic imperialism.^7
Historically, colonialist imperialism seems to be one 
essential unbroken reality, so that the very difficult 
intellectual task of reducing it to a short period of 
Western history during the fag-end of the 19th century, 
which was the task undertaken by Hobson and accepted as such 
by Lenin, makes its refutation all the easier. It is a 
matter of the harder you try the easier it is to fall. By 
an inverted logic, the fallacy of the specific theory of 
economic imperialism gives way to the myth of the political 
origins of the African grab. But if Fieldhouse*s refutation 
of Hobson is not a valid refutation of the economic causes 
of colonialism, what is it then? After 1880 colonialism was 
notoriously political in character, which does not mean that 
it was not also interested in profits, but that it was
motivated no so much by the defense of profits as by the 
expectation of future benefits, economic ones not excluded. 
Whatever or whoever set off the late-19th century scramble
for colonies, be it West Africa, Egypt, or Bismarck, the
question to ask, in relation to economic imperialism in a
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wide sense— which is the bridge between Hobson and 
contemporary dependency theory and is inferrable in even a 
formidable critic of Hobson such as Fieldhouse— , should be 
whether or not the rivalries and the issues involved were 
devoid of economic significance of any kind. To put it 
another way: the indiscriminate annexation of territories is 
not per se a contradiction of the causes implied in 
economic-imperialism theory. It would be if it were 
possible to affirm that the acquisition of land obeyed only 
motives and objectives of a rigorously non-economic 
character. This was demonstrated neither by Robinson and 
Gallagher nor by Fieldhouse, What Fieldhouse did prove was 
that a narrow definition of economic imperialism is 
practically impossible to defend successfully,
Fieldhouse was not, of course, alone in expressing 
those ideas, as Robinson and Gallagher were not the sole 
proponents of the idea of the 19th century importance of 
informal imperialism. The prominence we accord to Robinson 
and Gallagher is based on the impact of their program of 
political review of the economic-imperialism theory, and 
Fieldhouse, of course, wrote the virtually definitive 
refutation of its specific economic claims, J,S, Galbraith 
in 1960 defended the man-on-the-spot explanation of British 
colonial expansion, F, Crouzet and H, Neisser both probed 
different chinks in the armour of Hobson's theory: Crouzet
denied that the post-1880 colonial expansion contributed to 
the prosperity of late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain; and 
Neisser said that apart from a cushioning effect during 
periods of depression there were for Britain no other 
economic benefits from empire. Yet the ghost of Hobson's 
economic imperialism seems never to be laid to rest, A 
recent book by L, Davis and R, Huttenback, Mammon and the 
Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British
Imperialism, 1860-1912 (1987), tackles all the conceivable 
issues and implications of the specific theory in pages 
bristling with statistics, tables, and all the paraphernalia 
of cliometrics. It proves, for instance, that the people at
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large paid for an empire whose most palpable benefits 
accrued to the economic upper class. But if this indicates 
a loose connection between empire and gain, neither the 
import of raw materials, nor trade, nor emigration, nor 
overseas rates of return— colonial ones were not better than 
those to be had at home— argue for the profitability of 
empire.48 Even so, according to P.K. O'Brien, the proof 
that the empire paid or did not pay is not given one way or 
the other in this work and that mainly because it is not 
possible to quantify the alternatives of dismantling the 
empire to compare them to the existing facts and determine 
conclusively that the empire was demonstrably useless. In 
other words, the only final proof that imperialism was an 
unnecessary economic fiasco can only be obtained contra- 
factually, which means that Messrs. Davis and Huttenback and 
and their battery of computers may not have exhausted the 
subject.*
THE IDEA OF IMBALANCE
It may be that the only way to encompass imperialism, 
whether pre- or post-1880, whether political or economic in 
essence, is to be as unspecific as possible and to work with 
the broadest possible categories. The notion of imbalance 
very nearly fits the bill ideally. Fieldhouse's suggestion 
of the inevitability of the modern colonial empires from the 
rise of Western global power is reminiscent of T.S.Landes' 
theory that imperialism is the result of a secular imbalance 
of power, which he expressed in an article of 1961: "It
seems to me that one has to look at imperialism as a 
multifarious response to a common opportunity that consists 
simply in disparity of power...So if one seeks to understand 
the imperialism of the 19th century, one must take into 
account not only strong economic motives, among others, but 
even more those technological changes that increased the 
disparity of force between Europe and the rest of the world
* If they did not esd:Hust the subject, hcwe^^, th^ at least elaborated an inpressive set 
of statistical series, feon whLdi ve have extracted the synthesis in this table:
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and created the opportunity for and possibility of 
dominions...In this sense, the expansion of the 19th century 
Is only the last phase of a millennial explosion that goes 
back to the turning point of the Middle Ages when the
EKRUT CPBBCUSH FHWNCE
C^tal caUad up fton 1865-1914 (1,000,000s of fe) 
(% In parentiEsds)
TcnaL IK RBESSai SEIP-GCBEEN-
BGElflRE
rEIBŒŒ
EMHRE
mnA
5784(100) 1828(31) ■2mm 1045(18) 156(3) 86(5)
1865-189?
2933(100) 1038(35) 1209(41) 458(16) 55(2) 172(6)
1900-1914
2851(100) 790(28) 1239(44) 587(21) 101(3) 114(4)
Rlvate:
1865-1899
1925(100) 911(47) 733(38) 168(9) 40(2) 84(4)
1900-1914
1757(100) 471(27) 855(49) 292(17) 77(4) 57(3)
GboenuBnt;
1865-1#
998(100) 128(13) 476(48) 290(29) 15(1) 89(9)
1900-1914
1097(100) 319(29) 403(37) 295(27) 24(2) 56(3)
Sburae: J^fenmn and the Rgsuit of Bnpdre
David and Hjtteriback deduce the foUcwipg on the basis of these statistics: "It nust 
be reraenbeced that acaiœnts based on the concept of finance inpeialian concentrate on the 
feaction of British finance that \ænt into the Bipte. (Xer tie entire fi^y years feom 
1865 to 1914. the proportion is about 25 per cent ot the total, but that aseraga is biased 
icwards by the transfers made during the last decade. îbr the period before 1900, 
about which Hobson wrote and lenin paraphrased, the proportion is only about
\hile foreign firms received almost 45 percait and donestic 40, all Bipire firms absorbed 
less than one-fifth of the total, and only about one pound in elgit in tdie ]^ ar before 
1900. Mareo^, the dependent governments received only about a third of that Bipire 
total. The domestic Ëcre, on the other hæd, ^ as above 40 percent in every decade mcLl 
1905 Then it declined in reqmse to a \iave of finance directed toward the foreigi sector 
and the self-governing colonies. Ih the case of government finance the story is 
different. The foreigi sector reœived something less tfen 40 percent; the Bipire*s Ëcre 
ballooned to about tie same level; but that ot the dcm^ tic econoiy fell to just less 
than a quarter. Of the government total, hoæver, only about one pound in eleven Tient to 
India an the dqpaodent colonies.
"The picture is dear. Britain Tias indeed a major supplier of tie Trarld's
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plateau of Castile, on the East Elbian plain, along the 
shores of the Mediterranean."^^ These ideas have a vague 
resemblance to Schumpeter’s "objectless disposition on the 
part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion" to the 
extent that they all posit a lack of specific motivation. 
By contrast the special theory or economic imperialism aims 
at being as causally specific as possible. The contemporary 
reformulations of economic imperialism, however, incline 
more towards a general concept of economic causation than
towards the balance-sheet approach that characterized the 
theory during its first, essentially Hobsonian phase.
The idea of imbalance and the general theory of
economic imperialism could easily be reconciled and made 
complementary. Certainly imbalance and the notion of a 
development gap are apposite. The general theory of
economic imperialism, precisely because of its non- 
restrictive protean character, leads smoothly into the
question of the origins of international economic
inequality. This issue was in fact totally irrelevant to
the concerns of Hobson or for that matter of Lenin, for they 
were both immersed in strictly European political squabbles: 
Hobson in the question of British overseas expansionism; 
Lenin in Marxist factional struggles. Neo-imperialist
theory is associated with the Third World: it emanates from 
Third World concerns, and it has been elaborated to a 
significant extent in the Third World or from a Third World 
perspective. The specific theory can not escape the taint 
of intentionality given the nature of its contentions, and 
this carried over into Stalinism and into contemporary 
theorization. But aside from this— and, of course, the 
common ground of economic motivation or causation and the 
negative results of colonialism— they are two distinct 
systems of conceptualization with different historical and
there is little evidence tiiat at ary time, at least before 1905, it presided a significant 
alternative for private finds poËied out of Britain ty lew domestic returns, or a fertile 
grand for invegbiEnt at hi^ ^ exploitative monopolistic’ rates" (op.dt., pp.40-42).
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socio-political sources, different themes and objectives, 
and different investigative methodologies. Modern
dependency theory often protests its relatedness to Lenin's 
concept of imperialism, but the specific contemporary 
attempts to revive the latter— notably by H. Magdoff, T. 
Kemp, and A.K. Bagchi— have not been very convincing.
R. LUXEMBURG AND THE SCHEMA OF ENLARGED REPRODUCTION
In part, Hobson has become identified with the specific 
theory of economic imperialism because of Lenin's avowed 
debt to him. Marx himself, as we saw, did not formulate 
anything that could be described as a theory of economic 
imperialism, but this does not mean that Marxists did not 
try to found one on his teachings. One who tried to do so, 
even though it meant proposing a bruising criticism of 
Marx's main analysis of capitalism, was the Polish-German 
Marxist R. Luxemburg. She was a fiery, brilliant, and 
unyielding intellectual and politician who founded, with K. 
Liebknecht, the communist Spartakist movement in the 
aftermath of Germany's defeat in WWI, and who was killed in 
the insurrection of January 1919 in Berlin by the Freikorps 
under the social-democratic Weimar Republic. In 1913 she 
published The Accumulation of Capital, a work in which she 
tried to come to grips with the question of capitalist 
economic growth and economic imperialism in terms of 
complementarity. Given Marx's fundamental definition of 
capitalism (a term incidentally which he never used 
himself) as a discrete and finite historical mode of 
production, he had to explain three processes in relation to 
it: 1) how it came about, which he called "primitive
accumulation"; 2) how it reproduced its relations of 
production, which he called "simple reproduction"; and 3) 
how it evolved and expanded towards its own dissolution, 
which he called "expanded reproduction".^0 As we shall see, 
the general theory of economic imperialism, or dependency 
theory, places the start of capitalism's interference with 
economico-historical processes in non-European lands 
virtually during or just after the phase of primitive
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accumulation In Europe, The ambiguity here on the exact 
point in Europe's capitalist development at the start of 
European colonialist expansion is due principally to the 
lack of chronological and functional precision in Marx's 
usage of his analytical concepts, which appear in his 
writings as purely abstract and theoretical, hence with at 
most imprecise references to concrete historical situations, 
as when he placed the start of capitalism in the late 
Medieval Italian city-states active in international 
commerce. The most, therefore, that can be inferred from 
dependency theory is that colonialist expansion could have 
contributed to the drawn-out process of primitive 
accumulation in the more advanced European states during the 
15th and 16th centuries and that surely it promoted the 
ensuing capitalist process of self-replication and growth. 
In the case of Luxemburg's theory on economic imperialism 
there is no comparable ambiguity, for she explicitly took up 
Marx's schema when the requirement of expanded reproduction 
were leading towards the final integration and 
transformation of the world from its West European centres 
of power during the imperialist era.
Very synthetically and schematically, it can be said 
that Luxemburg starts from Marx's division of simple 
reproduction into a producers' goods sector (department one) 
and a consumers' goods sector (department two). The first 
supplies its own and the other sector's needs; the inverse 
relation holds true as well. This balance, however, was 
unrealistic, for it did not reflect the reality of economic 
expansion, and therefore, it implied and required the schema 
of expanded reproduction. Always following Marx, Luxemburg 
claimed that any increment in the process of capitalist 
reproduction had to come from increased production in 
department one, which meant that surplus value was deflected 
from hoarding or consumption into increased capitalisation, 
but this created the problem of the realization of capital 
in that department two would be interested in supplying the 
growing needs of department one but did not have the
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incentive to absorb its increased production.* The evident 
reason for this was that capitalist were in the business
* In the developiEnt of her arguent Imadxirg used Jferx's cxcn rgxoductlQn diagram 
rqresenting the total products of d^artments I aid H. The elation fiar siii#e 
reprodirtim is stated thus:
I. 400% + lOOCV + 10006 = 6000
n. 2000c + 500^ +^ 5003 = 3000
Tbtal 9000
\jhere c = constant c^tal, or investment in equipment and raw materials; v = variable 
c^tal, or ^iagps: aid s = siznlus, or the difference between \hat Tabour gpt in xages and 
the value that labour pcodured. This schema obeys the following rules: (a) The product 
of Dspartment I equals in value the sun of the two oorstait o^taLs in CepartnEnts I aid 
H. (b) The constant capital of D^ artment n  equals the sun of variable o^tal and 
surplus value in Dspartmait I—a neoessary oonsequenoe of (a), (c) The product of
Daparhnent II equals the sun of variable c^tal and surplus value in both dmartments—a 
necessary consequence of (a) and (b)." It assures a constant c/v ratio of 4 to 1 and a 
rate of esqiodtaticn of 100% (s/v = 1). The schema is static in that both departments 
mere^ cxni^ ement each other, that is, Dsparhnent I supplies the needs of itself aid n, 
and It the needs of itself am I: just c is produced in I to crver d^ geciation and
the raw materials required in both dg^ ertmaits, aid just enoqdi cmsuner gxds are 
prod load in H  for the csonsuiption of c^ talists and mrhars in both departments. The 
aggregate prodjct. therefore, ne\ar grows.
Uœr condLticns of enlarge reproducticn, however, the prodict of I nust be 
largpr than c in both I and H. and the product or H  nust be lœs tten the sun of v + s 
in both dqartments. The equatian thus beccmes:
1) I. 40000 + 10X^ + 10006= 6000
n. 1500c + 750^ + 7506 = 3000
Tbtal 9000
The rules for sinple regxductlon are not adhered to in this schema, althou^  the 
c/v ratio of 4:1 in Dpartment i is retained as \cell as the same rate of exploitation for 
both dgertments. Ihy ^hrx and Imenturg lower the c/v ratio of Dapartment II to 2:1 is 
not ciear. It is probably what econonists call an intuitive prcpositicn. At ary rate, 
given this new équation enlarged rmrpducticn can proceed. Tie rate of accunulation for 
capitalisation in PparbiHTt I is of s (.50 x 1000 = 500). 
to the Ëertfall in the product of I
is placed as per the 4:1 ratio of ^     _ _ .  ^ __  _
surplus c and hiring labour to the tune of lOOv. Department II in turn supplies tie 
Increased consuiptd.cn of lOOv in I, ax! it is then in a position to acquire the deft-o\er 
100c from the original surplus ptoduction. Finally, Daectment n  increases its v by 50 
according to its enlarged reproducticn ration of 2:1. Thus at the end of one period, the 
results are:
2) I. 4400 + 1100 + 1100 = 6600
n. 1600 + 800 + 800 = 3200
Tbtal 9800
be:
3) I. 4»Wt + 12KV + 121C6 = 7260 
n. 1760c + 880v+ 8806 = 3520
Tbtal 10780
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of making profits for themselves, not for others, and a 
fortiori, the capitalist mode of production did not operate 
with the target in view of creating jobs for workers. 
There was also no question of increasing over-all demand by 
raising wages, as Hobson had advocated, because Marxism was 
built on a series of fundamental psychological axioms which 
did not include the pursuit of social welfare or the 
exercise of altruism. This also disqualified the argument 
of natural population increases, for there were no special 
provisions under capitalism for new workers, unless they 
were taken on by capitalists as a result of profit-making 
opportunities, in which case they were already part of the 
working force and could not exert new demand. Population 
increase among workers had to be supported by the workers 
with existing wages, and this could not be considered an 
injection of new consumers into the economy. Another, 
perhaps more direct, way of describing the same problem was 
that the avid search for profits even by the sharpest 
operators did not guarantee profits in industrialized 
capitalist economies subject as they were to business cycles 
and especially to the law of diminishing profits.
Was Luxemburg being faithful to Marx in this analysis? 
She accepted Marx's premisses on capitalist reproduction and 
she remitted them with respect and punctilio. Where she 
parted company from him, and did not mince words in pointing 
out a gap in his theory, was on the question of the growth 
and expansion of capitalism. In Luxemburg's view Marx's 
schema of expanded reproduction was not a good enough answer
After a certain niiber of yeacs it wxûd be seen that the aggcog^ te social 
pcod^, the social qggo^g^ c^tal, and the surplus value wxldlHve increased 
oonsidecaihly fton the imtiaL equation, Luxaihurg esquained: "Wë m^ continF. the above 
chain of equations ad infmitiiii so long as \je cibsŒve this simple pdnciFle: that a 
certain increase in the constant c^tal of DEpartment I alwa^  necessitates a certain 
increase in its variable cmital^  vhidi detsennines befbrhand te extent of the increase 
in EfeHrtJient II. with \hicfi again a oorrespondiiig increase in the variable capital must 
be coordinated" .^114-19). The trouble with atl this ras that "Bton the Cf=pita1.ist 
point of view it is absurd to produoe more oonsuner goods merely in orcfer to maintain more 
wiiters, and to turn out more means of production merely to fero the surplus of wakers 
ooaçiea" (p.l32).
The Ajdnulation of Chpital, London, 1951.
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to the question, and even though, as she claims, Marx was 
aware of the insufficiency in his theory, he had not tried 
hard enough to cover it. On the other hand, it is not amiss 
to wonder in this case, as in the case of the origins of 
economic inequalities between the West and other cultures, 
to what extent that really was an issue for Marx. E. Mandel 
apparently thinks that it was, and despite his admiration 
for Luxemburg and his tendency to agree with her reading of 
Marx, he criticizes her on this issue on two grounds: 1)
that she makes too much of Marx's schemas, which were after 
all designed to illustrate the capitalist MOP and how it 
went on reproducing itself; and 2) that at any rate Marx 
did not finish Capital and that his intention had been to 
explore the problems of "many capitals", which somewhat 
inconsistently does seem to imply that Luxemburg had not 
over-stressed the point of a lack in Marxist theory.
It could be that Marx, who, after all, had offered 
sufficient reasons to expect the downfall of capitalism, did 
not feel the need to explain further the mechanics of a 
system whose expansion must have seemed to him transitory 
in time and lop-sided in its social effects. In whatever 
modern sense we employ the word development, whether as 
economic prosperity or as social welfare conditions or in 
any combination of these complementary ideas, it was foreign 
to Marx's concept of capitalism. Capitalism had come about 
historically and it had created progressive and socially 
rational economic structures and practices, but it had by no 
means "developed" either in the sense of abundance or of 
social justice. As we shall see, this blind spot in Marx's 
vision invariably leads his contemporary followers into the 
"development paradox" whereby they feel obliged to deprecate 
and denounce capitalism while at the same time wishing it on 
the Third World. Marx had seen in the capitalist system a 
driving need to increase profits which went about it self- 
destructively by concentrating capital and laying off 
workers every time a strong economic crisis struck at its 
foundations. Luxemburg interpreted the capitalist drive
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for profits as the need to incorporate more and more 
consumers and cheap labour, a possibility that was becoming 
increasingly more difficult in the industrialized nations. 
The difference between them lay in that Marx had his sights 
firmly place on Europe and more specifically on England, 
whereas Luxemburg as an intellectual product of the age of 
imperialism was much more aware than Marx of the spread of 
capitalism to backward nations. Unlike Lenin she did not 
make concessions to nationalism because she believed that 
all it did was divide the working class.5% How did 
Luxemburg formulate her theory of economic imperialism as 
she solved the problem of expanded reproduction?
Her solution to this problem went back to her criticism 
of Marx's schema of simple reproduction, which was "that 
simple reproduction is a fiction not only for capitalist 
production but also for the progress of civilization in 
general". The key to growth and expansion was expanded 
reproduction, and this was only possible if there existed a 
"third person" to absorb the increase in production as 
foreseen but not developed by Marx in his schemas. Who or 
what was the "third person" that other Marxists had also 
sought without finding? "The decisive fact", she wrote, "is 
that the surplus value can not be realized by sale either to 
workers or to capitalists, but only if it is sold to such 
social organizations or strata whose own MOP is not 
capitalist." And the difficulties that Marx had experienced 
in explaining the realization of surplus stemmed from his 
premiss that once capitalism prevailed it did so 
"universally", when in fact "real life has never known a 
self-sufficient capitalist society under the exclusive 
domination of the capitalist MOP." Nevertheless, capitalism 
in England and in Germany and generally in what she called 
the "old bourgeois countries", was probably at its peak, and 
this was where imperialism came in because there were plenty 
of non-capitalist societies to bring within the confines of 
capitalism as purchasers of excess production of capital 
goods, as provider of raw materials, and as sources of
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exploitable labour. Of course, in the long run and by those 
and other means capitalism would transform non-capitalist 
societies into replicas of itself and the "young capitalist 
states" would try to shake off the hold of the older ones, 
but while that happened capital flowing in to them would 
get its own back. In the end all would be operating under 
the same system, heading towards the same apocalypse of 
greed. Her basic point was that the only avenue for surplus 
capital was imperialism: "Only the opening of immense non­
capitalist lands, through the increase in the number of 
consumers, has allowed capital to pursue enlarged 
reproduction."^3
In this analysis, Luxemburg showed herself a firm 
adherent to and a cautious dissenter from Marx. Her use of 
Marxist definitions and postulates is deferent, even 
slavish, but the inclusion of the entire globe as a 
necessary field for the expansion of capitalism before its 
collapse was carrying Marxist analysis beyond what Marx, who 
could probably envisage revolution with more ease than 
decolonization, had foreseen. In doing this she was facing 
up to something that also troubled other Marxist theorists, 
and that was the extraordinary tenacity of capitalism in 
spite of grinding exploitation, cyclical crises, and cut­
throat political and economic rivalries. In her view of 
world capitalism Luxemburg was wrong because of something 
that her analysis did not reveal to her: she had not the
slightest inkling of the notion and the reality of 
underdevelopment and this for the simple reason that for 
her, as a good Marxist of another age, exploitation and the 
conditions of life were the same whether in the imperialist 
countries or in developing capitalist nations like Egypt or 
Turkey. A hungry worker in a young capitalist country had 
nothing to envy his counterpart in a capital-exporting 
country. To have believed otherwise would have meant for 
her, as for any true and loyal Marxist, a terrible 
misperception, indeed a heresy. Whatever else one might 
have said of capital, it could not be denied that it was an
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equalizer of working class conditions, and, as there was no 
theoretical objection to the export of misery, Luxemburg 
logically could not conceive the sort of international 
economic disparities, involving inequalities in employment 
ratios and dramatic wage differences, that we have become 
familiar with in our times. This problem has dogged Marxism 
all the way to the present and Marxists still have not been 
able to solve it adequately. As is known, those Marxists 
who engaged in revisionism by recognizing that capitalism 
could benefit workers by attenuating exploitation were 
ostracized and expelled from the fold.
HILFERDING AND THE COATTAILED CROCODILES
The Austrian Marxist R. Hilferding had actually taken 
an ambiguous step towards the perception of underdevelopment 
in his book Finance Capital, published in 1910.^4 Hobson’s 
square one had been the problem of low wages and oversaving; 
Luxemburg’s, the Marxist schemas of capitalist reproduction. 
Hilferding posited finance capital as the fundamental 
manifestation of capitalist concentration and, in effect, of 
"organized" capitalism. Bankers were like economic planners 
who took over industry and streamlined it through initially 
profitable monopolies and cartels. These achievements, 
however, could not last without their control of the state, 
which had to be used to protect profits by means of high 
tariffs allowing higher prices but at the same time 
provoking lower sales. Whereas in Marx production and 
profits continued punctuated by crises which lead to growing 
concentration and centralization, in Hilferding the combined 
forces of capitalism within one nation established policies 
to prevent the decline of the rate of profits. In view of 
the counterproductive effects of tariffs, exports had to be 
promoted and provisions made for the safe export of capital. 
But these measures collided with similar ones by other 
capital-exporting nations creating rivalries and tensions. 
The logical outlets were the undeveloped regions of the 
world, to ensnare which the state was made actively 
interventionist, and this led to expansionism and finally to
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conflict.
For some, Hilferding anticipated in general lines the 
conditions under which WWI started. His depiction of 
bankers, whether considered original to him, or, what is 
more likely, as a rationalization of a widespread popular 
perception, became influential in the 20s and 30s. It 
corresponded to the image of the pudgy, coat-tailed, high- 
hatted, hedonistic, and unscrupulous financiers represented 
in the Berlin paintings of G. Grosz and in countless 
cartoons of the times. His theory on the operations of 
finance capital was illustrated convincingly and 
entertainingly in M. Josephson's 1934 socio-historical 
chronicle The Robber Barons, in which a group of American 
financiers came within a whisker of taking over the entire 
economy of the USA. The coincidence between Josephson and 
Hilferding was probably unwitting since there is no mention 
in Josephson's book of Hilferding, but in any case both 
authors demonstrate the powerful hold that bankers had on 
the imagination and the thought of leftist intellectuals 
during the early decades of the century. Whatever the cause 
for this, Hilferding undoubtedly gave finance capital a 
theoretical status and a notoriety it did not have before—  
certainly not in Marx, whose villains were the generic class 
of capitalists, although, perhaps, on a more profound 
ontological level, what Marx really deplored was greed 
itself— , and this deserved or undeserved reputation became 
something of a folk-myth, as during the depression years in 
America. These are no mean achievements but history has not 
been kind to Hilferding's theory and today it is generally 
agreed that banks do not seem to have the power that 
Hilferding attributed to them. Whether they once had it and 
then lost it to state control and regulation or to some 
economic force stronger than theirs, is another question, 
but then he would have to be faulted for having had an 
excessively negative and pessimistic view of the state as a 
tool of special interests under capitalism. Where 
Hilferding commands respect and attention even today is in
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his pioneering if far from infallible exploration of the 
relations between developed and backward countries.
On this question he commenced with the classic Marxist 
proposition on the transplantation of capitalism to non­
capitalist territories, although he singled out a specific 
scenario, which Marx never did: Hilferding wrote: "The
export of capital, especially since it has assumed the form 
of industrial and finance capital, has enormously 
accelerated the overthrow of all the old social relations, 
and the involvement of the whole world in capitalism. 
Capitalist development did not take place independently in 
each individual country, but instead capitalist relations of 
production and exploitation were imported along with capital 
from abroad, and indeed imported at the level already 
attained in the most advanced country." But this did not 
necessarily create homogeneous conditions all over the 
world, for there were differences between the capital 
exporters and the capital importing or debtor countries, as 
there were international differences based on what 
Hilferding called the size of the "economic territory", 
which essentially referred to the ability of an economy to 
produce and to absorb capital. One of the results of the 
free flow of capital was the creation of colonies. Another 
was the establishment of dependency relations, a case in 
point being the control by foreign capital of the iron mines 
in Spain and Sweden. Hilferding's fallibility is manifest 
in his underestimation of Swedish capitalist resilience, 
although he was not far from the truth in relation to the 
economic backwardness of Spain. Finally and most
significantly, Hilferding described certain traits of 
capital-importing countries as corresponding not to 
economies growing to full capitalist status but staying 
rather at a level of stunted development. A capital 
surplus, for instance, usually gave a country advantages 
over less developed economies: "The export of capital had
now become a means of ensuring that the capital-exporting 
countries will be the suppliers of industrial goods. The
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customer has no choice: he becomes a debtor and hence a
dependent who must accept the conditions imposed by his 
creditors," There was also what Hilferding called "absentee 
ownership", by which he meant foreign capital and the 
profits it sucks out of "small economic territories". 
"Naturally, this accumulation did not have to take place", 
he wrote, "in the country where the profit originated; but 
this capitalist 'absentee ownership' slows down enormously 
the pace of accumulation, and hence the further development 
of capitalism, in the debtor country." Hilferding even 
described a typical phenomenon of today's debtor countries: 
the flight of capital: "The smaller the economic territory 
the less the power it has to sustain the competitive 
struggle successfully by means of large export subsidies, 
and the stronger is the urge to export capital in order to 
share in the economic development and higher profits of 
other greater powers." Of course, Hilferding was often 
absolutely and totally wrong. He considered the lack of 
free labour in a new country (citing Australia and Canada) 
as the greatest obstacle to its development, which even on 
the eve of WWl must have sounded like rigmarole. He 
referred to a supposed preference by British capitalists for 
an imperial tariff, although that was the particular hobby­
horse of a school of social imperialist thought and was 
never approved or a p p l i e d . A l l  in all, one suspects that 
Hilferding did no lump all capitalisms in the same category 
and that he considered that attaining to full capitalist 
status was important and rewarding per se for a country. 
Likewise, he thought he perceived that the inability to do 
so was engineered from the more developed capitalist 
countries, and this was a far cry from the point of view of 
a dyed-in-the-wool Marxist like R. Luxemburg, or of Marx 
himself. Marx had said that capitalism creates like 
wherever it goes. Luxemburg added that capitalism must 
create like in order to survive. Hilferding implied that 
capitalism created caricatures of itself from the more 
developed to the less developed countries.
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THE HARVEST OF LENINISM
R. Luxemburg had no doubts whatever about the
Inevitability of capitalism on a global scale, but it was
not a cheery prospect except in that it would presage doom 
for the system. R. Hilferding had an equally apocalyptic 
vision, but he was more interested in the mechanics and the 
effects of capital flows, not that he had any doubts about 
what their final exploitative intents were. In the process, 
however, he observed shades and variations. The impact of 
capital was not the same in every country. Often instead of 
capitalist development dependence was the result. Likewise, 
development could be stunted. Hilferding could have been, 
like the brilliant descriptive economist that he was, on the 
spoor of underdevelopment as we know it. Lenin's own 
outlook was influenced by Hilferding. He wrote his treatise 
Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism in 1916, in the 
midst of the Great War, which he was sitting out in 
Switzerland. But he was far from detached about it and in 
fact if his essay had one unifying purpose it was to give
the coup de grace to K. Kaut sky's notion of
ultraimperialism, the hypothetical grand alliance between
the imperialist powers to divide the world, shattered by the
occurrence of the Great War, and to offer his own version of 
why capitalism always carried in itself the seeds of 
conflict.
Lenin was also trying to square what he knew about 
capitalism with the theory of economic imperialism. For 
the latter he consulted Hilferding and the seminal 
work by Hobson, and he followed both closely. However, 
he was also attuned to Marx's vision of the evolution of
capitalism towards its downfall. In this respect, it is
necessary to retain two principles from Marx: 1) that
under capitalism there is a tendency for machinery to 
replace workers (what Marxists describe as an increase 
in the "organic composition of capital"); and 2) 
that, in consequence of the above, while profits 
for a time might increase in absolute terms, over
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the long-haul the tendency of the rate of profit, or the 
proportion of labour power the capitalist retains as surplus 
relative to total capital, is downwards. If the
mechanization of industry is a natural and rational tendency 
of the forces of production under capitalism, capitalist 
greed turns it unwittingly against itself when it uses 
machinery to lay off workers in order to save on expenditure 
on variable capital. This is carrying the trend towards 
concentration of the means of production— in Marx's words, 
"the facility of appropriating other people's surplus labour 
in great masses"— to irrational extremes. It also leads to 
the centralization of capital, a tendency summarized by Marx 
in the lapidary phrase: "One capitalist always strikes down 
many capitalists", which resulted in that a tiny few 
benefited from a system of economic oppression over the vast 
working majority of society, "trained, united and organized 
by the very mechanism of the capitalist process of 
production". Eventually, therefore, "The monopoly of 
capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production which 
has flourished alongside and inside it. The centralization 
of the means of production and the socialization of labour 
reach a point at which they become incompatible with their 
capitalist integument. The integument is burst asunder. 
The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The
* (Xæœ and Sutcliffe offer the foUowdng analytical esqplanaticn of the organic 
composition of cyital and the tendary of the rate of profit to fell: "]h tferx's analysis 
of the c^ talist MDP the valua of a oomnodity is ocnposad of: first, tte value or the 
constant omital (c)^  that is, the machlnary and r^ materials used up in ncodiction; 
second, variable o^tal (v), the amount of labour used—nrasured in terras of the \iagps 
paid to teep the wDrkers alive; aid third, sumLus value (s), the excess of the value of a 
oomnodity over its cost of production (c + vT.. .fedhnical progress In Itoc's view tended 
to raise the arganc composition of cmital (c/v) in production, reducing the amount of 
labour needed relative tx> cspital. With the clqæ struggle tendlpg to ke^ the rate of 
value, or the rate of exploitation (s/v), oonstait, it follows tmt there is a 
/ for the rate of profit in Iferx's sense s/c+v to fell."
Both technical progress and the class struggle nust be understood In terms of the 
capitalist's drive for greater profit, üsim the same sinple equation, thasfore, it is 
pofiBlble to deduce hew the absolute mass of surplus can grow mile the rate of profit
fell jpg ^hen both c and v grow but c at a faster rare than v. and finally, Inw a 
ocnstantly faLLipg rate of profit will lead to one of two outoones: 1) a reduction of s to 
increase s/c*v, or 2) the situation \here the strorgpr capitalists will gchble up the 
veaiter. In Ûk meantime, since v diimnWues in relation to the growth of the available 
labour force (in the reserre amy and throudi natural incnrese), the capitalist MP 
arrires at the stags vhere the tension betiween the forces of production and me relatlora 
of production is sixh that the s^ t^em will colline or \dll be overthrown.
Stirhes in the Theory of Imperialiam. London, 1972, pp.13-14
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expropriators are expropriated,"* Loyal Marxists such as 
Mandel would claim that the process is not quite as simple 
or as facilely determinist as this and that, despite his own 
words, Marx never meant that it should seem that way. 
Lenin, however, certainly believed in the ineluctability of 
those tendencies depicted by Marx. If capitalism had not 
yet succumbed it was because it compensated for its falling 
profits at home with its exploitation of non-capitalist or 
semi-capitalist territories abroad. To reach this
conclusion he accepted Hobson's "flag-follows-capital" model 
and Hilferding's thesis on the primacy of finance capital 
under modern capitalism and its control over the state in 
capitalist society. However, the ultimate, and the last, 
concretion of Marx's centralization process, and the base 
upon which imperialism rested, was the reduction of the 
exploiters not to a few individual capitalists but to a 
handful of capitalist powers in which there was virtually no 
separation between capital and s t a t e . 7^
Lenin believed that the world was ruled by financial
capital, concentrated in the "four pillars" of the system:
Great Britain, the USA, France and Germany. Capital 
travelled to wherever it could make profits, especially 
backward countries. He was well within the traditional
Marxist norm: "The export of capital affects and greatly
accelerates the development of capitalism in those countries 
to which it is exported. While, therefore, the export of 
capital may tend to a certain extent to arrest development 
in the capital exporting countries, it can only do so by 
opening and deepening the further development of capitalism 
throughout the world." When Lenin speaks of "development", 
though, it should be borne in mind that it is not
"development" in the contemporary sense, but in the brutal 
Marxist sense of the destruction of old social relations and 
of traditional economic institutions. What capitalism put in 
its place was not exactly welfare and social justice but the 
worst forms of economic subjection and drudgery. On the 
other hand, there was no question for Lenin, as there had
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not been for Hilferding and for Luxemburg, of some kind of 
"structural" impossibility to industrialize. In impeccable 
Hobsonian fashion, Lenin related the growth of colonialism 
to the age of financial capital, and he cited the fact that 
social imperialist thought accompanied and justified 
colonialism. The conquest of colonies was frequently 
motivated by the need to control sources of raw materials. 
Lenin refuted the arguments against imperialism based on the 
non-profitability of colonies: "Financial capital is
interested not only in the already discovered sources of raw 
materials but also in the potential sources, because 
present-day technical development is extremely rapid, and 
land which is useless today may be made fertile tomorrow if 
new methods are applied...and if large amounts of capital 
are invested." Finally, Lenin echoed Hilferding's analysis 
of dependency: "Typical of this epoch is not only the two
main groups of countries: those owning colonies and
colonies, but also the divers forms of dependent countries 
which, officially, are politically independent, but in fact, 
are enmeshed in this net of financial and diplomatic 
dependence." It is not easy to find consistency in all 
these points of view unless one keeps in mind that for Lenin 
financial capital and capitalism in general were unmitigated 
disasters not "out of any particular malice, but because the 
degree of concentration which had been reached forces them 
to adopt this method (division of the world) in order to 
obtain profits". Up to this point Lenin was well within 
conventional economic-imperialism analysis, but in what 
follows he tended to leave the beaten track to pursue 
certain formulations, some basically of practical politics, 
which were pregnant with consequences. 8^
Lenin made clear that he considered imperialism to be 
consubstantial with capitalism at its highest and final 
stage. The features of imperialism were: a) concentration 
of production and of capital; b) merging of bank capital 
with industrial capital in a financial oligarchy; c) export 
of capital; d) international monopolist capitalist combines
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sharing the world; and e) territorial division of the world. 
This international situation led to war. Far from lessening 
"the unevenness of contradictions inherent in the world 
economy, as Kautsky says, imperialism tends to increase 
them". Lenin cited France's appetite for Lorraine and 
Germany's for Belgium, but this is as far, really, as his 
explanation of WWl went in concrete terms. More
significantly within this international framework, Lenin 
looked at the spread of capitalism, which Cunow defended as 
"inevitable and progressive", and he responded with a 
singeing refusal. Yet Lenin himself had said pages before 
that the export of capital "accelerates the development of 
capitalism", presumably in a historically progressive sense. 
Now he turns his back on this classic Marxist proposition 
and throughout the final pages of his treatise he pounds 
time and again the same keys: exploitation in the colonies 
and dependencies, coercion of workers everywhere, resistance 
to imperialism, and so forth. The spread of capitalism 
means above all the outright exploitation of workers in 
backward and subject countries. No improvement there, but 
this was to be expected in a Marxist political tract. 
However, there is also unequal development: imperialism does 
not develop except insofar as it can exploit and in order to 
exploit it has to accentuate inequalities of all sorts. 
Therefore, it has to be fought politically by all available 
means in every terrain. His message is simple and direct: 
fight imperialism now and not when it has finished its work 
as a catalytic agent of social transformations, because it 
cannot be trusted to be anything but oppressive and 
rapacious. The form is obvious and the intention more than 
evident. There are no possible theoretical contradictions 
because Lenin's essay is a political tract with an 
essentially nationalist message: "Monopolies, oligarchy, the 
striving for domination instead of striving for liberty, the 
exploitation of an increasing number of small or weak 
nations by a handful of the richest or most powerful 
nations— all these have given birth to those distinctive
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characteristics of imperialism which compel us to define it 
as parasitic or decaying capitalism."
To complete the picture, Lenin remitted the concept of 
opportunism: "Imperialism, which means the partition of the 
world...which means high monopoly profits for a handful of 
very rich countries, creates the economic possibility of 
bribing the upper strata of the proletariat, and thereby 
fosters, gives form to, and strengthens opportunism." 
Hobson had said: "There is first the habit of economic
parasitism, by which the ruling state has used its 
provinces, colonies and dependencies in order to enrich its 
ruling class and to bribe its lower classes into 
acquiescence." Lenin plays up the idea and puts it on an 
equal footing with imperialism on a scale of political 
priorities, because "the fight against imperialism is a sham 
and a humbug unless it is inseparably bound up with the 
fight against opportunism". If we collate the different 
parts of Lenin's essay, we can deduce approximately a cross­
bred thesis in which the export of capital develops backward 
societies to some extent, but having entered the 
monopolistic imperialist phase capitalism is capable only of 
exploitation, which it does all over the planet from the few 
centres where finance capital is concentrated. By toying 
with the Marxist notion of the export of capitalist forms 
but giving the upper hand to the ideas on economic 
imperialism in Hobson and Hilferding, Lenin came up with a 
call on the patriotic and nationalist sentiments of backward 
nations. It was a political thesis in essence, but in 
expressing it, not without its large quota of ambiguity, in 
fact, the richer for this, he foreshadowed the contemporary 
notion of a sort of long-term imperialism by which 
capitalism does not stimulate development and instead 
generates underdevelopment. It was also the thesis that 
many nationalists in Asia and Latin America were arriving 
at, and Lenin's message was calculated to coincide with them 
and to produces political benefits for communism. The 
important point here for the architecture of our own work is
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that Lenin had expressed to all intents and purposes 
something approaching a theory on the origins of inequality 
among nations. The scope of this theory however was too 
restricted. It concerned itself only with the period of 
imperialism, which in Lenin's terms of reference had 
practically begun at the turn of the century. 9^
To arrive at these incipient insights, Lenin had had to 
solve two doctrinaire problems. One was, as we saw, the 
equation capitalism equals progress, which he had finally 
unambiguously denounced. The other was what to do with the 
so-called bribing of the working class in the centres of 
finance capital. After all, Lenin could not abandon the 
call "proletarians arise" for "oppressed nations, fight 
back". As to the latter problem, he placed the fight 
against opportunism on the same footing as the struggle 
against imperialism. This was retreating judiciously from 
the out-and-out nationalist position he was taking, but it 
was understandable and the unspoken message was that somehow 
the proletarians of the world were one class. Lenin was 
above all a politician and this was politics of the highest 
order. Concerning the other problem, that is, the 
transformation of capitalism in its international role, 
Lenin hit on a brilliant and quite frankly a pregnant idea: 
he said that capitalism had become imperialism and entered 
its final phase. Capitalism had not yet exhausted the 
possibilities of world-wide exploitation. In most colonies 
all it wanted were raw materials, which is hardly an 
advanced form of capitalist exploitation. But it had run 
its course in the centres of financial capital. In both its 
centre and in the backward nations all over the world, it 
was the same imperialism and therefore the fight, whatever 
the social conditions, was the same. In one stroke, he 
eliminated the objection that it was necessary for advanced 
capitalism to spread all over the world— which was a 
refutation of Luxemburg— and the objection that revolution 
had to begin at the core of capitalism. And this 
was theory-cum-politics of the most efficacious, almost
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prophetic kind.
It is true that Lenin's essay would probably not have 
gained the influence that it did if Lenin himself had not 
triumphed as a politician, but surely it would have stood 
out in any event as a signal elaboration. Of course, the 
final phase never actually existed as such, and in that 
sense he was wrong. Lenin, it must be recalled, elaborated 
his theory of imperialism at a time when, first, the world 
had virtually been carved up by the main capitalist powers 
and there were signs and symptoms of restlessness and 
resistance in the subject lands, and second, the capitalist 
Armageddon that Marx had envisioned seemed to be coming true 
in the sense that the different "advanced" and "monopolized" 
national economic structures were at each others throats in 
the Great War. But in fact he did not proffer any 
conclusive evidence that capitalism had actually undergone a 
qualitative internal change which brought it closer to 
extinction through the working out of its internal self­
destructive logic. He accepted Hobson's arguments and 
figures, reinforced with others he culled here and there in 
his own research, and poured the mixture into a Marxist 
conceptual and analytical framework, and after that he
thought he found corroboration for his views in contemporary 
events. Hobson, however, had not proposed a new foredoomed 
hypostasis of capitalism, and Lenin's evidence for it was 
highly selective, netted by political revolutionary 
prejudices rather than by rigorous inductive methods. Lenin 
was in fact losing sight of the forest for the trees.
THE CRITIQUE OF THE SPECIFIC THEORY OF ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM
Where did Lenin go specifically wrong in his historical 
analyses? He went wrong in dismissing the resilience of the 
centres of capitalism. Monopoly was not as widespread as he 
supposed. Financial capital had not taken over the system 
and was managing it through some kind of irresponsible and 
secretive petit comite. Raw materials were by no means 
running out. In other words, at the centre there was scope 
for growth and reform, and revolution was not imminent or
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even near because of the state of social conditions. This 
applied to the industrialized and to rapidly developing 
nations like Japan, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, On 
the other hand, even though capitalism was not doing 
anything spectacular to improve conditions in the 
underdeveloped world these nations were working out their 
own ways and means to resist political control and economic 
imposition. By and large their concerns were political and 
even though these often overlapped with socialist economic 
objectives, politics had the upper hand. Despite Lenin's 
sweeping optimism the toiling colonial masses ignored that 
they were in the grip of the international capitalist 
octopus, and their leaders wanted above all freedom to run 
their own affairs, even if under a mini-capitalist proto­
system. Conversely colonialist powers that had them in 
their grip were hanging on, but they were slowly becoming 
aware that they could survive without their colonies. Lenin 
was also right. He was right in the fundamental vision that 
revolution could succeed anywhere given the global nature of 
capitalism in its imperialist phase, hence he was on the qui 
vive about his own Russia and he did not have the doubts and 
scruples of the Mensheviks, which would have been fatal for 
the future revolution. Once in power, Lenin had in place 
the theoretical basis for the further spread of communism in 
any direction. He could in good revolutionary law look to 
the West for more social upheaval, but he could also, if 
that failed, cast his glance eastwards and southwards in the 
name of the struggle against imperialism, which in effect 
happened. His raw and ambiguous theses were the ideal seed­
bed for all sorts of practical and convenient theoretical 
eleaborations.
The theoretical critique of the Leninist imperialist 
hypothesis falls partially within the general critique of 
the specific economic-imperialism theory. We already saw 
the statistical critique of the latter. It is, in effect, a 
critique of Hobson, because after him no one attempted the 
same sort of rigorous statistical demonstration that he put
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forward. We also analysed and criticized the explorations 
of late-19th century colonialism that over and above 
economics placed political motivations and rivalries. These 
criteria, and in particular the Robinson and Gallagher 
theses, are not an outright denial but a modulation of the 
economic motivation.
There is also, however, the fundamental ideological 
negation of the validity of the concept of economic 
imperialism. The most famous is perhaps J. Schumpeter's 
over-rated explanation of imperialism, which is more in the 
nature of an alternative than a critique, and whose vague 
socio-historical character has had only isolated 
repercussions. He conceived imperialism as an atavistic 
tendency to expansion or aggrandizement on the part of the 
state, more or less pronounced depending on the influence or 
weight of militarism and other practices associated with 
absolutist political power. Schumpeter was emphatic about 
two things: capitalism per se was not imperialistic and the 
British Empire, despite the apparent contradiction, was not 
a product of imperialism. He was perhaps close to home 
insofar as Fascist Italy and Nazi German, whose use of naked 
bullying power during the 30s set the pattern of 
international power politics, were near-perfect incarnations 
of his model. But on the whole his overt distinction 
between capitalism and the state, between the economic order 
and the seat of political power, is frankly untenable as 
seen from almost any analytical and socio-historical point 
of view. Only economic marginalists and other strictly 
analytical equilibrium theorists could entertain such a 
separation and that only on the basis of their own economic 
and political prejudices. Leninism and economic-imperialism 
theory can be said to be fairly safe from this critique.
In the end, any criticism of Lenin must fall back on 
the critique of the specific theory of economic imperialism, 
and therefore it is true of his ideas as of Hobson's that 
they do not explain adequately enough the specific events 
that they address. Hobson's statistics have been confuted
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by other statistics, perhaps more precise and reliable, and 
there is certainly more to fin de siecle colonialism than 
cost/profit accounting can explain. On a wider front, the 
facts of history have overturned the analysis and the 
expectations of Hilferding, Luxemburg, and Lenin. Finance 
capital in our days has been relegated by neo“Leninist 
analysis to a subordinate position vis a vis the
multinational corporations. Despite Luxemburg's rigorous 
demonstrations, capitalism has not industrialized the world 
for its own benefit although there is a trend in
contemporary Marxism that tends to vindicate the Luxemburg 
forecast. And decolonization and other processes have left
Lenin's theory in tatters, however plausible the concepts of
neo“Colonialism and contemporary informal imperialism might 
have seemed in the recent past.
Non“economicist explanations of imperialism, however, 
also fall short of their objective, and economic imperialism 
at least has a flexibility and a range of applicability 
which rigidly political formulations lack. Economic
imperialism can have a narrow or a wide meaning. It can be 
read in the pages of "The Heart of Darkness" and it can be 
seen in the murals of D. Rivera in Cuernavaca. We shall see 
shortly how it evolved from the Leninist thesis into the 
principal, almost spontaneous way by which revolutionaries 
from the underdeveloped and colonial lands framed or
organize their perception of the relations between the rich 
and the poor countries. Economic imperialism is, in brief, 
one of the fundamental versions of the way intercultural and 
international perceptions and relations have evolved in
time, on the same level of importance at least as 
environmental theory and Eurocentrism. By way of contrast, 
could Robinson and Gallagher have applied their going“tO“ 
the“political“Sources method to the Spanish conquest of 
America, where the royal cedulas said one thing and the
adelantados did exactly the opposite? Or could Schumpeter's 
fancy conceptism allow for the likely inference that the 
British conquest of India could have been nothing other than
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a purely capitalist enterprise? Yet these two events were 
in essence not entirely unlike the scramble for Africa, and 
for all of them the wide or general theory of economic 
imperialism could conceivably seem the only possible 
symposium.
THE DAWN OF A BRAVE, NEW WORLD
The theory of economic imperialism gained immesurably 
in prestige and eventually in practical and ideological 
influence as a consequence of an event that occurred in the 
midst of the WWl hecatomb. On 7 November 1917 (October 26 
according to the Julian calendar), the Bolsheviks, inspired 
by Lenin himself, fresh from writing his thesis on 
imperialism, and implacably led by the redoubtable L. 
Trotsky, staged a coup d'etat which was, according to Curzio 
Malaparte, like "striking a blow at a corpse". Before the 
year was out, Trotsky, the one-man band of the Revolution, 
signed with the Germans an armistice which effectively took 
Russia out of the war and freed a million Germans to man the 
trenches on the Western front. The Western allies in an 
attempt to get Russia back in the war landed troops in 
Archangel, on the White Sea, and gave all the support they 
could to the insurrections which soon broke out all over the 
country. Thus began the siege of Soviet Russia. This time 
Trotsky donned the soldier's cap and from his command post 
on a train like an armoured fortress travelled from one end 
to the other of Russia successfully leading operations 
against assorted white generals commanding cossack and other 
counter-revolutionary contingents. The Bolsheviks were not 
to be the only ones in trouble. In November 1918 Germany in 
effect asked for terms and revolutionary agitation, which 
had been going on before, became active and menacing. 
Marxist socialists were prominent in the unrest that led to 
the abdication of the Kaiser shortly after the cessation of 
hostilities. The republic that followed was thrown at the 
lap of the social-democrats, who seemed willing enough to 
accept responsibility for it and for all that it came to 
mean for Germans as the heir to defeat and anarchy. The
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communists hung back and became a vociferous, semi-violent 
opposition led by k. Liebknecht and R. Luxemburg. For these 
two there were no half-tints: it was all out revolution or 
nothing. In Hungary the situation was even more critical 
because there the communists under Bela Kun had actually 
taken over the government. Revolution seemed to be 
spreading in the West after the end of the war in the wake 
of Soviet Russia, and the Russians were intensely aware of 
it.
The Bolsheviks were expectant about all these events 
for diverse good reasons. First of all, they themselves 
were being besieged by reactionary forces and had an 
understandable urge to hit back at the Western sponsors of 
these forces. There was not better way to do it than to 
carry revolution to the heart of their enemies* societies. 
Secondly, a Sovietized Germany would be an immeasurably 
valuable ally in the quest for world revolution. Considering 
the industrial importance of Germany, her radicalization, 
Russian leaders fantasized, could very well signify the 
beginning of the end of capitalism. Finally, there were 
solid doctrinaire grounds not only for wanting Germany in 
but also for expecting her to enter into revolution: Germany 
had the most numerous, the best organized and the most 
radicalized proletarian movement in the world, she was one 
of the models of Leninist finance capitalism, and her 
communization would respond ideally to Marxist principles 
and expectations. Therefore, even as the Bolsheviks were 
having to stitch their nation painfully back together, in 
the process suffering hunger and other deprivations, they 
felt encouraged and even optimistic when they contemplated 
the events taking place in Germany. None was more hopeful 
than the brilliant and irrepressible Trotsky.
THE PROCESS OF THE COMINTERN
The Third Communist International, or Comintern, was 
founded in March 1919, in Moscow. Its purpose was to 
promote world revolution, but also, as a matter of course, 
to obtain support for the Soviet revolution. For our
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purposes especially, it embraced a second, intermediate 
phase in the evolution of economic-imperialism theory. 
Throughout its life— and it was only shutdown definitely in 
1943— the ambiguity about its ultimate objectives hovered 
over all its actions and initiatives both practical and 
theoretical, so much so that the history of the Comintern 
has been classified in terms of the tug on its proceedings 
of one or another of those two tendencies. Another way of 
defining the same issue is to enquire into the extent to 
which the Comintern was from start to finish a mere 
instrument of Soviet policy. F. Borkenau considers that 
there was a first phase of Comintern history during which 
the Soviets did not dominate, when the initiatives were in 
the hands of German communists, of Kun in Hungary, and of 
various other local revolutionary movements, and the 
Comintern was strictly a means for furthering world 
revolution. Successive defeats to initially promising 
communist bids for power outside of the USSR, led to the 
devolution of control within the Comintern to the Soviets, 
who used the organization, in a second and longer phase, as 
one of the crucial stages in the Stalin-versus-Trotsky 
factional struggle, and in a final and even longer phase, as 
a mere appendage of Stalinist policy. This thesis is also 
held, along general lines, by I. Deutscher. A more prevalent 
opinion is that the Comintern could not have escaped Soviet 
control at any time in view of the organizational structure 
it gave itself at the founding congress of 1919 and at the 
two successive ones under the guidance of Lenin, whose 
avowed intention was doing away with any possibility of 
"federalism", the cardinal sin, in his opinion, of the 
Second International. Under the new form of organization 
all the essential powers in the Comintern devolved to the 
executive committee, which sat in Moscow and handled 
affairs from congress to congress and thus could and 
did turn itself into "an anti-democratic, self-elected
oligarchy".G2
- 115 -
Nevertheless, just as the Comintern could not control 
world events, not even all the actions of its members 
parties all over the world, so the Soviets could not control 
entirely at first the twists and turns in the debates that 
went on in the congresses. Towards the close, under the 
Stalinist boot, the Comintern became nothing more than a wax 
seal for Soviet foreign policy and for Stalinist ideology, 
but before that it followed an interesting process which 
lurched on towards the configuration of the contemporary 
neo-Marxist/Leninist general theory of economic imperialism, 
though it never actually got there, and when it started 
Lenin had already done half the theoretical work. To 
understand this process the classification proposed by D. 
Boersner can be handy:
"From 1919 to 1920, the International had its eyes 
entirely turned to the West, and considered the East only as 
an auxiliary in the apparently imminent proletarian 
revolution.
"From 1920 to 1923, i.e., from its Second to its Fourth 
Congress, the Comintern devoted an equal amount of attention 
to the West and to the East and distributed its agitational 
activities very evenly among both.
"From 1923 to 1927, i.e. from the Fourth Congress up to 
the volte face of the Kuomintang, the International devoted 
its greatest attention to the East and followed a policy of 
faithful cooperation with the revolutionary nationalists.
"After 1927, and especially after the Sixth Congress, 
the Comintern, in spite of the absence of proletarian 
revolution in the West, entered a phase of ultra-leftism in 
the Eastern and colonial countries. To this internal 
process, which treaded closely in step with the march of 
revolutionary events after the Great War, there corresponded 
an ideological one which had as pivot the questions of the 
world role of capitalism/imperialism in the historical 
movement towards revolution and in particular of the effects
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it had on the social and economic evolution of backward and 
dependent lands.
Despite radical opposition to colonialism, the Second 
International (1989-1914) all in all still lived by the 
dictum that "The colonies, too, must pass through 
capitalism. One does not pass from savagery to socialism in 
a single leap." The colonies, and the rest of the backward 
countries, were not very important in that period to 
socialist thinking and strategy. Lenin had a different 
opinion insofar as he showed himself primarily and 
intransigently anti-imperialist. He too felt, however, that 
revolution would take place first in Europe under the 
leadership of a proletarian-based communist vanguard. The 
events in Germany after the war were so potent a sign of 
hope for the Bolsheviks that despite the bloody suppression 
of the brief Spartakist insurrection in January 1919, when 
the First Comintern Congress met two months later, the 
enthusiasm for revolution was virtually intact. It fed on 
the thesis of the "permanent revolution"— the belief in the 
furtherance of revolutionary activism on a continuous basis 
and across international frontiers— , which had its most 
formidable and influential advocate in Trotsky, although 
Lenin too figured as a cautious adherent. The demise the 
same year of the ephemeral Bela Kun regime in Hungary did 
not dampen hopes either. Trotsky was at the zenith of his 
military career and of his political power. The Red Army 
was retaking one by one all the cities and the regions 
previously forfeited to the counter-revolution. Recognizing 
the failure of intervention, the British had withdrawn from 
Murmansk. Understandably enough in view of all these 
events, the colonies received only a passing mention in the 
final resolutions of the inaugural Comintern congress. With 
the recapture of Odessa in 1920, the Russian civil war came 
to an end, and with the alleviation of the military pressure 
on the revolution, the issue of the colonies— which became 
known as the "Oriental question" because it was in the 
Islamic East that a potential for revolution seemed to
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flicker— gained considerably in importance and figured with 
some prominence in the proceedings of the Second Congress, 
celebrated the same year. A gathering of Comintern 
representatives and Persian, Armenian, and Turkish delegates 
met in Baku after the Congress and proceeded to brand 
imperialism retrograde. It was also at Baku that John Reed, 
the American revolutionary journalist, proclaimed the 
solidarity of Latin America with the peoples of Asia.^^
In the Third Congress, held in 1921, the enthusiasm for 
revolution in the East was much subdued due to the Soviet 
need to maintain good relations with Persia and Turkey, and 
in its stead, Germany was once again the cynosure of the 
debates despite the recent defeat of a workers' uprising in 
the Ruhr. The claims of Asia upon the revolution, however, 
were met at the Congress of the Toilers of the East, which 
was held in Moscow in 1922. According to Boersner, the idea 
that "the national democratic revolution of an 
underdeveloped country was likely to precede the proletarian 
transformation of the advanced regions" was first expressed 
at this meeting. At the Fourth Congress, also in 1922, the 
colonial question came back strongly on the agenda. The 
tack taken tended towards the gradualist strategy of 
communist alliances with local bourgeoisies against 
imperialism. One of the most prominent theorists of the 
Comintern, the Indian M.N. Roy, divided colonial and semi­
colonial countries into a) the advanced with a class­
conscious bourgeoisie; b) those with feudal predominance; 
and c) the primitive with feudal patriarchalism. Roy also 
proposed the idea that capitalism promotes decolonization 
and industrial development in the colonies in order to 
create markets for producers' goods from the advanced 
capitalist countries, but this point of view was 
overwhelmingly rejected. Boersner summarizes thus the 
proceedings of the Fourth Congress: "The general theses on 
the Eastern question stated that the World War had weakened 
imperialism and that the growth of nationalist fermentation 
in the colonies was steady and mighty. In opposition to
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Roy's theory of decolonization, the theses maintained that 
European capitalism continued to keep the colonies 
underdeveloped and non“industrial. It could be said that 
as early as 1922 communism had taken imperialism, despoiled 
it of all ambiguities, turned it gradually into the
principal enemy of progress and change, and to round things 
out, had "invented" a national bourgeoisie to stand up 
against it in alliance with the communists themselves. In 
this scheme the only thing that was lacking was the dumping 
of the West as a revolutionary focus, and this was
practically inevitable with the failure of the communist 
insurrection in Hamburg in 1923. Revolution was not likely 
from that quarter anymore. The Soviet Union on its side had 
overcome its political birth pangs and was on its way to 
national consolidation. Revolutionary ferment was strongest 
in the non“industrialized world, and it was in this
direction that Comintern energies seemed to be converging, 
just as Soviet energies were almost inevitably committed to 
socialism in one country.
THE "DISCOVERY" OF LATIN AMERICA
The fifth congress of the Comintern was held in 1924, 
and it centred primarily on China, which was in the throes 
of extreme social unrest with the communist in precarious 
alliance with the Kuomintang. Behind the debate loomed the 
struggle for power in the Soviet Union between Trotsky and 
Stalin. Despite defeat in the West, where he had been the 
principal instigator of extremism, Trotsky still believed in 
permanent revolution and wanted his strategy, which implied 
a rejection of alliances and compromises, carried out by 
communists in China. Stalin preferred a more prudent, less 
adventurous approach, which meant preserving the alliance 
with the Nationalists, and his point of view prevailed. For 
its pains, it suffered Chiang Kai“shek's bloody 1927 
suppression of communists in Shanghai and elsewhere. Even 
after the failure of this strategy, plus that of another 
Stalin“sponsored, Comintern“inspired uprising in Canton the 
same year, Stalin still managed to crush Trotsky utterly.
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The fifth congress also consecrated the revolutionary 
importance of backward nations, or as Boersner says, it 
"placed the national and colonial question at the very head 
of its basic rules of action". Among other things it 
proposed the following slogan a propos the British Labour 
government: "The liberation of the workers of England
depends on the liberation of the colonies.
The sixth congress (1928), in the words of M. Caballero, 
"showed, with reference to colonial questions, two main 
trends. The first was the tendency to reverse the tactics 
which were dominant in the former congress related to the 
alliance with the national bourgeoisie. This was a 
consequence of the attitude of the Kuomintang against the 
communists... The second trend was what has been called the 
'discovery* of Latin America." What did this discovery 
contribute to Comintern debate and revolutionary theory? 
For one thing, there was the tentative denial of the 
existence of a national bourgeoisie in Latin America in the 
sense of a capitalist class in potential or actual 
opposition to imperialist penetration. There was also the 
emphatic presentation of the category of "dependencies" of 
imperialism as the only adequate one for the Latin American 
countries. It was put forward at the Congress by the 
Ecuadorian delegate Ricardo Paredes in these terms: 
"Therefore a new category must be accepted. This new group 
would consist of the 'dependencies' which have been 
penetrated economically by imperialism but which retain a 
certain political independence either because the economic 
penetration is not very strong or because they are strong 
politically." In assessing the relative significance of 
this clarification by a Latin American in a gathering of 
dedicated Marxist revolutionaries, it must be remembered 
that Lenin, who set the essential rules by which the 
Comintern lived, had been wont to distinguish, outside of 
the "four pillars" of imperialism, only between colonies and 
semi-colonies. The Paredes intervention implied a
hierarchy, which had been present in the Latin American
- 120 -
awareness of the political division of the world, involving 
the following categories: a) imperialist powers; b)
dependencies, which were sovereign nations with backward 
economies, hence subject to extreme exogenous influence; c) 
semi-colonies, that is, internally autonomous countries (not 
necessarily backward economically) whose defence and foreign 
affairs were conducted externally, which included the 
British self-governing dominions, Egypt, et al; and d) 
colonies proper and other subject territories. Whether this 
hierarchy was valid or not, whether say, Australia was more 
of a colony than Ecuador or the other way around, is of 
course a debatable issue, but in a purely formal political 
sense, it could be validly proposed and to a Latin American 
it also must have seemed prima facie admissible. This 
forceful presentation of a widely-held Latin American point 
of view did not prosper, however, and according to 
M.Caballero, "In spite of the relative acceptance of the 
diversity of state forms of dependence, in spite of the 
formula of Paredes, after 1928 the Comintern tended to use 
such formulas as 'dependency' less and, in fact, to put the 
accent on the semi-colonial condition of Latin American 
countries."^7
In summing up the relationship between Latin America 
and the Comintern, Caballero says: "Paradoxically (because
the Comintern did not want to be a propaganda association 
but a practical tool for organizing and leading the 
revolution), its main influence in Latin America has been in 
the theoretical realm. Thus, questions related to the 
definition of Latin American societies, such as if those 
countries were 'semi-colonies' or if they exhibited another 
kind of 'dependence' have been at the centre of theoretical 
and political debates for more than fifty years. Thus, 
also, the questions related to the 'democratic bourgeois' 
character of the Latin American Revolution have their 
doctrinal origin in the discussions over policy sustained 
within the C o m i n t e r n . Here, in a contemporary context, 
Caballero harks back to the implicit Paredes hierarchy.
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whlch likewise underlies the entire edifice of the theory of 
dependence defined and outlined by F.H, Cardoso and E. 
Faletto, in particular the distinction between 
"dependencies" and "semi-colonies". However, if the latter 
distinction in the 1920s relied on perceivable formal 
features proper to the final stages of the long epoch of 
European colonialism, in the decolonized post-war world even 
though it still might have seemed valid it was less easy to 
apprehend and define.
Again, it is Lenin who offers useful guidelines. For 
him "dependencies" was a portmanteau designation for all 
non-imperialist countries, as it had been for all colonies 
of conquest in 19th century British colonialist authors, and 
that is the sense in which Soviet dogma after WW2 used it in 
its analyses and propaganda. In some Latin American Marxist 
circles during the 60s it was used in the Paredes sense of 
political independence with economic dependence. The 
implication was that, historically at least, the relations 
of Latin American nations with the imperialist powers were 
different, much less externally dictated, than the former 
colonial relationships as established in Asia and Africa. 
But even in Latin America at the time there were actually 
two connotations to "dependence": one was the Paredes
definition, a connotation that some non-Latin American 
Marxists later decried, thus leading to a frank but 
equivocal rejection of dependency theory (were they 
rejecting the concept of qualified dependence, or were they 
rejecting Latin American theses?); and the other was the 
wider connotation which hardly distinguished between 
dependence and the related concepts of colonies and semi­
colonies .
The narrower definition of dependency fitted into a 
traditional Latin American point of view, one which 
received its highest accolade on the political left in the 
Cardoso/Faletto theory of dependence, but some Latin 
American thinkers also used "dependency" as a virtual 
synonym of "colony", which was standard analytical practice
- 122 -
outside of Latin America, and it was this meaning of 
dependence which eventually became entrenched in the heart 
of the general theory of economic imperialism in Latin 
America and outside of Latin America. Thus, even though 
Paredes' distinction and the hierarchy implied by it did 
certainly have a contemporary ring, and even though they had 
an indisputable validity from at least the Latin American 
historical perspective, they represented an intellectual cul 
de sac, as did Cardoso and Faletto, as we shall see, within 
the general trend of neo-Marxist world-historical analysis 
and thought. And just as the significance of the Paredes 
distinction can be over-interpreted, so Caballero's 
attribution of a theoretical primacy on Latin American 
Marxist issues to Comintern proceedings seems somewhat 
exaggerated in view of the fact that J.C. Mariategui and 
V.R. Haya de la Torre, plus a host of other Latin American 
thinkers and politicians, were deep into the issues 
Caballero mentions without having participated in Comintern 
congresses, in fact probably better off intellectually 
because of that. It can be said, though tip-toeingly, that 
the Comintern was influential on the general drift of the 
theory of economic imperialism but that it did not make one 
single identifiable theoretical contribution, and that it 
had virtually no impact on individual issues of Marxist 
theory although it undoubtedly did play an important 
bridging role between the specific theory of economic 
imperialism and the post-Stalin general dependency theory'^9
The Comintern had one final Congress, in 1935, before 
its dissolution eight years later. It sanctioned yet 
another strategic volte face with the approval of the 
"popular front" line, which defended a strategy of political 
alliances and was a consequence of successive defeats 
suffered world-wide by the communist movement. The Nazi- 
Soviet Pact of 1939 made the direction of the Comintern a 
delicate almost impossible affair, and the wartime pact 
between the USSR and the Anglo-American alliance practically
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condemned it to inoperativeness, thus putting paid to its 
useful life.
THE GENERAL THEORY OF ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM
The contemporary general theory of economic 
imperialism, that is, dependency theory, exhibits the 
following characteristics (and others, on all of which much 
more will be said further on): a) it considers that
capitalism does not just inhibit development but that it is 
actually and historically "underdeveloping"; b) it tends to 
smear over the distinctions between capitalism, colonialism, 
and imperialism; c) it puts in doubt the validity and/or 
utility of the concept of national bourgeoisie; and d) it 
virtually rejects the feudalism/capitalism schema of socio- 
historical analysis. It goes without saying that it
acknowledges the Marxist concepts of mode of production and 
class struggle, but it places the greater emphasis on the 
external aspect of socio-economic processes in 
underdeveloped countries. Already Lenin had taken a few 
halting steps in that direction. He practically did an 
outright reversal on the Marx/Engels conception of the 
modernizing or progressive final effects of capitalism on 
backward nations. Furthermore, he probably was not 
completely convinced of the virtues of bourgeois 
nationalism, and in fact, he said that the phase of
development that in a backward nation the bourgeoisie stood 
for could actually be skipped with revolutionary help from 
the outside. Even granting the significant differences in 
the worlds known by Marx and by Lenin, Lenin's deviations 
from strict Marxism would still merit the coinage of the 
term Leninism.
The Comintern went a few steps closer to our time 
ideologically without actually overstepping the bounds of
Marxism/Leninism. This was due to the presence in its 
deliberations of representatives from the underdeveloped 
countries themselves, whose experience of economic
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backwardness and of foreign penetration was practical and 
direct.
Comintern theses and resolutions, once the mirage of 
permanent revolution was dissipated, placed more emphasis on 
the retrograde influence of imperialism than Lenin himself 
had actually done, while at the same time, with the arrival 
en masse of Latin American delegates, identifying the 
significance of relative political independence. Comintern 
debates played up the notion of national bourgeoisie, but 
they contained different even opposed criteria, ultimately 
perhaps distrust having the upper hand. In the balance the 
most significant contribution of the Comintern to theory was 
probably formal in character and consisted in the constant 
collating of ideas and reality which over the years and 
despite the presence of the Bolshevik landlord-cum-censor in 
the background was inimical to orthodoxy and dogmatism. The 
Comintern debates did not produce the contemporary general 
version of the theory of economic imperialism, nor did they 
put forth any theory at all on the origins of inequality, 
which after all could not be further from their concerns 
and preoccupations. They had however the right conditions 
for it: the reality of imperialism, a fluid theoretical
point of view, and the presence of parties which did not 
need prodding to blame imperialism for all the evils in the 
world since the beginning of time. The Comintern, however, 
lacked agility, it lacked the free-wheeling view that came 
with the post-WW2 era of decolonization and de- 
Stalinization, and then perhaps too the Soviet gendarme was 
not there for nothing. Comintern influence cannot be 
circumscribed to the narrow Marxist revolutionary circles 
which were its normal intellectual clients. It can safely be 
taken to have flowed into a mainstream of theoretical work 
that carried on into the post-WW2 era in conjunction with 
the momentous historical processes that got their headstart 
in that conflict. In the meantime, what had happened to 
Eurocentrism, which we last saw on its social-imperialist
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hlgh horse and certainly not to be run down by Marxist 
rantings from Moscow?
THE HUMANE FACE OF EUROCENTRISM
Marxist theory and anti-imperialism hardly affected the 
pride of Eurocentrism, but WWl did, and so did the Bolshevik 
Revolution and the threat of revolutionary unrest in the 
West. Furthermore, the "inferior races" in the colonies and 
in semi-colonies like Egypt and Persia were getting edgy. 
Violence is a dangerous leveller, and WWl left the scent of 
violence in the air. Racism had not disappeared but it was 
no longer aired so openly. After the trenches and the 
slaughter and the indecisiveness of war, social Darwinism 
would have one last insane fling in Fascist Italy and 
especially in Nazi Germany. It was like a deadly caricature 
of militant Eurocentrism: Italians bombing Ethiopian hamlets 
from the air and Nazis carrying out the logic of race 
supremacy in the extermination camps. However, Eurocentrism 
had more humane and rational aspects. One that incides 
indirectly on the question of the origins of international 
economic inequality was the theoretical work on the subject 
of the development of the West.
Marx's oeuvre, which spans the period when industrialism 
entered a mature pan-Western phase was significantly, 
perhaps crucially, responsible for making capitalism aware 
of itself, but awareness is not necessarily admiration and 
capitalism was admirable in many ways, at least on its own 
turf. Just how admirable was the task that a group of 
theorists straddling the 20th century set themselves. These 
theorists were, principally, M. Weber, W. Sombart, and well 
past the start of the century, J.A. Schumpeter. All of them 
believed that capitalism was rational. The first two also 
believed that it had ethico-religious foundations. All 
three thinkers can be placed in the category of enlightened 
Eurocentrism through their tacit but unequivocal negation of 
racism and social Darwinism. Their myopia, if we can call 
it that, consisted in the restriction of their lines of 
sight, in being perhaps culturally star-struck by the West
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to the exclusion from their vision of the rest of the world 
(except in a relatively marginal way in the case of Weber), 
Our interest in mentioning them in passing lies in that 
their intellectual progeny are the works of those who in our 
days have carried on with the exploration, from different 
angles and with varying degrees of historical range, of the 
process and the evolution of Western capitalism, and this, 
as we shall see in the final part of this thesis, offers in 
the last analysis possibly the most reliable approach to the 
study of the origins of international economic inequality.
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CHAPTER 3
POLICIES AND POLITICS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE THIRD WORLD
“ 128 —
There is a three-stage sequence of ways in which the 
world can be roughly divided historically from the 
perspective of Western economic development into large 
conceptually manageable categories: before the 19th century, 
mainly into different comparable high cultures and 
civilizations; during the 19th century and up to WW2, into 
the advanced capitalist nations, which might or might not 
include Argentina and Uruguay depending on the measurements 
applied, and the politically and culturally backward rest of 
the world, which was made up mostly of colonies, a handful 
of semi-independent states in Africa and Asia, and the 
remaining Latin American republics (and in a category of its 
own, the rapidly industrializing USSR); and after WW2, the 
communist bloc excepted, into the economically developed and 
the underdeveloped blocs. These classifications are 
essentially "Western" as opposed to Marxist or "Third World" 
perceptions of history and of economic development. They 
betoken wide cultural, economic, and political perceptions. 
They are also the sources of theories and explanations. In 
the case of the pre-19th century dominant Western perception 
of cultures, the theories had to do with the differences 
between Western culture and the other world cultures. The 
relativistic perception of cultural differences engendered 
principally theories on the environmental causation of 
social and behavioural traits, although of course 
ethnocentric claims of Western superiority were never absent 
from pre-19th century inter-cultural contacts. Even though 
environmental or climatic theory ideally suited a world of 
cultural relativism, it survived in the Eurocentric climate 
of the 19th century as an explanation of Western 
superiority, and it was still going strong in modified, more 
enlightened versions into the post-WW2 era. During the 19th 
century Western progress and expansion made relativism 
unsustainable and Eurocentrism became the expression of the 
West’s certainty of its cultural superiority over what were 
uniformly described as "backward nations" and "inferior 
races". China, for example, was demoted from the station it 
had sometimes acquired of being a paradigm of wisdom and
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virtue to the level of a barbaric and uncivilized land. 
Eurocentrism, in the rather prejudicial guises it tended to 
assume, came under fire from the theory of economic 
imperialism. It did not fare well during the two world 
wars, but it too survived in a humanitarian, toned-down 
version, as we shall strive to show in the third part of 
this dissertation, which revolves crucially around explicit 
post-WW2 theories on the origins of international economic 
inequality as distinct from the explanations implicit in 
Eurocentrism and in the narrow, short-term theory of 
economic imperialism. In other words, it is here that we 
enter, properly speaking, into our principal area of 
research, which, however, in our opinion cannot be fully 
understood if it were not made part of long-term 
intellectual continuities, just as today's world division 
between rich and poor countries cannot be fully understood 
without the Industrial Revolution, nor the latter 
sequestered from its Western cultural cradle.
Before ceding its place to a less invidious 
"economicist" perception of the world, the rigid Eurocentric 
outlook had come under pressure and critical scrutiny from 
different quarters. WWl, which left Western civilization 
exhausted and disillusioned about itself, effectively 
claimed social Darwinism as one of its casualties. By the 
time that another world conflagration became imminent, the 
superior/inferior dichotomy was wearing thin. It was about 
then also that a new conceptual classification that obviated 
the increasingly untenable contrast between civilized and 
inferior peoples was being elaborated: it divided the
capitalist world into the same two blocs as before, but
these were now economic blocs, not overtly based on race or 
cultural disparities, but on the distinction between the 
economically advanced and the economically backward 
countries. The West still viewed the rest of the world
through dim sceptical eyes, but this scepticism was more 
plausible than extreme Eurocentric prejudices, and it was 
conceivable that it could be substituted by some sort of
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rational, progressive, and "hopeful” conceptualization. The 
compass to the new intellectual terrain was the idea of 
"underdevelopment". It elbowed aside the old jades of 
"inferior races" and "backwardness" and it also lent itself 
ideally for tracing sensible, bridgeable frontiers in a 
world of economic inequalities, even if in the end they 
followed in the main the old dividing lines.
"Underdevelopment" and "underdeveloped" more than mere 
post-war neologisms are socio-historical clues. Whoever 
actually put the word "underdevelopment" together was 
probably slaving away before the War in some university 
cubicle, and writing in English.^9 However, the invention 
of the word is not as significant as its general acceptance 
and wide diffusion during the years immediately after the 
War. This happened either because the term designated some 
meaningful reality, or because it gave a special sense to an 
old intellectual perception. Does "underdevelopment" have a 
basis in reality wider or different in any way than that 
which underpins the notion of economic backwardness? In 
point of fact, yes: underdevelopment refers to a measurable, 
numerically comparative backwardness. It is perhaps the 
same phenomenon as backwardness but seen through a fine 
wire-grid. It is like a quality photograph as opposed to an 
oil painting by a tyro. "Underdevelopment" has come to 
grief in recent times. The oft-heard assertion that 
"underdevelopment" is a mere euphemism is only partially 
correct. At the time when the word first became current 
there was little concern in the West for the opinions of the 
politicians or the public in backward lands. 
"Underdevelopment" takes on the appearance of a euphemism 
mostly in the critical review of post-war developmental 
dogmas and by comparison with older designations. But in 
fact it is not as an euphemism that it has fallen into ill 
repute but because of its patronizing overtones. This 
engendered, through the repeated exercise of what G.Myrdal 
called "diplomacy in terminology", a variety of new phrases: 
"developing countries", "less developed countries", and so
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on, which have entered the vocabulary of international 
agencies, politicians, and pressmen. Among the reasons for 
its downfall some have to do with the corrosive effects of 
time and failure. In its origins, however,
"underdevelopment" was not condescending, as it later came 
to seem, and it was not associated with stagnation and 
defeat. It implied the capacity to grow and catch up, a 
state of potentiality that would by rational means be taken 
to a higher level of economic organization.
AREAS OF RESEARCH
But if underdevelopment conjures up such a diversity of 
attitudes, it is probably because its principal historical 
raison d'etre was to offer a "mediation" for a global change 
that occurred in the material and conceptual relations 
between the West and the backward lands and which had WW2 as 
a fulcrum. The change itself admits different
interpretations. For one thing it substituted the
traditional vision of socio-economic backwardness for a more 
hopeful if more abstract condition. But principally 
"underdevelopment" firmly established the economic 
implications in the Western awareness of the relations
between the advanced and the backward countries in the
capitalist world. The pre-WW2 diversity in political 
perceptions played down the weight of economic issues, so 
that even imperialism theory, with its firm grounding in
economic analysis, functioned as an instrument of political 
action insofar as its underlying critique was contingent 
upon political domination. Instead of the old Western 
conceptual ordering which had been gradually coming round to 
the primacy of economic defferentiations but still hung on 
to political categories and definitions, the post-WW2 
capitalist world rapidly came to see itself as exclusively 
divided by economic inequalities. By the same token, under 
the general intellectual guidance provided by the idea of 
underdevelopment, the previous conceptual separation of the 
backward lands into colonies and politically and 
economically backward independent nations tended to
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coalesce, in rhythm with the process of decolonization, into 
not precisely a bloc-concept but an awareness of common 
basic economic interests.
In sum, the old Western racial and cultural prejudices 
had self-destructed even before they were seen to be 
inadequate in a world where colonialism was bowing out and 
Eurocentrism no longer had the field to itself. A new wave 
of theorization on the relations between the strong and the 
weak, the rich and the poor countries was on its way. It 
can be divided into two general currents: one, development 
economics and the sociology of development; and two, the 
long-view or general theory of economic imperialism, 
otherwise known as dependency theory. A third field of 
study incides on a whole range of issues on the origins of 
underdevelopment, but it is not primarily concerned with 
them. It is what we have called here "the development of 
the West", and it was begotten in the work of the pioneering 
authors whom we mentioned collectively before as presenting 
the humane face of Eurocentrism because of their deliberate 
disengagement from racism and social Darwinism. The 
remaining three sections of this dissertation are organized 
around these three areas of study. We shall start with the 
creation of development economics and its growing importance 
and influence after WW2. After following the evolution of 
development studies to the late 60s, we shall trace the 
parallel if tardier process of dependency theory to its 
recent culmination in the work of I. Wallerstein. We shall 
then take up again the thread of development studies and 
close the two intellectual processes with the "dependency 
debate" and a general critique of dependency theory. To 
round things out on the Marxist side, we shall consider what 
can best be described as MOP and class-struggle Marxism, 
which is the latest approach of this ideology to the issues 
of underdevelopment. And we shall close with an attempt to 
elicit from the study of the development of the West, 
principally but not exclusively in the work of F. Braudel,
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pertinent observations on the origins of underdevelopment 
and economic inequality.
THE "FOUR TRUTHS" OF PRE-1945 STUDIES IN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT
If the concept of underdevelopment was a crucial 
instrument for the West in re-focussing its relations with 
the non-industrial rest of the capitalist world, development 
economics was its necessary disciplinary framework. In time 
development economics would become a part, the main part, in 
the general field of development studies (and even then in 
as vague a manner as that necessary to grasp the concept 
itself of development studies), but during WW2, when it 
effectively started, it was strictly on its own. There is a 
special place in the canon of the literature on economic 
development for the category of pre-1945 works on 
underdevelopment and development policy, even though the 
word "underdevelopment" was barely in use then and the 
concept was still unfolding its diverse connotations,One 
of the outstanding names in that early phase is that of the 
British economist and econometrician Colin Clark, author of 
the The Conditions of Economic Progress (1940), a book that 
was being quoted on the statistical definition of 
underdevelopment long after the end of WW2, G,M, Meier and 
D, Seers, in their 1984 book Pioneers in Development, 
include Clark in a gallery of the then surviving founders of 
the discipline. What Clark did in his studies was to work 
out a means for determining the per capita real income of 
workers all over the world. From these it emerged that the 
seven countries with the highest standards of living were 
the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Great 
Britain, and Switzerland (in that order), comprising 10% of 
the world's population, followed by "the principal 
industrial countries of Europe", comprising 9% of the 
population, and finally, by the low-income countries 
accounting for the remaining 81%, To measure income Clark 
used what he called an "international unit" (I,U,), which 
was defined "as the amount of goods and services which could
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be purchased for $1 in the USA over the average of the 
decade 1925-34, or an amount interchangeable with them". 
Clark further clarified: "For international comparisons of
real income, the incomes are reduced to a 48 hour week basis 
by a simple proportion between the current prevailing 
working hours and 48 hours." The average wage for poor 
countries was below 500 I.U. a year, and for the top seven, 
above 1,000 I.U. "Summarising these figures", Clark said, 
"the world is found to be a wretchedly poor place." Despite 
the rueful tone, however, the figures themselves were less 
discouraging than reality itself would probably have 
warranted in his time, or at least, so they seem in 
retrospect from a world in which poverty seems manageable 
only by establishing distinctions between the poor and the 
extremely poor. But Clark did go to the heart of the matter 
when he lamented that "very little attention has been 
devoted to ascertaining the causes of the tremendous 
differences in real income which prevail between different 
parts of the world". In looking back in 1984, Clark himself 
considered that the two most important merits of his book 
were to have emphasised the significance of tertiary sector 
growth as an indication of development and to have pointed 
out that capital alone does not produce growth. 
Significantly, Clark's acknowledgements include S.Kuznets,
G.Myrdal, and V.K.R.V. Rao, all of whom would later become 
influential names in development studies. 2^
In going from C. Clark to the Dutch economist J.H. 
Boeke we undergo a radical change in perspective, which is 
useful in showing the range of work on economic development 
even in its parturient stage. Boeke's The Structure of 
Netherlands Indian Economy was published in 1942 by the 
Institute of Pacific Relations in New York. it was part of 
the concern in both America and Britain with the post-war 
order and in particular with the majoritarian less developed 
areas of the planet. If C. Clark's study was statistical 
and global, Boeke's was regional and descriptive: it was
what you would get or expect to get by applying a magnifying
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glass to one of Clark's statistical items, Boeke*s work, 
based on various decades of colonial experience, and 
certainly a cornerstone of "colonial economics", is 
significant in two respects at least: in the thorough
descriptive exposition of a "dual economy" and in the 
presentation of the effects of culture on economic activity. 
"In dualistic countries, on the other hand", Boeke wrote, 
"we find pre-capitalism embodied in the indigenous social 
system even at the present date...But here— in the 
Netherlands Indies for instance— it is brought into direct 
contact with capitalism in its full bloom, and this it is 
that gives it the double character which is indicated by the 
term dualism. We are here dealing with a clash between two 
social periods— a clash the economic aspect of which we 
shall discuss and analyse in the present paper under the 
name of 'economic dualism', although it finds expression in 
other departments of life besides the economic— in 
legislation, in government, in the administration and 
formulation of justice, in social organization— as well as 
in men's conception of what they need, in their evaluation 
of things, in work and recreation, in religion and morals." 
Boeke's observations derived from his study of the economy 
and social structure of villages, which he claimed were as 
alien to the modern urban milieu as different planets could 
be to each other. He was not, of course, the first to 
notice this. The British had observed Indian villages 
closely from the 18th century at least (though not always 
perspicaciously), especially when it came to the question of 
how best to exact tribute or taxes from them. The concept 
of dual economy was descried vaguely by Marx. It was 
clearly recognized by Marxist theorists of imperialism like 
Hilferding and Lenin, but it was never developed by any of 
these authors, who indeed would have found it untenable 
beyond a certain stage: in Marx's system different modes of 
production were mutually exclusive, the more progressive one 
inexorably displacing its predecessor. However, the 
possibility of overlap or simultaneity could not be entirely 
ruled out, and in Latin America, for example, J.C. Mariategu
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in 1928 explored further the feudalism/capitalism form of 
Marxist dualism.
What Boeke described was a rural society in which 
advanced capitalist forms and techniques co-existed with the 
predominant traditional village economy in a dynamic 
arrangement featuring reciprocal influences but by and large 
inclining towards modernity. Boeke*s was the "classic" non- 
Marxist expression of dualism. His was not a critique of 
colonialism, which he found progressive refuting 
specifically the India-based "drain theory" according to 
which empire skimmed profits from colonies and left little 
in return. The dual economy idea became the theoretical 
framework for the different growth models and strategies 
that were predicated on the existence of excess population 
in the countryside. Since rural-urban migration became one 
of the key concepts in development economics, Boeke was 
actually poking at its roots in his research, although the 
notion that there existed a labour surplus in backward 
countries due to the inefficiency of their agriculture was 
fairly conventional and apparently solidly established, and 
what Boeke contributed was a model that included different 
even antagonistic operative modes, such as that the profit- 
incentive did not function in the villages in the same way 
as in the cities. In this respect, that is, in the weight 
which he attributed to culture, he was a forerunner to what 
became known as the modernization school of American 
sociology, which was the principal alternative to 
development economics as a source of Western strategies for 
progress in the underdeveloped world. 3^
P.N. ROSENSTEIN RODAN AND A CRIPPLING DISPARITY BETWEEN 
TARGETS AND MEANS
For some, P.N. Rosenstein-Rodan laid the foundations of 
development economics in his 1943 essay "Problems of 
Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern E u r o p e " . 4^ 
He was born in Poland in 1902, emigrated to Britain before 
the war, and eventually settled in America as an elder 
statesman in the discipline. In London during the war he
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proposed the study of the problems of underdevelopment at 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and in the US 
in the late 50s he was among the more influential defenders 
of American economic aid to Latin America, What Rosenstein- 
Rodan did in his famous war essay was to establish upon what 
then seemed like unassailable foundations the hypothesis 
that industrialization is the best and most efficient road 
to economic development. He gave a variety of reasons for 
that. One was that it would absorb the rural slack. This 
was a theme that tied in with the dual-economy motif in a 
rather general way. It was later taken up in a more precise 
manner by W,A, Lewis and other economists. The general 
proposition that derived from it was that in exchange for 
taking a back seat to industrialization the agricultural 
sector would eventually reap the benefits of accelerated 
economic growth. Another basic argument for
industrialization were the so-called externalities. This 
was a marginalist concept according to which the growth of a 
branch of industry will of itself lower costs for individual 
firms within the industry, Rosenstein-Rodan applied it to 
entire national economies in the sense of external savings 
which were made possible by industrialization and which were 
in turn absolutely indispensable for the continuation of the 
industrial process. Externalities were to be augmented by 
"indivisibilities" and economies of scale. This meant that 
the demand generated by one factory required the 
construction of another and this one in turn of two more and 
so forth. The foreseeable increase in demand required that 
these plants be of an "optimum" size in order to maximize 
the externalities. The "market mechanism" was not a 
reliable guide to these projects— for who would build a 
plant twice or more as large as a market required on account 
of future demand?— , so planning of the "indicative" sort 
was required. In retrospect, Rosenstein-Rodan would defend 
his ideas on industrialization in these simple terms: 
"Industrialization has to be promoted not because of terms 
of trade, but because external economies are greater in 
industry than in agriculture alone", but the fact remains
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that the implications of his early model were of daunting 
social complexity. D. Avramovic believes that the example 
of Soviet planning must have had some influence on it. 
Rosenstein-Rodan himself mentioned Keynes and Harrod/Domar 
among the "predecessors of the theory of development"—  
although his own work was contemporary with post-Keynesian 
analytical research— , which reinforces the idea that he was 
more inclined to stimulation than to coercion and makes 
almost unavoidable the critique that the means he had in 
mind were disproportionately small to the goals he proposed 
for poor nations.
A third argument for industrialization was that it lead 
to the investment of what he called "social overhead 
capital" in the creation of infrastructure, which made 
modern transportation and trade possible and industry 
viable. It had also other obvious social advantages, from 
the employment it gave during its construction to the 
permanent services it rendered to the communities within its 
reach. The fourth argument, and one to which Rosenstein- 
Rodan was especially partial, was the impulse that it gave 
to education and to learning skills, which he called 
"technological external economies". In the Meier/Seers book 
he wrote that the "process of industrialization of 
underdeveloped countries was and is largely based on the 
advantages of training, learning on the job, and the 
formation of human capital", all of which, as with some of 
his other ideas, to our eyes seem like truisms, but this is 
as it should be in a successful new system of 
conceptualization, and the real problem involved was that 
these ideas also were simplifications that in practice have 
proven ineffective or misleading. Whether the "excess 
agrarian population" existed or not, the situation in most 
Latin American metropolitan areas after many decades of 
siphoning off rural "excess" is not one of rural-urban 
harmonization or even of social integration in the cities, 
but of "excess" unemployed or under-employed urban masses, 
in other words, that the "excess" was if anything merely
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transferred from one part of society to another. The 
"external economies" have transpired in some cases but the 
so-called "indivisibilities" are probably as vaporous today 
as they were vague on paper when Rosenstein-Rodan defined 
them. The "technological external economies" sounded and 
still sound as inevitable as breathing, but the truth is 
that lack of technology is probably today, almost half a 
century after Rosenstein-Rodan wrote, the one principal 
obstacle for the majority of the industrial projects in the 
LDCs.
The crowning all-embracing idea in Rosenstein-Rodan*s 
model of development was the "big push", for it brought 
together all the previous targets and it summarized what the 
model was all about: a sufficiently large bloc of investment 
from different sources applied in such a vast scale over 
such a compressed time-lapse as to overcome not only the 
drag of private marginal net product, which was determined 
by ordinary market mechanisms, but as well any shortcoming 
or lag that might arise from any of the sectors or areas 
participating in the process of development: agriculture,
infrastructure, finance, industry, training, and so on. For 
Eastern and South Eastern Europe he proposed an "Eastern 
European Industrial Trust" and he estimated an investment of 
6,000 million pounds, nearly half of which would have to 
come from outside. The concept of a "big push" was 
jargonized in the post-WW2 literature of development 
economics as a "critical minimum effort", although this 
could not dissimulate the fact that from its theoretical 
launching by Rosenstein-Rodan it partook of the nature of a 
pipedream as far as foreign assistance went and sounded 
quite incongruous yuxtaposed to the unanimously perceived 
insufficiencies of domestic savings in underdeveloped 
countries,
In following the intellectual trajectory of Rosenstein- 
Rodan one cannot help thinking that he became an expert on 
Latin American development by default. In 1943 his sights 
were firmly placed on the underdeveloped countries of
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Europe. By 1944, he was taking in other areas: the Far East 
(which in truth he had mentioned in his 1943 essay), the 
colonial empires, the Caribbean area, and the Middle East, 
besides Europe. By the 1950s he was mainly interested in 
Latin America— understandably enough in view of the 
communization of the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and China— , 
but his recipe for development had not deviated in any 
significant way from his original model, and in 1957, in an 
article which was part of a collective work published by the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), he went back to 
the "big push" concept, with a touch of Rostovian imagery, 
and defined it thus: "There is a minimum level of resources 
that must be devoted to...a development program if it is to 
have any chance of success. Launching a country into self­
sustained growth is a little like getting an airplane off 
the ground." Ironically, "take-off" and "big push" are 
analogues of the idea of "primitive accumulation"— in the 
sense of a decisive amassing of disposable capital— , which 
dependency theorists borrowed from Marx for their own ends 
and in their own interpretation during the following decade. 
More to the point at hand what we have in this essay are 
various useful indications: it revealed, one, that
Rosenstein-Rodan had remained consistent over the years in 
his criteria about development and that it was in America 
and during the early 60s that his ideas were coming into 
their own; two, that there existed an intellectual 
mainstream in development economics, which was flowing then 
between MIT and the State Department, and on which 
Rosenstein-Rodan and Rostow effortlessly sailed; and three, 
that this was probably a heyday and a culmination in 
development economics because the policies involved, which 
were being preached and occasionally applied all over Latin 
America, would not have results commesurate with the 
optimism that engendered them, and would never again get an 
opportunity to prove themselves such as the one they had 
during those years. But the most significant indication is 
that what Rosenstein-Rodan wrote in 1943, two decades later 
would still seem valid if not indisputably as truth at least
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as a mover of wills. Some may consider Rosenstein-Rodan a 
precursor rather than a begetter, and perhaps not even a 
precursor but an influential systematizer, the right sort of 
advocate in just the right spot for policies that many 
considered inevitable. The individual ideas which he 
espoused and wove together had been expressed before and 
they were developed with greater rigour and precision after 
him, but there is no denying the coherence and the force of 
his reasoning, its greater efficacy in contrast to what 
before had been mostly pious exhortations, so that finally, 
as often happens, the statement of the obvious was the 
beginning of the new.^S The obvious was that monetary and 
technological "externalities", infrastructure, and "excess 
agrarian population" had all been at one time or another 
among the priorities of independent underdeveloped 
countries before WW2. The new consisted in bringing all 
these ideas together as a recipe for accelerated 
development, and in doing so from a vantage which permitted 
bridging between areas as disparate as Eastern Europe and 
Latin America.
What made the Rosenstein-Rodan project problematic was 
the disparity between goals and means. The tentative 
solution was planning, but in Rosenstein-Rodan planning was 
cautious bordering on coy, and it was not even called 
planning but "programming". It was indicative and
supplementary, neither Socialist nor propitiatory to free- 
market extremists.^6 K. Mandelbaum, like Rosenstein-Rodan 
also working in England during the war, constructed a 
"hypothetical model of an industrialisation process in South 
East Europe", which of course never left the pages of the 
book, but which was a paradigm of what development economics 
would consider to be its task in the post-war world. It 
defined targets, quantified resources and their allocation, 
estimated outputs, and set the whole thing in motion with a 
snap of the fingers. The fact that it referred in a general 
way to South Eastern Europe did not detract from its 
relevance to the preliminary foundation-building of
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development economics. The theoretical work accomplished at 
that point was undeniably thorough and solid, not so much in 
the sense of completeness, although the work done during the 
war was admittedly comprehensive, as in the sense of a 
relatively finished set of hypotheses withal susceptible to 
further research and elaboration. It could be seeing too 
much into the short period covered, but the temptation is 
irresistible to depict an expanding progression from C. 
Clark, who did the quantitative definition of 
underdevelopment (on the basis of per capita statistics, 
which is the way we still mainly define it), to J.H. Boeke, 
who dealt with the problem of an available under-used work 
force, to Rosenstein-Rodan, who proposed a strategy to 
absorb it, and finally, to Mandelbaum, who described the 
means to make that strategy workable. It sounds too pat 
because, for one thing, these authors were not discovering 
anything that was not known before them, and for another, 
they, with the possible exceptions of Rosenstein-Rodan and 
Mandelbaum, were not working in one venue towards one 
specific objective— in the manner of astrophysicists trying 
to discover the origins of the universe— but were moving in 
different directions in different places. Nevertheless, a 
pattern of sorts can be read in the facts described, and
anyhow, the important thing is that we can recognize in them
an abstract meaningful intellectual structure despite the 
diversity of the contributions to it.77
THE WAR'S FLUID, VOLATILE AFTERMATH
WW2 placed the US not just at the head of the West, but 
also in such a commanding position in the world at large as 
to seem to ensure the prevalence of capitalism everywhere 
outside the USSR and its areas of influence. However, it
did not make the world any easier to deal with than it was
before. A very significant consequence of the war was that 
in severing the West for a time from some of its most 
important Asian colonies, it made their permanent separation 
seem inevitable later and this was crucial for the overall 
process of decolonization. Ironically, the agent for this
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radical turn of events was the militaristic Japanese empire 
in its pursuit of the so-called Greater East Asia Co- 
Prosperity Sphere, a semi-fictive international organization 
incorporating most of the countries occupied by Japan, 
orchestrated and based in Tokyo. Decolonization commenced 
after the war when the European colonialist powers 
attempted to start as if from scratch in their former Asian 
possessions.78 For a while France and the Netherlands 
managed to keep up appearances of business as usual, but the 
ground beneath their feet was quaking: within the colonies 
resistance to the re-imposition of foreign rule was fierce, 
and outside of them, America was frowning and colonialism 
had been condemned by the UNO. Indonesia was proclaimed in 
1949, and after losing in the open field against
nationalist-communist divisions, France acceded to the 
creation of an independent partitioned Vietnam in 1953. The 
British returned in force to Malaya and Borneo, but India
was in ferment and Britain was in no position to afford
empire as before. India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon became 
independent in 1947. They accounted for the bulk of British 
Asian possessions. Colonialism was on the way out not only 
in the Indian subcontinent and in the fringes of Asia: the 
Middle Eastern mandates, which had been created and shared 
out between France and Great Britain after WWl, were lapsing 
one after another, and in Algeria, which France classed
legally as French territory, the Arab-speaking population 
was determined to obtain its emancipation by violent means 
if necessary. Their fight would be bloody indeed before the 
hour of independence in 1964.79
There was another wave in action in the early part of
the post-WW2 era which must be taken note of here to explain
how the new Western conceptualization of the relations
between the industrialized nations and the larger community 
of poor or underdeveloped countries became so dominant. The 
USSR had been taken to the brink by the Nazis. The
thoroughness of Germany's defeat afterwards enhanced the 
prestige of the Soviet victory. By 1946 the wartime East-
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West alliance was a shambles. By 1947 the Soviet press had 
transferred the epithet "imperialist" from Germany and Japan 
to the US and Britain, and for the West, as Churchill 
announced in his 1946 "iron curtain" speech, the communist 
menace was on. It was not restricted to the European 
territories which the Red Army had penetrated or in which 
Soviet-allied guerrilla forces held the balance of power, as 
was the case specifically of Yugoslavia. Communists were 
strong enough in Greece to make an armed bid for power. The 
"Truman doctrine", committing the US to aiding governments 
under attack from communism anywhere— which was the original 
precedent for the Vietnam intervention of the late 50s and 
60s— , was formulated with Greece in mind and had a 
significant impact on the outcome of the civil war there, 
although in the end it was power politics that denied the 
communists a victory that was almost within their grasp. In 
China, American-backed Kuomintang armies were defeated by 
communist forces, which occupied Beijing in 1947 and in two 
more years took over the rest of that vast country. The 
Nationalists took refuge in Taiwan, where American aid 
propped them up and guaranteed their survival. In 1950 
North Korean communist armies overran South Korea despite 
the presence of American forces there, and the US and its 
allies were forced to fight them and the Chinese to a 
stalemate, not to defeat. These and other events were proof 
of communist advances to which even Latin America was not 
immune, as was shown by the election in Guatemala in 1951 of 
the radical, communist-backed regime of J. Arbenz 
(subsequently toppled by an expeditionary force financed by 
Washington). The West, therefore, was being confronted 
after WW2 by the crumbling of the pre-war colonialist order 
and by the rise of a world communist movement that at times 
even seemed threatened in territories that were geo- 
politically far removed from the centres of communist
Of)
p o w e r . O n e  of its responses to those challenges was to 
give full sanction to the economicist and developmentalist 
Western optic that had been focusing on the world since 
before the war and which had acquired a definitive urgency
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and relevance as a consequence of the international 
processes that the war set in motion. To give substance to 
this attitude there already existed the wartime work on 
economic development, and in addition, new theories and new 
arguments were being developed after the war which ratified 
and strengthened the essence of what had been said before.
THE GENESIS OF CORE/PERIPHERY
The UNO was created in 1945 as the successor to the 
League of nations, but in another spirit, that is, with a 
different outlook on the relations between larger nations, 
the Western powers in particular, and the colonies and the 
so-called semicolonial countries. Even in its infancy, when 
it was power politics that mostly mattered, it was 
significantly attentive to the political concerns of its 
weaker member due mainly to the convergence of America's 
desire to assume an anti-colonialist stance and the USSR's 
outspoken support of anti-colonialism, all of which resulted 
in the approval of general principles of international 
political equity. Some of the principles sanctioned the 
idea of national freedom and self determination. Others had 
to do with the desideratum of economic development for all 
nations. They were a reflection of the relatively fluid 
post-war international situation, especially as it affected 
the old colonial empires. In the area of economic 
development, the UNO was stimulating the formulation of the 
economic doctrines that had to go with it, and by 1949 it 
had created different organisms devoted to the issues of 
underdevelopment, including the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (ECLA; in Spanish, CEPAL), and it counted with 
the services of R. Prebisch, H. Singer, and V.K.R.V. Rao, 
among o t h e r s . T w o  memorable concepts emerged from the 
work on underdevelopment sponsored by the UN. One had to do 
with a purported secular trend of international commodity 
prices to deteriorate in comparison with the prices of 
manufactured goods to the benefit of the industrialized 
nations and to the detriment of the less economically 
developed ones. This was mainly Singer's doing. The other
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was the stroke-of-genius presentation that Prebisch did of 
developed and underdeveloped capitalist countries as "core” 
and "periphery".
In the brief but brilliant and far-sighted The Economic 
Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems, 
published in 1950 by ECLA— which was then functioning in 
Lake Success, N.Y.— , Prebisch, who had been influential in 
shaping economic policy in a rigidly "neo-classical" 
direction in his native Argentine before the war, described 
not only the process leading up to his advocacy of 
industrialization, but also the possible consequences, good 
and bad, of an all-out industrializing policy. The 
core/periphery motif was employed throughout his analysis 
although not with the ideological connotation that it would 
acquire in the hands of dependency theorists, but as a 
conventional designation for a geographical arrangement 
under-pinned by historico-economic circumstances that had 
evolved in the "natural" course of events. It definitely 
did not constitute an argument for the sort of deliberate 
long-term world process of underdevelopment of the Third 
World that economic imperialism theory later contemplated, 
which was latent in Marxist texts and debates and which 
Prebisch could have drawn on. What he said, signalling a 
radical change from his previous thinking, was that primary 
production for international commerce had very nearly 
reached the end of its possibilities for internal growth 
because of various factors: due to higher productivity and 
the advantages of technical progress in the core 
(explicitly, in this case, the USA), the prices of primary 
export commodities were deteriorating in relation to those 
of manufactured goods, and even though inflation could still 
be recurred to for capital accumulation, sooner or later the 
disparity in the terms of exchange would catch up with 
marginal gains and would tend to produce stagnation in 
underdeveloped economies. The cycles in the periphery had 
to be countered either with foreign savings or with savings 
from the production inside Latin America of substitute
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industrial goods. This was, of course, a denial of the 
international specialization or division of labour principle 
dating back to A. Smith, and it was not really the first 
(F, List had done the same thing at the high tide of 
classical political economy), but it was the first one based 
on economic analysis rather than on nationalism or neo­
mercantilism.
In justifying this position Prebisch admitted its 
"unorthodoxy" but countered that since the core/periphery 
order of things went against a Pareto equilibrium in the 
international factors market, which was one of the 
inescapable implications of the "invisible hand" philosophy, 
it was permissible to strike down also the absoluteness of 
the principle of the free international circulation of 
goods. Prebisch was not assuming this stance out of purely 
nationalist feelings, or a least he disclaimed that he did 
employing a sober "scientific" tone of presentation, and he 
wrote quite pointedly: "It would be a matter of discovering 
whether the increase in industrial production brought about 
by the factors diverted from primary production was or was 
not greater than the amount of goods formerly obtained in 
exchange of the exports. Only if it were greater could it 
be said there was an increase in productivity, from the 
standpoint of the community; if it were not, there would be 
a loss of real income." In this, and perhaps not 
unbeknownst to each other, Prebisch coincided entirely with 
Rosenstein-Rodan. The suspicions that cling to the 
reasonings of both authors is that they answer the same 
enquiry affirmatively without the benefit or the backing 
historical, statistical or other evidence. Prebisch was 
probably more aware than Rosenstein-Rodan of the formidable 
problems involved in an all-out industrial development 
policy. For instance, he affirmed categorically that "The 
centre must not lower its import coefficient", which, with 
his experience in government, cannot have seemed a pre­
ordained assumption, and he ruled out the creation at the 
start of the process of a capital goods industry there being
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"still ample room for current consumption". In the end, and 
really at the base of his presentation, he chose import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) crucially because "we 
are of the opinion that industrial development will bring 
out the consequences of the cycle more clearly by 
accentuating fluctuations in urban employment". This 
particular theme would become a cornerstone of theories 
based on the dual-economy model, particularly, though hardly 
exclusively, in W.A. Lewis, who by then had been doing 
substantial work in industrial development problems in some 
of the British colonies in the Caribbean. In the context of 
Prebisch's concerns, it basically meant that he was probably 
thinking in terms of the ultimate application of Keynesian 
economics to the economies of Latin America, and 
specifically, to that of the Argentine, and this was a far 
cry from anything even remotely resembling the dependency 
model that Marxists later adopted.^2
Even if there is room for debating whether or not some 
Latin American economies jumped the gun in the matter of 
heavy industries, it is a reasonable assertion that the 
general Latin American process of development adhered quite 
closely to the Prebisch formula. Even more to the point, 
though, to what extent was this an original program or a 
reflection of policies already operating in Latin America? 
The ambiguity of development economics, whether it is 
original research or a synthesis of previous experience, 
whether it is a "science" in its own right or merely an 
accumulation of sanctions and eloquent exhortations, has 
never perhaps been better illustrated than in the early work 
of Prebisch, which is itself one of the essential pillars of 
the discipline. Ironically, or perhaps inevitably, it was 
from within ECLA itself, by then operating out of Santiago 
de Chile, that Prebisch's theses came under siege in the 
late 60s, with pleas and arguments for more national 
economic autonomy through more state action and more heavy 
industries, as on behalf of more free trade it would be 
attacked in the 70s by the critics of the idea of general.
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all-fronts industrialization. In later years, Prebisch 
would blame the flaws in the system on "the serious 
socioeconomic bias of the mechanism for income distribution 
and capital accumulation in favour of the high social 
strata". He would also insist on his criticism of the 
American "hegemony" in international trade, and doff his hat 
to those of his colleagues in ECLA who "have dealt much 
better than I with the political and strategic significance 
of this hegemoney".B3
H.W. SINGER AND HIS CRITICS
The essential premiss in Prebisch*s system was the idea 
of the imbalance in the terms of trade sustained in the 
also UNO-sponsored 1949 work Relative Prices of Exports and 
Imports of Underdeveloped Countries. Its author was H.W. 
Singer, and although neither he nor Prebisch remember having 
known at the time about each other’s work, their shared 
interest in the subject is frequently referred to as the 
Prebisch/Singer thesis or effect. It was faulted by P. 
Bairoch on two counts: lack of originality and lack of
accuracy. Bairoch traced the Singer essay to the League of 
Nations study of 1945 titled Industrialization and Foreign 
Trade. which states, in Bairoch*s words, that "between the 
last quarter of the 19th century and the eve of WW2, or more 
precisely between 1876-1880 and 1936-38, there had been a 43 
per cent reduction in the price of primary products compared 
with the prices of manufactured products". Against this 
accusation. Singer in 1984 made a very good case in three 
directions. In one he attributed his interest in what he 
called "the problem of distribution of gain from trade and 
investment" to deeper sources than mere statistical 
analysis. Keynes, whom he acknowledged as a basic influence 
on his thought, had in 1938 "advocated buffer stocks for 
primary commodities". He had "come back to the idea when he 
started thinking in 1941 about post-war reconstruction", and 
in Bretton Woods in 1947, in anticipation of a "long-run 
downwards trend" in primary commodity prices, "had 
considered the creation of (an) organization to increase and
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stabllize” them as "the third pillar, in addition to the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, of the 
international system he envisaged". This concern geared 
smoothly for Singer with the idea of "structural backwash 
effects" from industrial economies "on the trade of the 
primary exporting countries, with prices and terms of trade 
acting as a mechanism of transmission", which he credited to 
the Swede G. Myrdal. The latter had in turn been influenced 
by his compatriot Folke Hilgerdt, "who had already shaped 
the League of Nations publications on the Networks of World 
Trade" (surely the origin of the work cited by Bairoch), but 
from whose attribution of the "backwash effect" to cycles in 
the industrial countries Singer shied back preferring 
Myrdal's "structural" hypothesis. These ideas closely 
resemble the Prebisch centre/periphery construct, and they 
are undoubtedly the basis of the Prebisch/Singer ex post 
facto pairing. In the other two rebuttals of the Bairoch 
critique, he in effect implied that his study was more 
thorough than the League of Nations one and that it made 
accurate projections up to 1973. But especially he claimed 
for it the condition of a "policy guide" advocating, if 
needs be, "temporary delinking" between trading partners 
"until a better basis for trade with more evenly distributed 
gains could be developed" and an "engine for growth" for 
underdeveloped countries to be constructed on "a shift from 
primary products to manufactured goods and the development 
of a system of international aid", a clear foreshadowing of 
the New International Economic Order (NIEO), to whose 
support Singer later became deeply committed.
Before considering the accusation of lack of accuracy, 
which others besides Bairoch have advanced, we would like to 
emphasize at least one aspect of Singer's basic stances, in 
1949 as now, and that is his insistence on the "structural" 
nature of the unequal trade relations between the rich and 
the poor countries, for it is not in his view just a 
cyclical or conjunctural phenomenon, but the result of 
something inherently tenacious in the way it functions or
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malfunctions, not unlike the depiction of the deliberately 
exploitative international processes in economic-imperialism 
theory, although Singer does not incline in that direction 
and he is dismissive of the "phraseology" of the "dependency 
school". If he has sought support for his ideas, it has 
been among fellow development economists, and in particular, 
he recognized in 1984 that he had extended the reach of his 
original thesis, from being about the relative deterioration 
of the prices of export primary commodities, to encompass 
the terms of trade in general of developing countries, on 
the basis of investigations by C.P. Kindleberger in the 
early 70s showing that the value of primary products tend to 
deteriorate more when these are exported by developing 
countries than when it is developed countries that export 
them, and that manufactured exports of developing countries 
tend to be worth less per unit than those from developed 
economies. "Thus", Singer wrote, "the deterioration of the 
terms of trade of developing countries can be attributed to 
the combined effects of three factors: the relative
deterioration of unit values for primary commodities 
exported by developing countries in relation to primary 
export unit values of developed countries; the relative 
deterioration of manufactured export unit values of 
developing countries relative to manufactures exported by 
developed countries; and the lower proportion of 
manufactures in total exports of LDCs (for which unit values 
have increased less)."85 Whatever Singer's reservations on 
dependency, the fact remains that the terms-of-trade 
hypothesis has gained more and stronger pledges from the 
Marxist side, where it is probably an article of faith, than 
from the Western developmentalist side of the divide between 
approaches and attitudes to Third World problems.
Bairoch denied the original unequal terms-of-trade 
hypothesis outright, although he at first ignored Singer and 
restricted his criticism to the League of Nations study that 
was the basis of the letter's work: "The chief bias in the 
League of Nations world trade price indices is that they use
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Britlsh prices only, and that some three-quarters of the 
prices used in the British indices are import prices. So, in 
fact, what is measured is notably the price of the products 
but also, and mainly, the transport costs that fell very 
considerably during this period. Since those import prices 
are more numerous for primary products, and since for those 
products transport costs are of particular significance, 
this involves a major distortion of the prevailing trend." 
From his own studies Bairoch "deduced that between the 1870s 
and the 1926-9 period, the terms of trade for primary 
products relative to manufactured goods improved by some 20- 
25 per cent, instead of worsening by about 20 per cent as 
had been calculated by the League of Nations". Bairoch 
admitted that "from the early 50s and until 1961-2, there 
was a real deterioration in the terms of trade of primary 
products, and even more so of those primary products 
exported by less developed countries", but added that there 
was a stabilization afterwards, although the "negative 
evolution" was still there. With considerable foresight, he 
wrote down the oil crises of the 70s as a "cyclical 
phenomenon". Admitting the 50s downturn, he ascribed it to 
"the slowdown in demand for a large range of primary goods, 
combined with an increase in supply, the development of 
synthetic products, measures to restrict the imports of some 
tropical goods (internal taxes), technological progress that 
has reduced the input coefficients of raw materials in 
manufacturing industry and, last but not least, what is 
called the Singer-Prebisch effect. This thesis suggest that 
due to weaker organization, the unequal relationship between 
the developed and the underdeveloped worlds leads to a 
situation where, in the case of primary products, the gains 
in productivity are translated into a decline in prices, 
while in the case of manufactures, those gains are 
translated into higher salaries and p r o f i t s " . ^6
The list of critics of the Singer/Prebisch thesis is 
quite long— and does not necessarily exclude Marxists, such 
being the case of G. Kay— but the really all-stops-out
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statistical assault on it was coordinated by B. Balassa, one 
of the main champions of the strategy of growth-through- 
exports, who asserted in 1984 that not only have the terms 
of trade not been unfavourable to LDCs, but that in fact 
there was "a decline of 10 per cent in the terms of trade of 
the developed countries in their exchange of manufactured 
goods for primary products other than fuel with the
developing countries during the 1953-1977 period", and
furthermore, that there was "no change in the terms of trade 
of industrial Europe relative to the developing countries 
between 1872 and 1953", as per research and adjustments on 
UN figures done by I.B. Kravis and R.E. Lipsey in 1981, 
reinforced by M. Michaely for the first period in
q u e s t i o n . 87 Whoever is right on this strictly quantitative 
issue, and the entire Third World with its program for a
NIEO vociferously supports the Singer/Kindelberger theses—  
not to mention the support of its generally enthusiastic 
Marxist partisans— the controversy, as all those involving 
the origins and the perpetuation of underdevelopment, has 
passed from the realm of the technical to the domain of the 
ideological and the political.*
KEYNESIANISM AND THE REALITY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT
So far in our survey of development economics we have 
collected diverse, allusions to J.M. Keynes and his 
theories. What in fact did he and his followers 
contribute to the discipline? The overwhelming consensus
*Ihis would seem not to be so feom the reams of material devoted to the technical side of 
the debate, yet let us consider how it stDod up to the early 80s. J. 
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among development economists is that his general theory 
wasvirtually inapplicable to underdeveloped economies. R. 
Nurkse, who, with Rosenstein-Rodan, Prebisch, and Lewis,
Fton this it wxild seem tha^  inckecL there is no noticeable long-term trend in \hat 
calls IShticnal E&rter lerms of Ikade. îfcwever, the drrt-tenn curve tells another 
r, as witness:
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ifcwever, for bothi time periods, the long and the short, and in two authors who 
would appear inclined to agree rather than to disagree, there is really no basis on which 
to sustain a secular dowi^ rds trend, althoq^  it vrouTn seem 6om these exercises as if, 
on the whole, exports &om the Third Ibrld do tend to be valued less than those &om the 
developed world in international exrhapg^ . Tb any impartial observer this would appear 
to ccnfirm B. Balassa's position that mere is no a±Aae trend in the merchandising of 
the products of developing countries, yet not content with this, Ehlassa insists OBt 
techniol adjustments—wry technical, in feet, such as that "changes in mit values do 
not appropriately represent changes in prices"—demonstrate that, if there is a trend, it 
is afflinst the exports of manufactured goods firom the developed comtries, which has the 
appearance of a comterHhesis at the other extreme of the ftehisch/Singpr effect, a 
farther positioning wry likely infLuenoed by Balassa's championir^  of tm strategy of 
grcwth-throu^ T-traæ against gtowth-throq^ IBI. It seems inevit&e to condide that 
ideolQgies' can hardly be dLscomted even in the hi^ ier and more abstract reaches of the 
(Mate. At arw rate, on the question of Third Whrld economic backwardness it is probably 
true, as H.J. Bruton wrote back in 1955, that the Ro^ dsch/Singpr thesis "has surely been 
asked to support a heavier argument thai it can bear" ("Growth Models and Ihderdeveloped 
Bouoomies", At:, August 1955).
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towers over his peers in the early years of the field, found 
no relevance in Keynes to the study of trade, consumption, 
and savings in those economies. R.R. Nelson, the author in 
1956 of an influential model of the low-level equilibrium 
trap, wrote: "Keynesian unemployment of labour and capital
is a phenomenon of a money-market economy of specialized 
producers. The theory is not appropriate to an economy 
based on self-sufficient units, with money and the market 
playing but a minor role.” The analytical work underwriting 
this conclusion had been done by the Indian economist 
V.K.R.V. Rao in 1952. Following Keynes, Rao reasoned that 
whereas in a developed economy the marginal propensity to 
consume decreases with an increase in income and brings down 
with it the value of the multiplier, thus requiring easier 
money and higher investment to restore equilibrium with full 
employment, in an underdeveloped economy "the marginal 
propensity to consume is likely to be not far short of 
unity", which produces a high multiplier "with the result 
that comparatively small increments of investment are likely 
to bring about full employment". This reading of Keynes led 
to highly suspect inferences: "The paradoxical situation,
therefore, arises that the poorer the community the greater 
the ease of obtaining for it a condition of full employment 
and the smaller the fluctuations in its employment caused by 
changes in its net investment." This did not tally with the
fact that "deficit financing and created money" in backward
agricultural countries had a minimal multiplier effect on 
output. In exploring this paradox Rao took into account the 
characteristics of the Indian economy and found that it did 
not have the modern productive resources to respond to 
stimulation of the Keynesian sort, which instead had a 
rudimentary "income multiplier" effect that went into an 
increase in food consumption and into imports and eventually 
risked provoking inflation. He distinguished between
enforced unemployment as in an industrialized economy and 
the disguised unemployment or the subemployment that 
characterized India and would not respond productively to 
the "current wage". In his opinion, economic progress
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consisted in going from full employment at a lower level of 
economic activity to full employment at a higher level of 
development, and his advise for underdeveloped countries was 
to work harder and save more.^B
However, the extremely backward economic structures 
that were adduced to refute the validity of Keynes for 
economic development might not have been the only models of 
underdevelopment available— most Latin American economies, 
for instance, could hardly be described as consisting of 
"self-sufficient units"— , and there was besides the 
argument that while it was true that Keynes, undoubtedly 
influenced in his work by the economic depression of the 
early 30s, had aimed at the target of full employment 
equilibrium at a given level of economic performance, post- 
Keynesians, and in particular the Briton R.F. Harrod and the 
American E, Domar, assumed a point of view that contemplated 
and pretended to explain growth, and this was what 
development economics was really all about. Nevertheless, 
even if one tried to apply their ideas to economies one or 
various steps removed from the bottom-level of the 
traditional/modern scale of socioeconomic evolution— where, 
obiter dicta, India itself was not situated, pace Rao's 
stark depiction of its economic progress— , there still 
arose the problem that capital inputs in them did not have 
the expected or desired multiplier effects, G.M. Meier, in 
assessing the role of the capital/output ratio in 
development, wrote of the Harrod/Domar model that it 
"relates to an advanced economy, and it seeks an answer to 
the question of how much national income would have to grow 
to induce sufficient investment to maintain this rate of 
growth in income. For a poor country, the relevant problem 
is not that of sustaining a rate of growth, but rather the 
prior task of initiating or generating a higher growth rate 
in the first place".^9
H.J. Bruton actually assumed in a 1955 article that the 
Harrod/Domar theory was applicable to underdeveloped 
economics and went about applying it to a relatively simple
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model of such an economy, "The central proposition of the 
Harrod/Domar theory", he wrote, "arises from introducing the 
rather obvious assumption that investment is capacity- 
creating as well as income-generating. Thus, if the new 
capacity is to be utilized, the equivalent demand must be 
generated." The increase in income to achieve this was 
dependent on the saving/income ratio over a constant 
capital/output ratio. From the point of view of "mature 
economies", the result of that equation could "be thought of 
as the maximum allowable rate of growth possible without 
inflation", but from the point of view of growth— although 
both views amounted to the same thing— , it indicated "the 
rate of growth of income required to use the newly created 
capacity". From these premisses, he went on to make certain 
fairly conventional and plausible deductions, including the 
convenience for underdeveloped countries of a more equal 
distribution of income "if the greater equality was achieved 
at the expense of rents and in favour of larger returns to 
owners of productive capital equipment". However, towards 
the end of his article he introduced the variable of 
international trade and this made the previously neat
Harrod/Domar formula a shambles. To the saving/income ratio 
in the determination of the required growth of income was 
added a factor representing the balance between debit and 
credit items in current account, and this led to inferences 
such as that "the percentage growth of imports also imposes 
an upper limit on the percentage rate of growth of income". 
This finally debouched in the pessimistic general
proposition that "since the rate of growth of income [in 
underdeveloped economies] has a ceiling set by the rate of 
growth of foreign exchange and since this rate of growth is
less than the rate of growth of income of the developed
countries, the [underdeveloped economy's] income must 
necessarily grow at a lower rate than that of the developed 
countries", which meant that the Harrod/Domar premiss of his 
analysis was virtually worthless in determining what it was 
that underdeveloped economies had to do to overcome 
underdevelopment.* In the balance, then, all that can
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reasonably be alleged for Keynes and for Harrod/Domar in the 
context of development economics— aside from their influence 
on the intellectual formation of development economists 
themselves— is, for the first, the purely formal influence 
of his iconoclastic approach, which £erhaps might have 
encouraged development theory in its flirtation with the 
notion that there is no such thing as a universal set of 
economic rules, and for the others, the use of their 
formula for growth, whether justified or not, as "an 
indispensable component of macro-economic planning".^0
ECONOMISTS IN THE FRONTLINES
While the UN-based economists were preparing a forceful 
theoretical case in defence of the industrial development of 
the underdeveloped economies, political events had been 
making their own even more urgent point concerning the 
potential usefulness of development economics.
* In Rao’s stark reduction of IfeyEs's analysis the marginal ntcpensily to oonsuie, \ihidi 
is al\<^  less than uiLty, detennines k (the multiplier) in me fbrnula I - I/k. If the 
marginal propensity to oonsune is .5 and inoome eqims one, then the multiplier is 2. Td 
determine tie Y (liRestuBit) requited to increase I to an eqidlibciun lem of investment 
and demand with full employnent, you fectxr k iito the fomuLa = kl. In the case of 
an inderde^ eloped ecorary if I - I/k is near unity, s^ .9, then k will be 10, aid a 
minimal Y will raise I to a full-enpilqyiEnt level.
Eoraar had written: "The sfanærd Ifeynœian systjem does not provide us with ary 
tools for deriving the equilihciun rate or growth. Te problem of growth is entirely 
absent feom it because of the esçlidt assmptlon that employment is a function of 
national inoome. This assuiption can be justified only over smrt periods of time; it 
will result in serious errors o\er a period of a f^ years, dearly, a fLdl-enrioyment 
level of inoome of five years aga wxûa create considerable irEnploynent tody, vfe dEll 
assuiE instead that enoplcyment is a fiiEtion of the lEtional income to productif 
opacity." ("Capital. Btpansion, Bate of Growth and BipLoyraent", Ebonometrica, 4iil 1946, 
p.39). This yproach eventually yielded the fomuLa used by Hcuton \hich isAy = s/k Y, 
h^ere s is a constant ratio between saving and income and k a constant csfital/output 
ratio. Dividing throq^  by ^  it readAY/Y = s/k. Ebr an increase of say 50 to income 
1000. the equivalent s .20 and the k was 4. If you locked at the left side of the 
equation, it dxwed the growth of inoome required to absorb new capacity; if on the ri^, 
tiE necessary growth for an increase in inoome without inflation. The equation modified 
for an uiderdesdqped eoonoiy appeared thus: AY/Ï = s + b/k, \here b was the balance 
between ddaits Ov and credits (X) in current account. Ituton introduced into his 
analysis certain inquanti fiable variables sudi as imc^ ntions and bëiasdcural trends in 
consuiption. The farmer would tend to decrease the M/Y ratio and the latter to incteaæ 
it, but on the whole \hen income rose in an mderdeveloped eoonony, M would tend to rise 
also, iMch wxdd throw b into the red and constrict the growth of Y with resulting 
tnaraplcyment. In ary event Y d^ Ended on the sign of b, m  b tended to be negative 
because of tjednolpgical ard bdi^ oural fectors an underdeveloped countries. Bæn if 
c^tal flows oonpaisated for a negative balance of trade, Auton believed that th^ 
relieved but did not sdhe the prdoLem. In sum, analysis nad to give w^ entirely to
policy in tackling the pcoblem of growth aid enplcynEnt under conditions of 
underdevelopment.
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Decolonization and the post-war aggressiveness of communism 
seemed to create for the capitalist West a wolf-stalking- 
sheep situation, but the Western powers could not play 
watchdog to the underdeveloped world in a military sense. 
They did not have the resources for that, in part because of 
the commitment to the defence of Europe and in part because 
the retreat of colonialism was raising prohibitively the 
ante of intervention, but they could still rely on the 
allegiance of local ruling classes— whether new ones as in 
the ex-colonies, or tried-and-true old ones as in Latin 
America— , and in general, of all who considered that the 
West was a better hope for the future than communism. The 
frontier between "hope" and "self-interest" were difficult 
to draw, but that was not important: what mattered was to 
get things under control by outflanking subversion and 
consolidating friendly political power. To achieve this, 
the West was banking on material progress and improved 
standards of living, and the sol-distant key to that was 
development economics. There was, therefore, a convergence 
between theoretical work like that of Prebisch and Singer 
and Western political concerns, and it was from this 
circumstance that development economics got its head of 
steam in the 50s. It proposed policies against poverty and 
backwardness, all within acceptable capitalist norms and in 
the form of advise respectfully tendered to the governments 
of underdeveloped countries, which in turn was usually well 
received by them.
Somewhere between the offer and the acceptance there 
was always the dangled carrot of something akin to the 
phenomenally successful Marshall Plan. This was the 
conjurer's formula that made the eyes of rulers and 
administrators of underdeveloped nations glimmer with hopes 
of future welfare. However, the Marshall Plan, a privileged 
member in the coterie of pet Soviet hatreds, required 
certain conditions which made it virtually unreachable for 
these nations: it was a life-or-death strategic choice for 
Washington in the part of the world where communism loomed 
as the greatest ever menace to capitalism. Western Europe,
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and its massive outpouring of dollars and credits and open- 
door measures could only really work for economies which 
already had the social and industrial basis for short-run 
economic rehabilitation, and on neither of these counts were 
underdeveloped countries eligible. In its stead, these 
were getting some material aid but more specially the 
grounding necessary to be ready in future to benefit form a 
Marshall Plan of sorts, or as some preferred to see it, not 
to need one at all. So while Europeans, who did not need 
economists from America as they had plenty of their own, 
received investments and import orders, the LDCs were host 
to development economists both from America and from Europe. 
Of the ten Meier/Seers "pioneers" (and of others, such as R. 
Nurkse and S. Kuznets, who had died by 1984), a majority 
either had been primarily in the service of Western agencies 
or through the experience of government service, or had 
acted as important advisors on state policy. Often these 
economists, like Singer, Lewis, P.T. Bauer, and A.O. 
Hirschman, ended up in the "front lines" themselves acting 
as advisors to administrations and official bodies and 
institutions in underdeveloped lands. In one way or 
another, whether in the groves of Academe or in the 
ministries of the Third World, whether turning foreign 
aspirants into fully-formed boffins or actually advising on 
policies and plans, development economists and development 
economics were recruited in the West's campaign to improve 
the world's living conditions and to keep communism at bay.
The political context of development economics need not 
be considered the only guide to its evolution, especially as 
the discipline has its own inherent logic and its proper 
field of study, but it should never be underestimated or 
neglected. Development economists present certain
classificatory and definitional difficulties. Their works 
are often overburdened with ambiguities. They sometimes 
seem to skate merrily over obstacles and bumps, or they 
establish analogies and comparisons that seem vague or 
remote, or are founded on an excess of optimism. But they 
never exceed certain very rigorous political bounds, which
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if they did would risk exposing them to a loss of 
credibility and authority In Western academic circles. The 
thought-patterns of some development economists consist In 
sliding down the slope of theoretical radicalism but somehow 
managing to stop at the edge of the precipice of potentially 
damaging commitments or speculations. After a lifetime of 
service to the Idea of state capitalism, Rosensteln-Rodan 
always found time to curtsy American free enterprise 
convictions. With much less seeming Influence, but much 
more faith In private Initiative, his near-contemporary P.T. 
Bauer has always been more attuned to the core of Western 
beliefs on the sources of economic development, and his 
views, therefore, have had more staying power. P.W. 
Preston's category of "radicals" In development economics 
refers to nothing more than the die-hards of state 
Interventionism.91 Prebisch and Singer sounded like near- 
revolutlonarles In the late 40s and early 50s. Singer was 
the original and probably too the ultimate theoretician of 
economic thlrd-worldlsm, which Is the LDCs' alternative to 
social revolution. Prebisch's core/periphery scheme can be 
read, and Indeed has usually been read as a strictly un- 
Ideologlcal, politically neutral, nutshell version of the 
theory of economic Imperialism. There Is no evidence 
anywhere that Prebisch wanted his Ideas to be anything other 
than that, and In the balance of his life's work, he was a 
stout If disabused partisan of the status quo In Latin 
America. Development economics and development studies In 
general should not, therefore, be Interpreted as ever 
straying very far from Western political orthodoxies. The 
attempt that have been made to juxtapose them 
complementarlly to dependency theory, or even to place them 
In the same wave-band of the hlstorlco-polltlcal spectrum as 
dependency, have usually ended up with a confusing and 
unhelpful olla podrlda. Development studies embody the 
basic optic that the West chose to look upon the backward 
nations and to Interpret Its own relations to them, and In 
that sense they were an Immense progressive movement away 
from racially-tainted and discredited Eurocentrlsm. In our
- 162 -
exploration of the history of development studies, we shall 
try to determine how far they went in disassociating 
themselves from Eurocentrism, and, if in doing so, they also 
posited an explanation of their own on the origins of 
economic inequality among nations.
TWO APPROACHES TO THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
In order to explore these themes, the voluminous 
productions of development economics have to be put into 
some sort of manageable order. The two methods most 
frequently recurred to are: a) by conceptual emphases and
tendencies, and b) by chronological sequences or stages. 
The former approach can be found in, among others, H. B. 
Chenery and P.W. Preston. Chenery is the originator of the 
useful concepts of "structuralist hypothesis" and 
"structuralists". "The structuralist approach", he
explained, "attempts to identify specific rigidities, lags 
and other characteristics of the structure of developing 
economies that affect economic adjustments and the choice of 
development policy." He identified the following as 
structuralists: Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse, Lewis, Prebisch, 
Singer and Myrdal. Besides the structuralists, Chenery 
also recognized two other tendencies: the neo-classical and 
the neo-Marxist. However, the latter two groups represent a 
virtual denial of development economics itself, the neo­
classical by reducing it to orthodox mainstream economics, 
and the neo-Marxists through its refutation by dependency 
theory, so that what Chenery really proposed was a 
classification of "approaches to the analysis of developing 
economies". Preston suggested two different but related 
classifications of development studies and theories, one 
according to definitions of progress, the other according to 
an ideological classification of the theorists themselves. 
In the first classification, progress can be defined in 
three ways: as "growth", and this definition corresponds to 
the "positivists" of the second classification (Lewis, 
Rostow, the sociology of development and modernization 
theory); as "ordered social reform", corresponding to the 
"radicals" (A.G. Frank, C. Furtado, G. Myrdal); and as
— 163 —
"disengagement from world capitalism and the pursuit of 
planned socialism", corresponding to the Marxists (P. A. 
Baran, G. Palma, Frank again). Without entering into the 
validity of the conceptual sequence involved here, the 
groupings of theorists by this system are outlandish and 
incomprehensible. What can Frank, who figures in two 
different, almost antipodal categories, be doing in the same 
group with Myrdal? And why should Myrdal, to start with, be 
considered a "radical" (which he certainly was not) and not 
a "positivist" (which is likelier he was, as per Preston's 
references)? There is a closet-full of bones to pick with 
Preston, and we think the problem is his refusal to admit 
the fundamental opposition, even incompatibility, between 
Western developmentalism and Marxist dependency theory. 
There is a huge difference in outlook between these two 
groups of theories which extends to almost all aspects of 
Third World reality and which in our opinion can most 
eloquently be brought out through the consideration of the 
problem of the origins of inequality.^2
P. Streeten and K. Basu are in general agreement on the 
way to organize chronologically the contents of development 
economics. Streeten (1984) said: "The history of
development economics can be regarded as a progress from 
large generalizations and high abstractions to greater 
specificity and concreteness." He attributed this change to 
"two discoveries— that many problems of the countries of the 
South are shared by the North, and that few problems are 
common to all countries of the South". Basu (also 1984) was 
more specific on the same transformation: "This recent
development economics is distinguished by being less 
ambitious and more realistic in its aims. Its concerns are 
more with the short-run than the long. Attempts to describe 
the paths of development over decades, so popular in the 
period immediately following Lewis (1954), no longer occupy 
the centre stage. The focus is now on the problems and 
structure of underdevelopment and not just the process of 
development. Along with this change of focus there has 
occurred a rather natural change in technique— an increasing
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use of rigorous analysis and concepts and results from 
economic theory.” Both authors seemed to discover in 
development economics a pattern in which something 
resembling order emerges out of nebulousness.^3
As the only full-scale monograph on the subject of the 
history of development economics, H.W. Arndt published in 
1987 the work titled Economic Development: The History of an 
Idea, which is a chronological depiction of the basic 
doctrines on the economic development of the Third World. 
Arndt divides the concept of development into two branches: 
growth and social objectives. Under growth he places 
capital accumulation, the development of human capital, and 
trade as the engine of growth. He recognizes a variety of 
strategies that he categorizes under the general heading of 
social objectives, among them the creation of employment as 
the number one priority and "basic needs". Arndt describes 
capital accumulation as "the orthodoxy of the first phase of 
postwar thinking about economic development". He considers 
that all the significant departures from the orthodoxy 
occurred during the 60s, although he does not make a 
completely convincing case for some of the tendencies of 
thought that he identifies. Finally, and rather late in his 
exposition— because of the light it throws on the 
theoretical origins of the research on economic development- 
-, Arndt included a section on "structuralism", a concept 
which he defined with a formula from I.M.D. Little: "In
economic terms, the supply of most things is inelastic." 
Basically what structuralism involved was a critique of 
price mechanisms as a means to correct balance of payment 
crises and other distortions, all of which had to be 
approached, in the structuralist perspective, from 
government planning and controls. Associated to this 
general outlook dating from before WW2, were M. Kalecki, T. 
Balogh, E.F. Schumacher, D. Seers, H.D. Henderson, N. 
Kaldor, Rosenstein-Rodan, and apparently Arndt himself. The 
idea all these economists shared was that the price 
mechanism works "even less well in under-development than in
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developed countries and that classical economic theory was 
therefore largely inapplicable to LDCs". Since this general 
version of structuralism was undoubtedly also held by many 
other economists, what we think that Arndt was indicating 
with his choice of names was the "structuralist" origins in 
mainstream economics in England of development economics, 
although the placing of this important chapter in his scheme 
is undoubtedly eccentric as it comes after he has covered 
the full range of what he and others call the orthodoxy of
development economics.^4
MAINSTREAM TO DISILLUSION
By way of introduction to our interpretation of the 
history of development economics and, at the same time, of 
our criticism of the Arndt version, we agree that there is 
an orthodoxy of development economics or economic 
development (either way is equally valid for us), but unlike 
Arndt we think that the orthodoxy was not successfully 
challenged in the West from within or from without until the 
70s, and that in the Third World even now it still by and 
large expresses the dominant outlook on development, 
although two provisos must be made: one is that there are 
important exceptions to its prevalence, and two, that the 
orthodoxy of development economics in the Third World was 
often encumbered by principles and practices that were not 
originally contemplated in it, so that it has often also 
been transformed out of all recognition, closer at times to 
the model of a command economy with capitalist traits than 
to a free economy with indicative planning as was originally 
envisaged by that orthodoxy. In the West, and sometimes in 
the Third World or from a Third World vantage, the orthodoxy 
was challenged during the 60s in different ways. There was 
the permanent challenge flung by Bauer during its inception, 
consisting in a rejection of "statism" and planning and 
consequently of the notion of induced industrialization and 
all the political paraphernalia of development economics. 
This challenge was reinforced at different times, as by the 
Haberler Report (1957) and U.N.-sponsored the
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Llttle/Scltovsky/Scott report (1970), but it became 
increasingly strong in the 70s in view of two circumstances: 
the awareness of inadequacy and failure that gripped 
development economics manifesting itself in the social 
orientation of development studies, which dates tentatively 
but not significantly from the late 60s; and the rise of the 
"gang of four", later dubbed the "four dragons" (Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan), and with them the 
notion that it was a totally free-market economy that was 
behind their success. We also reject Arndt's tripartite 
division of the orthodoxy, or for that matter, his reduction 
of it to an obsession with "growth": the "revision" that he 
calls "investment in human capital" can be found almost 
anywhere in the early literature of development economics 
and the "revision" proposing trade as the engine of growth 
was part of the challenge flung by J.Viner and others in 
the 50s, which later B, Balassa made his special cause, and 
not an issue that came up originally in the U.N. or in 
research done in the 60s.
Without renouncing Arndt's exposition entirely, or the 
Streeten/Basu "creationist" outline, in charting the history 
of development economics we shall follow a chronological 
multi-phase scheme, and within each phase, we shall rely on 
the emphases or tendencies approach used by Chenery and 
Preston. The first phase of our own scheme has already been 
discussed. It can be described as the initial gestation 
phase extending from the war years to 1950, during which the 
basic ideas, methods, and attitudes of development economics 
were elaborated. After this phase, we enter what we shall 
call here the mainstream phase of development economics, 
which is an extended unfolding of the implications of the 
development process. As Streeten and Basu have said, the 
mainstream phase, which covers mainly the 50s decade, was 
indeed concerned with generalizations. It also was oriented 
towards definitions and basic principles. It came up with 
the idea itself of development studies as a wider research 
endeavour than what was being contemplated within the
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strictly economic field. The means for that conceptual 
expansion was principally the launching in the US of modern­
ization theory under the umbrella of the so-called sociology 
of development. The 60s decade contains in our opinion 
another phase in the evolution of development studies, for 
it was a time of external influences on the discipline, of 
experimentation, and of second-thoughts, and towards the 
end, the doubts and the shuffling and the daring cross­
breeding of ideas (not always felicitous) were gaining the 
upper hand. After 1970 and up to the present, development 
studies became almost obsessively concerned with immediate, 
starkly down-to-earth research and policies, as reflected in 
such issues as "basic needs" and the "informal sector". We 
think it can be accurately described as the "onset of 
disillusion". It was also the time which brought back into 
force the old "rightist" denial of the development-economics 
project. This last phase can be seen as a kind of 
negative, near-despairing gloss on all that had come before. 
The "great white hope" of the "right wing" in development 
studies was the "gang of four", but the economic performance 
of these fringe Asian countries could be interpreted in 
different ways and by no means exclusively as the Golden 
Apples of the free-enterprise, free-trade, export- 
substituting Hesperides.
The mainstream phase had a central preoccupation and a 
fundamental outlook. The preoccupation was to build on what 
had been achieved during the gestation phase about the 
reality and the meaning of underdevelopment. The act of 
building— in the various senses of further explorations of 
the reality of underdevelopment, of the elaboration of 
specific policies and mechanisms, and of the erection of 
syntheses and conning towers for theoretical overviews— was 
undertaken with an optimistic, rationalist, and voluntarist 
outlook, not unlike the spirit which informed progressive 
thinking in the 18th century and which we observed in this 
work in connection with cultural relativism. On the 
question of the definition of underdevelopment, the
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quantitative approach pioneered by Clark was reaffirmed and 
refined. There had been from the beginning the temptation 
to think of development in terms of major industrial 
projects, including the manufacture of weapons and 
munitions. For the developing countries that could afford 
it, it was a matter of national pride in the 50s to 
construct a steel mill regardless of profitability or of 
domestic absorptive capacity. Volta Redonda, in Brazil, was 
the premier example that others in Latin America strove to 
imitate (Paz del Rio in Colombia, Ciudad Guayana in 
Venezuela). J. Viner's famous 1950 stricture on the per 
capita distribution of the national product as the meaning 
of development made so much sense that it is hard to believe 
that economic development could have ever been understood as 
anything other than expanding social welfare.^5 The trouble 
with underdevelopment was that it did not seem to allow for 
economic growth of the spectacular sort that European 
countries had known after the start of the Industrial 
Revolution and which alone could permit the acquisition of 
social welfare. Admittedly many underdeveloped countries 
were too backward even after to really be able to
utilize the technologies of a modern Western economy for 
their own benefit, but what of the countries that were not 
so backward and that could have theoretically followed in 
the footsteps of the more advanced nations? The temptation 
was there to put the blame on external influences, but for 
development economics the problem was not one of external 
impediments because it was not engaged in a historical 
search for origins and because it simply could not believe 
in possibilities it did not contemplate seriously. Its 
basic approach was to describe, in the field if possible, 
why underdeveloped economies did not produce a socially 
acceptable degree of economic growth, and the explanation to 
hand was structuralism.
OF VICIOUS CIRCLES AND POVERTY TRAPS
Structuralism is one of those Protean archetypal 
concept that mean different things in different contexts.
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We have seen in Arndt that in pre-WW2 economics it meant the 
critique of the price mechanism as the instrument to correct 
economic distortions. It was probably from this perspective 
that it spread to development economics. However, it became 
better known in the 60s in connection with a theory on 
inflation in Latin America different from the traditional 
monetary explanation.^^ In 1975 Chenery brought back the 
use of structuralism in its original pre-war meaning to 
describe a specific approach to Third World realities. 
These realities were of general acceptance in development 
economics since it early years. In fact, it could be said 
that "rigidities and lags", plus bottlenecks, disparities, 
and disequilibria in general, were the daily bread on which 
the discipline was fed and raised from birth. But even with 
this description in view, it is possible to have two 
readings of structural underdevelopment. The more extreme 
version means that underdevelopment is such a hopeless 
historical malformation that only a social upheaval can cure 
it. This is the view of economic backwardness that Lenin 
came close to stating, the one that Comintern proceedings 
either suggested or tacitly ratified time and again. It 
disqualifies the ability of capitalism to develop any 
economy outside of where it is already entrenched on a 
foundation combining social bribes and complicities. We 
shall come across this version in the section on the 
contemporary theories of economic imperialism. The other 
less extreme version of structural underdevelopment does not 
go to that length, but it does say that the internal 
malfunction in underdeveloped economies is of such magnitude 
as to necessitate considerable reconstruction, and 
furthermore, than the untreated or unfiltered norms and 
conventions of orthodox economics do not apply to it. It is 
essentially this version which quickly became standard 
doctrine and went untouched down to the mid-70s, when the 
doubting hit home.
One of the basic early motifs of the structural vision 
of underdevelopment (the less extreme, which we shall be
- 170 -
using in this part of our analysis) was the "vicious 
circle", later translated into technical terms as a "low-
level equilibrium trap". It derived from the awareness even 
during the optimistic gestation phase of development 
economics that Rosenstein-Roden's model might have been 
somewhat blithe. In 1949 Singer wrote an article—  
incongruously or ironically titled "Economic Progress in
Underdeveloped Countries"— , which enumerated a long list of 
vicious circles present in backward economies. These were 
beset by health problems, but medical improvements increased 
population which made the economic situation more difficult 
which over the long haul made the solution of endemic health 
problems more complicated. Social legislation to mitigate
the scourge of poverty diverted resources needed for
economic development. Low production hindered the
possibility of acquiring capital equipment which could have 
served to increase production. Singer synthesized the
discouraging nature of underdevelopment in these simple 
terms: "An underdeveloped country is poor because it has no 
industry; and an underdeveloped country has no industry 
because it is poor." The solution to these problems were no 
less subject to the vicious-circle logic than the problem 
themselves. The solution for underdevelopment required a 
"big initial effort" yet underdevelopment by definition only 
allowed small-scale measures. The highly unequal
distribution of income resulted in that savings were wasted 
in luxury imports or in the export of capital, but 
redistributive policies tended to diminish savings capacity. 
Finally, development could not take place without political 
stability which required unpopular policies which resulted 
in social discontent and political instability. One vicious 
circle did not exclude another, and they could be made 
complementary or concentric. In his highly influential 1952 
lectures titled Some Aspects of Accumulation in 
Underdeveloped Countries, R. Nurkse reiterated or elaborated 
on some of the previous examples of the vicious circle. 
Lack of capital and low productivity made for low real 
income and low saving which resulted in lack of capital.
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Alternatlvely: low income led to low savings and lack of 
capital which made for low productivity and low income. 
Nurkse too envisaged the obstacles in the way of solutions, 
in particular those stemming from the operation of the 
"demonstration effect", which was the jargon equivalent of 
"keeping up with the Jones" and explained why in the US the 
growth of income did not generate a correspondingly higher 
savings to income ratio (known as the Dusenberg effect). In 
the case of the underdeveloped countries, Nurkse reasoned, 
foreign investment could paradoxically diminish the relative 
level of real income and increase the distance between the 
rich and the poor economies through diminished savings in 
the latter resulting from the spending of income gains 
according to patterns of consumption imported from the 
developed countries.^7
Like structuralism, the vicious circle was less a 
theory than an idea, and perhaps even less than an idea, an 
image eloquently in the service of an important cause. In a 
pinch, it could pass muster as a technical definition of 
underdevelopment. This was in effect what some theorists 
attempted to do during the mainstream phase of development 
economics. Nelson's mathematical model of "the low-level 
equilibrium trap in underdeveloped economies" emphasized the 
relations between the production function and population 
growth. "At an equilibrium level of per capita income", he 
wrote, "both capital and population are constant, or are 
changing at an equal rate so that their ratio is constant." 
If the ratio of population increase to capital accumulation 
at equilibrium was less than one, "then equilibrium is 
unstable and there is no trap". Otherwise, the economy 
would show no growth and it would remain trapped at a 
constant ratio of income to population. The model was 
somewhat more complex in that it also took into account the 
availability of arable land and the relative efficiency of 
production, but on the whole it basically described the 
fairly obvious principle that development required 
investment, food production, and technological progress.*
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Another model in general use was called the "two-gap 
approach" because it correlated the savings/investment 
function in an underdeveloped economy, which usually did not 
suffice for development targets, with the flow of foreign 
resources, which showed in national accounts as an excess of 
imports over exports.
The implication in these models was that under­
development manifested a condition which backward countries 
tried to escape but kept falling back into due to the pull 
of its accumulated deficiencies. A frequent underlying 
assumption for these pessimistic projections was that 
whereas in a developed economy the attainment of full 
employment with high productivity required viable 
adjustments in certain quantifiable magnitudes, in an 
underdeveloped economy each new investment was afflicted 
with disproportionality due to the much narrower production 
and income bases. In characterizing economic backwardness 
as a whole, H. Leibenstein, relying on the concept of the 
vicious circle, contrasted its condition of quasi-stable 
equilibrium with the state of disequilbrium in advanced
*lhe îfelson low-level trap was represented in the following graph
dy
dP
in which (Y/P) was the siteLstenoe level of per c^ta income at the point of intersecticn 
of the population curve ((%>/?) and the incnme-growth curve (dy/Y). &  dp/P exceeded cfy/Y, 
the rate of population growth wuld tend to fall towards the trap levâ. (Y/P)*; if dy/i 
exœated dp/P, the equmhlun was instable and growth was possible. But the momentim of 
growth had to be sustained or the curves muld once again intersect at trarrlevel (Y/P)**. 
In îfelson’s words: "If the prodjction function is Jirear hcmp^ nous, then oumit per 
c^ta can only be increased if the amount of c^tal per worters is increased. Di otner 
w:%ds, the dy/i curve lies above the (%>/P curve at a given level of per capita income if 
and only if the rate of cmital increase exceeds the rate of population increase at that 
level of per c^ ita inocne. 'The low-leiel equilibriun tr^ ", ÆR, Deoaiher 1956, p.90O-
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There was, however, something nugatory, and perhaps 
inaccurate, about these exercises. They were aggregative 
and descriptive, hence they analysed neither in depth nor in 
detail, and it could be argued that the real concrete 
problems of underdevelopment eluded them. The notion itself 
that underdevelopment was a state or quasi-state of 
equilibrium was useful perhaps in constructing a 
mathematical model, but in the balance it seems profoundly 
unsatisfactory as a representation of reality or as an 
approach to the problems of economic backwardness. Despite 
these technical models, underdevelopment was in various 
ways closer to a state of disequilibrium than to a condition 
of stability. There was, to start with, the essential 
imbalance between development and underdevelopment, which in 
the normal course of events made for instability on a global 
scale. Within underdevelopment, there was the permanent 
imbalance between the reality of low-level economic 
performance and potential development, and this condition 
implicated a whole series of specific disequilibria and 
disproportionalities: between means and ends, between the
urban and the rural sections, between the income/saving 
ratio and a desired input/output relation, and so on. If 
one compared these disequilibria with the articulations in a 
developed economy, the only way to perceive underdevelopment 
as a state of equilibrium would have had to be through the 
prism of history in the sense that economic backwardness 
represented the permanence in time of very old traditional 
ways, but this was perceivable from the vantage of 
industrialization and economic progress in general, which in 
itself made the indefinite survival of these ways either 
problematical or unlikely. Development economics existed 
precisely to come up with solutions for these problems, and 
that is perhaps what explains the greater influence in its 
proceedings during its mainstream phase of formulators of 
policy such as Rosenstein-Roden, Prebisch, Singer, Nurkse, 
and Lewis over those engaged in general descriptive 
analysis,
- 174 -
Working in the field of foreign commerce, G. Myrdal 
used in 1957 the "vicious circle" metaphor but gave it a 
further twist with the "principle of circular and cumulative 
causation". What he meant was that without corrective 
measures the working of the market made for growing 
inequality, and this was particularly relevant in 
international trade. Myrdal was partial then to regulations 
and arrangements which biased conditions in favour of 
underdeveloped countries. Along with most other development 
economists, Myrdal believed that without help from the 
developed world underdevelopment could not be overcome. 
This did not involve dolloped programs of foreign aid but a 
truly massive effort that would affect the industrialized 
nations over-all rate of growth. This outlook, which had 
been foreseen by Rosenstein-Rodan in 1943, presupposed that 
you could not have real significant growth at the same time 
on both sides of the divide. Myrdal was always a prolific 
researcher and writer and he later modified this approach by 
conferring a crucial importance to the question of 
modernization and of social reform in underdeveloped 
countries. His initial impact on development studies, 
however, was much greater than his later somewhat acerbic 
opinions on the Third World. There is one constant through 
his work and that is a sense of moral outrage at misery and 
suffering, and this gave strength in his early work to the 
idea that economic aid was an ethical obligation. The 
latter concept had its sharpest expression in a vision of 
poverty and backwardness continuing or getting worse over 
the years.99 This was the essence itself of the vicious 
circle. Myrdal and Nurkse also had in common that, though 
both were liberals, firmly inclined towards free trade, 
neither could bring himself to accept the advisability of 
free trade as the sole motor of growth for underdeveloped 
economies.
OF RURAL-URBAN FLOWS AND INDUSTRIALIZATION
Industrialization was defended in many ways during the 
mainstream phase, even though it was already a foregone 
conclusion before the basic texts from this period were
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written. In fact, even for Rosenstein-Rodan and Preblsch it 
probably had been an inevitable if problematic choice in 
view of the Western penchant for equating collective wealth 
and manufacturing, which concretely goes as far back at 
least as the age of mercantilism and has its most resounding 
historical validation in the Industrial Revolution. Among 
the traditional arguments were: one, industrialization
appeared to be the best solution to unemployment, disguised 
unemployment, and low productivity in the rural areas; two, 
industrialization seemed to be historically the ideal 
instrument for economic growth and development; and three—  
which because of its political overtones was not quite as 
forthrightly used as the others— , planned industrialization 
had worked in the Soviet Union and it probably would too in 
Eastern Europe, which was the original target area for some 
of the more important economic development projects devised 
in the Allied countries during the war. To these reasons at 
least two new ones were added after the war: one, that
industrialization could correct the lop-sided scheme whereby 
the underdeveloped countries exchanged raw materials— and 
had to put up with all the disadvantages of the rural - 
sector— , for manufactured goods: and two, that it would put 
an end to the resulting terms of foreign trade which seemed 
to be so disadvantageous for underdeveloped countries. The 
doctrine of industrialization did not necessarily include a 
denial of the advantages of international commerce as an 
instrument of development— certainly not in Prebish, whose 
rallying cry for underdeveloped countries had to do with the 
imbalances rather than the "backwash effects" of trade— , 
but it did involve a strategic choice between the three 
following alternatives: 1) the export of primary products as 
per the old international division of labour set-up; 2) 
manufacturing for exports; and 3) emphasis on the 
development of the domestic market on both the supply and 
the demand side. The last possibility could be said to be 
at the heart of the idea itself of economic development, 
although, as we shall see, it did not enjoy universal 
acceptance even during the mainstream period of development
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economics, Nurkse explicitly defended it because he 
identified primary exports with the vicious circle and he 
did not believe that underdeveloped countries were in a 
position to compete in the international market with 
manufactured goods. Since underdeveloped countries, unlike 
the historical cases of Great Britain and the other early 
industrializing nations, did not generate enough surplus for 
their own endogenous industrialization, foreign capital 
resources in the form of foreign investment and capital 
goods were added as "indivisibilities" in the development 
process. This had been known since early in the game, but 
during the mainstream phase of development economics it 
became an indissoluble part of the dogma of 
i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . More complex elaborations of the 
industrialization model required the notions of social 
overhead and economies of scale, all of which came straight 
from Rosenstein-Rodan and the gestation phase of 
developmental thinking. On the whole, these ideas were 
incompatible with a system strictly activated by profit/loss 
calculations and had to be part of a planned development 
program.
Capital, whether for industry or for infrastructure, 
was not, however, the only precondition for 
industrialization. Even though in the early literature of 
development economics it often seems as though 
industrialization were an end in itself, it was in fact 
always a response to the excessive importance of the primary 
sector in weight of numbers and of production ratios in 
underdeveloped economies. Underdevelopment could have been 
defined during the mainstream phase as the prevalence in a 
national system of the low-productivity rural economy over 
the high-productivity urban economy, and development 
consisted in the orderly transfer of under-utilized factors 
from the country to the cities. We shall see later that one 
of the basic changes in development economics, leading to 
disillusionment and to the search for concrete issues and 
solutions, came about when it was seen that the rural-urban 
process did not result in harmonious development but in the
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transfer of rural unemployment and poverty to the cities. 
However, at this stage the rural surplus population was seen 
as the fundamental problem to be tackled.
Rosenstein-Rodan and Nurkse tailored their ideas on 
industrialization on the existence of rural unemployment, 
but it was W.A. Lewis who presented the situation of the 
rural sector in an underdeveloped economy in such a way that 
it became part of fundamental doctrine. For this he 
translated the awareness of rural excess population into 
two technical formulas: "unlimited supply of labour" and
"zero marginal productivity". The first permitted a set of 
subsidiary inferences, such as that wages in the rural 
economy had to be "institutionally" determined rather than 
market determined in order to guarantee a constant flow of 
labour power towards urban industries, which required that 
the supply of labour in the rural sector should be of a 
certain magnitude, at least during the early phase of 
industrialization, in order to prevent a fall in
agricultural production and at the same time a rise in rural 
wages to the levels prevalent in the urban sector. The 
operative principle behind this balancing act was "zero 
marginal productivity", and this meant that agrarian
productivity in an underdeveloped economy was so low that 
workers could be subtracted from the agricultural labour 
force, up to a certain point, without affecting over-all 
production, although this did not mean that, at any given 
time, a unit of labour could not be more productively
employed.
Lewis' oft-repeated concern was productivity— in the 
sense that more production per capita redounded in a more 
equitable share of goods and income— because he believed 
that in the long-run it was trade that would allow for
steady growth through export competitiveness. The
overloaded rural sector did not allow much room for 
improvement as it was, but there were trade benefits to be 
had from an expanded industrial sector. The countryside 
could contribute cheap agricultural produce to sustain the 
rural-urban migration. In the end it would benefit from a
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lessened human burden on its resources and from higher per 
capita output. Nurkse was in substantial agreement with the 
idea that agriculture should keep its prices down. 
Following these recommendations Latin American economists 
would argue that "food prices are irrelevant to the long-run 
development process since both producer and consumers are 
insensitive to changes in prices", a fallacy which would 
cost developing countries dearly in future. J.C.H. Fei and 
G. Ranis became identified during the 60s with "labour- 
surplus economy" theory, which they derived from Lewis* 
unlimited supply of labour idea, and summarized in this 
manner: "In a word, the vital real resources function of the 
agricultural sector in the dualistic economy is performed 
when the released agricultural worker fed by the 
agricultural surplus is enabled to create new output in the 
industrial sector." Without surrendering the premiss of 
the low-productivity rural sector, they tended to emphasize 
the over-all necessity of balanced growth between 
agriculture and industry, and in 1969, in view of the 
frequent misapplication in underdeveloped countries of the 
orthodox norms of development economics, they wrote: "While 
the modernization impulse may well have to come from outside 
agriculture, without the mobilization of that sector and its 
full interaction with the rest of the economy in an ever 
broadening net of human and market participation, 
development is difficult to sustain.
Development economics did not deal with a "natural" or 
spontaneous process of industrialization or with the causes 
of why this process had not occurred. Its concerns were 
induced industrialization and development. From the study 
of its fundamental texts, we have tried to extract certain 
basic doctrines by singling out and inter-relating the ideas 
which best exemplify the process of induced growth and which 
by all logic are the least ascribable to a real historical 
process of industrialization, such as the British 18th and 
19th century paradigm, since those ideas by definition had 
to do with historical lags and were meant to provide 
correctives for them. The concept of structural
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underdevelopment characterized by vicious circles and 
poverty traps is foreign not to say antipodal to the process 
of material growth in the industrialized countries. It is 
true that capitalism was afflicted by relatively short-term 
economic cycles, which reached a depressive paroxysm in the 
1930s, but these periodic downturns were also by definition 
surmountable, and this was not the case with the sort of
continuous low-intensity rhythm of activity that defined 
underdevelopment. We have also seen that development
economics conceived development as induced
industrialization, which is not consonant either with the 
historical norm. Foreign investments were required to 
industrialize and this again did not reflect an invariant
historical pattern. Neither economies of scale nor social 
overhead— except in terms of profits, as for the latter, in 
British toll roads and canals— were operative historical 
functions. We have refrained from indicating other
concepts, such as infant-industry protection or policies for 
monetary stimulation, because they are either self-evident 
or they were part of historical experience. Finally, we 
have seen development economics attempting to model short- 
run replications of the complex and historically long-term 
process of Western urbanization that came perilously close 
to being distortional in the light of historical experience. 
Yet these daring prescriptions were still not enough by the 
canons of development economics to ensure industrialization. 
At lest two more coordinative principles were necessary: one 
practical, the other a guiding theoretical light.
PLANNING AND BALANCED GROWTH
Early development economics was as committed to 
planning as it was to any other of its basic principles. 
However, Rosenstein-Rodan always seemed diffident about the 
subject despite the fact that his views on induced 
industrialization seemed to clamour for strong economic 
dirigisme. Nurkse like him sounded copy and uncommitted on 
the subject although the policies he advocated also required 
not just planning but planning that was both precise and 
far-reaching. Lewis probably expressed the general attitude
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of his peers when in 1949 he wrote for the Fabian Society a 
book on planning in which he practically defined it as 
"targeting" and as having to do with "the means which the 
government uses to try to enforce upon private enterprise 
the targets which have been previously determined". Lewis 
was only marginally pro-planning and inclined strongly in 
favour of "mobility of resources". Here again we see that 
development economics required of its practitioners an 
ethical commitment that went beyond the mere exercise of a 
profession or the use of scientific instruments. Despite 
their very real and very profound misgivings, Rosenstein- 
Rodan, Nurkse, and Lewis had to admit that planning was a 
necessity in order to combat poverty, and planning duly 
entered development economics on an equal footing with 
induced industrialization and rural-urban population flows. 
Theorists like the Indian Mahalanobis and the Dutchman J. 
Tinbergen did their best to make it practical and
acceptable. Mahalanobis in particular became influential 
through his crucial involvement in the choice in post­
independence India of a policy of all-out heavy
industrialization, that is, in favour of the construction of 
the steel mills and the engineering and tool plant that 
Third World countries were yearning to possess. Ironically, 
early gung-ho industrializers took for granted in their 
planning models one of the tools that has proven most 
recalcitrant to the control of underdeveloped nations: a
practical, self-multiplying fund of modern industrial
technology. Conventional wisdom had it that education would 
provide the resources needed in that area, but few 
economists apparently suspected how complex technology would 
become, or to what extent the centres of gravity of
technological research under capitalism would shift over the 
years from the universities to the laboratories of 
multinational corporations. This exclusion from the sources 
of vital knowledge for survival in the international market 
place would become in due time the crowning aggravation in 
the career of failures and frustrations that economic 
development has turned out to be for most of the countries
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in the Third W o r l d .
If planning was supposed to offer the superior means to 
stimulate and control the process of industrialization, 
"balanced growth" was the open sesame with which development
economists hoped to crack open the gates of progress. it
had been spelled out first by Rosenstein-Rodan in his 1943 
essay, where it was proposed as an all-weather azimuth for 
those involved in the process of economic planning, and it 
was of a piece with the idea of the big push. After the 
war, when economists started to perceive the quagmire on 
which Rosenstein-Rodan's grandiose edifice of
industrialization had to be built, balanced growth and the 
big push were invoked as the two sledge-hammers with which 
to break the vicious circle and the poverty trap. Nurkse 
had few illusions about the big push, but he was the
foremost advocate of balanced growth. In his view it was 
the necessary approach to attack the fundamental dilemma 
that any input into an underdeveloped economy, whether of 
capital, labour, or foreign currency, was never sufficient 
for self-sustained growth because it generated additional 
needs and requirements, as when investment A generated a 
demand that could only be satisfied domestically by 
investment B, except that by the time that B was in place 
the output of A could not supply the aggregate demand of A + 
B. By anticipating these problems, balanced growth could 
ensure what Nelson described as a "linear homogeneous" 
production curve. In primary-products exporting economies, 
it was the ideal strategic alternative for stagnating 
exports through diversified and mutually complementary 
industrial investments.
There was an even more basic application of the same 
principle, which incidentally showed that Nurkse was not 
unaware that agriculture could not be entirely neglected in 
the process of development: "The relation between
agriculture and manufacturing industry offers the clearest 
and simplest case of balance needed for economic growth." 
But Nurkse also drew from the notion of balanced growth an 
additional justification for the principle requiring that
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cheap food should keep flowing to the cities at all costs in 
order to support industrialization. The reasoning behind 
this was apparently that increasing demand would stimulate 
productivity in the agricultural sector and bring it in line 
with industry, but in practice the policy of supporting 
urban industrialization was interpreted as either 
underpaying producers or subsidizing them where fiscal 
resources permitted it, and resulted in agriculture becoming 
the poor handmaiden of industry and eventually in parasitic, 
ramshackle, and volatile urban economies, which came to seem 
like the millstone around the neck of development theory. 
Whatever the distortions that were later introduced, Nurkse 
rested his case in this fashion: "The case for balanced
growth is concerned with establishing a pattern of mutually 
supporting investments over a range of industries wide 
enough to overcome the frustration of isolated advances in 
order precisely to create a formal momentum of growth," 
Balanced growth, then, was a sort of compendium of all the 
norms and dicta of development economics. It was 
specifically contrasted to international specialisation by 
Nurkse, which was about as complete a statement as could be 
found of the internal-market orientation, as opposed to 
trade-oriented strategies, of development economics. The 
idea was fertile in possibilities and influences. No other 
policy made planning so absolutely indispensable, and not 
just of the indicative sort that Lewis seemed to favour, 
H,B, Chenery understood that it had to be the moving force 
behind industrialization or development programs. In line 
with his heavy-equilibrium view of underdevelopment and 
despite evidence on the limitations of foreign aid and 
investments, H, Leibenstein in 1957 still insisted that in 
order to break the vicious circle of poverty it would have 
to be attacked through a critical minimum effort oriented by 
the guiding idea of balanced g r o w t h , 1^3
MODERNIZATION THEORY, OR A CONTROVERSIAL EXPANSION OF 
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
In 1972 G, Myrdal wrote of his disenchantment over the 
increasing socioeconomic inequalities within Third World
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countries themselves. His moral fervour on market 
inequalities and international injustices had been buffeted 
by events and grievously offended by the social reality in 
some underdeveloped societies. He had in effect come down 
from the Elysium of figures and intentions to the mire of 
corruption and bureaucracy. In his own words: "After the
war and the avalanche of decolonization, the ideals of 
modernization were adopted almost everywhere as a sort of 
state religion. A prominent role among these ideas was
played by the egalitarian doctrine. There is a strong
flavour of the Enlightenment philosophy colouring most 
public pronouncements in these countries concerning the 
goals for planned development." Reality, however, was a 
painful let-down. "In sharp contrast to these declarations 
for greater inequality", he went on, "stands the fact that 
almost everywhere in the non-communist underdeveloped 
countries actual development has moved towards increasing 
inequality. Even when egalitarian reforms have been 
legislated for in some of these countries, they have not 
been carried out, or they have been permitted to work in 
the interest of the not-so-poor. " The basis of these
observations was an in-depth study of social habits and 
institutions in some South Asian states which he undertook 
when his wife Alva was named Sweden’s ambassador to India in 
1957. From this immersion in the day-to-day reality of 
developing societies, Myrdal concluded "that social and 
economic institutions and attitudes should be changed in 
order to: increase labour efficiency and diligence,
effective competition, mobility, and enterprise; permit 
greater equality of opportunities; make possible higher
productivity and well-being; and generally promote 
development".
The new emphases in his approach to the problem of 
underdevelopment were decidedly grimmer than they had ever 
been, even granting that he was never really a pollyanna on 
the possibilities of development, and it led him to a 
terrible dilemma : "Observing the broad correlation between
degree of inequality and poverty in South Asia, it is
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legitimate to ask whether or not poverty breeds inequality.” 
He surfaced with three concepts which explained for him in 
part the causes of the observed deterioration: environmental 
influence, cultural determinism, and the "soft state". The 
last two put him smack in the middle of an important Western 
intellectual stream. Cultural determinism was exemplified 
by religion, which, on the popular level, was "a ritualized 
and stratified complex of highly emotional beliefs and 
valuations that regularly give the sanction of sacredness, 
taboo, and immutability to inherited institutional 
arrangements, modes of living and attitudes...acts as a 
tremendous force for social inertia." The "soft state" was 
a crucial derivation from this psycho-cultural complex. 
Within it there was neither solidarity nor social 
discipline. Western juridical principles and practices were 
foreign or incompatible with it. But above all it was 
arbitrary and corrupt. And Myrdal mentioned the irony of 
Third World corruption: "On one hand it had proved difficult 
[in backward countries] to allow and encourage the operation 
of rational motivations with profitable ends in the social 
sector where these motivations function in developed 
countries, which is the area of private business; while on 
the other hand it has been seen to be equally arduous to 
eliminate the search for personal gain in that sector where 
it has been extirpated in the West, which is that of 
political power and public administration." Myrdal cited 
the case of Indonesia where corruption was reputedly absent 
during Dutch colonial rule but had picked up dramatically 
after independence. By some recondite means, climate was 
the ultimate cause of social and economic backwardness, but 
the immediate determinant influences were "reformable" 
social practices. The offshoot seemed to be that more could 
be done about underdevelopment from within than by changing 
the structures of international c o m m e r c e . 1^4 shall refer
later on to the implications of Myrdal *s change of heart 
about underdeveloped countries, but let us explore now the 
intellectual frame of reference in which it came about. 
What had happened between his plaintive pleas on
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International inequities and his later schoolmarmish 
attitude towards non-Western developing societies?
There is a line of reasoning going back to at least M. 
Weber which explains development as the result of certain 
favourable collective mental attitudes and the resulting 
social habits. The essential idea of the psychological 
origins of progress reappears in J.A. Schumpeter's thesis on 
the importance of the entrepreneur for the optimal working 
of a capitalist model. American sociology had been examining 
these ideas since the 30s without extending its conclusions 
beyond what could be described as the field of its immediate 
social implications, but during the 50s it had begun to 
enlarge its vision to take in the problems of 
underdevelopment. The starting point for this analysis was 
T. Parson's concept of "pattern variables", which clustered 
related traits into divergent groups of varying social 
efficacy. D. Lehman considers that modernization theory, 
which, in this context, is a conventional name for the 
Western sociological concern with underdevelopment, is 
"Talcott Parson's reading expounded in his Structure of 
Social Action of Weber and Durkeim". D. McLelland (1961) 
drew from this research the idea that "community 
development" was a function of an individual desire to do 
well, which he called "n-achievement". Social progress 
depended for each group on the number of "n-achievers" which 
it produced. E. Hagen (1962) saw the possibility of 
applying these concepts to the condition of economic 
underdevelopment and he proceeded to do so, specifically in 
connection with "peasant societies". As B. Higgins (1959) 
put it: "In contrast to the technologically advanced society 
with its high n-achievement, high autonomy (need to be 
independent of others) and high need dominance (need to a 
leader), the peasant society is characterized by a high 
need-affiliation (need to please friends and to have their 
affection, to cooperate with them) and high need-dependency 
(need to feel inferior to someone; to have ides and 
attitudes approved by persons regarded as superior)."
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Furthermore, said Higgins: "The lack of Schumpeterian
entrepreneurship in a peasant society is a direct reflection 
of the value system in such a society." Hagen cited as 
high-achievers the lower-order of Samurais in Japan and the 
antioquenos of Colombia (from amidst whom, incidentally, 
today's international cocaine-barons emerged). Other 
pattern-variables were proposed, always according to a 
scheme contrasting progress to stagnation. B.F. Hoselitz 
(1960) attributed to the "first world" a pattern of 
behaviour defined by universalism, achievement-orientation 
and functional specificity, and to the Third World the 
opposite traits: particularism, the inability to generalize 
or discover productive analogies; adscription, the 
acceptance of one's station in life; and functional 
diffusion, the lack of concentration and method. It was 
believed by the theorist of this tendency that if the n- 
achievement mystique could be instilled in a general and 
systematic way into a society it could help it escape 
underdevelopment. The program for doing this was known as 
the "sociology of development", and the designation 
"modernization theory" probably derives from looser, non­
technical analyses of developing societies, such as those 
by D. Lerner (1958). In essence, this method sought to 
substitute traditional habits and values, which were seen as 
retardating, with new, progressive, essentially Western 
ones. Myrdal has admitted that the work he undertook in 
Asia was specifically oriented towards modernization, that 
is to say, towards the study of "attitudes and institutions" 
which he "found to be largely responsible for those 
countries' underdevelopment and would have to be changed in
order to speed up d e v e l o p m e n t " . 1^5
Modernization theory did not have the acceptance in 
economic circles, or the success in general, its authors and 
defenders envisioned. Myrdal's Asian Drama (1968) was 
probably both its hightide and its swan song. The 
appearance and diffusion of the sociology of development 
during the 60s permitted the creation of the wider category
- 187 -
of development studies, but the sociological approach to 
underdevelopment has not prospered either academically or in 
the area of policy, as P.W. Preston stated in 1984. Its 
influence on development economics has been minimal though 
not entirely null. There are elements of sociology in the 
re-orientation of economic development studies in the 70s 
towards social objectives, but on the whole development 
economists, while accepting the existence of non-economic 
factors in underdevelopment, have tended to put them on a 
"lower order of variables", or to use them only as discrete 
or ancillary aspects of the entire picture. Even if they 
agree that underdevelopment has endogenous causes, 
development economists, habituated to interpreting behaviour 
in terms of rational self-interest, do not as a rule see it 
as psychological in origin. As was to be expected, the 
greatest opposition to modernization came from those who 
believe that underdevelopment is not primarily a self­
generated phenomenon, but a product of international 
inequalities and forces. This takes us a step closer to the 
contemporary theory of economic imperialism, which is 
critical of development studies in general, and it is 
apposite in this respect to mention the A.G. Frank critique 
of the sociology of development because of its precise 
targeting and because, despite Frank’s radicalism, it 
probably reflects the widest possible spectrum of Third 
World opinion on the subject. Frank, of course, denies the 
assumptions about the origins of underdevelopment in 
modernization theory, but he goes further and impugns the 
theory itself in that it posits a "psychological dualism" 
which goes against the fundamental idea of the unity of 
humanity. His criticism consists in attributing to 
modernization theory an implicit racist discriminatory 
content which he then proceeds to demolish with a mixture of 
both sarcasm and common s e n s e . Was his victim really 
racist though? One supposes it was not by intention, but 
like the I.Q. test, it laid the burden of the proof of its 
egalitarianism on the shoulders of the people it deprecated. 
Even if its influence had gone further than it actually did.
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the sociology of development would always have been a 
difficult doctrine to preach in the context of economic 
theory and policy.
THE W.W. ROSTOW SYNTHESIS AND ITS CRITICS
The figure who brings together all the main strands of 
development studies is also the most controversial because 
of his theoretical contentions and because of his political 
clout. One aspect really cannot be separated from the other. 
With the publication and wide dissemination— to no small 
degree due to the quasi-official backing of the US 
government— of his book The Stages of Economic Growth 
(1960), W.W. Rostow came to seem like the incarnation of the
quintessential development economist, but before that he had
been associated with the theory of modernization through his 
participation in the CIA-funded, MIT-based Centre for 
International Studies (CENTS). CENTS was a policy-research 
institution (a "think-tank", we would say today) pursuing 
that objective with a foot in economics and the other in 
sociology. It also exemplified the tight bonding in the US 
during the 50s between government and academe on Third World 
development issues. This is Rostow*s own description of its
operations: "CENTS*s work on development began formally in
1952 and included intensive studies in India, Indonesia and 
Italy. Aside from [M.] Millikan and me, the members of the 
senior staff engaged in economic development problems were 
Everett Hagen, Benjamin Higgins, Wilfred Malenbaum, and P.N. 
Rosenstein-Rodan. Rodan had, of course, been at work in 
development problems longer than any of us— since his 
research on Eastern Europe in London during the Second World 
War. We were also closely in touch with our colleague 
Charles Kindleberger, whose wide portfolio of interests 
included the field of economic growth in both a historical 
and a contemporary context." However, even before his 
attachment to modernization as a strategy for development, 
Rostow had been interested in the "application of economic 
theory to economic history", in particular in connection to 
economic growth.
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By fishing in three different ponds— the history of 
economic development, development economics, and the 
sociology of modernization— , he came up with his special 
theory of stages in economic development. Rostov’s 
contribution in this area consisted in defining and 
describing five stages through which economic modernization 
supposedly went: starting from traditional society, itself 
classified as the initial stage, these were: the
transitional stage, the take-off stage, maturity, and high 
mass consumption. From the angle of underdevelopment, the 
take-off stage was the principal concern and target of
policy. Thirlwall summarized it in these terms: "Since the
pre-conditions of take-off have been met in the transitional 
stage, the take-off stage is a short stage of development 
during which growth becomes self-sustaining. Investment 
must rise to a level in excess of 10% of national income in 
order for per capita income to rise sufficiently to 
guarantee adequate future levels of saving and investment." 
Conventionally, Rostow accepted that resources had to be 
transferred from the rural to the urban economy. Less 
conventionally, he was not in favour of balanced growth. In 
development, he found, certain key industries led the way 
generating forward, backward, and lateral linkages. This 
meant, therefore, unbalanced growth in its most elementary
sense. Rostow wove together in his study of stages of
growth, first adumbrated in an article from 1956, strands 
from different, even opposed tendencies within development 
economics, an approach which gives more substance to the 
notion that his work was a conscious attempt at a summation 
of all the basic themes and areas of development studies. 
The sociological aspects of a strategy of development, which 
could be defined as the political, social, and institutional 
frameworks for industrialization, had to do with change and 
stimulation of traditional societies or of large traditional 
residues within changing societies. Ultimately for Rostow, 
as for the other intellectual pillars of development 
economics, change and progress were dependent on the 
assimilation of technology, which was the process itself of
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learning, and economic growth was not an end in itself but a 
symptom, "one manifestation of a society's total 
performance", as he stated in The Process of Economic 
Growth, a book from 1952.1^7
There was a blandness about all this that belied but 
could not do away with the fact that this was near-official 
American foreign policy doctrine for Latin America and the 
rest of the Third World during the late 50s and early 60s, 
and Rostow himself made no bones in 1984 about his clear 
perception of the stakes in the East-West power politics: 
"It was vice president Nixon's difficulties in Lima and 
Caracas in May 1958...that shifted the balance of power 
within the Eisenhower administration towards support for the 
Inter-American Bank and other positive responses to Latin 
America's development needs, long urged upon it. Castro's 
emergency in 1959 as a working ally of Moscow was not 
irrelevant to easy congressional acceptance of the Alliance 
for Progress." Rostow was, of course, completely identified 
with this ill-started program for aid and counselling in 
Latin America. His ideological position has provoked more 
attacks and denunciations than the actual contents of his 
academic work, but the latter has not had easy sailing 
either. In putting aside (or down) Rostow's claims to 
having given due recognition to non-economic factors in 
development, A. Fishlow inveighed against his reliance on 
quantitative measurements to define economic stages and in 
particular the so-called take-off stage, which is the 
crucial step in the development ladder, and he cited nations 
that, like Mexico and Argentina, have entered the transition 
phase to take-off and relapsed or stagnated without apparent 
cause. Fishlow explained: "The national capital input ratio 
lacks behavioural content. Its constancy subsumes
complementary changes in other inputs, such as labour or 
entrepreneurial skills, not to mention technological 
progress. It excludes the important category of human 
capital." Furthermore, Fishlow argued that Rostow's 
quantitative measuring rods were useless to stabilize his
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stages because the historical evidence for them was at best 
patchy and at worst contradictory. S. Kuznets, whom Rostow 
recognized as an influential teacher, nevertheless 
castigated Rostow* s historical data as well as some of the 
conclusions that he derived from the historical process of 
industrialization. Kuznets disputed Rostow*s estimates on 
the savings ratio (marginal propensity to save) 
characteristic of the take-off stage, but worse, he compared 
unfavourably today*s data from the LDC*s and the estimates 
for the pre-industrial phase of the industrialized nations, 
and he concluded that Rostow*s optimistic sequency of stages 
was probably unrealistic. In short, what Kuznets was saying 
was simply that history does not repeat itself. But he also 
faulted Rostow for applying to economic history the 
Procrustean bed of development economics, as, for instance, 
with his (Kuznets*) claim that industry and agriculture 
during the pre-industrial and the industrial phases in 
Europe presented a reciprocal growth pattern, rather than 
agriculture being skimmed for industry*s benefit, as 
development economics seemed sometimes to suggest. We shall 
see more of Kuznet*s pessimism but his final answer to 
Rostow on underdeveloped countries was that they could be in 
"a sequence of long-term growth separate and distinct from 
that of the Western European cradle of the modern economic
e p o c h " . 1 0 8
An interesting analytical adjunct to Rostow*s 
historical approach to economic development was a Ranis/Fei 
article from 1961 in which they attempted "to make a 
contribution towards the theory of growth by rigorously 
analysing the transition process through which an 
underdeveloped economy hopes to move from a condition of 
stagnation to one of self-sustaining growth". The authors 
stated that they took as their basic reference "an economy*s 
first departure from quasi-stagnation or the initiation of 
the so-called take-off process. Rostow defines this as a 
period of two or three decades during which the economy 
transforms itself in such a way that economic growth
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becomes, subsequently, more or less automatic; its 
characteristics are a reduction of the rural proportion of 
the population, a doubling of savings rates and the first 
marked and continuous flowing of industry stimulated by the 
availability of surplus labour. This well-known intuitive 
notion has been chosen as our point of departure. For our 
basic analytical tool-kit, however, we draw heavily on the 
work of Arthur Lewis.” Considering that the authors made 
liberal use in their analysis of the ideas of balanced 
growth and of the critical minimum effort, it can be 
considered as an attempt at an analytical synthesis of the 
principal doctrines of development economics. Their 
elaborate mathematical framework yielded, as most models of 
that sort did, fairly self-evident, even simplistic results. 
In concluding, they said that "the take-off can only occur 
if i > r; if i = r or i < r, no matter how large a t is 
permitted, take-off becomes impossible”, where i was the 
rate of growth of the industrial labour force, r was 
population growth, and t a conventionally assumed time- 
period. For the rest they underlined the necessity of 
increased investment in agriculture as development 
materialized and the application to industrialization of the 
"critical minimum effort” thesis, although what this really 
meant was "that, for every value of t, a certain investment 
activity must be carried on in both the industrial and the 
agricultural sectors during every year of the take-off 
process, from year 0 to year 5 ”.1^9
THE BALANCE TO 1960 AND THE PRIDE OF THE HERE-AND-NOW
What was the intellectual balance of development
economics to around 1960? It had been built on a series of 
coordinated assumptions that amounted to one large
theoretical construct which is frequently and on the whole
accurately described as the orthodoxy of development
economics. In future it would subject itself to a mordant 
critique of those assumptions, even to raising the question 
of its own legitimacy, for what if not the assumptions in 
question was development economics? Few on the outside (or
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even Inside it) accorded it the title of science, or even of 
academic discipline, separate, that is, from the wider 
science of economics. But it was not downgradeable to a 
mere chapter or section on the concept of growth, as Meier, 
Baldwin, and Kindleberger had implicitly suggested. It was 
therefore a theory. Its first assumption was the 
commendable one that all men could and should be capable of 
the same productivity, and were consequently entitled to a 
commensurate standard of living. It was a democratic, 
egalitarian doctrine in face of evidence on abysmal 
inequalities and on yawning cultural canyons. It assumed 
that underdevelopment, which was measured in per capita 
terms, could only be understood and described through the 
concept of a social duality: on one side, a modern urban 
society with the basic economic traits of more advanced 
Western societies, but with a much lower register of 
activity; on the other, a traditional rural society with a 
high degree of hidden or overt unemployment and therefore a 
very low level of productivity. The values of the rural 
society were antithetic to those of the city and of the 
West, and it was on this contrast that modernization theory 
and the sociology of development were built in the 50s and 
60s. It was assumed that it was necessary to promote 
industrialization in order to modernize all of society, 
which in essence meant integrating the two badly articulated 
planes on which underdevelopment thrived. This was a very 
convenient assumption because it supposed that the human- 
input needs of industry could be supplied by the rural 
masses, and that therefore one and the other ideally 
complemented each other. The capital needed for industry 
would come from domestic savings and from foreign 
investment. The guiding principle in this process was 
dubbed balanced growth and the instrument chosen for its 
application had to be economic planning, but of the 
targeting persuasive kind. Why didn't development economics 
choose development through export specialization or growth- 
through-trade? Because most of its leading lights had 
actually accepted the thesis that developing countries were
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being deprived or swindled out of the profits in their 
commerce with the industrialized nations and would not be 
able to raise sufficient surplus in that way to escape the 
vicious circle of poverty, whereas through the principle of 
balanced growth they expected that the internal consumer 
market could grow in tandem with an increasing supply of 
goods. It was expected that development would become self- 
sustaining, which on the assumptions about the terms of 
trade, it simply could not be. Was development economics 
biased against agriculture? Defenders of its gestation 
phase like D. Lehman claim that it favoured 
industrialization but did not neglect agriculture. However, 
the facts speak quite clearly: while development economics 
had all sorts of prescriptions on the technology of planned 
or stimulated industrialization, it had nothing but contempt 
for agricultural commodities or it went out of its way in 
nurturing the expectation that the urban economy would of 
itself in the end stimulate agricultural productivity.
Having said all this, we must go one step further. 
Development economics had one fundamental outlook and
assumed one significant philosophical stance in such a way 
that it informed all its undertakings and all its objectives 
from the very start, and was in fact consubstantial with its 
very existence, and that is what we shall call the
phenomenological attitude towards reality. Development 
economics above all strove for and stood by the claim of 
having achieved objectivity. It prided in its impartiality 
and purported lack of biases. And yet we have seen that the 
orthodoxy of development economics consisted of mostly a 
priori choices and manifested biases in matters of policy 
and method. In what then did the phenomenological attitude 
consist? It consisted in the pride of the here-and-now.
Development economics virtually rejected history as a 
dimension in its research. It accepted the past hesitantly 
or in rigid cliometric dimensions, but mainly it saw time in 
terms of the abstract future involved in policy and 
planning. However, even if it did not openly state or
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acknowledge It, even if it glided into it silently and 
sometimes unwittingly, development economics was an attempt 
at replicating the European Industrial Revolution in the 
Third World. It harboured a model for replication obtained 
by superimposing the historical experiences of the principal 
national industrialization cycles in Western Europe. The 
model could be a bad copy, or what is more likely, it could 
be that it was the wrong model to throw at the Third World, 
but the historical involvement of development economics in 
this sense can not be ignored. To what then does the here- 
and-now attitude specifically apply? In which respect is it 
valid if at all? Development economics had its biases and 
it did not entirely ignore history despite the apparently 
abstract, intemporal character of its injunctions, but it 
did tend to avoid as if from principle the issue of the 
origins of underdevelopment. We shall see that this is not 
entirely true either, that some development economists did 
write on that subject, categorically if briefly; but taking 
all in all, the attitude of the literature itself in its 
mainstream phase could be synthesized in this manner: we
have a problem that needs solving; we have identified the 
problem; we know how the problem can be solved, because it 
has been solved in the past; but frankly it is none of our 
concern how the problem came about. This spurious 
"ahistoricity" goes to the root of the fundamental 
differences in approach between development economics and
the contemporary theories of economic imperialism.
Did the gestation phase of development economics 
actually produce an original theory of economic growth? 
Setting aside the vexed issue of what exactly is a theory of 
economic growth, we think it is possible to arrive at an 
unassuming assessment through the use of a variant on the 
once-common analogy between society and human physiology. 
Biological growth can be studied from three angles: the
description of the average natural rate of growth of an
organism, that is, the how of growth; the physiological
analysis of the process of growth, that is, the immediate
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why; and the study of the disruptions of growth and of the 
means for its stimulation, that is, the pathology and the 
therapeutics of growth. We shall assume that the how of 
growth refers to an individual type and thus obviate the 
question of a genotypal tendency over the long term for an 
increasing rate of growth. Economic marginalism and 
equilibrium theory in this analogy are concerned with the 
how of growth. The tradition of political economy since the 
physiocrats has dealt with the why of growth. For example, 
W.A. Lewis wrote in 1955 that "the last great book" to deal 
with economic growth was J.S. Mill's Principles of Political 
Economy (1848), and it is true that Mill did make a clear 
distinction between growth and the distribution of wealth: 
growth was possible in backward countries; allocation was 
the proper study in developed economies. Besides its 
concern with equilibrium levels of employment and income. 
Keynesianism has been passionately dedicated to applying 
correctives to economic dysfunctions. In this sense, there 
does not exist a unique theory of growth, but different 
categories of valid theories on growth to the extent that 
they address themselves not exclusively but predominantly to 
one of the different aspects of growth in our analogy.
Development economics in its gestation phase did have 
underlying ideas on the how of growth, but they were taken 
by its practitioner from what they perceived as the process 
of modern European development, that is, industrialization, 
rural-urban migration, balanced growth, et al. In order to 
describe underdevelopment, development economists borrowed 
the Keynesian idea of equilibrium with unemployment and 
transformed it into the unstable or low-level equilibrium 
trap. As to the why of growth, they harked back to the 
classical industry-oriented models of Ricardo and Mill, and 
they (including now the sociologists) also reflected the 
more modern preoccupation with the utility of technologies 
and the importance of the entrepreneurial function. There 
was also a tendency to identify economic development with 
the Harrod/Domar formulation on growth, but although the
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shared emphasis on savings and investment did seem to 
indicate some kind of concordance, it was easily seen that 
the social circumstances of underdevelopment did not warrant 
an unrestricted scope of applicability. Where development 
economists did seem to break new ground was in the obvious 
area of correctives and stimuli, because here they had no 
classical or Keynesian precedents to go by, yet even in this 
they borrowed old infant-industry and other neo-Mercantilist 
precepts. In the mainstream of the orthodoxy of development 
economics were the orderly transfer of labour from the 
countryside to the cities, the indispensability of foreign 
aid and investments, and the coordination of growth though 
planning. These "recipes", except to some degree the one 
referring to foreign investment, were not part of "standard" 
Western growth models. Some precedents were to be found in 
the Soviet Union, but it would be unfair and inaccurate to 
say that development economics advocated Soviet policies, or 
that it "lifted" its doctrines in one piece from a communist 
model. Development economics was fully and unambiguously 
committed to capitalism and private initiative. The
development assistance it advocated was Western capitalist 
assistance. The planning it contemplated was an indicative 
pis aller, not the coercive totalitarian type. The trouble 
with its program was that precisely because of its ultimate 
libertarian, easy-going character, it could not cope with 
the sweeping historical movements it foresaw, like the
shifting of population masses or the conversion of sleepy 
old Andean towns into whirring industrial dynamos. 
Nevertheless, with all its shortcomings there did exist a 
"corrective" development-economics theory of growth with 
what seemed like a rightful place in the firmament of 
academic disciplines. Would it hold up against the 
hammering of reality?
THE CRITICS OF THE ORTHODOXY OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
Even before time had its say, the orthodoxy of
development economics had come under fire from all 
directions, right, left, and centre, even from those who
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could be considered to be intrinsically involved in its 
affairs, S, Kuznet had been researching into the statistics 
of growth since before WW2. In fact, C, Clark mentions him 
as a source of advice for his pioneering book on world 
statistics. During the mainstream period of development 
economics, Kuznets took to it like a duck to water, and thus 
he can be credited with having been an early starter both in 
cliometrics and in development economics. His original 
field had included the late-19th century and onwards, but he 
also went backwards much beyond this bound, for which 
F, Braudel paid him the following tribute: "La tentation, a 
la quelle il a heureusement cede, était de remonter en deca 
du XIXe siecle, pour suivre ou deviner les evolutions 
possibles du XVIIIe, en utilisant les solides graphiques 
consacres a la croissance anglaise par Phyllis Dean et W,A, 
Cole, puis, de report en report, arriver jusqu'en 1500 et 
meme en deca," What Kuznets found in his long trek was that 
there did not appear to be as was usually believed a 
noticeable or dramatic change in net capital formation in 
the period prior to the clear emergence of the Industrial 
Revolution in the 18th century, a finding which had to be 
particularly gratifying to Braudel with his long-term 
gradualism amounting almost to a denial of the concept of 
Industrial Revolution, However, there had in fact been a 
considerable increment in gross capital formation, which 
meant that much of the investment leading to 
industrialization had gone into the yearly renovation of the 
existing stock of capital and into social overhead,
When Kuznets came to face with the assumptions of 
development economics, he pointed out that "Output per 
capita is much lower in the underdeveloped countries today 
than it was in the presently developed countries at the date 
of entry— a period rather than a point in time— into modern 
economic growth". But even more significantly he concluded 
that "the most serious obstacle to the rapid spread of the 
industrial system was one that it shared with many major 
innovations: it meant a marked break in established patterns
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of social and economic life; it destroys established 
interests; it requires a system of social values and a 
cultural milieu quite different from those that are the 
heritage of a long historical past in many countries". The 
instrument of change within a society thus attached to 
traditional values was a class "which views the industrial 
system as its ideal; which is willing to exercise pressure 
for the social change requisite for the introduction of the 
system; and which become powerful enough to impose its 
interests, considered by it identical with the interests of 
society at large, upon the country". He was not optimistic 
about the generalization of change: "The spread of the
industrial system is often assumed to be a process that will 
take its inexorable course in due time— like a slowly moving 
glacier whose course cannot be stopped or avoided. In the 
light of history such a picture is largely an illusion." 
Finally, he himself had no illusions about discovering a 
formula for development, "some invariant pattern of economic 
growth of nations" which would permit "distinguishing 
between the necessary and accidental conditions of the 
effective adoption of the industrial s y s t e m " . W h a t  
Kuznets was telling his peers then was that European 
development had been a process of "longue duree", in 
Braudel's phrase, not the result of a sudden spurt of 
growth, and therefore, it was highly unlikely that there 
would be a replication of it in the compressed time-scale of 
development economists. This was a much-needed cautionary 
note that few heeded and in the event was to prove 
premonitory. It also meant that Kuznets was a defender of 
the notion that the Third World could not be considered a 
homogeneous lump to be kneaded and shaped in any way 
development economists wanted.
If Kuznets assailed the heedless optimism of 
development economics, A.O. Hirschman’s equally basic 
criticism was directed at the crucial principle of balanced 
growth. Hirschman was a "front-line" or in situ development 
economist in the sense that a decisive part of his formation
- 200 —
took place while acting In his professional capacity as 
economic adviser in Colombia from 1952 to 1956. He had, of 
course, his career prejudices, but he took the trouble to 
observe how Colombians themselves were managing their 
economic affairs in their own ”al reves" fashion (the other 
way around), in which he discovered merit that went against 
the grain of standard development doctrine. For one thing, 
whatever development economists propounded about the 
simultaneous advance of different branches of industry in an 
underdeveloped economy in order to achieve all-round 
complementarities and provide maximum employment, the 
existence of high-technology, high-efficiency enterprises 
seemed to be defensible through unquantifiable advantages. 
Hirschman called them "pressure mechanisms" and "pacing 
devices", because they set standards of productivity and 
were means for passing on efficiency to other sectors. He 
used the example of airlines— Colombia's at the time was 
considered one of the most advanced in Latin America— , and 
he generally included as illustration of his idea industries 
with a high capital to labour ratio, precisely those that 
orthodox development economics considered unadvisable for 
high-unemployment developing economies. Another Hirschman 
proposition was the "investment sequence" based on an 
advanced industrial activity which complements itself by
creating backward and forward linkages, again in rank 
disregard of the coordinated frontal advance envisioned in 
balanced growth. Hirschman applied the principle of
imbalance to other areas, like inflation and balance of 
payments, always trying to see the more salutary and
exploitable side of real events rather than trying to 
squeeze reality into a preconceived mould. What Hirschman's 
approach amounted to was in effect a rationale of what Latin 
American countries were laboriously striving to implement on 
their own devices, which was to foment industrialization by 
all available means and to simultaneously control inflation 
and produce enough trade surplus to fuel growth. The
concept of import-substitution industrialization, which 
Hirschman considered a fundamental if flawed development
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strategy, was compared by him to the Hansel and Gretel 
situation in which the "fatter" the imports of a specific 
sort a country had, the likelier it was that they would be 
swallowed up in its industrializing efforts. Hirschman 
carried his diagnosis of the reality of development in Latin 
America to the decision-making process in government in his 
book Journey towards Progress (1963). Here he proclaimed
himself an enthusiastic subscriber to modernization theory, 
specifically to its Schumpeterian emphasis on the
entrepreneur as the initiator of progress, the entrepreneur, 
however, as decision-maker in the public as well as in the 
private sector. Above all, he was arguing for improvisatory 
development from within as against development by formula, 
or as he put it: "I am trying to show how a society can
begin to move forward as it is, in spite of what it is."^^^ 
Hirschman's work was undoubtedly a denial of the orthodoxy 
of development economics. What he claimed was that the 
developing countries were doing things their own way, 
regardless of balanced growth and the rest of the
development economics shibboleths, because they really had 
no other choice. In spite of the constraints, however, they 
were not doing so badly, in Latin America at least, and the 
task of developmental research was to observe and to cull 
the good from the useless. Hirschman was an acute and 
persuasive expositor, and his approach, its refusal of 
preconceived models and well-intentioned but impractical 
abstractions, would be influential when the time came for 
development economics to take a starker look at itself.
HOW MARXISM AND DEVELOPMENTALISM FELL TOGETHER
It is possible to exaggerate Hirchman's alienation from 
orthodox development economics, because both had things in 
common, like the convenience of discreet government planning 
and prodding or the necessity for foreign investments. It 
is nearly impossible to do so in regard to the critics that 
development economics had on the right. These were out-and- 
out partisans of laissez faire and its corollary of growth 
through the comparative advantages of foreign trade
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specialization. Their idols were Adam Smith and homo 
economicus. They did not believe in economic planning or in 
strict modernization theory, but in the profit motive, in 
free enterprise, and in the free movement of factors. The 
leading light of this group was and has remained to this day 
P.T. Bauer, a hard-to-beat record in the history of the 
trends in development studies. Bauer believes in the 
retardating influence of the state. To the argument that 
the state merely supplies the lack of the entrepreneurial 
function in an economy, he replies that bureaucrats can 
hardly do as a substitute. He blames the West for the 
politicization and the social distortions in the Third 
World. His ideas on underdevelopment sound sometimes like a 
mini-theory on despotism, comparable in some respects to 
Wittfogel's except that Bauer puts the blame not on 
"hydraulics" but on development economics and on "the 
establishments in most Third World countries". J. Viner and 
H. Myint were both defenders of the market and the doctrine 
of growth through trade. Viner was also very keen on the 
defence of agriculture in the midst of the development 
economics high tide. "Misallocation of resources as between 
agriculture and manufactures", he wrote, "is probably rarely 
a major cause of poverty and backwardness, except where 
government, through tariffs, discriminatory taxation and 
expenditure policies, and failure to provide on a regionally 
non-discriminatory pattern facilities for education, health, 
promotion and technical training, is itself responsible for 
this misallocation. Where there is such government-induced 
misallocation, it is today more likely to consist of the 
diversion of agrarian-produced resources to the support of 
parasitic cities than of overinvestment of resources in 
primary industries and in workers in such industries." 
Myint employed the formula "balanced growth" mainly in the 
sense of equal weight in development policies for 
agriculture and manufactures. He did not believe that the 
international trade in primary products had exhausted its 
potential for contributing to Third World development and
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he denied that the transfer of rural masses to the cities 
was devoid of social costs,
How influential were these critics? Bauer was active 
in Washington in the 60s, in general pushing for aid 
programmes in Latin America which favoured free enterprise 
regardless of the politics of the recipient countries, and 
his insistence certainly did not go unheeded. The well- 
intentioned, relatively innovating policies of the Kennedy 
administration in the early 60s, associated with Rostow and 
the mainstream of development economics, were scrapped or 
modified by Lyndon Johnson, but this was probably just a 
question of getting a rickety old train on its rails again, 
that is, going back to traditional American policies 
oriented towards maintaining the status quo in Latin 
America, although the Kennedy program, it must be said, was 
no inter-city either. Within development studies the 
preachings of the pro-trade, pro-agriculture lobby became 
influential as the optimism of the mainstream phase waned in 
the 60s. But this influence really came into its own in the 
late 70s and the 80s with the electoral deluges that brought 
M. Thatcher and R. Reagan to power in Great Britain and in 
the USA, respectively with their monetarist and supply-side 
policies. The sanction all this gave to radical anti-state, 
pro-market administrative philosophies was also a tacit 
recognition for the same approach to development problems 
and in Western relations with the LDCs. These political 
changes in two of the most important capitalist countries 
coincided with the strengthening of conservative academic 
trends and with the rise of a phalanx of economists and 
specialists on LDCs, some new, some converted, who denounced 
development economics as a bankrupt statist ideology. Among 
these voices were those of D. Lai, K. Basu, A. Sen, W. 
Elkan, B. Balassa, and others. Their influence today 
probably means that development economics as a theory of 
growth will probably stay dormant for a long time to come, 
unless some dramatic political changes bring it to the fore 
again.
- 204 —
But what really did the orthodoxy of development
economics in as the nearly "official” Western approach to 
the problems of the Third World, was probably the failure of 
the revolutionary Marxist alternative to capitalist
development. We saw that the expansion of development
economics was chiefly a response to decolonization and to 
the rise of communist world influence after WW2. However, 
the communist record in the Third World has been lamentable. 
After three decades of Marxism, Cuba remains as 
underdeveloped as when Batista and the Mafia left. 
Vietnam's heroic freedom struggle produced national 
integration but also extreme poverty, and the country
probably deserves the dubious accolade of being the most
militarily powerful amongst the poorest nations of the 
world. Angola and Mozambique have not advanced much since 
independence in 1975, though admittedly they have had to
cope with the siege from racist South Africa and from its 
own armed dissidents. The Soviets compounded their own 
serious problems and the problems of communism in the Third 
World with their December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. The 
communist spectre no longer seems to be haunting the world. 
The LDCs apparently can take care of themselves if not 
actually develop. They have their own powerful interests, 
as they in fact always have had, in not going communist. 
The West's economic help is not needed urgently. It has
been severely chastised as useless or actually counter­
productive by the critics of development economics, and the 
underdeveloped countries themselves have often hindered and
sabotaged its operation. Neither are Western specialists
and their advice and their policies required and welcomed as 
they were in the past, partly of course because LDCs have 
had time to prepare their own people. Politics is now as it 
was after WW2 what is determining the rise and fall, the
influence and the eclipse, of development economics. Are
its critics on the right correct, therefore, in calling it 
an ideology? Perhaps, but if so they themselves must admit 
that they share in essence of the same capitalist ideology 
and that their polemics are over means rather than over
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objectives. Let us see, to close the mainstream phase, what 
the practical balance-sheet of development economics was.
THE PRACTICAL BALANCE-SHEET
The parallels between the strategies put forward by 
development economics and the polices and social tendencies 
within developing countries after WW2, concern such crucial 
areas that it is tempting to infer a vital, even a causal 
connection. There was world-wide a significant rural-urban 
movement in underdeveloped countries. Cities grew much 
faster there than in the industrialized nations, where, 
after a rapid post-war increase, they tended towards 
population stability or decrease (in the case of the large 
metropolitan centres). For the LDCs, urbanization became 
both a goal and a badge of progress. It was possible to 
argue that it should be stimulated even if the cities did 
not have the immediate resources to integrate the rural 
emigrants because at least these would be settling where 
makeshift work could be had and where eventually social and 
economic reforms would be easier to implement. 
Industrialization likewise was an objective pursued in 
almost every independent underdeveloped country. From this 
time were the images of thousands of Indian peasants 
carrying wicker baskets weighed down with earth and rocks 
for the construction of a steel mill in Bihar. The same 
pride in and devotion to vast industrial projects was shown 
in all the other LDCs that could allocate funds to them, or 
could attract or borrow the necessary capital. Those 
nations that could not afford a steel mill actively pursued 
or stimulated less ambitious enterprises as long as they 
were in manufacturing. To promote them, all sorts of 
financial institutions were created and to protect them 
tariffs were raised and restrictions on free-flow were 
devised. Although of course grounded on rational arguments 
industrialization shone in their eyes with the aura of 
religious dogma.
One thing that was absent from all this no matter how 
hard the LDCs and their experts and foreign advisers tried.
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was the achievement of the cherished principle of balanced 
growth. Inequalities, disparities, and distortions kept 
tugging and squeezing things out of shape, like the work of 
a maladroit taxidermist. For a seeming endless time— in 
fact, it still is the case of most developing countries— , 
they could not escape the single export pattern, but 
investment in agriculture was not keeping up either with 
manufactures or with the demand for foodstuffs in the 
cities. In the industrial sector, the rolling mills and the 
sheet metal plants were producing uncompetitive goods for 
domestic consumers that had not come on stream. 
Industrialization was a kind of slapped-up monstrosity with 
some very powerful looking limbs but with others that were 
either shrunken or made of rotten wood. Its tiny head
lolled on a thread-like neck over a huge but emaciated rib- 
cage. Planning was going on all the time, but it was not 
achieving much except an endless flow of inaccurate 
statistics. It quite seemed as if Hirschman had been 
absolutely right: underdevelopment had to be taken on its
own terms, not forced into moulds, and development had to be 
nurtured and raised like a fragile plant. Indeed, the only 
development economist who appeared to have gotten the right 
measure of underdevelopment in his works, was Hirschman to 
the extent that he perceived that the real striving for
development was not imported into but generated within
underdevelopment itself. At the time he wrote his classic 
work on unbalanced growth, fresh from his Colombian stint, 
it was obvious to him also that the more appropriate
development tactics being applied in Third World countries 
had not been invented outside, but had been elaborated there 
from experience and from needs. However, even his own ideas 
on "pacing devices" and "pressure points" and on productive, 
spontaneously arising linkages were actual observed events 
he hoped would happen again, and even today the sad facts 
are that there have been as many or more cases of linkages 
either not taking place or doing so imcompletely as of fully
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realized chains of linkages in any individual underdeveloped 
country.
Hirschman himself said that ISI was the cant-phrase 
development economists gave to a process that had been going 
on in Colombia before he got there. It is very likely, 
therefore, that what development economics did in Latin 
America and elsewhere was to give sanction to, and perhaps 
to modulate somewhat, certain fundamental policies that had 
already been chosen and were already being applied as 
practical measures. It would be very hard to claim that 
development economics influenced or determined any sort of 
fundamental choices in the Third World. It might have 
channelled some of those choices, like tendering proposals 
on how to stimulate an orderly rural-urban flow, but it 
could be argued as well that post-war circumstances were 
probably favourable to spontaneous world-wide urbanization. 
Latin American governments in general believed in it. Newly 
independent states agreed with it because it made ruling 
easier. The West in general did not want the sort of 
communist-sponsored rural agitation that had incubated in 
Malaysia, Indochina, and Indonesia. Even the communists 
still believed that revolution was more likely in the cities 
than in the country. Urbanization like industrialization 
was a global aspiration: for modernity, for prestige, for
development. J. Nehru in India, to put it succinctly, 
wanted industrialization, and industrialization of sorts 
would have come with or without Mahalanobis. These trends 
were as important and as irresistible as nationalism. It is 
not very likely that development economics had anything 
crucial to do with them, or the way they were working 
themselves out all over the underdeveloped world. Mutatis 
mutandi, it would be like placing the historical 
responsibility for the Industrial Revolution on D. Hume or 
on A. Smith, or like explaining Western economic history in 
the decades before WWl through the medium of equilibrium 
analysis. Of course if development economics did not 
significantly affect the post-war evolution of
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underdeveloped economics, it was not the Dr Frankenstein 
that created the monster of Third World industrialization. 
It could be argued that developing countries did not apply 
correctly the principles of development economics, but this 
would be complicating the issue with a series of useless 
contrafactual possibilities. And in the end the fact will 
remain that development economics, despite its claims to 
originality, was merely following historical trends which it 
did not undertake to criticize unambiguously and, tout au 
contraire, did the utmost to abet and encourage, as when, as 
often happened. Third World countries intent in applying 
statist strategies called upon Western development 
economists to give their blessing to policies that had 
already been selected and were practically in motion. 
Finally, it is also very likely that the high-faluting, 
idealized conditions that development economists envisaged, 
such as balanced growth, were self-defeating in that they 
were used by its critics to highlight the disparities 
between targets and real achievements, and this was, when 
all is said and done, the ultimate explanation of its 
downfall.
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
Does development economics include or imply a theory on 
the origins of economic inequality among nations? A common 
19th century Western European way of thinking about the 
relations between cultures and nations was founded on the 
notion of inequality, or as we have called it, the 
superiority/inferiority matrix. Inequality was seen as the 
product of a struggle for survival in which the decisive 
advantage was race. The useless carnage of WWl had 
signalled the end of credible social Darwinism. Racism 
persisted but it was largely discredited as a serious 
intellectual doctrine in the West, except in Nazi Germany. 
By the start of WW2, the old Eurocentric matrix, though 
still quite a common outlook, was being supplanted in the 
more advanced Western circles by a politico-economicist
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optic that no longer saw the world in terms of superior and 
inferior cultures but of nations divided according totheir 
state of economic development or their international 
economic specialization. However, it would be an error to 
affirm that there had been a total break with Eurocentrism 
in the West. The politico-economicist perspective did not 
have the force to suppress the Western-supremacy historical 
syndrome. The latter was still there but without the double 
foundation of social Darwinism and racism.
In its avowed aims and in its consequences WW2 helped 
to strengthen the politico-economicist perspective. After 
the war, development economics made it explicit, and in 
doing so assumed part of the burden of defining the terms of 
the relationship between the West and the rest of the non­
communist world. Just as it had been biology and race that 
gave form to international doctrine in Victorian Britain and 
during the Second Empire and the Third Republic in France, 
so gradually before and much faster after WW2 it was 
economics that shaped the ideas influencing a wide gamut of 
relations between the industrialized and the underdeveloped 
capitalist nations. This may be because of all the social 
sciences economics is the only one that is fundamentally 
committed to a rock-bottom definition of human nature and 
can thus deal with diversity and with all the grades in the 
scale of social progress with the utmost steadfastness and 
self-assurance. Development economics was, in sum, the best 
instrument the West had to hand for managing intellectually 
an explosive piebald world. In this respect, it would be 
idle to explore the ideological propensities of individual 
development economists one by one. Development economics, 
of which it can accurately be said that it represented more 
than the sum of its individual thinking parts, had its own 
overarching political engagements, to which its 
practitioners as a rule subscribed. The latter sometimes 
came close to but never edged into socialism. Shared 
cultural attitudes were another matter. On the whole, 
development economics was resolutely Eurocentric, but not so
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much in the old way we have so often seen in this work as in 
presenting the West as a socio-economic paradigm.
MYRDAL, PREBISCH, AND THE PERSISTENCE OF EUROCENTRISM
Take the case Myrdal. He had two attitudes towards the 
Third World: in the first he blamed underdevelopment, in
part at least, on "cumulative causation" and he called 
earnestly for redress; in the second he blamed the "soft 
state" and vented his moral indignation on corruption, which 
he seemed to attribute to the brain-withering power of the 
Tropic sun despite the fact that there is more corruption 
going in New York or Tokyo, to mention two notorious venues, 
than all the considerable stealing in Venezuela and India 
together. What was the difference between the first and the 
second Myrdal? A stay in the Third World perhaps? At any 
rate, the cultural prejudices of the second Myrdal were 
always in the first Myrdal so it is probably true that there 
wasn't that much difference. Yet a caveat is in order. 
Myrdal was neither racist nor a social Darwinist. His moral 
feelings were sincere. He was what in America is called a 
"bleeding-heart liberal", that is, someone who will 
sympathize with the poor but never sanction rebellion. He 
had, in Marxist parlance, a "petit bourgeois" mentality. 
And in this he was very much like his unimpeachably third- 
worldist Latin American colleague Prebisch, who towards the 
end of his life was still decrying poverty and injustice but 
having to accept the system because, although unfair, it was 
somehow compatible with freedom. Both, the Argentine and 
the Swede, the theorists of "core/periphery" and of 
"cumulative causation", in the final reckoning turned for 
the causes of underdevelopment towards the inside of 
underdeveloped societies. They were in fact upholding 
Western developmental paradigms and, in particular, they 
were being loyal to the principles of their academic 
discipline. The case of both these passionate
developmentalists serves, we think, to illustrate 
convincingly the limits of speculation on the origins of
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internatlonal economic inequality within development 
economics and development studies in general.
On a deeper level— and here too Myrdal, though not 
Prebisch, concurred— , Western developmentalism had, as we 
have seen, the nagging awareness that tropical climes were 
related if not causally at least consistently to economic 
retardation, and many development economists during the 
mainstream phase and afterwards, Streeten perhaps foremost 
amongst them, kept making asides in the course of their 
researches to bow respectfuly in the direction of
environmental theory. In the end this did not produce more 
than obiter dicta amounting to an endorsement of the truism 
that, since Montesquieu, had written down indolence and 
backwardness, partially at least, to the effects of adverse 
environmental circumstances. Development economics and 
development studies as a whole were not interested in
origins but in the here-and-now, in analysis and in policy,
and this undoubtedly prevented them from an engagement with 
further, deeper research in that area. Even the work of 
A.M. Kamarck, which we cited in the first part of this work 
as relating minutely the adverse effects of climate on 
economic performance, was strictly analytical and 
contemporary, totally lacking in historical and cultural 
dimensions. Development economics limited its say on 
origins to positing endogenous causes, at times, as in
Myrdal, through concrete social analysis and criticism, but 
mostly by default, through not saying anything on the 
subject and letting the eloquence of its socio-economic 
paradigm speak for itself. If a verdict were to have been 
required from development economists on the relations 
between the West and the rest of the world and their 
economic consequences, it probably would have been the 
express exoneration of all Western responsibility for Third 
World backwardness. The sociology of development was much 
more declarative in this respect, which in itself had the 
merit of forthrightness, but it overstepped the bounds of 
reasonable cultural and social differentiation in that its
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premisses closely bordered on a kind of psychological 
superiority in the West, and although the distinction 
between psychological and cultural or social attitudes is 
often hair-thin— how separable, from an economic point of 
view such as Kuznets', are social and psychological habits 
and attitudes from their cultural matrixes?— , it is valid 
enough to have kept economics and the sociology of 
development clearly apart on the issue of the causes of 
underdevelopment. Though garbed in modern sociological 
jargon, modernization theory was of the purest Eurocentric 
stock, and could have been related historically to the more 
obscurantist 19th century pronouncements on Asian despotism 
and on non-Western cultural backwardness in general. As 
such it made an easy target for anti-capitalist polemicists 
and more generally it bared itself to a complete clean- 
conscience repudiation by anyone connected to or affiliated 
in any way with the Third World.
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS IN THE SIXTIES
Despite the carping, development economics went almost 
intact through the 60s, which was probably the time of its 
greatest political clout. There were however significant 
stirrings of dissatisfaction with previous doctrine, some 
even perceivable in the original upholders of that doctrine. 
Arndt underscores the significance of T.W. Schultz's 
orientation towards the formation of human capital instead 
of the accumulation of physical capital. But you could not 
honestly fault development economists for not being aware of 
the benefits of education, and besides, with this theme 
Schultz was more interested in economic growth in the US 
than in the underdeveloped countries. However, he was much 
closer to development economics in his no-holds-barred 
repudiation of the idea of the zero marginal productivity of 
labour in the rural areas of backward countries. In this he 
was adding to the growing bulk of the literature that was 
picking holes in, or simply putting down, the established 
priorities for development economists between the rural and 
the urban sectors in developing nations. D.W. Jorgenson at
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the start of the decade and on the heels of Lewis and 
others, stated flatly, but with the benefit of a 
mathematical model for dual economies, that "there is no 
'minimum critical effort' of investment in dual economies in 
which substitution between capital and labour in 
manufacturing is possible", a statement which apparently 
seemed to undercut the advantages of the touted rural-urban 
flow. In 1967 H.M. Southworth and B.F. Johnston wrote what 
seemed like a self-evident truth, but which development
economics in the 50s, with all its ingenious inventions and 
complicated models, apparently did not grasp: "Most of the 
underdeveloped areas are predominantly agricultural. It is 
now recognised that increasing the productivity of their 
agriculture is essential to their economic development."
This was but one blow away from bashing the other icon of 
the rural-excess school, and this one M. Lipton dealt in a 
1968 collective work on the crisis of Indian planning, where 
he spoke of urban bias and the useless diversion of manpower 
to the cities. This general volte face in development 
studies was even evident in the noticeable shift of emphases 
which we observed in Fei and Ranis, who were the principal
exegetes of the Lewis canon. They were not the only ones
re-assessing the orthodoxy from within, or at least some of 
its emphasis, as could have been observed when Prebisch in 
1964 took a mincing sidestep away from all-out ISI towards 
manufacturing for exports. Finally in this short list of 
uncollected arrears, G.M. Meier put his finger on another 
trend when he went for international trade as the engine of 
growth from a Rostovian angle and in step with other 
favourable international reports on this subject.
If it is accepted that development economics is a 
legitimate discipline of study and research, less than a 
science but more than an ideology, which exhibits sufficient 
identificatory traits in the past and still has a claim to 
recognition whether because of its field or its methods or 
for whatever other reasons, then more pertinent to its 
evolution during the 60s than the critiques and
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reassessments were certain bourgeoning trends within the 
discipline itself. We shall discuss three of those: C.
Furtado's historical outlook from a conventional 
developmentalist position, for it brought developmentalism 
to proximity with dependency theses and presaged the 
dependency debate; the disabused assessment of the 
limitations of developmentalism in D. Seers and P. Streeten, 
which was a forerunner of the discouragement and disillusion 
of the following decade; and J. Freyssinet's abstract, 
almost philosophical enquiry into the nature of 
underdevelopment, in that it synthesized French theorization 
on developmentalism— not significantly different from the 
contents of the orthodoxy of development economics— and also 
indicated a tendency to either evasion or ossification.
At the start of the period, the Brazilian economist C. 
Furtado held reasonably conventional views on development: 
underdeveloped economies suffered from lack of capital 
accumulation; cultural explanations of development, which he 
traced to Weber, were helpful in explaining instances of 
economic retardation; ISI was valid as a development 
strategy; and so on. But his Latin American origins made 
him especially sensitive to the question of the causes of 
underdevelopment and he devoted a considerable amount of 
thought to it as part of his research. His fundamental 
idea, apparently related to the dual-economy construct, was 
that underdevelopment resulted from a hybridization between 
capitalism and earlier and more primitive economic 
structures. As he put it: "The advancing European economic 
frontier was almost always translated in the formation of 
hybrid economics, in which a capitalist world peacefully 
coexisted with an archaic structure." Apparently then 
(because Furtado's writings are not pellucid on the 
subject), capitalism, which was brought from Portugal into 
Brazil at the start of colonization, first coexisted with 
the tribal economy of the Amerindians, then with some form 
of feudalism, which it had itself engendered, or more 
importantly, with a slave-based plantation system, also of
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Its own creation, and finally, with the modified vestiges of 
those systems in our times. Furtado’s distance from the 
dual-economy model of the Boeke type was explained by his 
close acquaintance with Marxism, which, however, he on the 
whole refuted, and by the specific character of the economic 
evolution of Brazil and Latin America in general. Despite 
his emphasis on hybridization, Furtado considered 
underdevelopment to be a singular, discrete manifestation: 
"As the specific phenomenon which it is, underdevelopment 
requires an autonomous theoretical effort," which in such 
terms was made to seem, from the point of view of research, 
as solid and as self consistent as capitalism, i.e., as a 
"structural" phenomenon. The same ambiguity obtained when 
he tried to relate development and underdevelopment from a 
historical optic: "Underdevelopment must be understood as a 
phenomenon of modern history, coeval with development, as 
one of the aspects of the diffusion of the Industrial 
Revolution." It was not clear, however, whether
underdevelopment travelled like a virus or whether it was 
created in situ. What is significant about Furtado is not 
so much the specific meaning of his theory on
underdevelopment as the fact that he renounced the 
phenomenological here-and-now of development economics and 
placed underdevelopment in a historical and inter-cultural 
perspective. He did not actually subscribe to imperialism 
theory, to which Prebisch unwittingly perhaps came much
closer, but Prebisch's core/periphery scheme described an 
international system with a marginal if significant impact 
on peripheral societies, whereas Furtado’s hybrid capitalism 
suggested that Europe had put the seed of backwardness in 
Brazil and presumably in the rest of Latin America as well. 
Furtado was not strictly a dependency theorist, but he had 
all the bricks with which others were already constructing
dependency elevations.
Economics in general and development economics in 
particular have a habit of coming up with related or
collaborative pairs: Smith and Hume, Ricardo and Mill,
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Marshall and devons, Harrod and Domar, Prebisch and Singer, 
Fei and Ranis. Seers and Streeten are undoubtedly part of 
that tradition. Both were drawn to development economics in 
the 60s, and both have Sussex University as base. They have 
collaborated on some projects. And especially they are both 
inclined to theoretical radicalism— Seers perhaps more than 
Streeten— and have remained in close theoretical nearness to 
each other. Before he became an advocate of the "basic 
needs approach", Streeten took a significant siding away 
from the development economics mainline. He negated the 
"advantages of being a latecomer", and with that an 
important aspect of the overly optimistic expectations of 
development economics. He came close to denying the 
possibility of development and his ideas, with Furtado's, 
could have led to another hybrid: the spontanous generation 
within development economics of a theory of dependent, non­
progressive capitalism. What Streeten did was to prepare a 
commentated list of the drawbacks to developing countries 
from the fact alone of the existence of developed countries, 
that is, without going into whatever deliberate effects the 
economic policies of the latter had on the former. He took 
no cognizance of economic imperialism as such, but even 
without this, the consequences of the coexistence in time of 
development and underdevelopment seemed devastating. One 
was "overpopulation", which could be attributed in part to 
the inevitable diffusion of medical techniques. Advances in 
labour-saving technologies, no matter how punctiliously the 
Third World hewed to labour-intensive development policies, 
unavoidably filtered down to developing countries and had a 
chain-reaction effect, a stricture that placed Streeten in 
direct confrontation to Hirschman. Social welfare was a 
practice that Western Europe started implementing in the 
second half of the 19th century, when the capitalist core 
states had already amply surpassed the breakthrough stage of 
industrialization. Ironically, its imitation in the Third 
World produced a harmful diversion of resources from 
industrialization itself. Synthetics replaced raw
commodities like rubber and cotton and had a negative effect
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on Third World exports. The developed countries had 
virtually closed their doors to Third World immigration, but 
they still exerted the "brain-drain" effect so debilitating 
to developing countries. By another route Streeten came to 
Kuznets* conclusion that history would probably not repeat 
itself, the contrary being one of the underlying 
implications of development theory. He was not, however, 
perplexed or obsessed with paradoxes, but pointing out the 
"limits" of development studies,
In 1975, he argued that his critique of the prospects 
of industrialization in the Third World did not mean giving 
up on them, but going for the production of "simple mass 
consumption goods" like hoes, tillers, and bicycles. By 
then Streeten was exploring the priorities of "basic needs" 
in underdeveloped countries, D, Seers had theorized in the 
early 60s on the "special" nature of development problems. 
By the end of the decade he was emphasizing social needs 
rather than standard developmentalist remedies and during 
the 70s both he and Streeten were doubtful about the 
singularity of development economics. As Streeten put it in 
1979: "Whereas, with the growing interest in different
societies in the Sixties, many had argued that there is no 
single, universal 'science’ of economics, applicable from 
China to Peru, and Dudley Seers wrote on 'the economics of 
the special case', the wheel has now turned full circle and 
we (with Dudley Seers in the lead) now acknowledge that many 
of the issues that we considered as belonging to the poor 
countries are seen to be universal, of concern to the rich, 
too," This position was difficult to grasp fully in view of 
the fact that Seers and Streeten were then immersed in the 
study of basic needs, which if anything could serve to 
emphasize not the similarities but the differences between 
the developed and the underdeveloped countries,
There was another trend during the early 60s which, 
though less iconoclastic, was probably more generally 
disruptive: it in effect raised development economics to an 
abstract almost philosophical level where its ideas were
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taken at their own value rather than in their connection to 
reality, and as is known, development economics, or any 
discipline of studies, thrives on its rapport with concrete 
reality and tends to fade into ineffectuality without it. 
In J. Freyssinet's Le concept de sous-developpement (1966), 
policy issues gave way to a gradual paying out of a 
repertory of descriptive concepts. Grosso modo, the book is 
divided into two parts: in one, underdevelopment is
disclosed in its aspects as the "defeat of development" with 
the analysis of concepts such as "low-level equilibrium" and 
"growth threshold" presented without regard to chronology, 
disciplinary area, or affiliation to intellectual school or 
social ideology; in the other, underdevelopment is the 
"product or development" involving "terms of exchange", the 
Marxist theory of imperialism, and the specially interesting 
idea of underdevelopment as non-integrated or non­
articulated planes, all these motions brought together 
through their internal affinities rather than external 
classificatory signs. Non-articulated spaces or planes can 
be interpreted as another derivation from the dual-economy 
idea, as prolific in conceptual possibilities as it was 
momentous in its policy implications. It can also be 
related to the Marxist theory of the articulation of MOPs. 
After convening the different manifestations of economic 
dualism (two-sector economies, development poles, rural- 
urban balanced growth, and so on), Freyssinet reached a 
climax in his exploration of underdevelopment with the two­
pronged notion of the incompatibility of developed and 
underdeveloped spaces and of the "non-convergence" of planes 
within an underdeveloped space. This conceptual approach, 
favoured by French students of development, sometimes 
adopted by Braudel, and which can be traced to so-called 
spatial economics going back to the early 19th century work 
of the German economist J.H. von Thunen, cannot however 
conceal its limited practicality in the elaboration of 
concrete policy alternatives, although in offering a more 
prehensible representation of underdevelopment it can at
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least lead to clarity of scope and perception, and that is 
always a useful r e s u l t .
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CHAPTER 4
THE MARXIST RESPONSE TO WESTERN DEVELOPMENTALISM
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Before the 60s, Marxist or Marxist-derived theories on 
imperialism, though they could contain an underlying concept 
of underdevelopment, were usually designed as instruments of 
politics and not as purely academic representations of 
reality. If we substitute "policy" for "politics", it would 
be possible to discover a certain similarity between that 
and the concerns of development economics during its
mainstream phase, but of course in a totally different 
direction: the theory of economic imperialism had always
pursued radical social change and development economics was 
created to stabilize the status through change within the 
status. We have so far covered two phases of the theory: 
the phase from Hobson to Lenin, and the Comintern phase, 
which was virtually terminated with the congress of 1935. 
Neither of these phases was influential on the dominant 
Western conceptualization of the relations between the
advanced capitalist nations and the rest of the world. The
Marxist conception of the backward countries was, of course, 
vastly different from the old Eurocentric cliches, but in 
the West in the decades before WW2, there were few 
influential Marxist thinkers, their influence was marginal, 
and often they managed to reconcile their Marxism with 
undisguised though moderate Eurocentrism. In explaining the 
relative intellectual isolation in the West of Marxist 
thinking on colonialism and on international economic 
inequality, it must be taken into account that the greatest 
individual influence on the theory of economic imperialism 
came from Stalin himself, hardly an impartial, objective 
theoretician. Even at the height of Marxist proselitizing 
among intellectuals during the 30s, the "scientific" 
authority of this theory did not extend beyond the leftist 
press. It had a much greater latitude in literature, but 
what obtained here were images and representations rather 
than new ideas. Stalin had been Lenin's spokesman in 1924 
on the issue of the revolutionary importance of the colonies 
and "semi-colonies" insofar as they rebelled against 
imperialism and wasted some of its strength. He remained 
faithful to this doctrine and even tended over the years to
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emphasize its importance affirming that the fate of 
capitalism depended on its hold in the colonies and backward 
lands. By "hold" of course he meant actual physical 
domination. Obviously post-WW2 events would force the 
Soviets to backtrack discreetly while trying to preserve 
Stalin's "infallibility".
THE WORLD AS SEEN BY NEW TIMES
For a short while after WW2, the Soviets adopted a 
conciliatory tone towards their erstwhile Western allies, 
and this was reflected in their attitude towards the 
colonial empires and the other underdeveloped lands within 
the Western orbit, which they habitually described as 
"dependencies". In general, "dependency" rather than 
"imperialism" was the concept used to denote in the magazine 
New Times (the English language version of Trud), the 
relationship between the principal Western powers, mainly 
the USA and the UK, and their client states. There was thus 
created a grey area in which dependency and colonialism 
seemed to merge and blend. There were underlying 
oppositions between the West and the Soviets and they would 
soon come out into the open. The Anglo-American alliance 
was resentful of the USSR's absorption of Eastern Europe, 
and in order to achieve what was seen essentially as 
containing communism, the US government approved the massive 
economic recovery programme known as the Marshall Plan. It 
also adopted the policy of tendering assistance to any 
nation facing communist subversion as enunciated in the 
"Truman Doctrine". And finally, it resisted the Soviet 
blockade of Berlin and gave unstinted backing to the German 
Federal Republic. The Soviets responded flexibly: they gave 
ground in Greece, which means that they cut their people 
loose in exchange for tacit guarantees on Yugoslavia; they 
suspended the Berlin blockade, but created the German 
Democratic Republic; and they formed the economic 
organization Comecon with themselves at the centre of all 
the European nations under their control. But the Soviet 
condemnation of the West in all its guises and in all its
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policies henceforth became unsparing, unremitting, and 
unrestricted. It was particularly noticeable in the concept 
of imperialism and the way the Soviets reverted to using it.
As the Cold War froze over, the Soviet doctrine of 
economic imperialism became set into a cluster of principles 
of universal and inflexible application to the 
underdeveloped world. The doctrine was a derivation from 
pre-war ideology. The idea that capitalism prevented 
development in colonies and "semi-colonies" was a clear 
carry-over from the Comintern, and the notion that the 
capitalist West needed its colonies to survive was standard 
Stalinist fare. Soviet thinking on imperialism has tended 
in the past to be chiliastic, and this has put it more than 
once, as it did in the post-war period, in the position of 
the bearded fanatic carrying a ludicrous sign about an 
imminent end of the word that obviously never comes. The 
fanatic in this analogy was evidently Stalin, but he got
others to do the sign-carrying for him. One of the constant 
motifs of Soviet analysis was the supposed Anglo-American 
imperialist "act", in which Britain sometimes cooperated as 
junior partner and sometimes tried to be the rival and got 
its knuckles bashed. A case of cooperation was India, which 
we shall examine later, and a case of rivalry was oil, in 
which the Americans usually got the upper hand. Iran
supposedly was up for grabs by the two imperialisms. New
Times. who was not a stickler for consistency, afterwards
never explained how the British could get the best of the 
Americans there or how they allowed Mohammed Mossadegh to
1 99come to power.
Latin America, however, was the area where imperialism 
had achieved its fullest bloom. Immediately after the war, 
it was described as a "dependency" of the USA, and within 
each country what the correspondents of New Times observed 
and reported were what seemed to be internally generated 
inequality and poverty. Such were the cases of Argentina 
and Venezuela, the most written up countries in the 
magazine. By mid-1947, "imperialism" and "imperialists" had
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fully replaced "dependency”, and in Venezuela as elsewhere 
"US monopolists" were squeezing out profits and creating 
social and economic misery. Extortionate foreign capital 
was also behind fundamental political decisions. It was 
supposedly responsible in 1947 for the break in diplomatic 
relations between on one side the USSR and Brazil and Chile 
on the other. New Times was perhaps not too far amiss in 
blaming American sugar interests for some of Cuba's economic 
ills, but it probably exaggerated in attributing the rise of 
Peron and Peronism to the interference of foreign 
monopolies. Venezuela was the prime example of imperialist 
domination, and it became little less than a colony when the 
Venezuelan government broke with the USSR in 1952, "on 
orders from the USA". A Venezuelan communist, J. Faria, was 
much more direct if not more accurate in disparaging 
Venezuela’s sovereignty when he claimed in 1949 that a
military coup the year before had been engineered by the 
military attache at the American embassy, whose full name
and rank he appeared to ignore. There was not an iota of
proof behind that claim, but other communist claims like it 
by people like Faria— Clodomiro Almeyda in Chile, for 
example, who descried American interference in all facets of 
Chilean politics— , were being made the length and breadth 
of the continent. When it was impossible to go to the usual 
extremes about interfering American "monopolies" (a word 
that was used right and left without a clear sense of its 
meaning), as happened to be the case of Uruguay, with a high 
standard of living and no raw materials in exploitable
abundance, Soviet resourcefulness pointed out that Uruguay's 
dependence had to do with its not having a steel industry! 
In each country, imperialism relied on its "agents", 
"placemen", or "anti-popular governments". They hardly 
mattered: by 1951 all of Latin America was "under
Washington's control", and New Times summarized the 
situation in this sweeping way: "The activities of the
American imperialists in Latin America can be compared only 
with the occupation of a conquered country. To all intents 
and purposes, American imperialism has deprived the Latin
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American people not only of their economic, but also of 
their political independence as well. With the aid of its 
placemen in Latin American governments, the USA is dictating 
its own line in home and foreign policy," Stalin himself 
gave a better reason than an interest in truth for the New 
Times line on economic imperialism: he did not like the way 
Latin American countries were voting in the UN, Be it said 
in passing that the Spanish language edition of New Times 
circulated profusely in Latin America and that it was often 
the only and certainly the most available socialist news 
magazine all over that region, which perhaps puts in a more 
realistic perspective the actual political sway of American 
"monopolies",123
The start of decolonization came as something of a 
surprise to New Times, as well it might given Stalin's 
prejudices on the subject. There were two sets of reactions 
for each of which India was the perfect module. At first 
Stalinist analysis did not believe that decolonization was 
actually taking place or would really take place. It 
presented as proof of its scepticism the Dutch return to 
Indonesia, the French offensive in Indo-China, and more 
specifically the British military presence in India, 
Therefore, what New Times did was to cheer on the 
nationalist movements in Asia quite as enthusiastically as 
it did the doomed Greek guerillas, whose ultimate fate 
Stalinists must have known beforehand. When India and 
Pakistan became independent nations. New Times initially 
termed their independence "fictitious". However,
decolonization went on, formally at least, and New Times had 
to design new "informative" lines. There were three 
categories for that: outright colonialist or neo-colonialist 
intervention, as in Indonesia; informal imperialism, which 
excluded intervention and was applied in the case of Burma; 
and there was the complicated case of India, which was not 
quite in the other categories and was described by the 
magazine in 1949 in this manner: "The British and American 
capitalists, upon whose help the Indian government relies.
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are anything but interested in promoting India's industrial 
development; on the contrary, they are anxious to retard it 
and to use the country as a market for their own 
commodities...The Indian big bourgeoisie are too closely 
interconnected with British capital to permit the
nationalization of its plants." This was evidently a form 
of imperialism, but it was not of the all-powerful kind that 
the magazine pretended to observe in Latin America. India 
was too big a country to belong in the imperialist fold of 
the UK or the US alone. Soviet general attitudes,
therefore, went from an initial pertinacious scepticism on 
the possibility of decolonization to graduated denials of 
the reality of independence: outright in the case of
Indonesia, partial for Burma, and qualified for India as 
independence with economic subjection. In all cases, 
however, economic imperialism retained ultimate c o n t r o l . 1^4
Western Marxists/Leninists had been toeing the Soviet 
Stalinist line since before WW2. They seemed willing to go 
on doing so manifesting no foreseeable intention of 
innovating after the war. The villains in the Marxist 
economic-imperialism scenario did not vary whether they were 
seen from Moscow or from Paris. Communist ideology managed 
to leap effortlessly across the Iron Curtain in a way that
capitalism could not due to the totalitarian nature of the
Soviet regime. The Latin American version of Stalinism had 
had a go at achieving a kind of regional identity but it was 
not really extremely original at it. The ideas involved had
been there since the 20s in the work of J.C. Mariategui and
in the tenuous influence of the Cominern, and in fact what 
the post-WW2 Latin American communists did was to make them 
more rigid and more dogmatic. Their standard view of 
underdevelopment was based on the infliction on powerless 
nations of a dual mode-of-production structure in which 
feudalism was strong enough to dominate an incipient often 
venal bourgeoisie through an alliance with imperialism. As 
in a musical score for organ, you could play with the 
buttons and the keys and come up with variations like making
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the bourgeoisie stronger and more promising as an adjunct to 
progressive economic forces, or, as was more frequently the 
case, assuming that Imperialism was the ultimate klng-maker 
and arbiter. The basic concepts and the principal enemies 
of progress were always the same: feudalism, capitalism.
Imperialism, etc. Communists were Invariably In their midst 
or hovering about, quick to see, first to draw conclusions, 
nimble In scurrying to hover again. The appeal of this 
model was so powerful that It undoubtedly Influenced 
Furtado, whose point of view, however, was long-term 
historical and did not have overt political motivations. 
The model current In the early post-war was extremely 
Ideological and mechanistic. It defined terms like feudallm 
loosely or not at all. And above all. It was Incurious 
about basic causation and In general contemptuous of serious 
historical research. In other words. It was propaganda with 
a smattering of Marxist jargon.
STALINISM OUT OF ITS DEPTH
But even as Stalinism kept Its hold on the minds and 
wills of Its adherents. It was losing touch with reality 
fast. There was the unresolved Issue of colonialism, of 
which Stalin had made such a to-do In the past. He had put 
every loyal communist In the uncomfortable situation of 
having to beat his brains out for an explanation to the fact 
of spreading decolonization. Even If It was claimed, as New 
Times was wont to do, that these new nations were not as 
sovereign as they should have been, to any brain but that of 
a Stallno-Marxlst fanatic a bit of a good thing would have 
seemed better than nothing at all. To deny decolonization 
therefore was plain obstinacy. There was also distortion. 
The Stalinist portrayal of Latin America was sweeping and 
strident, so close In places to absolute falsehood that It 
probably was not possible to separate lies from near-truths 
In It. It was true that the US had a long history of 
Intervention In the Caribbean after the Spanlsh-Amerlcan 
War. It was also true that Mexico had an even longer 
history as object of American Interventionism and
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aggrandlzement. Most Latin American countries were weak. 
They were also keen on receiving foreign investments, or at 
the very least, they were willing to be accommodating to 
foreign economic interests. But that was at quite a remove 
from saying that American military attaches made coups from 
their desks at their embassies, or that American imperialism 
did in Brazil exactly as it wished— in rank disregard of the 
fact that the military there and all over Latin America were 
usually even more reactionary than imperialism— , or that 
"monopolies" had the free run of the Argentine economy 
during the paroxysm of Peron's extreme economic chauvinism. 
Stalinists could have claimed that imperialism exploits 
whereas the military do not, but there were also Brazilians 
who exploited and it was mainly on behalf of these that the 
military acted. To go to the extreme of downplaying the 
exploitation and the abuses and the failures of the local 
bourgeoisies in Latin America required a special sort of 
effort, and that was the effort that communists were putting 
into their commitment to the Soviet Union at the height of 
the Cold War. But what was good for the Soviet Union was 
not necessarily good for Latin America or for theorization 
in the West.
One thing that was definitely distasteful to communist 
dogma was the theory and the practice of developmentalism 
and in particular the idea of foreign aid. The Marshall 
Plan rankled the Soviet Union as the showcase of American 
aid and because it was a reminder of the frustrated Soviet 
project for a manipulable European order. In Latin America 
nothing even remotely comparable had been initiated, but New 
Times let loose a barrage of invective at the slightest hint 
or mention of foreign aid. It was argued untiringly and 
without proof that American aid was the cutting edge of 
economic imperialism and that it was specifically intended 
to open the way for resource exploitation by "big 
monopolies". This argument left standing as many questions 
as the answers it pretended to provide on the issue of Latin 
American economic backwardness. In due time the radical
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left would find more sophisticated arguments against 
American aid and investment based on relatively reliable 
statistics and substituting "multinational corporations" for 
"monopolies", but the fundamental anti-capitalist prejudices 
on this subject would not change. Curiously enough, the 
Soviets and their partisans in Latin America had no qualms 
about using for their own purposes the idea of under­
development despite the implication of economic progress 
that flew in the face of the Stalinist dogma that capitalism 
obstructed progress, a contradiction that would later be 
pointed out from within the Marxist camp itself. They 
apparently were not standing up to look at all the 
connotations of the notion, which they employed as just 
another synonym for backwardness.
Aside from the unsubstantiated critique of "monopolies" 
and "placemen" and the rest of the "forces" which acted as 
brakes on development, what general explanation for the 
origins of economic backwardness did the Stalino-Marxist 
theory of economic imperialism propose? The principal 
question was the historical frustration of potential 
economic growth in individual underdeveloped countries. 
Although he had duly nodded towards Marx's belief in the 
progressive character of capitalism, Lenin insisted on 
blaming it for generating backwardness but with the 
qualification that this was happening after capitalism had 
debouched onto its imperialist phase. This was hard to 
swallow especially as it was placed cheek-by-yowl with the 
even unlikelier proposition that capitalism had changed in a 
matter of years from stimulating economic progress in 
backward countries to being its principal obstacle, as Lenin 
de facto implied. Nevertheless, he had left open the 
possibility of endogenous development through the agency of 
the national bourgeoisies in each country. Comintern 
debate, which was not basically about economic development 
but about how to organize successful revolutions, tended to 
squash that possibility in the same breath that it 
periodically impugned the politically progressive role of
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the bourgeoisie, all of which amounted to a denial that 
capitalism outside or inside backward countries could have 
any stimulative power at all. This view had been sponsored 
by Stalin on various occasions and it became an essential 
ingredient of Soviet doctrine up to the post-war years. New 
Times expressed it in a direct and unsophisticated manner: 
"In bygone times, when the fight was against feudalism, 
capitalist initiative helped to develop the economic 
resources of society; capitalism was then a step forward
compared with medieval economic forms. But today capitalism
is incapable of being a constructive f o r c e . "1^5 This 
explanation was profoundly unsatisfactory even taking into 
account the context and the intention behind it, which was 
primarily propaganda. Supposing that this "fight against 
feudalism" had taken place in Europe, why had it ceased 
operating in the rest of the world? Why did capitalism 
achieve so much in some countries and so little in others? 
Was capitalism then promoting feudalism in Latin America and 
elsewhere instead of displacing it? The underdeveloped 
world simply seemed to have been left out of marxist
analysis in a cloud of anti-imperialist gas, and the Latin 
American version of the Stalinist imperialist model, in 
particular, with its persistent invocation of the fight 
against feudalism within national frontiers, contained a 
contradictio in adjecto insofar as it also insisted that the 
only visible enemy of contemporary social change was
imperialism itself. Even granting the elementary nature of 
Stalinist ideological formulations, one could have expected 
some minimal degree of theoretical consistency.
P.A. BARAN TO THE RESCUE OF ECONOMIC-IMPERIALISM THEORY
The problem was even more complicated than it seemed 
because communist attitudes towards underdevelopment never 
faced the issue squarely. Communists blamed capitalism or 
imperialism in a ritualistic way for perpetuating economic 
backwardness, and they made no attempt to discover the 
origins of economic inequality, on which development studies 
had at least some half-baked explanations. The Marxist
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hlstorlcal perspective was either diffuse, impossible to 
circumscribe in accordance with a precisely oriented 
theoretical model, or else it had a clear if unconvincing 
point of view with a myopic visual reach. Lenin's 
imperialism was a specific historical manifestation of 
capitalism in which capital had become nationalistic and 
managed to combine a two-tier system of labour exploitation 
with the wholesale exploitation of entire national entities. 
Would knowing how capitalism had gotten there have made any 
difference? Did the study of the origins of economic 
inequality have any theoretical importance for Lenin? 
Apparently it did not and there was a hitch to all this. As 
we saw, development economics arrived at a theory of sorts 
by default or by inference: the West was definitely not to 
blame for underdevelopment; therefore, underdevelopment had 
secular endogenous causes in the underdeveloped countries 
themselves. This simple formalistic approach left much to 
be desired, and the least that was to be expected was that 
Marxists should respond with a deeper historical explanation 
of underdevelopment rather than with the tired political 
slogans on the immediate oppressive consequences of economic 
imperialism. Something more rounded, more meaningful, and
more far-reaching was needed.
FHopoSeP
The person who an answer was the Russian-
American Marxist economist Paul A. Baran. The importance of 
Baran has been bruited by those who worked beside him, like 
H. Magdoff and P. Sweezy. Magdoff considered him a 
significant innovator within Marxist thought because of his 
criticism of "relayed stereotypes". At the zenith of his 
termagant career, A.G. Frank admitted Baran's decisive 
influence on him, which was no mean compliment. R.B. 
Sutcliffe credited Baran with being the first warrior 
against the myths and mirages of development economics. G. 
Palma considers him the "father" of dependency theory. A.M. 
Hoogvelt explains: "From about the late 1950's theories of
imperialism began to address popularly the effects of 
imperialism on the overseas territories in an attempt to
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explain the roots of backwardness. The dependency theory 
that emerged from this exercise thus became a counterpart to 
Marxist theories of imperialism." Hoogvelt's reference to 
"overseas territories" is at first confusing because of the 
implication that he might have meant colonies alone. The 
use of "counterpart" is also imprecise as it suggests a 
strong differentiation, but further on he makes his case 
explicit: "The original version of 'dependency and under­
development' theory, as outlined by first Paul Baran, and 
next more popularly and grandly by Andre Gunder Frank, 
concentrated on locating the cause of backwardness of Third 
World countries, more especially of Latin America, within 
the dynamic growth of the world capitalist system." There 
is an unjustified chronological compression in attributing 
dependency directly and originally to Baran, but Hoogvelt is 
nearly right in saying that the "genesis of dependency 
thinking and its continuing qualifying essence was its 
criticism of bourgeois modernization theory", although again 
it would be more accurate to speak of a criticism of Western 
development studies in its two branches of economy and 
sociology. The point well taken is that Baran led the way 
in the formulation of contemporary dependency theory. From 
Wallerstein's optic he "introduced 'the long view' into the 
core/periphery conception", which was a bit like recognizing 
Baran too as Wallerstein's intellectual p r o g e n i t o r .
Baran's early explorations of the persistence of under­
development are contained in two essays, one on economic 
causes (1951) and the other on social analysis (1952). The 
first of the two essays did not once mention economic 
imperialism. It aimed to prove that economic development 
was impossible in a capitalist underdeveloped country, 
contrary to the données and expectations of development 
economics, solely from the inhibiting mechanisms of 
capitalism itself. This was nothing less than lese majeste 
to Stalinist imperialism theories, but the Soviet 
credibility gap in the West was even then so large, even 
among Marxists, as to make the offense less heinous than it
- 233 -
would have seemed in other circumstances, Baran's claim was 
that in any "profit-determined economy" there exists a large 
divergence between what Arndt calls "the social and private 
marginal product", or less technically, between social ends 
and private motives, and this difference was "particularly 
striking in underdeveloped countries". Development policies 
had to fail because they would have to curtail upper-income 
corruption, including the prevention of foreign currency 
flight, and this was something that the system in place 
would not t o l e r a t e . 127 This does not sound very original on 
the surface but in fact it was something that neither 
development economists nor Stalinists were emphasizing: the
latter because what they wanted to prove were the evils of 
Yankee imperialism, not those of local bourgeoisies; and the 
former because development economists did not go about 
antagonizing their patrons in the Third World, no matter how 
strongly they may have felt in pectore about social 
injustice. Western developmentalists in the best of cases 
usually preached to people whom they probably knew would 
either bungle or sabotage any stringent programme for 
economic growth, and in fact some of them were merely 
proposing timid policy measures with the understanding that 
radical programmes of social reform were unnecessary. As a 
result you seldom got to hear or to see in print simple, 
almost self-evident statements like Baran’s, which almost no 
one wanted to hear anyway.
The second of the two essays did approximately the same 
thing as the first but by concentrating on the collective 
behaviour of the upper classes in a social situation 
somewhere between feudalism and capitalism. Baran gave no 
names, used no dates, and cited no figures. The thesis was 
the same as before: that under capitalism underdevelopment 
could not be overcome, and as before, the culprit was 
capitalism and not some maleficent, all-mighty imperialist 
juggernaut. According to the Baran outline, capitalism 
"reoriented the partly or wholly self-sufficient economies 
of agricultural countries towards the production of
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marketable commodities”, but it did not wipe out feudalism 
leaving instead mostly dual-economy situations: ”an economic 
and political amalgam combining the worst features” of 
feudalism and capitalism. And who introduced capitalism 
into the social equation? The imperialist jenie, at this 
point in Baran* s thinking, was discreet but he was on the 
loose anyway. The "ruling coalition of owning classes” 
could not increase output by employing the manpower in the 
countryside or by transferring it to industrial jobs in the 
city for various reasons: potential investors either feared 
the risk or they lacked the necessary technology for 
industry; wealth was squandered in conspicuous consumption; 
measures to stimulate development were nearly inconceivable. 
” The mere listing of the steps that would have to be 
undertaken in order to assure an expansion of output and 
income in an underdeveloped country”, wrote Baran, "reveals 
the utter implausibility of the view that they could be 
carried out by the governments existing in most under­
developed countries.” Large landowners were the only 
potential investors in industrial development, but even if 
they were willing to invest, the problem of infrastructure 
was beyond them both as a possibility and in principle. 
Government planning and investment, on the other hand, would 
only breed corruption and inefficiency under capitalism. 
And Baran underlined: ”The crucial fact rendering the
realization of a development programme illusory is the 
political and social structure of the governments in power.” 
This was turning all the fundamental precepts and principles 
of development economics upside down. Baran*s under­
developed country was a pure model, a distillation of all 
the negative traits in a backward society, but it was also a 
never-never land, and therefore this article was perhaps 
less good than the first one, in which the arguments rested 
on economic logic, that is, the logic of either individual 
or collective self-interest. But it was also effective in 
that it based its arguments on solid social grounds and in 
that it skirted the imperialist controversy and went to the 
root of the question, which was underdevelopment itself, and
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faced off development economics on Its own terms. Aid, 
Baran said, whether policy advice or external monetary aid, 
was no substitute for endogenous g r o w t h . W h y  there had 
been no endogenous growth in the Third World in the first 
place would be his next endeavour in this field. Something 
momentous happened before that, however.
THE "ATOMISATION" OF MARXISM AND THE RISE OF THE THIRD WORLD
Joseph Stalin died on the 5th March 1953. The process 
of the "atomisation" of Marxism had started before that, but 
his death gave it further licence and momentum. Atomisation 
presented two aspects: actual international political
decentralization and its correlative ideological 
fragmentation. From its birth the USSR had every right to 
consider itself the Vatican of Marxist communism and no one 
dared to dispute this for a long time. There was some 
disappointment and some grumbling in the West when Stalin 
signed a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany in 1939, but 
Nazi barbarism soon cleared away the fog and the 
ambiguities, for most Marxists at any rate. The crimes of 
Stalin were not as well known and documented during WW2 as 
they later became. After the war, the USSR had as much 
world prestige as it ever had had in its short history, but 
Stalin had not changed his stripes and he was bound to slip. 
Yugoslavia was the one and only slippery slope in his 
lifetime: Tito bucked the Stalinist yoke in 1949 and the 
USSR reacted with all the fury of a thwarted super-power, 
but the situation between East and West was still fluid and 
Belgrade offered the capitalist powers the olive branch of a 
neutralist foreign policy. Thus was born Titoism. It was 
premonitory of future events in the communist political 
world, where the Yugoslav initiative was followed by failed 
insurrections in East Germany (1953) and Hungary (1956), by 
the defections from the Soviet orbit of China in 1960 (if 
she ever had actually been within it) and of Albania (1961), 
by the Prague 1968 spring, and by the civil war in 
Afghanistan (1979); and ideologically, Titoism became 
influential through the decisive participation of its
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founder In the deliberations that launched the non-aligned 
movement. The latter is very significant. The Afro-Asian 
nations had met in Bandung in 1955 and had approved the 
basic general principles of non-alignment. In 1956 Tito was 
host to Nasser and Nehru for the preparations of the first 
non-aligned summit meeting, which gathered in Belgrade in 
1961. Marxist Yugoslavia thus contributed meaningfully to 
the formation of an international doctrine which stated that 
nations not only could but in fact should steer a course 
between the extremes of American capitalism and Soviet 
communism. This of course did not go unobserved by Marxist 
theoreticians in the West. The influence of this approach 
to international issues was further enhanced, though perhaps 
not wittingly, by the revelations about the crimes of Stalin 
made by N. Khrushchev during the 20th Congress of the 
Communist Party of the USSR in February of 1956. At about 
that time, the USSR also adopted the principle of peaceful 
coexistence with capitalism, which put the Leninist/ 
Trotskyist doctrine of uneven development and permanent 
revolution into sine die abeyance. But perhaps the greatest 
impact on Marxist theorisation about underdevelopment was 
the rise of the Third World.
Opinions on the Third World run the gamut from 
forthright scepticism and denial to sympathetic 
understanding and "official" self-affirmation. Marxist 
radicals have been wont in the past to describe third- 
worldism as, in J. Sebreli's phrase, a "bourgeois myth", or 
in R. Debray’s own dressing down, as "a statistical gap". 
Western scepticism is on the whole less ideological, more 
attuned to the realpolitik insufficiencies of the Third 
World. The anthropologist and sociologist P. Worsley 
illustrates an evolving perception of the Third World which 
went from hopeful acceptance— in his 1963 book The Third 
World— to frank disillusionment ten years later. In this 
personal intellectual process the Third World passed from 
being a historical awareness of itself allied to a will for 
change into the bottom-line belief in "the economic strategy
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of a mixed economy”. An extremely critical view of third- 
worldism, manifesting a curious convergence between the 
right and a relatively consistent interpretation of Marx, 
holds that it was begotten after WW2 through Stalinist 
influence and support and depicts it as a simplistic, 
maladroit copy of dependency theory in its reiterative, 
emotion-laden blaming of underdevelopment on the capitalist 
West,129
As against these critiques, there exists what might be 
called the ’official” literature of the Third World movement 
which principally encompasses the voluminous proclamations, 
statements of principle, and ’action” programmes emanating 
from Third World conferences, conclaves, and more or less 
permanent international organisms such as the United Nations 
Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or the also UN- 
sponsored economic commissions for Latin America, for Africa 
and for the Pacific. The contents of this literature can 
actually be boiled down to what came to be known in the 70s 
as the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The 
political scientist K. Nweihed has prepared an instructive 
outline of the evolution of Third World solidarity starting 
with the Bandung Conference and branching out into a 
political and an economic cycle. On the political side he 
places the non-aligned movement from Belgrade to the 1973 
Algiers conference. The economic cycle covers mainly the 
actions and proceedings of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), created in 1960, and of UNCTAD, 
founded in 1964, In this outline, the two cycles, which 
were evidently not oblivious to each other, moved fully into 
phase with the approval by the General Assembly of the UN in 
1974 of the NIEO, (Table 4) Nweihed considers that the 
essence of third-worldism are the principles of non- 
alignment and of international economic justice. What the 
latter means had already been stated by Prebisch and Singer 
in the gestation phase of development economics— better 
prices for Third World raw produce and non-reciprocal 
concessions on trade from the industrialized nations— , and
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TABLE 4
THIRD-WORLD SOLIDARITY TABLE TO 1974 (Simplified version)
Bandung (1955)
POLITICS ECONOMICS
-1960: OPEC (Bagdad)
-1961: Non-aligned movement 
(Belgrade)
-1964: Non-aligned conference 2 -1964: UNCTAD 1
(Cairo) (Geneva)
-1966: Tricontinental conference 
(Havana)
-1967: UNCTAD 2
(New Delhi)
-1970: Non-aligned conference 3 
(Lusaka)
-1972: UNCTAD 3
(Santiago)
-1972: Teheran OPEC 
meeting on 
oil crisis
-1973: Non-aligned conference 4 
(Algiers)
Declaration of the "New International Economic Order" in the 
6th Special Session of the General Assembly of the ONU on 
development and primary products (1974)
Courtesy of Dr K.G. Nweihed
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it was also a theme that came up in all the reunions of the 
non-aligned and of UNCTAD. However, there was also beyond 
these general principles an ideological undercurrent that 
received full expression at the 6th non-aligned conference 
that met in Havana in September of 1979. This document was 
not subscribed by the entire Third World— many governments 
were present only as observers and others expressed 
reservations about its contents— , but it was fairly 
representative of widespread Third World opinions whether 
official or not. Its tenor despite the facade of 
impartiality was definitely anti-Western and anti­
capitalist. It defined non-alignment as "the fight 
against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism,
apartheid, Zionism", and so forth, and it harped on this 
theme time and again in virtually unvarying language. It 
devoted a considerable part of its considerable extension to 
a review of the struggles for liberation. It proposed a 
"new international informative order" based on national as 
opposed to international news media and sources. It pointed 
to the "widening breach" between the developed and the 
under-developed countries. It sanctioned, as a matter of 
course, the NIEO, and then it practically turned this into 
an indictment of "imperialism, colonialism, neo­
colonialism", etc., of MNCs, and of capitalism in general, 
in other words, it was what might be called an exercise in 
applied dependency theory. Was this, however, a valid 
expression of basic Third World positions?
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND A DOCTORAL DISSERTATION
There is a valid connection between third-worldism and 
dependency, but we believe that it is not to be found in the 
fellow-travelling pieties of the Havana Declaration but in 
the nature of the questions that the Third World started 
asking on the origins of international economic inequality 
from the moment it became conscious of itself, and it may 
even be that these questions themselves are the only valid 
definition of third-worldism. Since doubt and query are 
often the liminary stances to the emergence of valid
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correlatives of reality, they may not have been a flimsy 
basis on which to construct, and whatever some views on the 
Third World may have claimed, the Stalinist theory of 
imperialism was not giving sufficiently good answers to 
these questions. It simply did not go deep or far enough. 
There was, of course, a general Third World consensus that 
colonialism blocked development, besides being racist and 
unjust, but it was also admitted that economic retardation 
was there before colonialism had the run of the planet in 
the late 19th century. Colonialism was capitalism in 
action, but it was not the only form of capitalist 
expansionism. There was, among other forms, informal 
imperialism, part of the large and flexible concept of 
informal political influences on which Robinson and 
Gallagher had built their studies of 19th century English 
imperialism. The concept also had wide acceptance on the 
left and was employed by K. Nkrumah, H. Magdoff, and even 
the magazine New Times. The theories that began to appear 
in the late 50s and which expanded and crossbred and clashed 
in the 60s and 70s were meant to be to a considerable extent 
answers to Third World queries. That is also why for the 
first time many of the theorists that were involved in their 
elaboration came from the Third World, from the vast area on 
which the speculations in this thesis have mostly been 
about, but engaged in at a distance, in the context of 
strictly Western preoccupations. The death of Stalin and 
the loosening of the previously adamantine ideological 
bonding of Marxists, what we have called the atomisation of 
Marxism, in conjunction with Third World political and 
intellectual dissatisfaction and unrest, were the mainspring 
of this theoretical dispersion and search, and in fact, they 
were primarily crucial in starting the process of revision 
of the theory of economic imperialism in the West.
Before the publication of Baran*s cornerstone long-view 
of dependency and underdevelopment, the French-speaking 
Egyptian theoretician S. Amin, in an unpublished but 
influential dissertation from 1955, which presaged the
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accession of Third World thinkers to the front rank in
economic-imperialism studies and research, analysed the 
circumstances that prevented economic development in the
Third World, although he did not use this expression, as he 
did not use the term imperialism either, and dependence only 
in an elementary, non-ideological sense. Subsequently, Amin 
would become much more of an intellectual radical, but in 
this scholarly work— which still contains the seeds of some 
valid theses, such as the analysis of colonial and post­
colonial monetary systems and his study of the economic 
cycle in underdeveloped economies— , he hewed punctiliously 
to an academic, non-political method and approach. Even 
though his starting point was a distinction between 
"economic structures” that was analogous to Marxist mode-of- 
production analysis, he did not stake any claims on 
systematic Marxism or Leninism. The difference between
development and underdevelopment— the latter being given the 
global definition of "misere”— was the operation in the 
former of "épargné créatrice": under "autocentric"
capitalism, savings were put to use in production and in 
demand-generating circulation. Because of their backward 
economic structuress— based on land-rent, on subsistence 
agriculture, and on artisanal industry, and involving in 
addition a different "psychological structure"— under­
developed countries did not use savings to improve or expand 
production, although Amin did admit that the potential was 
there. But the crux of his argument really was that once 
advanced capitalism integrated these economies into the 
world market their ability to develop, which was precarious 
at the best of times, simply evaporated. Initially they 
were utilized merely as outlets for industrial production to 
mitigate cyclical imbalances between production and demand 
in the developed countries, but even the external flow of 
capital, which came in the heels of manufactured imports, 
although it did have some "multiplier" effects, went into 
the exporting sector and flowed right out as profits that 
easily compensated the initial outlays. Amin accepted 
the monopoly theory of capitalism— which he derived
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unquestioningly from Lenin, just as he accepted in the same 
spirit of acquiescence the idea of the beginning of the 
decisive outward expansion of capitalism in the late 19th 
century— , and he ruled out any possibility of competition, 
either between exporters of goods and exporters of capital, 
who were the same in his view, or between foreign articles 
and local manufactures, which could not prosper because of 
inherent disadvantages in the latter. The few gains that 
went into local underdeveloped economies either entered the 
tertiary sector, which was interpreted by Amin as a sign of 
backwardness, or into what he called "thésaurisation", i.e., 
mostly accumulation for consumption by land-owners.^^^
There was a significant ambiguity in that Amin, despite 
his radicalism, in the end consented to the development- 
economics model in nearly all its parts. He accepted the 
dual-economy theory, in fact he made it the basis of his 
entire analysis, and not an alternative Marxist formulation 
of it based on the mode-of-production concept. He came out 
in favour of delinking in terms comparable to those used by 
Singer. Although he attacked the Nurksean idea of the 
vicious circle and the concomitant notion that external 
capital and aid could foment development, he agreed with the 
principles of balanced growth and of planning, perhaps in a 
more committed and enthusiastic way, but in essence such as 
development economists were proposing them at the time. 
With reservations, he gave sanction to Prebisch’s ideas on 
the growing imbalance of trade between centre and periphery 
and on the potentially productive results of internal 
inflation, i.e., if it permitted internal investible 
accumulation. His insistence on the absolute necessity of 
transforming precapitalist social structures coincided with 
Kuznet’s emphasis on the same point, and could even be read 
as an anticipation of modernization theory. And finally, he 
even ratified the assumption in development economics that 
underdevelopment was not originally produced through the 
action of external forces but was begotten endogenously. It 
could be said of Amin, in effect, that he, more even than
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development economists, took their hypothesis and 
assumptions to their ultimate radical intellectual 
consequences, and in doing so, demonstrated how close they 
could be to radical Marxist ideas on development. But 
whereas development economists, as we saw, never even 
contemplated shaking off their bottom-line adherence to 
capitalism, Amin did not labour under that inhibition and he 
did not rule out that the Soviet model could in the end be 
the one valid instrument for the development of the Third 
W o r l d . I n  this remarkable coincidence of criteria, more 
than in any other instance that we shall study, it is 
possible to appreciate how the differences between 
developmentalism and Marxism in their final definitions and 
approaches to underdevelopment were more a matter of 
ideological choice than of purely academic preoccupations. 
When we meet Amin again, it shall be as a contributor to the 
foundations of dependency theory. As in other aspects of it, 
Baran here also pointed the way to his successors.
BARAN'S LONG-VIEW OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT
Baran had a talent for utilizing the technique of 
conceptual transposition. A case in point was the idea of 
"uneven development", which in the Lenin canon refers 
principally to the disparities in economic and military 
strengths between advanced capitalist powers, but which 
Baran, and many others after him, used to refer to the 
economic gap between developed and underdeveloped nations. 
Another was "primitive accumulation" : in Marx it was the
process whereby producers were divested of their means of 
production at the onset of the capitalist mode of
production, but Baran used it to refer in a crucial way to
colonial booty. The transposition of Marxist concepts 
became in due time a regular practice of dependency
theorists, who would turn almost all the basic ones into
equivalences in relation to underdevelopment. It could be 
argued that these were simply latitudinous readings of Marx 
and Lenin, but if you combine all the transpositions you do 
not get the same results as you do with the same concepts in
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their pristine ordering. "Uneven development" gave rise to 
the inevitability of war under capitalism. Khrushchev 
banished the latter with the formula of "peaceful 
coexistence". Shortly afterwards, Baran used "uneven 
development" again, but out of its original context and 
subject to any arbitrary interpretation. It could refer 
indistinctly to war or to exploitation or to both at the 
same time. The "reserve army of the proletariat", another 
Marxist concept transposed in the Baran manner, referred to 
the growing legions of unemployed as a consequence of the 
increase in the organic composition of capital and of 
successive capitalist business crises. It was supposedly 
the mechanism whereby capitalism kept wages low and ensured 
its profits beyond the point of exhaustion of its real 
productive potential. In the transposed version— which had 
been adumbrated in Luxemburg's analysis of enlarged 
reproduction— , it was loosely used to refer to the 
unemployed in the underdeveloped countries, who had no
actual role to play in the mechanics of developed 
capitalism. Alternatively, it designated the
underdevelopment economies themselves, presumably 
capitalists and all.
The work that contains the fundamentals of Baran's
thinking on underdevelopment. The Political Economy of 
Growth (1957), was principally another attempt to explain
how capitalist relations of production hampered growth yet 
still managed to subsist. In this sense, it was conceived 
in the spirit of Hilferding and Luxemburg. Baran's 
explanation was founded on the concept of surplus, which is 
related to but not qute the same as Marx's surplus value. 
In his short-hand definition, surplus was the difference 
between production and consumption, and it raised once again 
the classic Marxist problem of realization. The trouble
originated in that the monopolistic and oligopolistic 
structure of the capitalist system did not allow for the 
rational and socially beneficial investment of surplus, such 
as, he believed, would obtain under socialism and planning
-245 —
(though not necessarily Stalinist-type socialism), and 
propitiated instead wasteful spending on publicity, which 
acted as a substitute for competition; on trashy and 
unnecessary output; and most significantly, on armies and 
weaponry. The last item was crucial in two respects: it
demonstrated how government functioned under capitalism as 
the crucial prop of the system and it pointed towards the 
"international relations" of advanced capitalist countries, 
which were likewise an indispensable area for the irrational 
disposal of surplus. Given the inability of the system to 
utilize surplus rationally in its own maximization for the 
benefit of society, it streamed out to underdeveloped lands, 
where it could exploit at will and obtain exceptionally high 
rates of return. Capitalist surplus was, then, but a 
fragment of its potential size, and at the same time, it 
operated as the safety net that kept the system, like a fat 
ageing acrobat, from landing on its face. Through its 
employment for military purposes and in its outlay in 
foreign economic relations, which were complementary 
functions, it constituted "the central core of government 
intervention on behalf of 'full employment'". But this of 
course was nothing but a "glitteringn facade of economic 
prosperity and social and political cohesion". At the time 
all this was written, Marxists believed that, after Korea 
and on the doorstep of Vietnam, capitalism was living on 
time borrowed from militarism. Baran sounded as Marxist as 
one would expect, yet the quotes from Marx were either so 
general and abstract, or so specific and technical, that 
they could not be easily grasped or refuted. The old 
Marxism was dead, you seemed to feel, but here was a new 
version of the old dogma, a non-Stalinist, libertarian, 
ultra-modern Marxism. H. Marcuse was then waiting in the 
wings for fame and prestige in America.1^3
When Baran came to consider the problem of under­
development in Marxist terms, he did not have to do much 
fiddling with Marx, as he had had to do in dealing with the 
surplus, because there was not much there to tamper with.
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In fact, what he had to do was answer questions that the 
theory of imperialism, which had not been Marx’s doing, 
fudged or simply did not consider. The implications in Marx 
were that all societies could climb from the most primitive 
to the most advanced stages of economic development, and 
that the environment had to do with the divergences that had 
appeared between cultures over the ages. Marx had also 
asserted that capitalism was an unwitting agent for change 
and progress in less advanced countries. Lenin could not 
stomach the idea that capitalism was good for anything, even 
for change, so he formulated the notion that at a very 
advanced and decadent stage capitalism becomes imperialistic 
and totally reactionary. After that, the Comintern wove 
motifs on the nap of imperialism’s worthlessness. It made 
the Leninist theory a dogma, with Lenin’s approval. These 
ideas explained late-19th century colonialism and they 
explained how imperialism kept territories under subjection 
and exploited them, but they did not explain how under­
development got started. In Latin America in the 20s, the 
Peruvian Marxist J.C. Mariategui, and a few other lesser 
lights, toyed with the notion that imperialism had inflicted 
a crippling dual mode-of-production system on less developed 
economies, and this would become standard Marxist fare for 
the region. Because of his realism and objectivity, 
Mariategui is considered with some justice a social analyst 
head and shoulders over his contemporaries, but he never 
claimed that he was looking for origins or causes. If these 
had been his main concern, or even one of his main concerns, 
he certainly would have devoted more time to historical as 
opposed to social a n a l y s i s . 1^8 Through Comintern influence 
analogous ideas derived from Lenin were applied by
communists to the rest of the backward lands up to and
beyond WW2, but again these explanations were either 
tentative and unexplored or they were strictly for 
contemporary politico-strategic use with scant 
historiographical or analytical value. At any rate, for
Marxists these and only these were the options in
considering economic backwardness and the relations between
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the advanced and the backward countries, and this was the 
situation until the post-war years, when the concept of 
underdevelopment came into general use in the West and even 
in communist texts.
CAPITALISM, OR THE ROOT OF ALL EVILS
Baran was a Western-trained economist and he knew what 
underdevelopment meant as a new conceptual mediation in the 
relations between the industrialized and the poor countries 
in the capitalist world. He knew that development economics 
had espoused aggressively in the name of capitalism the idea 
that economic development was possible, and he had tried to 
refute the essential suppositions behind that project. The 
West had substituted "underdeveloped" for "backward". It 
was making a strong bid for support in the less developed 
countries while Stalinists were still talking about colonies 
and "semi-colonies". Among the latter were Brazil, 
Argentina, Iran, India, and so on, and this, apart from 
incongruous and unconvincing, was offensive to such 
important national entities. On the other hand, colonialism 
per se could not explain the full meaning of the social 
condition of underdevelopment. Baran wanted to prove that 
underdevelopment, the very concept practically patented by 
development economics, was consubstantial with capitalism, 
that development and underdevelopment were the two faces of 
the capitalist Janus, and that underdevelopment was as 
eradicable under capitalism as marrow was from bone. That a 
relation of dependence existed few would have denied and 
Baran* s intention was to make it as explicit and tight as 
possible.
Baran subscribed to Marx's principles that the 
countries of the first rank of history have shown the way 
that the others were to take: "Still, whatever its speed and 
whatever its zigzags, the general direction of the 
historical movement seems to have been the same for the 
backward echelons as for the forwards contingents. The 
country that is more developed industrially only shows to 
the less developed the image of its own future." But this
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was not the way history had taken. There were disparities 
to start with: "Differences not only in the natural pre­
requisites of economic development, in geographic location 
and climate, but also in political, cultural and religious 
background, were bound to create divergences in levels of 
rates of increase and of productivity." Western Europe had 
gone ahead of the rest of the world because its geographical 
location stimulated overseas mercantile enterprise and, 
strangely enough, because of its lack of resources. 
However, its "large leap forward need not necessarily have 
prevented economic growth in other countries". What 
happened was that once capitalism started operating all over 
the world, which had happened long before the Industrial 
Revolution and the advent of the classic Marxist model of a 
capitalist economy, the laws of exploitation and 
accumulation inherent to the system put a stop to economic 
development in all the less advanced countries. This in 
turn served to consolidate the West's progress and led to 
the economic breakthrough of industrialism, which in effect 
meant the permanent subordination and backwardness of 
today's underdeveloped economies. Baran was not too precise 
about the exact magnitude of the world's tribute to the 
development of the West, but he had no doubt about its 
importance: "The intensity of the boost to Western Europe's
development resulting from the 'exogenous' contribution to 
its capital accumulation can hardly be e x a g g e r a t e d . I t  
was like saying: "we know it is true but we can not prove 
it." This sort of tactic would come up time and again in 
dependency arguments against historical capitalism.
The plundering of India was of special concern to 
Baran. With Hobson, he believed that colonialism, a 
quintessentially structured form of capitalist international 
exploitation, had disrupted the cohesion of its pre­
capitalist society for the sole purpose of extracting 
profit. India was, of course, less advanced than Great 
Britain when its conquest started and so less capable of 
utilizing its own economic resources, but even so "there can
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be no doubt that had the amount of economic surplus that 
Britain has torn from India been Invested In India, India's 
economic development to date would have borne little 
similarity to the actual sombre record". Furthermore, "It 
should not be overlooked that India, If left to herself, 
might have found In the course of time a shorter and surely 
less tortuous road toward a better and richer society. That 
In that road she would have had to pass through the 
purgatory of a bourgeois revolution, that a long phase of 
capitalist development would have been the Inevitable price 
that she would have had to pay for progress, can hardly be 
d o u b t e d . I n  reading Baran's text the question persists: 
but why Britain and not India? Surely being an Island and 
lacking resources, which was how Baran explained the causes 
behind England's historical advance, was not enough. 
Throughout dependency literature, these residual 
Interrogations will always seem like the final metaphysical 
Achilles heel of dependency explanations of underdevelop­
ment. What must be emphasized about Baran's speculations on 
Indian underdevelopment Is that they at least try to give It 
a historical rationale rather than to use It solely as an 
unconditional condemnation of colonialism or of Anglo- 
American Imperialism. In the balance, Baran's was the first 
attempt at a systematic If summary theory on the origins of 
the contemporary Inequality between the advanced capitalist 
nations and the rest of the non-communist world on the 
assumption of the relative comparability between East and 
West before the advent of colonialism. And the fact that It 
was simplistic and schematic does not detract from Its 
originality.
Finally, there was the question, which In retrospect 
seems premature as applied to the newly Independent ex- 
colonles, of the persistence of underdevelopment In a world 
In which colonialism was becoming a thing of the past or for 
that matter In nations with a long history of Independent 
life like those of Latin America. Why did sovereign nations 
avid for economic development fall to Increase their
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productivity and improve their standard of living? Baran on 
this issue tried to light the candle at both ends. On one 
hand; he argued that "colonial and dependent countries today 
have no such sources of primary accumulation of capital as 
were available to the now advanced capitalist countries". 
This proposition he balanced with the claim that potential 
economic surplus in underdeveloped lands was large enough 
for a very high rate of growth. Apart from the scepticism 
about national elites expressed in his articles in 1951 and 
1952, there was also the problem that sovereignty in the 
Third World was often an illusion— he cited as especially 
significant the case of the overthrow in 1948 of a 
democratically elected government in Venezuela— and, as B. 
Sutcliffe explained in a lengthy exposition on Baran's 
ideas, that when a nation sought to oppose foreign economic 
domination "all leverages of diplomatic intrigue, economic 
pressure, and political subversion are set into motion to 
overthrow the recalcitrant national government and to
replace it with politicians who are willing to serve the
interests of the capitalist countries". These interests 
were that economic frontiers should remain open to foreign 
investment for the extraction of raw materials, for the
unrestricted marketing of manufactured goods, and for the 
acquisition of profitable assets either for direct surplus- 
extraction or for the crushing of competition. The only 
form of capitalism allowed by foreign capital were minor 
merchandising and other trivial services. "The principal 
impact of foreign enterprise in the development of the
underdeveloped countries", Baran insisted, "lies in 
hardening and strengthening the sway of merchant capitalism, 
in slowing down and indeed preventing its transformation 
into industrial capitalism." And as to Third World 
reformist planks, such as the thesis of the unequal terms of 
trade, Baran belittled the tapage around them with the 
argument that they had no bearing on development for what 
counted was who benefitted from trade in the Third World and 
not what the benefits were. Even if the terms of trade 
could be evened up or made favourable to the underdeveloped
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countries, as long as the benefits from trade belonged to a 
privileged class of accomplices in the capitalist system of 
trade relations, development would remain an ignis
fat u u s . 1 3 7
A TIME OF POLITICAL RADICALISM
The fluid historical circumstances in which Baran 
divulged his theories on underdevelopment were crucial to 
the influence that they achieved as well as in connection to 
the basic targets that they aimed at. Of the latter, one 
was technically within the purview of Marxism, and the other 
target could be fairly described as one of the main 
intellectual adversaries of violent change in the Third 
World. Baran gave, if not proof, at least colorable 
arguments against the notion that capitalist development in 
the Third World was possible, or as G. Lichtheim had put it, 
that there was nothing in the laws of the system to prevent 
it. Bill Warren later would say that capitalist development 
in the underdeveloped countries was inevitable, that it was, 
in fact, happening. Even later, N. Harris would adduce that 
he had proof of it. But the bulk of Marxist opinion had 
been from Lenin's day that capitalism not only did not 
develop but also prevented development by any other means 
and even tended to immiserate. However, until Baran this 
was dogma and propaganda. It was founded on images and 
feelings and not primarily on reason. Baran gave reasons, 
Latin American Marxists were torn between hatred of Yankee 
imperialism and the Marxist logic that feudalism engenders 
capitalism. Baran explained that feudalism was not the 
primary cause of the condition of underdevelopment, because 
endogenous capitalist development could evolve from it, as 
it had in the advanced Western nations, and that it was 
capitalism imposed from the outside as a system of 
exploitation and of lopsided trade relations that had been 
producing backwardness and poverty over the centuries from 
the start of European expansion. In proposing these 
explanations, Baran fused Marx's sometime-negative view of
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colonialism with a vast historical expansion of Lenin's 
theory on the reactionary nature of imperialism.
The other target singled out by Baran was development 
economics: the whole wide myth that all that Latin America 
needed was social reform, some state intervention, and
plenty of investment in order to develop without tampering 
with private property or with the incentives to private 
enterprise. It was against this more than against anything 
else that Baran flung his missiles, because here was an 
enemy that had to be destroyed, and that was the idea of 
potential progress at the heart of the concept of under­
development, Before Baran the left had been content to 
castigate the colonialist and semi-colonialist Western
domination of the world and it had done nothing significant 
to counter the specific threat in the idea of a potentiality 
for development in the Third World that only had to be 
stimulated, and this was an ideological and policy approach 
that bid fair to move and in fact was moving the relations 
between the industrialized and the non-industrialized 
nations from the old Eurocentric and colonialist patterns 
onto a new basis of possible dialogue and collaboration, 
certainly of strong intellectual and political complicities. 
This was not a promise of instant change and thirty years 
ago it was not even much of a possibility, but underdevelop­
ment nevertheless needed to be defined by Marxists
differently from the way Western developmentalism had 
defined it when it created the idea during and after WW2, 
Baran understood how important it was to scotch any notion 
that being underdeveloped meant that development was 
possible, which was the philosophy behind an anti-Marxist, 
anti-socialist programme like the Alliance for Progress, and 
that is what, in Marxist terms, he tried to accomplish in 
his book and in some three basic articles he wrote on the 
subject,
Baran's book was published the year that F, Castro came 
to power. The Cuban revolution became radicalized in less 
than a year. By 1961 it was trying to export subversion all
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over Latin America. The ideological prestige of Stalinism, 
which, in spite of Cold War vociferation, was basically 
conservative in that it placed Soviet interests above all 
else and in that it at times contemplated progressive inter­
class nationalist alliances in backward countries, had died 
with the Soviet despot, and the Soviet Marxist ideological 
centre was not holding. All over the Third World there was 
a tendency to try out new ideological formulas, usually with 
radical often irresponsible or adventurist practical 
implications. New Times did not have the same readership 
and influence as before. In Latin America in particular the 
New York-based relatively unorthodox Monthly Review had a 
reach and commanded a respect out of all proportion to its 
scant circulation (probably around 10,000 copies per issue). 
Some of the forces for renovation in Latin American Marxist 
thinking irradiated from its pages, in which L. Huberman, S. 
Nearing, Sweezy, Magdoff, and others regularly expressed 
their views. It was used by Baran as a vehicle for his 
ideas, and it was the firing range in which A.G. Frank later 
tested his most explosive arguments. The shock of the Cuban 
revolution on Latin American politics and society after 1960 
had something to do with the spread of the ideas that 
Monthly Review had been expounding during the previous 
y e a r s . I n  particular there was a special complementarity 
between theories that postulated a complete rejection of 
capitalism and a political strategy that spurned all 
alliances and compromises in favour of revolutionary 
radicalism and even violence. The theoretical rationale to 
armed insurrection might have been the strategic ideas of R. 
Debray, but Baran (or something akin to his work) was the 
necessary ideological linchpin on which everything hung. In 
the wider Third World, Baran's ideas (or again, an 
orientation similar to them) were likewise at work, though 
in a more subtle fashion. The non-aligned movement 
manifested a decidedly anti-Western bias on both political 
and economic issues. In conjunction with the call for the 
end of colonialism, it proposed that the world capitalist 
economic order be re-structured. The communist world
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emerged unscathed. The USSR was now much involved in the 
Afro-Asian countries: it had tended bridges to India, it was 
building Egypt's Aswan dam, it was in general in the midst 
of its Krushchevian Third World offensive, and it was 
brandishing its space triumphs and its revolutionary self- 
confidence. The Third World felt assisted in its inchoate 
intuition that it was not to blame historically for its 
underdevelopment, that it was the victim of Western 
cupididity, and that the West had a responsibility for which 
it had to make amends, and part at least of this was what 
Baran had been claiming since at least 1957.
A DISPASSIONATE ASSESSMENT OF BARAN
What can be said of Baran's work from a less passionate 
vantage than the political confrontations of his time? In 
general his approach to history was abstract, diffuse, and 
subsuming. Less than a fully worked out interpretation of 
"historical underdevelopment", what he proposed was a 
gigantic and unspecific programme of research. Frank 
attempted this for Latin America and Wallerstein for the 
entire world with the results that we shall see. W. Rodney 
followed through on Baran's idea of frustrated nationhood in 
the countries colonialized by Europe. Baran merely threw 
out what amounted to hints and clues, and his texts, like 
Amin's dissertation, are shot through with ambiguities. In 
general they have not produced consistently quality fruits. 
The idea that capitalist primitive accumulation took place 
at the expense of the colonial world is pure impressionism 
of the sort "it would seem as if" or "it evidently had to 
be". He did not have an iota of proof, and the idea itself 
lacks even clear definition. His speculations on the 
contemporary relationships between the developed capitalist 
countries and the Third World, what he specifically called 
"dependency", have failed, as we shall see, the proof both 
of investigation and of subsequent historical events. His 
insistence on the notion that the prosperity of the West 
depends on the exploitation and the misery of the Third 
World seems in hindsight nothing short of pious and
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arbitrary, that Is, with no other basis than the intense 
desire that it be true. When all is said and done, for all 
his superficial unconventionality as a Marxist thinker, 
Baran was essentially a prejudiced pro-communist Marxist 
observer. What is his standing as such? He had the knack 
of transposing Marxist concepts, which consists in taking 
the originals and giving them a likely twist for the purpose 
of contemporary analysis but in the process isolating them 
from their original organic context. Baran invented 
something called the "social surplus", which has as much to 
do with surplus-value as Mr Gradgrind with the Rockefeller 
Foundation. And "primitive accumulation" as he defined it 
is as foreign to Marx's thinking as was the idea of a Third 
World.
Baran did make what seem like two significant 
contributions to Marxist/Leninist thought. He cut through 
the contemporary tangle concerning the theory on the meshing 
of disparate modes of production in underdeveloped 
countries. This scheme, especially recurred to in Latin 
America, permitted a series of inferences on possible 
political alliances between Marxists and the property-owning 
or the rising middle classes or different combinations of 
these classes. The explanation was that imperialism somehow 
had a special affinity for "feudalism", which in turn was 
the enemy of industrialization. There were special 
definitions of what in Latin America constituted feudalism, 
but they were mostly too vague or too abstract and certainly 
had nothing whatever to do with the Marxist feudal mode of 
production, although, ironically enough, they were 
elaborated by Latin American Marxist intellectuals in an 
effort to mould their thinking to Marxist and post-Marxist 
theory. Baran, who had himself also initiated his study of 
underdevelopment with a rather bloodless feudal-seeming 
social model, had come around to seeing the essential 
vacuity of the concept of feudalism outside of its Marxist 
Eurocentric context. He therefore cast it aside and pointed 
out that external capitalism took on as ally any class that
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ha d an interest in the capitalist system of exploitation. 
To emphasize "feudalism” was anachronistic and inaccurate, 
and worse still, it was unnecessary since feudalism, 
capitalism, imperialism, and other related concepts, were 
equivalent insofar as the creation of underdevelopment was 
concerned.
Baran's other contribution had to do with Lenin's idea 
of labour opportunism. The latter implied some degree of 
nation-to-nation exploitation. Imperialism exploited
workers in the colonies and in the "semi-colonies". The 
benefits were hoarded by the ruling classes in the "four 
pillars" of imperialism, but some wage benefits trickled 
down to the workers there through the agency of 
opportunistic labour bosses. This infuriated Lenin. Baran 
was somewhat more resigned to the fact that some of the 
spoils of imperialism were part of a workingman's paycheque 
in the USA. He did not like it but the alternative for him 
was the Soviet myth of the starving masses under capitalism, 
and Baran knew the lie behind this. What he did do was an 
analysis of the way nation-to-nation exploitation worked, 
and this made the Lenin intuition explicit. Imperialism 
exploited entire countries to the extent that even its 
ruling classes, which were the collaborators of imperialism, 
received only the crumbs. These profits were added to 
surplus in the developed world and made possible a 
superfluous production, principally in war industries, which 
created jobs and the illusion of prosperity. The idea was 
that for its own preservation capitalism could not afford 
not to share out with its wage-earners part of its ill- 
gotten gains.
Baran refrained from calling his historical system 
"imperialism". The Marxist tradition was to stick to 
Lenin's terms according to which "imperialism" had started 
around the beginning of the century. Lenin had relied for 
general purposes on the term "dependency", which, as we saw, 
was used during the 19th century to designate colonialized 
territories in contrast to colonies of settlement. Despite
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the definition of "dependency" by the Ecuadorian Paredes in 
the Comintern as referring to a country that is not a colony 
and in which imperialist penetration had not managed to 
subvert national sovereignty entirely— which responded to a 
peculiarly Latin American view of hierarchical international 
categories— , the term still retained the connotation of 
subjection or absence of effective sovereignty, and Baran 
opted for it to indicate the historical impact of Western 
capitalism on the world at large. The Leninist touchstone 
for imperialism was that capitalism in its final stage had 
to look for areas to exploit beyond its own backyard. But 
for Baran capitalism had always gone overseas to seek out 
profits necessary to its own advancement. The Industrial 
Revolution would not have taken place as it did without the 
exploitation of India and other colonies. (This left 
unanswered questions on why Spain had not kept in economic 
step with the rest of Western Europe, but that was an issue 
that came under the province of more precise historical 
research, such as Wallerstein initiated with his world- 
system analysis.) It is logical, therefore, to conclude 
that when Baran explored the distant origins of under­
development and related them to capitalism, he was 
formulating the long-view, long-term version of economic 
imperialism that is known as dependency theory.
THE LEFT TAKES THE OFFENSIVE DURING THE 60s
The Western counterpart to the spread of Marxist and 
generally anti-Western radicalism in Latin America and the 
wider Third World during the 60s, was a strategy combining 
softness and hardness. On the soft side there was 
decolonisation. Algeria acceded to independence after many 
years of struggle. More peacefully, so did most of Africa 
and all of Asia, as well as Guyana and the former British 
West Indies. It was also the time of the widest and most 
intense application in the Third World of the Western 
strategy of aid-and-advice. The Alliance for Progress 
reached its apogee during the first half of the decade, and 
on the whole, the American government tried to stimulate
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prlvate investments all over the underdeveloped world while 
inter-governmental assistance banks evaluated projects and 
lent funds. On the other hand, the hard side of all this, 
Washington armed and financed in 1961 a failed invasion of 
Cuba, which was the culmination of countless raids and 
attacks on Cuban territory, and in 1963, the US Marines 
actually invaded and occupied the Dominican Republic to 
thwart a perceived leftist take-over threat in that country. 
The former Belgian Congo at one time during the 60s was in 
the grip of European mercenary brigades, later displaced by 
a peace-keeping contingent of the UNO. France currently 
sent its paratroops into its unstable former colonies in 
Africa. Massively supported by American military aid, 
Israel in 1967 occupied the West Bank, Gaza, the Sinai, and 
the Golan Heights. If anything what all this showed were 
the limitations of the Western economicist, developmentalist 
approach to its relations with the Third World, and the Left 
was not slow to notice.
Leftist intellectuals tried to counter the capitalist 
West in at least three ways: by revamping or updating the 
theory of economic imperialism as Baran had done, with the 
denunciation of "neo-colonialism", and through the 
stimulation of Third World anti-Western attitudes. The 
French ideologue P. Jalee wrote in 1965: "La quasi totalité 
des pays du tiers monde ont ete naguère des colonies, 
quelques-uns le sont encore. La dépendance militaire et 
politique n ’a ete établie, dans la plupart des cas, que pour 
asseoir la dépendance économique, et celle-ci, nous l’avons 
deja dit chemin faisant, n ’est de nos jours que la 
survivance et l’adoption au monde moderne du vieux ’pacte 
colonial." In other words, overt colonial domination had 
given way to complete dependency. One of the founding 
fathers of the Afro-Asian non-aligned movement, K. Nkrumah, 
the first head of state of Ghana, the country which in 1957 
became the first British African colony to gain 
independence, was arguably the principal intellectual 
supporter of the idea of neo-colonialism, which he defined
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thus : "The essence of neo-colonialism is that the state
which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has 
all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In 
reality its economic system and thus its political policy is 
directed from o u t s i d e . "1^5 Sovereignty, independence, even 
decolonization, were at most dubious concepts. Ex-colonies 
had to be kept under observation to see whether they could 
slough off the condition of dependence, H, Magdoff summed 
up the ultimate intent of neo-colonialism: "Imperialism
without colonies".
One of the ways to combat dependence was to stimulate 
Third World solidarity, which was based for most under­
developed countries on a common colonial past and on current 
capitalist/imperialist penetration. In order to achieve 
this, as Baran had shrewdly perceived, developmentalism had 
to be unmasked, Jalee cited the French Marxist economist C, 
Bettelheim as having "démystifiée le concept de sous- 
development" by denouncing its implication that under­
developed countries were catching up with the advanced
capitalist economies. This was a direct onslaught against 
development economics. The countries of the Third World, 
Jalee affirmed, unlike the industrialized nations, did not 
possess and did not exploit their own resources. By way of 
contrast, according to Bettelheim, who in this followed
Baran's logic closely, today's industrialized nations had 
never been economically dependent, Jalee supported
Bettelheim's suggestion that the Third World was integrated 
not by "underdeveloped" countries but by "pays exploites, 
domines, et a économie deformee", E, Ruiz Garcia, following 
P, Moussa, suggested that they should be termed "proletarian
nations". For Ruiz Garcia, a radical Spanish demographer
with a wide-ranging and sympathetic interest in the Third 
World, Third World unity reposed on the awareness of 
colonial outrages, with special emphasis on racism, whose 
wounds decolonization had not permanently healed. The 
French historian G, de Bosschere, who was not a partisan of 
dependency or economic imperialism theory, also emphasized
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the poisoned legacy of colonialism and the painful after­
effects it had during and after decolonization. Insofar as 
his writings, like those of Ruiz Garcia, who was much nearer 
to Marxism/Leninism, consistently pursued a structural 
conception of Third World, they, and many other sympathetic 
intellectuals, contributed subsidiarily to the propagation 
of the theoretical model of dependence between the 
underdeveloped and the developed nations posited in 
dependency t h e o r y , T h e  concept of Third World in the 60s 
was not exclusively Marxist revolutionary property but the 
moral indignation against the West and the enthusiastic 
cheering that it evoked from different quarters usually 
served to feed the mill grinding out radical leftist theses,
NEO-LENINISM
Perhaps the most important of those theses concerned 
the new imperialism, whose basic assumption was that Lenin's 
doctrine was still valid and needed only the "retouchings" 
that the times called for, mainly having to do with 
decolonization and the capitalist global developmental 
strategy, Baran and P,M, Sweezy published in 1966 an essay 
in which they substituted MNCs for the Hilferding/Lenin 
concept of finance capital. In 1967 Sweezy again forayed 
into the area of imperialism to describe how international 
capitalism assigned underdeveloped countries the work of raw 
material production, and even then sought to control those 
resources through the investments of giant corporations, T, 
Kemp also believed that MNCs had taken over the running of 
imperialism. His thesis was addressed specifically to the 
epoch of decolonization in the sense that the new 
imperialism was relaying the colonialist states in turning 
newly-independent countries into economic neo-colonies, H, 
Magdoff devoted most of his research, published in the late 
60s, to the nitty-gritty of imperialist control and 
exploitation. The strictly theoretical side of his work was 
standard neo-imperialist fare, W,J, Mommsen describes it in 
this manner: "Magdoff*s interpretation is thus summed up in 
the thesis that imperialism signifies economic rule by the
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big monopolies (despite their mutual rivalry), either 
exercised by simple pre-eminence or in the form of overt 
colonialism. Imperialism continues after colonialism has 
formally come to an end. The colonial period served only to 
adapt the social and economic institutions of the dependent 
countries to metropolitan needs. Once this was done, the 
colonial relationship persisted after the establishment of 
formal political independence, thanks to the informal 
economic, financial and social structures that had been 
created." Magdoff explored the different liens fastening 
underdeveloped countries to imperialism. US banks went 
international due to "a relative shrinkage of business 
opportunities in the domestic front and attractive 
opportunities overseas". This was a conventional
contemporary reiteration of the thesis on the tendency of 
rates of profit to decline. In the Third World these 
institutions used subsidiary corporations to acquire
controlling interests in native enterprises. Likewise, US
firms dealing in raw materials operated in those countries 
to secure a strategic share of world production. As a 
consequence, raw materials were produced, priced, and
exported there on decisions made by MNCs. American foreign 
aid also functioned as an instrument of imperialist control. 
The objectives of the US aid programme in the Third World 
were two-fold: a) "to keep the outer rim of the imperialist 
network as dependencies of the system"; and b) "to stimulate 
the growth of capitalist forces— economic and political—  
within these countries". The deficit in the US balance of 
payments put these considerations out of focus, but Magdoff 
explained it away by adding to foreign investments military 
spending abroad, especially in Vietnam, and the cost of 
military assistance and economic aid, all of which were 
indispensable for the maintenance of the international
capitalist system. His arguments were all backed by 
abundant statistics, the over-all trend of which was to 
prove the growing share of the US participation in foreign
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placements and in world trade, especially with 
underdeveloped countries,
In the context of Marxist theory on economic 
retardation, the special features of Latin America merit 
mentioning. With nearly a century and a half of independent 
political life, these republics could not in good faith 
blame colonialism for their underdevelopment, and in fact 
when traditional or academic Latin American historians 
turned their eyes in search of causes of economic 
retardation they tended to blame endogenous traits and 
processes. The combination of Marxist MOP analysis and 
economic-imperialism theory that the Comintern had devised 
to explain international economic inequalities had been 
relatively influential in Latin America. Mariategui's 
pioneering socio-analytical approach to the problems of 
latifundia and of the Indian population in Peru was 
undoubtedly a creative and stimulating use of Marxist 
methodology. However, in the 30s and especially in the 
years immediately after WW2, Latin American Marxists, 
completely and willingly under the thumb of Stalinism, went 
over to an extreme form of anti-imperialism that ruled out 
any possibility of objective social analysis. Nevertheless, 
reality could not be entirely obviated, and there arose an 
early form of Latin America dependency theory— well 
exemplified by a group of Venezuelan writers active in the 
early 60s— resulting from a cross between anti-imperialist 
cliches and the unavoidable awareness that Latin American 
republics had independent histories of their own.^^l The 
overuse by Marxists of the concept of feudalism had been 
under revision by authors such as Hobsbawm and Anderson. 
The practice also had been attacked and refuted by Baran and 
Magdoff. Yet it was imbedded in Latin American Marxist 
thought, which hung on tenaciously to its sui generis 
definitions of feudalism, and it was accepted by non- 
Marxists such as Furtado and C. Fuentes. Frank’s theses 
were in part a reaction against this practice.1^2 At any 
rate, Latin American Marxist theorization on international
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economic inequalities stemmed from the "chemistry" within 
this melange of views on external dependence and on internal 
social structures, in which the former category in its 
radical anti-imperialist form was the dominant element.
REVOLUTIONARY RADICALISM AND OTHER NOT-SO-RADICAL POLITICAL 
TRENDS IN LATIN AMERICA
Political events in the 60s were impelling leftist 
Latin American intellectuals in opposite directions: one
towards the extreme left and the other towards moderation. 
The diffusionist effects of the Cuban revolution had been 
checked by the mid-60s, yet, as often in history, there 
seemed to be a lag between facts and theory, between Clio 
and logos. Even as subversion waned, the literature of 
insurrection proliferated. Particularly influential were 
the ideas of F. Fanon on the revolutionary potential of 
urban slum-dwellers and those of Debray on the strategy of 
foquismo, that is, the idea that guerilla bands could act as 
leavening in the mass of discontented peasantry.1^3 But on 
the whole the cause of revolution seemed to be losing 
momentum: the USSR had suffered an important setback in the 
missile crisis of 1963 and not long afterwards L. Brezhnev 
inaugurated a policy of retrenchment in the Third World. 
The US under the administration of L.B. Johnson, cut back on 
the Alliance for Progress and shifted to a policy of 
indiscriminate recognition and support of repressive
military r e g i m e s . 1^4
Superficially it would seem as if these currents and 
events should have tipped Latin American Marxist 
theorization towards a hard-line, out-and-out anti­
imperialist position, and in fact this did happen to some 
extent, but they also paved the way for a "dependencia" 
theory that represented in various ways a break with the 
traditional orthodoxy of anti-imperialism. There were 
good reasons for this, too, grounded in the evolving reality 
of Latin America. There were symptoms that the image of 
economic imperialism as an unfettered and unstoppable 
kingmaker all over Latin America was losing its power. The
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Peruvian military had taken over in their country in 1965 
with the excuse of covert oil-company machinations, and 
they had decreed a programme of defiant nationalism and 
radical socio-economic reforms, which at the time was 
compared to Nasser's Arab revolution and was widely studied 
in Latin America as an alternative political and 
developmental model. Despite heavy pressure from
Washington, Mexico never broke with the Cuban revolutionary 
regime even at the height of its promotion of guerilla 
activities. Allende's election itself was decided in the 
Chilean congress against heavy conservative and American 
opposition in 1970. Besides the vanishing outline of the 
imperialist spectre on which communism thrived, there was 
also for Marxists the terribly wasting dilemma of advocating 
and relying on a proletarian movement that simply did not 
take wing, that in fact whenever it showed some force either 
leaned towards state-sponsored reformism as in Venezuela or 
towards a freak, irresponsible populism such as Peron's in 
Argentina, or in any direction except revolution and 
communism. Last but certainly not least, there existed 
clear indications that capitalism had not entirely exhausted 
its industrializing and developing potential in spite of the 
combined refutation of Soviet propaganda, of dependency 
arguments such as those used by Venezuelan Marxists, of the 
neo-imperialism thesis defended by Monthly Review theorists, 
and of the long-view anti-capitalist perspective expounded 
by P. Baran. If anything some Latin American Marxists in 
the early 70s were in secret, dare-not-say-its-name sympathy 
with the idea that, as Marx had coyly implied, history and 
class struggle had to run their course and the bourgeoisie 
had to achieve its historical tasks before revolution could 
come about. Even though it has been said repeatedly that 
"dependencia" got its winding up from the prevalence in 
CEPAL circles of the Prebisch core/periphery paradigm, it is 
more likely than not that "cepalistas" in the late 60s were 
concentrating more on the development side of their economic 
studies and policy researches than on imperialism theory, 
and the former in the final analysis were not incompatible
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with modified versions of national capitalist s t r u c t u r e s . 1 ^ 5  
This seemed particularly true for Brazil, where economic 
development in spite of glaring social lacunae seemed to be 
taking on a new lease on life under the auspices of 
"technocratic" military authoritarianism.
WHAT CARDOSO AND FALETTO SAW THAT OTHERS DID NOT WANT TO SEE
The concept of dependency has had different avatars 
along the pages of this work. We saw it used by Lenin as an 
all-purpose designation for the relations in the capitalist 
world between the centres of imperialist power and the rest 
of the world. In the Comintern it was proposed as a half­
way condition between complete colonial status and economic 
and political independence. Baran employed it to describe a 
world-historical condition created by the expansion of 
capitalism from the start of colonialism in the 16th
century. Finally, some Marxists defined dependency
basically in terms of all-embracing, all-powerful economic 
imperialism. According to some observers, the definitive
Latin American version of dependency was formulated by F.H. 
Cardoso and E. Faletto in their famous and controversial
work Dependencia y desarrollo en America Latina. Before 
proceeding, a brief word is in order on the publication life 
of this treatise. It was written between 1965 and 1967 in 
Santiago de Chile, when its authors were working at the 
Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning, 
an offshoot of ECLA. However, the book was apparently first 
published in Mexico in 1969 and reprinted there in 1971. It 
was not published in English until 1979, on the basis of the 
1971 edition but in an "expanded and ammended version" which 
included a lengthy and almost defensive but illuminating 
"Preface to the English Edition". This edition retained the 
original "Conclusions" plus an added, minutely explanatory 
"Post-Scriptum". It is necessary to make these
clarifications because a great deal of the "dependency 
debate" which later arose hinged on the Cardoso/Faletto 
"justification" of their own enterprise in the English 
edition, and we shall use this edition as the mainstay of
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this analysis. P.J. O'Brien, affirms that "the original 
formulation of dependency in Latin America began within ECLA 
in the mid 1960's" and that the Cardoso/Faletto "text is
classic in the sense that it was the first clear,
comprehensive, ambitious and rigorous attempt both to 
formulate the concept and to analyse a variety of dependency 
situations in Latin America". C. Abel and C. Lewis praise 
Cardoso and Faletto for "the breadth of their canvass and in 
the sustained exhilaration of their presentation". On the 
other hand, neither G. Palma nor R. Thorp seem to attach
more than a moderate significance to the Cardoso/Faletto 
contribution to social analysis in Latin America giving
pride of place instead, in the context of dependency, to 
A.G. Frank and, the former especially, to T. dos Santos.1^6 
In our opinion, which we will justify later, Frank and dos 
Santos do not meaningfully depart from the radical long-term 
economic imperialism ideology, being in fact some of its 
early formulators in the wake of Baran, whereas Cardoso and 
Faletto at least made a stab, a very restrained and not 
finally a very succesful one, at reinterpreting Latin 
American history, both from the socio-political and from the 
international point of view, under a more modulated, less 
intransigent "dependency" illumination.
In a brief somewhat pedantic critique of Cardoso and 
Faletto, the American professor R.A. Packenham made three 
points concerning their ideological position. He said: a) 
that Cardoso and Faletto were hard-line defenders of the 
neo-Marxist economic-imperialism line; b) that their work 
was probably influenced by A.G. Frank's theses on Latin 
America, or that at any rate their theories were nearly 
indistinguishable; and c) that in the English language 1979 
edition of Dependency and Development in Latin America they 
went out of their way to emphasize the "autonomist" aspect 
of their position, after they had seen how economic and 
political events were going in Latin America, presumably 
also to ingratiate themselves with an American audience. 
Cardoso and Faletto have disclaimed any influence from Frank
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on purely chronological grounds and others have endorsed 
their allegation.147 Their position, they affirm, was 
defined and expressed before Frank’s own main works. The 
important distinction to be made on this discrepancy is that 
whereas Cardoso and Faletto were trying to insert Marxist 
analysis into a Latin American socio-historical tradition, 
Frank was doing his utmost to pour Latin American history 
into a mould that combined the long-view general theory of 
economic imperialism derived from Baran and the neo­
imperialist analyses of the Monthly Review theorists, among 
whom he could rightly count himself. Having said this, 
however, it does not do to start by stressing too strongly 
an aspect of the Cardoso/Faletto analysis with which they 
themselves sometimes seem to feel uncomfortable.
In what exactly does their malaise consist? To start 
with, they define their work as belonging to a "radically 
critical Latin American heritage". They even go as far as 
to give blanket "at least" approval to the Latin American 
guerilla movements, and they conclude that their main 
concern "is how to construct paths towards socialism", which 
in Latin American ideological parlance is little different 
from communism. However, they did admit, as Abel and Lewis 
put it, "that socialism was not on the immediate agenda". 
All of this probably means that Cardoso and Faletto took 
note, as few of their fellow Marxist intellectuals had, that 
contemporary events did not warrant a revolutionary 
optimism, or even a die-hard ultraist "you-just-wait-and- 
see" attitude, which was quite common among radicals either 
putting down or taking up arms in the late 60s. The other 
set of facts they worked with, elicited from social and 
economic processes in Latin America, had to do with the 
nature and the potentialities of capitalist industrializa­
tion. They shared Furtado's diffident acquiescence on this 
point and they participated critically to some extent in 
ECLA’s dogged search for developmental formulas and 
strategies, which were inevitably affiliated to the 
assumptions and the programmes of development economics in
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its mainstream phase. They went about expressing this in 
words that committed without putting them too far out on a 
limb which other Marxists cut easily saw behind them. They 
made tentative, ambiguous statements such as that "when 
foreign capitals start to promote development in dependent 
economies some deepening of internal markets occurs and some 
forms of income redistribution benefit upper levels of 
middle sectors", benefits which they "might expand to 
include...alienated parts of working classes". In brief, "a 
real process of dependent development does exist in some 
Latin American countries", a form of discriminatory lopsided 
development, which nonetheless empowered them to criticize 
"those who expect permanent stagnation in underdeveloped 
countries because of a constant decline in the rate of 
profits or the 'narrowness of internal markets', which 
supposedly function as an impassable obstacle to capitalist 
advancement". This form of development, even though it was 
characterized by the "increasing control over the economic 
system of nations by large multinational corporations", did 
not conform to the "belief that the internal or national 
sociO“political situation is mechanically conditioned by 
external dominance". On the contrary, "the formation of an 
industrial economy in the periphery of the capitalist system 
minimizes the effects of typically colonial exploitation; 
this economy incorporates not only the dominant classes but 
also social groups tied to modern capitalist production, 
such as wage earners, technicians, entrepreneurs, and 
burocrats." This was then a picture of convergence and 
conciliation of internal and external interests rather than 
one of dominance and submission, and one that "makes 
possible political analysis". The evident awareness of the 
Latin American historical juncture in Cardoso and Faletto 
was expressed in a judgment which seemed to exclude the 
violent radicalism of the previous years: "There are
structural possibilities for various types of social and 
political movements." When they spoke of "historically
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viable goals", they were in effect saying, like Marie- 
Antoinette: "Give them cakes instead of b r e a d . "1^8
THE "METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLE" OF IMPERIALISM
Despite the implied reformism and the sketchy politics 
of participation, which in themselves were not unknown among 
certain Latin American communist movements and tendencies—  
in Venezuela in particular the party was embittered and 
repentant after a decade of military trouncings— , Cardoso 
and Faletto were not throwing out all the traditional 
Marxist imperialist motifs. If anything they reaffirmed 
some of the more persistent ones in their own conception of 
what they were attempting to express. Dependency was still 
dependency, even in its extreme anti-imperialist meaning. 
Their definition of it is eloquent enough: "From the
economic point of view a system is dependent when the 
accumulation and expansion of capital cannot find its 
essential dynamic component inside the system." This meant 
that capitalist development had very limited possibilities. 
It was impeded by the stumbling block of the capital goods 
sector in countries like Brazil and Mexico. It did not 
lessen the underlying irreconcilabilities of the class 
struggle, and it did not even act in a significantly long- 
haul redistributive manner. It had nothing in common with 
the "theoretical schemes concerning the formation of 
capitalist society in present day developed countries".146 
So in what way did Cardoso and Faletto distance themselves 
from the Baran-style or the more current extremist Latin 
American Marxist definitions of dependency? To answer this 
it will be necessary to bring into sharper focus the way in 
which the various versions of the theory of economic 
imperialism conceived the relations between the centre and 
the periphery, to use the handy and ultimately accurate 
Prebisch duality. For this in turn we have to insist on the 
distinction between the narrower, more "orthodox" Hobson/ 
Lenin thesis (this designation refers to its two basic 
chronological poles and ideological extremes) and the 
general long-view theory of economic imperialism outlined by
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Baran in the form of an explanation of the origins of 
international economic inequality.
In simple terms, the former propounded an overwhelming, 
almost sudden turning of advanced (and for Lenin also 
moribund) capitalism towards backward countries with the 
intention of preventing the decline of profits through the 
exploitation of labour in the extraction of raw materials 
and other primary products. This tendency resulted from 
either the "laws" or the inherent mechanisms of the system, 
driven at all costs towards the realization of surplus value 
in whatever terrain was accessible to it. It was not 
something that had been initially decided in board rooms or 
other decision centres of social and political power and 
control, but once the process got in motion it was difficult 
to escape the impression derived from the loci classici that 
it was being planned and conducted deliberately and 
infallibly towards its specific, perfectly defined targets. 
The effects of imperialism fell on already backward nations, 
but they further resulted in that no development, or at most 
only rigorously controlled, inconsequential forms of 
development would occur. For imperialism there were no 
frontiers and no sovereignties. It dealt mostly in 
colonies, and in those territories that hung on to the 
external trappings of nationhood, it brought down and put up 
puppet governments at will. Bourgeoisies if they existed 
had no backbone and no economic roots. There were class 
conflicts, of course, but they were rudimentary and unclear; 
it was imperialism itself that ultimately decided who had 
the upper hand. According to Marxist/Leninist ideology, 
there was usually an alliance between imperialism and 
something extrapolated from European history called 
feudalism. Only communist political action could change 
this scheme. Truth to say, the only difference between this 
ideology and its Stalinist variant, was the vociferous and 
simplistic extreme to which the latter carried it, and also 
perhaps the absolute reliance that Stalinist post-war 
political strategy placed on anti-imperialism everywhere.
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which had been muted In the case of Western Europe during 
the anti-fascist period before the war. Hobson, be it said 
in passing, had not contemplated most of these accretions to 
his theory, but they were in one way or another deducible 
form his pristine adumbration of a colonial system built on 
impersonal capitalist forces.
The long-term general theory was more vague about how 
the process got started, because it traced its origins back 
to the initial post-Medieval expansion of merchant 
capitalism, or as some put it, when capitalism took the 
first steps towards becoming a world system. Here things 
were much more impersonal. Laws and forces and all sorts of 
influences external to the system were taken into account, 
but the primum mobile of expansion was still and principally 
the part of surplus accruing to profits. Given the diffuse 
and erratic nature of the process due to technical, 
financial, and resource limitations, it was more difficult 
to speak of intentionality or deliberateness, but again 
results bespoke causal uniformity and this was exactly as if 
history took place according to a carefully drawn out 
blueprint. And in the case of the forces involved in the 
general theory, which have been identified as "world 
market", "world-system", or simply "capitalism" according to 
who does the expounding, there was no room for the 
uncertainties that Lenin allowed through Marxist 
revolutionary political tactics: capitalism in whatever form 
it took prevented or scotched any potentiality of economic 
progress or change. Despite the inchoateness of its roots, 
the general theory was even more fatalistic than the 
narrower original version: nations were pawns and hostages, 
social classes and politics outside of the imperialist 
centres did not count in the balance of history. Here were 
the origins of international economic inequality. Only 
revolutionary social change could achieve economic progress 
and independence. The two theories, rightly considered by 
many as basically Eurocentric, arrived at the same 
revolutionary conclusions, and this was one of the rubs.
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because the revolution in Latin America was stalled or 
seriously stalling. And there were other even more grievous 
objections. If there were as we have seen persistent 
questions on the economic nature of the scramble for Africa, 
there was no consistent historical evidence to the effect 
that imperialism had been manipulating the politics and the 
economic policies of Latin American nations against their 
will from the start of independence. Even the evidence on 
the direct imperialist exploitation of those countries, as 
defined in Lenin or Baran, who were totally agreed on this 
point, was not— pace E. Galeano and the other muck-rakers of 
Latin American history— conclusive for the 19th century and 
much less so for the 20th. There was though plenty of 
evidence on political instability and local complicity in 
foreign capitalist penetration, although the latter did not 
conform to one universal pattern. In addition, if the 
Marxist alternative of classist political analysis and 
tactics were based on the premiss of imperialist domination, 
it was virtually emptied of efficacy. In other words, the 
Marxist theories of economic imperialism were very close to 
bankruptcy past the mid-20th century in Latin America, and 
Cardoso and Faletto were trying to pay the creditors in the 
interest of a broader Marxist analysis of realistic 
socialist politics.
The historical scope of their book is restricted. It 
delves superficially into colonial history and in general it 
downplays the "external connection" in Latin American 19th 
century history in favour of internal political events and 
processes. The authors' fundamental source for these 
processes was T. Halperin Doughi, a Marxist in the mode-of- 
production, class-struggle tradition. Instead of the all- 
or-nothing schematic approach of economic-imperialism 
doctrine, Cardoso and Faletto preferred to categorize what 
they called "basic situations of dependency", of which they 
described two: the "enclave economies" and "economies
controlled by local bourgeoisies". In the former, capital 
"originates in the exterior"; in the latter, "capital
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accumulation is...internal". For the 20th century they 
created an additional modality which they called 
"contemporary dependent industrializing economies controlled 
by multinational corporations", in which a substantial part 
of "industrial production is sold in the internal market", 
their distinguishing feature as regarded enclave economies. 
Local control of capital ensured a greater degree of 
development, but significantly the other modalities did not 
indicate total imperialist domination. "We conceive the 
relationship between external and internal forces", they 
wrote, "as forming a complex whole whose structural links 
are not based on mere external forms of exploitation and 
coercion, but are rooted in coincidences of interests 
between local dominant classes and international ones, and, 
on the other side, are challenged by local dominated groups 
and classes." Or more explicitly: "What we affirm simply
means that the system of domination reappears in 'internal* 
forces, through the social practices of local groups and 
classes which try to enforce foreign interests, not 
precisely because they were foreign, but because they may 
coincide with values and interests that these groups pretend 
as their own." This was, in effect, a laboured recognition 
of the fact that Latin American societies, whatever their 
terrible inequities, had lives of their own, even the power 
of decision-making with regards to their own evolution. 
Political action within underdevelopment was not entirely 
subservient to imperialist intervention or even to covert 
string-pulling. Therefore, leftist political practice had 
to proceed on the basis of this supposition if it was to 
have some efficacy. Dependency was still very much in the 
works, but it had to be fought at the grass-roots political 
level so to speak, rather than with the tiresome reiteration 
of the slogans on external domination. In particular, 
dependence had to be considered in the manner in which it 
affected the social structure in each dependent country. 
Class struggle was paramount but it did not respond to 
special "laws" pertaining only to dependency situations. It
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could only be understood and interpreted within the 
framework of a "general economic theory of capitalism".1^9
What, in the final analysis, Cardoso and Faletto were 
trying to destroy, was the image which we described before, 
of imperialism as the supreme arbiter in the destinies of 
all underdeveloped coutries. "Conceived in this manner", 
they said, "imperialism turns into an active and 
metaphysical principle which traces out the pattern of
history on the sensitive but passive skins of dependent 
countries. Forms of local societies, reactions against 
imperialism, the political dynamic of local societies, and 
attempts at alternatives are not taken into consideration. 
This type of analysis, although it uses Marxist vocabulary, 
is methodologically symmetrical to interpretations based on 
the 'logic of industrialization', or on the 'stages of 
modernization', or even on the phases of 'political
development', which foresee change as a result of mechanical 
factors." The key words, we think, are "change" and 
"metaphysical": the latter because it embodies the
refutation of the old inadequate representations in 
economic-imperialism theory, and the former because,
although like Baran's The Political Economy of Growth this 
is a programme for research and inquiry rather than a
finished, perfected construct, it is also above all a 
strategy for political change. In fact, behind all Marxist- 
affiliated theories on international economic inequalities 
there is a project of radical social transformation, and 
therein lies the reason why in our times with respect to the 
Third World no rational reconciliation or coexistence is 
possible between the theories that posit endogenous causes 
and those that stress, however modulated, the external 
connection. They are all basically incompatible political 
choices.^
THE "NEW" DEPENDENCY AND THE LATIN AMERICAN 
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL TRADITION
Dependency and Development in Latin America is a work 
riddled with equivocations and yawning gaps. Political
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independence led to the "consolidation of external 
linkages", yet these were no obstacles to a considerable 
degree of autonomous development in some countries. 
Capitalist development was definitely possible, but it was 
dependent development. This echoed the dilemma that Marx 
willed on his 20th century followers of trying to reconcile 
the denunciation of capitalism in toto while seeking for
underdeveloped countries the blessings of developed 
capitalism. You could not denounce interminably the 
developed core of capitalism for "causing" underdevelopment 
without at some point coming to terms with what it was that 
development really meant. If it meant "capitalist
development" or some aspects of it, then why denounce
capitalism globally? Apparently it worked in some countries 
and in others it did not. If it was "socialist 
development", then two problems came up: one, the core could 
not really be in a developed state despite appearances, and 
two, given the balance of political forces, it was 
practically a will-o*-the-wisp for the Third World, or at 
least, in the case of Cardoso and Faletto, for the Latin 
American part of it. The simple solution for these 
contradictions was that for Marx "capitalist development" 
per se was an alien concept. For him, there was a
historical process determined by political and economic 
forces within successive modes of production towards some 
sort of ill-defined workers’ millenium. There was no 
development in capitalism outside of that process. As it 
turned out, capitalism did develop. It did not culminate in 
a final showdown between antagonistic social classes. It 
somehow engendered social welfare and it wore down social 
asperities and antagonisms sufficiently to obtain a 
consensus approval for its continued operation. Of course, 
long-view Marxists believe that the historical process is 
still going on and that everything will eventually turn out 
the way Marx expected it would. This point of view is 
fraught with complexities and risky analytical profundities 
about the contemporary world. Standard Soviet Marxism 
peddled the "starving masses" theme, which it pretended to
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apply equally to the core and the periphery of the 
capitalist universe, with the only perceivable difference 
being that capitalists In the core were richer and more 
rapacious than those In the periphery. Baran tried to make 
this seem plausible with his own definition of surplus, 
which Implied a precarious equilibrium In the core sustained 
by militarism and conspicuous consumption. Cardoso and 
Faletto probably believed they had the answer In 
"dependent capitalism", which Is Integral to the one and 
only capitalism yet In some way a lesser variety of It. 
They Invoked "socialism", but the term was not elaborated or 
explained. Perhaps they meant Cuba In the first version of 
their book, but later on they were hedging their bets, as 
Packenham correctly pointed out. The advent of socialism 
Implied previous class struggle but they did hardly more 
than mention It repeatedly. In this sense, their analysis 
was not unlike E. Laclau's 1985 Gramsclan essay "The 
Hegemonic Form of the Political" as It droned on 
Interminably about "hegemony" and new forms of "socialist 
strategy", which could be. Indeterminably, peaceful or 
violent, without once saying what It meant, unless It was 
the Incorporation of "marglnados", gays, and feminists Into
the political arena.151 Cardoso and Faletto were labouring 
to give birth to the mountain's mouse, or In the manner of 
H.G. Wells' jibe at the style of his erstwhile friend H. 
James, they were like two elephants trying to play soccer 
with a peanut.
In part what they were saying about Latin America was 
something that non-Marxist Latin American historians and 
social analysts had known for a long time, which was that 
the history of the region could be Interpreted In the light 
of endogenous political events and social movements In the 
widest possible sense to the exclusion of any form of 
economic determinism Including that put forward by the 
theory of economic I m p e r i a l i s m . 1^2 Despite Its shortcomings 
and Its shilly-shallying between a radical dependency 
outlook and political reformism, the Cardoso/Faletto
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interpretation became highly influential, outside of Latin 
America especially through its diffusion by sympathetic 
commentators.153 However, it fell far short of being an 
adequate understanding of Latin American underdevelopment, 
and by the standard we are using— the origins of 
international economic inequality— , it had precious little 
to say, even on the mundane problems raised by developmental 
strategies such as ISI, of which a more telling and eloquent 
critique can be found on 0. Sunkel.154
RADICAL DEPENDENCY THEORIZATION FROM AND ABOUT LATIN AMERICA
Even as Cardoso and Faletto were exerting themselves to 
extricate dependency theory from the clutches of its own 
contradictions and distortions, other Latin American 
theorists were doing their utmost to prevent it from 
straying from its rigid adherence to the dogmas of economic 
imperialism. The Brazilian T. dos Santos, whose major 
contribution. La dependencia economica y las perspectivas de 
cambio en America Latina, dates from 1969, is credited by 
Palma with initiating "an interesting attempt to break with 
the concept of a mechanical determination of internal by 
external structures which dominated the traditional analysis 
of the left in Latin America, and which particularly 
characterized Frank's work", but in the same breath Palma 
admits that Santos' analysis "re-establishes, little by 
little, the priority of external over internal structures", 
and dos Santos himself in his "Introduction" to a 1974 
rehashing of his previous work recognized that he and Frank 
were in the "same camp" and shared the same interest in 
finding "a theoretical alternative destined to serve as 
basis for the revolutionary transformation of Latin 
America." The origin of their "marginal" divergences was 
the priority which dos Santos gave to the exploration of the 
"process of social transformation" under the external weight 
of dependence, an emphasis which Frank tried not very 
enthusiastically to incorporate into his own social 
analysis. Also from 1969, R. Mauro Marini's Subdesarrollo y 
revolucion, which in line with ultra-leftist dependency was
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orlentated towards revolutionary struggle more than towards 
any serious academic pursuit, was chiefly significant 
because It gave theoretical formulation to the concepts of 
"subimperialism" and "superexploitation of labour", both 
used extensively by F r a n k . A p p a r e n t l y  Marini began 
developing his "subimperialism" thesis In an article In 
Monthly Review from 1965, In which he argued that the 
military take-over In Brazil the previous year was leading 
to the "Imperialist Integration" of that country and the US. 
However, the most strenuous efforts within this Ideological 
tendency were undoubtedly those of Frank himself.
A.G. FRANK
One approaches A.G. Frank with some trepidation. He Is
a formidable polemicist. He Is a man with a conscience. He
himself admits his "middle-class North American" background
and his conventional even reactionary roots (one of his
teachers In Chicago was M. Friedman) In development studies.
He credits his contact with the reality of underdevelopment
In Latin America with his political and Intellectual
radlcallzatlon. We shall try to be as accurate as possible
In describing his positions and In remitting here his basic
arguments, although this Is a fearsome task given the
capaciousness of his Intellectual embrace, the volubility of
his utterances, and the trenchancy of his mind. Before 
JT co h Jy /E h U C in ' T o  SoMG coMMewrmRitr 
starting : : ' ~  ^ on his oeuvre
-y claims on the 
time sequence and on the circumstances of his numerous works 
and theses. We shall also propose a three-fold division for 
the almost uninterrupted flow of his productions, which Is 
not at odds with anything we have heard or read. We do not 
pretend to be exhaustive about his bibliography. In the 
first group In our classification, we Include his early 
works specifically on Latin America, Including his 
"apprenticeship" In Monthly Review, comprising: Capitalism 
and Underdevelopment In Latin America. Historical Studies 
of Chile and Brazil, published In 1967 but written In 1963-
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65; the brief "The Sociology of Underdevelopment and the 
Underdevelopment of Sociology”, part of a larger work on the 
Latin American revolution published in 1969; and the also 
brief Lumpenbourgeoisie, Lumpendevelopment, published in 
1972. The trouble with this category is that, as Frank 
explains, while he was in Chile and presumably immersed in 
Latin American  ^ he initiated his attempts
to carry his researches onto a world stage from which 
eventually resulted works that go significantly beyond his 
initial historical and conceptual perspectives, although 
this did not detach him from his Latin American 
preoccupations and he published Mexican Agriculture, 1521- 
1630 in 1979. Be that as it may, and as this lingering 
interest in Latin America can be described as a quite common 
case of dialectical overlap indicating mere changes of 
emphases, the second group takes in a trio of works which 
have as fulcrum Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment, 
written in two laps in 1969-70 and 1972-73, and published in 
1978: Towards a Theory of Capitalist Underdevelopment, a
derivation from the previous work in the first lap, 
published in 1975; and World Accumulation, 1492-1789, also 
derived from the first work but from the second lap, 
published in 1978. The third general category of Frank's 
works are those which, following upon the fundamental 
labours and cornerstones of previous years, have undertaken 
the analysis of contemporary inter-related world events and 
processes. The most significant of these works are Crisis 
in the World Economy (1980), Crisis in the Third World 
(1981), and a collection of essays on a variety of themes 
chronicling the ebb-and-flow of his politico-intellectual
fortunes titled Critique and Anti-critique:____Essays on
Dependence and Reformism(1984). To be quite thorough w,e 
should also mention a long list of "discussion papers" which 
he published while in East Anglia University, but these are 
in the main, chapters taken from the works in the third 
group.
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From the start, Frank was clear on two points 
concerning Latin America: his own revolutionary ardour,
which was partially a contagion from the Cuban revolution, 
and his conviction that capitalism underdevelops, expressed 
In the opening salvo of his work on Brazil and Chile: "I
believe, with Paul Baran, that It Is capitalism, both world 
and national, which produced underdevelopment In the past 
and which still generates underdevelopment In the present." 
From this It followed, as day does night, that he would also 
do his best to stimulate and defend revolutionary change, 
and that the best way to do It Intellectually would be to 
refute the concept of feudalism as applied to Latin American 
history. Baran had toyed with a "feudalist" model to 
explain underdevelopment but he had discarded It for the 
wider notion of world capitalism. Aside from that, he never 
actually took a strong stand on the Issue of feudalism. 
Frank would. Halperln-Donghl surely exaggerates when he 
attributes to Frank "a violent rejection of all Latin 
American Intellectual and Ideological tradition". Frank's 
Iconoclasm and rebelliousness were perfectly In line with a 
tradition of Latin American "nay-saying" going back even to 
such pre-Independence figures as Manco Capac, A. Narlno, M. 
Gual, J.M. Espana, J.M. Morelos, M. Hidalgo, and many 
others, who manifested a sometimes rootless lashing out at 
the system and at Its established conventions. Halperln- 
Donghl Is perhaps closer to the truth when he suggests that 
Frank represents the perfect Ideological pendant to Debray's 
muslngs, later recanted, on the correct strategy for the 
revolutionary conquest of power In Latin America. Frank's 
fulminations, which probably began with his onslaught In 
1963 In the pages of Monthly Review on one more of countless 
repetitive appeals by Latin American Intellectuals to the 
explanatory value of the Idea of feudalism, despaired of any 
fruitful political action outside of the decisive triumph of 
the "masses". They were emitted at a time when, as Cardoso 
and Faletto perceived, such a possibility had been proving 
futile, as It would go on doing during the following decade. 
In 1984, Frank would admit that his essays from 1968 to 1973
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were done "in an attempt to defend a hopefully still 
revolutionary position against reformism and the necessarily 
reactionary and successful reaction it generates". It is 
important to keep all this in mind because the ideological 
debate in Latin America during the late 60s and early 70s 
was as much about political action as it was about the 
reality of Latin American history and society. Here again 
it is inaccurate to displace Frank from his well-earned 
Latin American patch and his further Marxian admission "that 
the point in interpreting the world is to change it" harks 
back to Mariategui's defiant statement that all his essays 
regardless of the subject were p o l i t i c a l . How did 
Frank's war on the socio-historical category of feudalism, 
which was after all a long-standing Latin American Marxist 
near-dogma, contribute to his vision of a revolutionary 
strategy?
Given its briefness, Baran's critical presentation of 
world-historical capitalism was necessarily sketchy. It did 
not go into details on how capitalism actually under­
developed. Marxists in Latin America had usually accepted 
the idea that capitalist relations of production were a 
historical step forward. What they defined as "feudalism"—  
a mixed-bag concept fusing colonial institutions such as 
mita and encomienda with the useless dilapidation of 
surplus— was considered to be retardating especially in 
alliance with imperialism. Therefore, the bourgeoisie and 
the urban middle classes were sometimes seen as objectively 
progressive and potentially revolutionary in the long run. 
Frank took it upon himself to demonstrate what he saw as the 
essential kernel of truth in Baran's position. To do this 
he had to ablate from Latin American Marxism any residual 
illusion it still had about capitalism, and this 
necessitated making deductions and extrapolations from the 
"wider Marxist canon" and applying them to Latin American
history. (This was, incidentally, his only real departure
from what Halperin-Donghi calls the "Latin American
intellectual and ideological tradition".)
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Latin American history, in Frank's hands, was subject 
to the forging of two sets of chains of domination and 
exploitation: the first of these chains was the colonial
satellization of nascent countries like Brazil and Chile by 
the fully operative forces of international merchant
capitalism starting in the 16th century. But this 
subjection was economically meaningless without what he 
called "domestic polarization", in which the second set of 
chains were clapped on the "internal colonies" of the 
subsidiary centres of metropolitan political and economic 
control. The over-arching structure led to different 
"concrete" situations. In Chile it produced latifundia in
the interior and some rudimentary manufacturing activity
with owner/worker relations in the towns. In Brazil, with 
its potential for a European-style internal economic 
evolution in the 18th century, it established 
underdeveloping industrial monopolies and it placed the 
colonial economy on the frail foundations of sugar
production in the North-East and gold-mining in the central 
interior. With the coming of independence, Chile's efforts 
to develop were undermined by free trade and the externally 
imposed reliance on the export of nitrates and minerals. 
This was a replication or a carry over of the colonial 
metropolis/satellite relationship. In Brazil, coffee was 
the instrument of further international satellization, and 
industry rather than being socially integrating became the 
catalyst of sharper internal polarizations, to which foreign 
capital contributed decisively. Imperialist retrenchment 
provoked by the Great Depression of the 30s resulted in what 
Frank labelled "active involution", which finally dissolved 
in the intensification of foreign capitalist penetration and 
c o n t r o l . 157 These processes were given the catchy over-all 
designation of "the development of underdevelopment". They 
were the specific playing out of the scenario that Baran 
outlined in which underdevelopment was the other side of the 
European-minted coin of development. One would not have 
been without the other; one would never be like other. The 
die of economic progress had been cast with the two sides in
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mind: on one side, it showed that capitalism once it got
going could only beget underdevelopment outside of its 
metropolitan centres; and on the other side, that the 
development of capitalism could only continue on the sweaty 
backs of the underdeveloped lands. There were some basic 
objections to this scheme.
"FROM THE NETHERLANDS DOWN TO THE INDIAN VILLAGE"
As observed from a supra-national, "impersonal" 
eminence, these processes responded to forces that could 
hardly be incarnated or reduced to the individual wills and 
actions of human beings. The seemingly "rational" and 
purposeful if deleterious and unjust results were 
"inevitable" from the way that capitalism worked, given the 
basic rules of its terribly contrived historical game. In 
Baran/Frank the real distinction between capitalism and 
imperialism was not Lenin’s somewhat vague sudden 
heightening of capitalism’s power and avidity in the late 
19th century— in truth a product of the Hobsonian
afflatus— , but a long-term intensification and sharpening 
of its international vision and sense of purpose. This was 
not sufficient to justify a historical separation between 
the two and instead it provided a crucial justification for 
positing an underlying general theory of economic
imperialism. From the beginning, capitalism/imperialism was 
foreordained and irresistible. Wallerstein, as we shall 
see, is the only theorist to confront the global
implications of this view. For the moment, what Frank did
was to leave politics out in limbo, if by politics is
understood, as Cardoso and Faletto seemed to understand, the 
ability to choose and determine, the art of the possible, in 
P. Mendes-France’s famous apothegm. In Baran’s murky vision 
the personae of history were like spectres entering and
exiting national stages, especially so in the countries of
the Third World. That is why his ultimate explanation of 
the origins of international economic inequality was vaguely 
"environmental", vaguely "culturalist". Frank’s fulfillment 
of his "programme" insofar as it referred not to under­
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development in general but to the underdevelopment of Chile 
and Brazil— extensive by analogy and research to all of 
Latin America— had to be more specific than that. He also 
had to contend with the seemingly superficial but really 
crucial objection that in his "satellization" outline, the 
Chilean/Brazilian pattern had not obtained everywhere.
Frank did not like the Cardoso/Faletto distinction 
between "enclaves" and less manipulable national economic 
structures. For him Argentina was not developed point 
blank. Brazil despite its social complexities and its 
gigantic geographic mass was simply a satellite. The Grito 
de Ypiranga and the Duque de Caixas were part of a mythology 
as unreal as Jason and the dragon's teeth or the birth of 
Quetzalcoatl in the Eastern Sea. The Brazilian upper 
classes were wasteful and sluggish coffee-vendors; the 
Chileans, incompetent brokers of solidified dung. In his 
view, Brazil had had various opportunities to develop: 
during the late 19th century coffee boom, during the world 
depression of the 30's, and during WW2. In all cases, after 
an initially promising beginning, external capitalist forces 
had intervened to strangle industrialization and to 
reinforce that country's status as economic satellite, and 
the internal forces and tendencies that could have 
propitiated growth were either too weak or too compromised 
to to anything about it. This etched deeper the Baran image 
of the spectrality of the political and economic actors in 
underdeveloped countries, but Frank accompanied it with a 
model including the following hypotheses: 1) that "in
contrast to the development of the world metropolis, which 
is no one's satellite, the development of the national and 
other subordinate métropoles is limited by their satellite 
status"; 2) "that the satellites experience their greatest 
economic development and especially their most classically 
capitalist industrial development if and when their ties to 
the metropolis are weakest", a proposition that implied the 
corollary "that when the metropolis recovers from its crisis 
and re-establishes the trade and investment ties which fully
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re-incorporate the satellite Into the system, or when the 
metropolis expands to incorporate previously isolated 
regions into the world-wide system, the previous development 
and industrialization of these regions is choked off and 
channelled into directions which are not self-perpetuating 
and promising"; and 3) "that the regions which are most 
underdeveloped and feudal seeming today are the ones which 
had the closest ties to the metropolis in the past",^^® 
These long-winded propositions were choc-a-bloc with 
unproven assumptions. The concepts involved were imprecise 
or undefined. But what was really most damaging was that 
there were sufficient historical examples to disprove the 
gist of what they were claiming, that is, that the 
functioning of the world capitalist system— whatever exactly 
that was, for Frank had not actually taken the trouble to 
circumscribe it with precision— made economic development 
impossible or useless and that politics that were not 
revolutionary and violent were impotent or nugatory.
Frank could get away with ladling out these ideological 
lumps because Latin American Marxists were willing to accept 
them in the lingering radical climate of those years and 
they flocked to his field kitchen in droves. But he could 
not escape the dilemma of the developing to metropolitan 
status of a nation that like the US had the same satellite 
roots as its southern neighbours. Here was the real 
historical and ideological crux and here too one of his 
basic ideas on the "development of underdevelopment", and he 
referred to it in the opening chapter of Lumpenbourgeoisie, 
Lumpendevelopment, in the third chapter of World 
Accumulation and Underdevelop-ment, and in the "Preface" to 
World Accumulation. 1492-1789. He discovered two possible 
solutions: one was "Weberian" intimating differences between 
the colonizers themselves, which he haughtily dismissed; the 
other one was "suggested by Smith and Marx", and it applied 
particularly to Mexico and Peru. In these countries, the 
Spanish discovery of "gold and silver and a pre-existing 
socially organized and technologically knowledgeable work-
- 283 -
force whose exploitation through less-than-subslstence 
wages...permitting the expansion of commerce and the 
accumulation of capital in the European métropoles, required 
a certain mode of production and diverse institutional forms 
in the colonies in changing historical circumstances". Why 
didn't the English colonies follow the "Spanish example"? 
In his first treatment of the issue, he averred that English 
colonists had not found those "factors" in their own 
territories, but on further examination he discovered that 
the absence of those "productive and exchange relations" in 
New England, which was due to the "benign neglect" of the 
métropole, had permitted its development in combination with 
"its particular 'semi-peripheral * intermediate (as per 
Wallerstein) or 'proto-subimperialist' insertion and 
participation in the process of world accumulation, 
associated with its particular role in the triangular trade, 
which permitted an important merchant capital accumulation 
and its subsequent investment in industrialization in the 
New England and Middle Atlantic colonies". He did not 
explain with any more precision how this had been possible 
despite such obvious questions as why such a powerful 
métropole as Great Britain had allowed this to happen, why 
it had allowed the North American republic to prosper, and 
why it had preferred to underdevelop the less productive 
Latin American republics. Again, he asked why did the 
Spanish "implant single-crop export economies activated by 
low-salaried labour establishing thus a mode of production 
and a colonial relation of interchange, not unlike the
Mexican and Peruvian, that generated the development of 
underdevelopment in Brazil, the Caribbean and the South but 
not the North of the US? Because these regions offered the 
potential for this sort of exploitation of labour and
capital accumulation although only with an initial outlay of 
capital and the importation of manpower that could not be 
justified and would not have been without the resulting
benefits and the necessary degree and kind of exploitation". 
If we exclude the transient character of the under­
development of the southern seaboard English colonies, the
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blanket results were, "for the English and the Spanish 
colonies, critical and in the (comparative) levels of 
wages", all in favour of the economic development of the
former. His theory, therefore, combined the natural and 
social determination of externally imposed underdeveloping 
"modes of production" which apparently carried in them the 
seeds of irresistible historical perpetuation through 
changing historico-political situations and circumstances. 
Political independence did not change the basic underlying 
economic structure and the continuation of the external 
linkages had only served to reinforce it. Whatever changes 
occurred in the "superstructure" had little effect on the 
"base" and on the nature of the imperialist connection, and 
none on the foredoomed nature of Latin American under­
development.1^9 Even if we obviate the rather imprecise
utilization of the concept of "mode of production", all of 
this still left standing the quintessential Marxist category 
of Latin American feudalism.
Every time that Frank employed the phrase "mode of
production" in the Latin American colonial context, the 
temptation was there to read "feudalism" into it, at least 
from an "orthodox" Marxist point of view. In opposing this, 
Frank raised the primary set of chains that fettered Latin 
America. Disregarding the vexed issue of what exactly is 
capitalism and when it came into being (which Baran had also 
done), he claimed that it was "capitalism" that had 
discovered and colonized America. It was also capitalism 
therefore that had created the plantations and the mining 
centres everywhere, and it was capitalism in two
incontestable ways: in the sense that the surplus from
exploitation accrued to the home of capitalism in Europe, 
and in the sense that in whatever form it took, whether 
through wages or through enforced labour or even through 
slavery, exploitation was ultimately the handiwork of 
capitalism. After Frank, it became a commonplace in Latin 
American revolutionary tracts to illustrate the structure of 
capitalist/imperialist world domination by invoking the
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calloused hands of the lowliest peasant picking the lowliest 
cotton-bud or coffee berry in the remotest corner of the 
remotest plantation in the globe, or as Bagchi ironically 
put it: the "Netherlands-down-to-the-Indian-village" view,
Frank was slightly less hyperbolic: "Even the indigenous
people of Latin America, whose supposed non-market 
subsistence economy is so often said to isolate them from 
national life, find themselves fully integrated into the 
same capitalist international imperialism." This was of 
course for the consumption of university students and 
derring-do ultra-leftist revolutionaries, and in later 
years, after the euphorias of Castro's Cuba and Allende's 
Chile were over, Frank found his hands full defending 
himself from communists who rubbished mercilessly his ultra­
leftism and his political irresponsibility. What Frank was 
in effect proclaiming through his ostensibly academic 
research programme was that capitalist exploitation, having 
already reached out to all accessible mankind in all 
possible and conceivable ways of life and work, had gone the 
limits of its possibilities and was ripe for overthrowal. 
If the lowliest peasant was already "fully integrated" into 
the "system" and as fully subjected to exploitation as the 
most over-zealous Detroit card-puncher, what strength could 
the whole evil global machine have left in its nuts and 
bolts? There was really nothing remaining but to liberate 
them. Lenin had implied approximately the same thing, but 
Frank had the advantage in that his call to revolution came 
after 50 years during which capitalism had had more time to 
tighten the noose around its own neck. In all this there 
was even the glorious underlying historical absurdity that 
since, as Frank claimed, capitalism was behind the whole 
Spanish enterprise in America— as Baran had claimed for 
British India— , then it could be inferred that revolution 
had been advisable and theoretically possible in the 16th 
and in any of the subsequent centuries. But Frank was not 
really interested in these ideological minutiae. His 
exertions were "specifically directed at important problems 
of political analysis and policy". His criticism was
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peppered with phrases like "scientifically unacceptable", 
politically disastrous", and "real national liberation 
movements". His real target was not so much "feudalism", 
the communists' own bugbear, as the "national bourgeoisie" 
which in his view was the political lotus-flower that was 
paralyzing the will of the revolution.
What was this "bourgeoisie" that so exercised Marxists 
on so many different fronts? For Marx the bourgeoisie 
operated behind the scenes of power in each European 
country. He never explained whether the bourgeoisie was one 
or many, whether the bourgeoisie of all advanced capitalist 
countries would eventually merge or fight it out behind 
their respective frontiers, whether, in brief, it put 
profits or politics above all else. In the event, he tended 
not to distinguish between them, and for that he has been 
accused of neglecting the question of nationalism. 
Bourgeoisies were self-generated through bourgeoning 
capitalist forces and the concept of "local bourgeoisie", in 
the 20th century sense of "lesser" or "artificially 
created", would probably have been problematic for him. For 
Lenin, the concept presented less difficulties because he 
was convinced that capitalism in its imperialist stage had 
reached its historical pinnacle and that, whether 
bourgeoisies existed or not in the colonies and "semi­
colonies", the centres of capitalism could mostly do with 
them as they wanted. They were ideologically irrelevant but 
not strategically so, since they could act as a bulwark 
against imperialism with the right sort of communist 
stimulation and support. Consequently, the Comintern and 
afterwards Stalin, who were both to a significant extent 
Lenin's creatures, acted in accordance and sometimes played 
up and sometimes played down the importance of "local 
bourgeoisies", which were like a flowering of mushrooms 
around a rotted tree trunk. By contrast, local communists 
on their own, though they were often obliged to accept 
Moscow's change of moods, normally inclined to view "local 
bourgeoisies" with some respect (some of the exceptions, as
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in China in the 20s and in El Salvador in the 30s, paid 
bitterly in blood and suffering), and this was especially so 
after WW2 in Latin America. The fear of the bourgeoisie 
abated somewhat with the victory of Castro in Cuba (there 
was also then in circulation the Maoist dictum about "paper 
tigers"), but "true" Marxists, those that had read the 
master or knew their history, were never truly convinced 
that you could just snap your fingers at the bourgeoisie. 
Besides Latin Americans were used to hating "Yankee 
imperialism" and even Latin American Marxists never felt 
comfortable when it was suggested that their principal enemy 
could be at home sleeping beside them.
For a long time Moscow had obliged by blaming
everything on the US, not coincidentally at the height of 
the Cold War. During the 60s, however, the insurrectionary 
strategy that the left flirted with and frequently adopted, 
ipso facto brought it into conflict with the bourgeoisie, 
and this had to be justified and understood if extremist
momentum was not to be dissipated. Not all were interested 
in this. Cardoso and Faletto were not. But Frank's
theories were expressly designed to that end. To start with 
they did not give up "Yankee imperialism". On the contrary: 
they offered a stream-lined if history-laden version of 
world capitalism. The latter was at the base of 
underdevelopment and it still was the principal brake on
economic progress. Only socialism could save Latin America
and Frank denied that socialism had to wait for the
bourgeoisie to finish its work as the historical agent of 
economic progress. Capitalism had already done its best and 
worst, and the bourgeoisie's task was ended: "If the
structure and development of the world capitalist system 
have long since incorporated and underdeveloped even the
furthest outpost of 'traditional' society and no longer 
leave any room for classical national and modern state 
capitalist development independent of imperialism, then the 
contemporary structure of capitalism also does not provide 
for the autonomous development of a national bourgeoisie
— 288 -
independent enough to lead (or often to take part in) a real 
national liberation movement or progressive enough to 
destroy the capitalist structure of underdevelopment at 
home. If there is to be a 'bourgeois' democratic revolution 
and the elimination of capitalist underdevelopment, then it 
can no longer be the bourgeoisie in any of its guises which 
is capable of making this revolution. The historical 
mission and role of the bourgeoisie in Latin America— which 
was to accompany and to promote the underdevelopment of its 
society and of itself— is finished." This was a "logical" if 
far-fetched deduction from the idea that capitalist 
exploitation had reached the farthest recesses of the
territories under its domination and was extracting as much 
surplus from its masses as could be expected, and the
"logical" ideological riposte to this situation was to pair 
total exploitation with the total superfluity of the
bourgeoisie, thus closing the cycle of history and the
revolution. But was it true that peasants all over Latin 
America had reached on the average the peak of advancement 
that they could aspire to, which in Frank's scheme was no 
advancement at all but eternal miserable servitude? And had 
capitalism truly exhausted all possibilities of further 
development? Had the bourgeoisie in Latin America run out 
of ideas and of capital and of all other resources for 
industrialization and economic development? And even if all 
these questions were to be answered in the affirmative, did 
this necessarily mean that revolution was around the bend 
and "that the role of promoting historical progress has now 
fallen to the masses of the people alone" and that to play 
along with the bourgeoisie (the alternative inevitably 
having to be armed struggle) was "treacherous or 
treachery"?!^! Needless to say, these statements, which 
were an integral part of Frank's "studies", put his 
writings into the correct context, which was academic and 
investigative only in form.^^Z
THE PROBLEMS OF WORLD ACCUMULATION
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Frank’s Latin American period ended with the overthrow 
of Allende, but by then he had already shifted his attention 
towards the mightier problems of historical capitalist 
accumulation and the origins of world underdevelopment. 
What motivated this shift? Frank wrote in the "Preface" to 
Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America of the 
"need in the underdeveloped and socialist countries for the 
development of a theory and analysis adequate to encompass 
the structure and the development of the capitalist system 
on an integrated world scale and to explain its 
contradictory development which generates at once economic 
development and underdevelopment in international, national, 
local and sectorial levels". Whether this implies or not a 
burning concern with accumulation, the facts as he described 
them are that he felt at the time that placing Latin America 
— and specifically Chile and Brazil— in a historical context 
which explained underdevelopment left virtually untouched 
the complementary question of how the underdevelopment of 
Latin America and of the rest of the Third World, on the one 
hand, was made possible in its origins by world capitalist 
accumulation, and how in turn the process of 
underdevelopment became forcibly integrated as a necessary 
component in the ongoing historical process of world 
capitalist accumulation, in other words, that he had not 
made clear enough that development and underdevelopment are 
parts of the same process. This lack was in addition 
pointed out to him by S. Amin in 1969— at the time busily 
writing his own Accumulation on a World Scale— with his 
criticism that in Frank’s approach to accumulation he was 
"failing to differentiate and analyse the main stages of 
capitalist development adequately". From this self-critical 
awareness emerged the two 1978 books that we have mentioned 
as being part of the second phase in Frank’s intellectual 
evolution: Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment and
World Accumulation, 1492-1789. In the former he explained 
that he was working towards "the integration of dependence 
and underdevelopment within the world process of 
accumulation", which he divided into three stages or
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periods: mercantilist (1500-1770), industrial capitalist
(1770-1870), and imperialist (1870-1930), The specific 
object he had in mind was "to proceed historically from one 
stage of world capitalist development to another and through 
the analysis of the relationship between production and 
exchange relations... to examine on the one hand the 
differential contribution of each of the major world regions 
to the world process of capital accumulation during each of 
its major stages of development, and on the other hand to 
analyse the underdeveloping consequences of this 
participation in world accumulation for each of the major 
regions of the now underdeveloped 'third world'”. This work 
included three theoretical essays, each one juxtaposed and 
corresponding to one of the three periods mentioned, on what 
Frank considered to be the essential issues raised by world 
accumulation in those periods. They were titled
respectively: "On the Roots of Development and Under­
development in the New World: Smith and Marx v. the
Weberians"; "That the extent of the Internal Market is 
limited by the International Division of Labour and the 
Relations of Production"; and "Multilateral Merchandise 
Trade Imbalances and Uneven Economic Development". The 
other work. World Accumulation, 1492-1789, was a more 
profound historical exploration of the first period 
delimited in the other book. It was part of an exhaustive 
project that would have explored the process of capitalist 
accumulation to our days, but it was cut short by the events 
of 1973 in Chile. It can be considered definitive, at least 
for the period concerned, in a way that Dependent 
Accumulation and Underdevelopment is not because of the 
relative brevity of the letter's historical studies. 
However unfinished Frank may have considered his 
élucubrations from the perspective of his original 
intentions, it can hardly be denied that both works contain 
a thorough examination of the issues that were foremost in 
his mind. To understand them fully, it is necessary to do a
bit of backtracking.
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Given that Marx defined capitalism as a discrete 
historical mode of production, that is, one among various 
analogous historical formations, he had to explain, and
indeed partially explained, three things: 1) original
accumulation, or how the capitalist mode of production came 
to be; 2) reproduction, or how it replicated itself in time; 
and 3) expanded accumulation, or how it tended to evolve 
historically. For her theory on imperialism, R. Luxemburg 
started with the second of these concepts and with the idea 
that in any stable Marxist reproduction model there always 
arose an excess of surplus value that predicated the
existence of non-capitalist formations. Baran suggested 
that primitive accumulation already implied or involved a 
form of capitalist exploitative expansion from Europe to the 
rest of the world. In a murky and unspecified way
capitalist accumulation in general, which might or might not 
have been the same as reproduction, perpetuated colonial, 
semi-colonial, and neo-colonial exploitation. Marx had
defined primitive accumulation as the process whereby 
producers were alienated from their means of production, and 
even though he hinted that colonialism contributed to 
reproduction (or accumulation in the vague Baran sense)—  
allusions which Frank collected throughout the text of World 
Accumulation, 1492-1789— nothing in his work warrants 
modifying his essential definitions of primitive 
accumulation and of reproduction, which means that he saw 
the process of the birth and replication of capitalism as 
essentially self-sustaining and West European, and it also 
means that Baran's latitudinarian view of these concepts was 
transpositional and theoretically unfounded, even if there 
might have been hermeneutic precedents for his usages.
Be that as it may, these conceptual manipulations entered in 
a not-too-rigorous manner, as did other transpositions of 
Marxian ideas, into the motley realm of dependency ideology, 
where all that was required of ideas was that they should 
serve to prove, and reprove of, the polymorphous "reality" 
of economic imperialism. It is likely that S. Amin— on the 
direct or indirect prompting of Baran, for Amin was
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indisputably in the large group of theorists affiliated with 
Monthly Review— was the first to work systematically with 
these conceptual transpositions, as we shall see further on, 
but it is also true that Frank's entry into the field of 
accumulation theory was spontaneous and perfectly consistent 
with his dependency concerns. It could even be argued that 
in order to defend and sustain all of his work on Latin 
American underdevelopment it was absolutely necessary that 
he explain how it was that he saw underdevelopment generally 
as indispensable to the functioning of the world capitalist 
economy from its start, and even perhaps to its very 
origins. Accumulation for him, therefore, was not a 
superfetatory area of study but an intrinsic part of his 
ideological system, and it was inescapable, to boot, in 
order to bring some coherence and logic into his reiterated 
if always inferential affirmation that capitalism was fully 
operational in the European conquest and colonization of 
America.
The one thing that Frank can never be faulted for is 
not stating problems explicitly or not making direct precise 
questions, and this was a practice he applied in World 
Accumulation, the work which, more than the others of the 
same phase, grapples directly and in extenso with these 
issues. This is not to say that his answers were equally 
precise. To start with, he managed in his "Conclusions" to 
evade the problem of the origins of capitalism, and he did 
it without giving in to his critics or giving up on his 
pretensions of fidelity to Marx. In order to do this he 
visited the usual places where Marx himself wiggled and 
fudged with nebulous references to Medieval Italian city- 
states or to the creation of a world market in the 16th 
century. But he could not really cope with the conundrum of 
how to square his vision of capitalist colonial plunder with 
the process of primitive accumulation, which Marx saw 
occurring principally or even solely in Europe, so he took a 
saving way out declaring that "The extent of the single, 
worldwide process of capital accumulation and of the
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capltalist system it has formed over several centuries 
remains an important open question" or that "The question of 
when and how original precapitalist, primitive accumulation 
of capital became (the starting point of) [sic] the 
capitalist process of capital accumulation remains 
substantially open". The deliberate equivocations here left 
all the combatants in possession of their grounds— it was 
somewhat like applying the principle of uti possidetis in an 
ideological battlefield— , it disengaged accumulation per se 
from the convolutions of primitive accumulation, in fact it 
fused accumulation and reproduction, and it freed him to cut 
a wide swath in skirmishes in which he could put all his 
polemical strength into action.
There were two doubtful questions to be disposed of 
here. One had to do with his insistence on the essential or 
ultimately capitalist nature of exploitation through non­
capitalist economic formations, which to any Marxist ear 
would have sounded heretical or even nonsensical. The other 
was the emphasis he placed in situations of underdevelopment 
on the decisive influence of external forces, which again 
some Marxists found one-sided and exaggerated. On the first 
point he had various arguments to hand, some of which 
plunged the depths of Marxian sophistry. For instance, he 
argued that depending on how it was defined "precapitalist" 
could signify "non-capitalist" or "part capitalist", "but in 
either event, non-capitalist need not be pre-capitalist, 
since it can also be simultaneous with capitalist 
accumulation or even post-capitalist", with which he 
apparently was adducing both evidence from historical facts 
and deduction from abstract logic. (If precapitalist equals 
non-capitalist and part capitalist, then non-capitalist did 
not rule out capitalist.) To make the argument stick he 
distinguished between "primary accumulation", to which non­
capitalist production could contribute, and "precapitalist 
primitive accumulation and production", by which he retained 
the original Marxist concept without diminishing the 
importance of non-capitalist colonial booty to general
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capitalist accumulation, "Such primary accumulation, based 
in part on production through non-capitalist relations of 
production", he concluded, "has been a frequent, if not 
constant, companion of the capitalist process of capital 
accumulation even in its developed stage of the dominance of 
wage labour and later of relative surplus value." What was 
more, even in our times non-capitalist relations of 
production were important for the capitalist process of 
accumulation (reproduction in Marx's schema) through, 1) 
"the sustenance and, in time of need, provision of a
potential reserve army of labour and pool of labour power; 
2) the contribution to the sustenance and the reproduction 
of wage labour power for which capital pays a less-than- 
subsistence wage that is too low for the wage labourer's 
sustenance and reproduction (as in 'non-capitalist village 
production' in underdeveloped countries); and 3) the use of 
non-capitalist 'socialist' relations of production to 
produce value that enters into the world capitalist process 
of capital accumulation". This last point had to do with 
the question of the extent to which the communist world
participated in or contributed to the capitalist world
market, which had already been raised by Amin when Frank 
adverted to it and was to be taken into account also by 
Wallerstein. The finished statement on the whole issue was 
summarized in this manner: "Insofar as relations of
production— in relation to exchange and realization— are the 
significant criterion, it is the transformation of the 
relations of production, circulation, and realization 
through their incorporation into the process of capital 
accumulation that is, in principle, the relevant criterion 
of the existence of capitalism." But in the end, Frank went 
back to the beginning of the discussion when he reaffirmed 
his position in Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin
America that, whatever the formal manifestations, the 
exploitation of peasants and slaves was ultimately 
capitalist because it "contributed to the primitive and then
- 295 -
the Industrial accumulation of capital concentrated in 
particular parts of the system and times of the process".
The other large question he felt compelled to consider 
— the one "posed by those who argue that relations of 
production are 'internal' and therefore determinant"— he 
translated into the relative opposition between production 
and circulation, that is, whether internal relations of 
production or external relations of exchange were 
determinant in the development of underdevelopment (although 
the specific reference to the latter phenomenon was only 
implicit in the text). His answer was that since both 
modalities were part of "a single mechanism of accumulation 
and the development of a single world capitalist system", 
the question was "irrelevant", but that the thesis of the 
predominance of internal relations was "questionable". In 
fact, though, what he did was to beg the question by 
assuming that internal relations of production were 
subservient to the general process of capitalist 
accumulation, which in his unshakeable view was crucially 
dependent on imperialist exploitation. Rather than to point 
out the inconsistencies and the tortured logic, we feel it 
is more instructive to indicate that what Frank achieved was 
to incorporate the history or more accurately the 
"prehistory" of the Third World into Marx's sequential 
scheme of primitive accumulation and reproduction and to 
make it a necessary if subordinate part in the historical 
process of capitalism since its inception. This was 
somewhat analogous to what R. Luxemburg had done, except for 
two points, one of which made Frank's construct 
problematical: Luxemburg attributed the same necessity for 
non-capitalist socio-economic formations to the expanded 
reproduction of capital but she expressly limited it to the 
period of full development of capitalism during the 19th 
century, whereas Frank took it back to the start of 
colonialism; and while Luxemburg foresaw that the 
equilibrium which the non-capitalist areas permitted 
capitalism to maintain (in the sense of absorbing excess
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surplus) would eventually be broken— when these areas in 
turn became capitalist, thus raising once again the problem 
of surplus— , Frank’s system did not have an escape valve, 
because, since underdevelopment was fixed for eternity under 
capitalism, the latter could carry on indefinitely by 
squeezing the Third World with varying strength according to 
the needs of the capitalist centre, and the only conceivable 
way out was the only one not forthcoming despite Frank's 
intense gropings: the revolutionary political action of the
masses. It could be said that the circumstance that made 
all the difference between Luxemburg and Frank was that in 
the years intervening between them the USSR had come into 
existence, and with this a most authoritative precedent on 
the possibility of accelerating the world revolutionary 
process. Finally in connection with these ideas, another 
flaw in Frank’s scheme was that it established, as per the 
hypothesis on the interaction between the developed centre 
and the underdeveloped periphery, that the centre loosened 
its hold on the latter in times of recession or warfare, 
precisely when it would have been logical to expect the 
tightening of economic bondage. Without regard for 
consistency Frank would espouse precisely the opposite point 
of view in his Crisis books.1^6
THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM
If Frank had two unassailable attitudes towards Latin 
American reality, he had one single conviction concerning 
world capitalism in the late 70s, and that was that it was 
exhausted and on the brink of a historical collapse. This 
reflected traditional Marxist millenialism, which was 
something that could be read into Marx himself and which 
motivated much of the writing on turn-of-the-century 
imperialism, including Lenin’s and Trotsky’s ideas on 
permanent revolution. Millenialism was at a peak in Latin 
America after Castro, and Frank carried with him, if not his 
Latin American revolutionary illusions, his Marxist 
hopefulness about the final scuttling of capitalism when he 
climbed the heady heights of the world-system. His two
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Crisis books are founded on this persuasion. Crisis in the 
World Economy is devoted on the whole to trends and policies 
in the capitalist core, although it touches on their 
consequences for the Third World; but it is Crisis in the 
Third World, a companion volume to the first, that centres 
on the main themes of our research, and it is the one that 
we shall briefly consider. The principal idea there, and 
one which in one way or another pervaded every Marxist work 
on the theory of economic imperialism since its inception, 
but which Frank apparently did not share at first, was that 
when international capitalism enters a "crisis of 
accumulation" it intensifies its exploitation of the 
labouring masses in the less developed parts of the world. 
According to Frank, the world crisis he had in mind had 
started in 1967, it had become acute in the early 70s, and 
it had been given a sort of coup de grace with the oil
crises of 1973-74 and the late 70s. If this meant austerity 
and unemployment in the first world, it provoked the
implantation of "new" forms of domination and exploitation 
in the Third World, which became a necessary prop for the 
survival of world capitalism. This was made possible by the 
further thwarting of development. Mexico, due to its 
nearness to the raw power of the US, had always been a 
storehouse of raw materials and of agricultural produce. 
Argentina missed the historical boat because it had favoured 
exports to high tariffs, which its powerless labour movement 
could not impose and which, by way of contrast, had been
possible in Australia. Brazil had left Argentina far behind 
in industrialization but it had failed to expand the
internal market despite over two decades of classic 
capitalist development policies. One significant effect of 
world capitalism had been the distorting influence of 
"agribusiness" in the Third World, which steered under­
developed economies away from self-sufficiency and towards 
the export of cash-crops. To keep the system in working 
order, capitalism had fostered the formation of regional 
"subimperialist" powers such as Brazil, Israel, and Iran. 
Political interest stimulated development from the outside
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in the Asian "gang of four”. These peripheral
manifestations of economic vitality were analogous in 
reverse to the way in which historically the core of 
capitalism had shifted from Northern Italy in the Late 
Middle Ages through Spain and Portugal in the 15th and 16th 
centuries to Northern Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries 
resulting in the ”semi-peripheralization” of the previous
core regions. The modern "semi-peripheries" were a working 
backwards of the process, as it were, but with no real
development content. This was a congeries of ideas 
emanating from Braudel and Wallerstein, In the periphery 
itself, the greater the exploitation the greater the need 
for internal political repression and to that end peripheral 
states were activist and strong, although always willing to 
defer to the pressures of the multinationals,
History and contemporary reality were at odds with
these interpretations. There was no proof that capitalism 
was hanging on by the skin of the Third World's teeth. The 
"crisis" that Frank diagnosed was a cycle trough and if
profits and rates of return were down they subsequently 
bounced back to the heights of the late 80s, The problem of 
development in the Third World does not seem to be so much 
one of external "super-exploitation" as of a lack of 
efficient utilization of both natural and human resources,
and at any rate, as J, Robinson, G, Kay and others have
pointed out, developed capitalism is more interested in its 
own markets than in those of the Third W o r l d , C apitalist 
ups-and-downs in the core occur without significant long­
term effects in one way or another on the permanently 
depressed conditions in the Third World, whose industrial
"mini-booms" often happen either against cycle trends in the 
centre (as during the depression in the 30s, whose 
peripheral effects Frank on the whole analyzed correctly), 
or as a result of anomalous market conditions (as in OPEC 
countries during the late 70s), If Frank's new-fangled 
theories on a core "dependent" on the exploitation of the 
Third World to overcome its crises were true, the logical
“ 299 ”
expected result, from his belief in the importance of 
external determination, should have been the thorough 
development of underdeveloped economies, or else their 
importance to the capitalist centre was being inflated. The 
idea of "peripheralization", which Frank borrowed from 
Wallerstein and which is a logical ideological correlative 
of "subimperialism", does not stand up to historical 
scrutiny. The process of historical peripheralization of 
parts of Europe did by no stretch of the imagination deter 
the more significant and forward process of long-term over­
all European economic development, and the analogous inverse 
process of "sub-imperialization" can hardly be read as a 
global accentuation of underdevelopment, even taking it on 
its own dubious terms. "Subimperialism" has had a short and 
lamentable existence. The attribution of the
"subimperialist" condition to Mexico did not prevent the 
Sandinist victory in Nicaragua. Brazil's supposedly 
privileged position in the capitalist checkerboard did not 
preclude it from becoming the Third World's number one 
debtor experiencing periodic bankruptcy crises. Israel's 
existence is arguably the most de-stabilizing influence in 
the Middle East. And Iran's unforeseeable Islamic 
revolution (as per Frank's admission reported to the author) 
put an inglorious finale to its regional hegemonic role.
In reference to the "four Asian dragons", there can be 
no question that the seed of "doomed" Hong Kong's 
development was nurtured internallly, and that in the cases 
of the other members of the group external economic support 
would have gone to waste without the policy choices that 
those countries made. No labour movement in history has 
ever been the motive force behind protectionism, and 
Australia in particular did not develop behind a 
specially formidable tariff wall. It is true that the 
technological "stinginess" of MNCs contribute significantly 
to Third World industrial stagnation, but it can not be said 
that it is its principal cause. Third World political 
repression is a fact of life that can not be correlated with
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periods of capitalist "super-exploitation", and the notion 
that Third World governments habitually defer meekly to the 
interests of MNCs can be disproved with many examples, among 
which those of India and the Andean Pact, with their 
codilleran barriers to foreign capital, have front-rank 
value•
In fine, if A.G. Frank's intellectual evolution can 
legitimately be read as an attempt to interpret and apply P. 
Baran's outline on the origins of international economic 
inequality, it can only be described as very nearly a dismal 
failure, and was probably a throw-back, unwitting if you 
will, to some of the cruder levels of post-WW2 Stalinist 
anti-imperialist argumentation. This interpretation gains 
considerable force from the fact that for Frank at all 
stages in his intellectual evolution, the so-called 
socialist world and in particular the USSR have always 
seemed to represent a valid political and economic 
alternative model to capitalism both in its advanced centres 
and in the Third World, an attitude, perhaps derived from 
his years in Latin America— where indigenous Marxists have 
usually had no qualms about condoning Soviet 
totalitarianism— , which is not shared by fellow 
intellectuals like Amin and Wallerstein, who incline towards 
an idealized but hazy notion of world socialism,
THE DEFINITION OF DEPENDENCY
In our analysis of Cardoso/Faletto and of Frank we have 
encountered two related but significantly divergent 
intellectual outlooks claiming the mantle of dependency 
theory. Before proceeding on our survey of neo-Marxist 
thought on underdevelopment, it would therefore be advisable 
to formulate a more precise definition of the concept and 
the theoretical contents of dependency. During the 19th 
century, the condition of dependency referred to colonies of 
conquest, at least in British usage. In Lenin it refers 
indistinctly to colonies and so-called semi-colonies, 
including the Latin American republics, an usage which 
continued through Comintern congresses and on to Stalinist
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dogma and propaganda, Baran, who respected the Marxist/ 
Leninist historically restricted definition of imperialism, 
recurred to the idea of dependency for his long-view
interpretation of the historical effects of capitalism on 
non-Western nations. This in effect raised dependency to 
the category of a theory. In the early 60s, some Latin
American Marxist intellectuals were using the concept of
dependency to designate the relations between American 
imperialism and the backward Latin American economies, which 
amounted to the application of Marxist socio-economics
analysis and Marxist/Leninist imperialism theory to the
independent history of Latin America. Somewhat loose, even 
fanciful, definitions of feudalism were an integral part of 
the model, which, however, mainly postulated the direct
domination of Latin America by capitalist, principally 
Yankee, imperialism. Subsequently, Cardoso/Faletto took the 
idea of dependency and used it in a theory which attenuated 
the external imperialist connection and upgraded internal 
social processes and mechanisms in Latin America. 
Underdevelopment was still a function of dependency but the 
possibility of capitalist development, albeit beset by 
distortions and social inequities, was not discarded. 
Finally, at this point in our dissertation, Frank too 
appropriated the dependency predicate for a theory that, 
following Baran, traced the origins of underdevelopment to 
the early expansion of capitalism and posited that under
international capitalist relations development was out of 
the question for the Third World. Frank accepted the idea 
of imperialist domination, but he rejected outright previous 
neo-Marxist Latin American social and historical analysis 
based on the operation of so-called feudal relations of 
production.
What in this pot-pourri "legitimately" represents
dependency theory? A definition encompassing all the above 
criteria could be that dependency is a national condition of 
economic alienation engineered through diverse means by 
international capitalism either producing or perpetuating
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underdevelopment, or at the very least, making development, 
even capitalist development, an uphill barely possible 
struggle. If one denudes dependency of its 19th century 
and its Marxist/Leninist colonialist and imperialist 
overtones, then one crucial observation springs to mind, 
which is that economic development of the most sophisticated 
kind is possible even under conditions of extreme 
dependence, as in the case of Canada and less markedly of 
Brazil. From an "external" objective point of view, this 
would seem to put the neo-Marxist Cardoso/Faletto definition 
with its emphasis on endogenous processes and structures in 
the limelight, reinforced by much additional research on the 
possibilities of dependent development. However, in dealing 
with dependency theory one cannot simply go by semantical 
criteria, that is, one cannot escape its ideological 
context, and therefore, one is inevitably drawn back to the 
fact that dependency is a traditional Marxist designation 
for all backward countries, a condition barely less 
derogatory than that of colony. In other words, regardless 
of the abstract connotations of dependency, which would make 
the term applicable to nations accross the development/ 
underdevelopment divide, dependency theory must apply to 
underdeveloped lands. The examples of Canada and Brazil 
cannot serve to determine which analytical outlook rightly 
embodies dependency theory. It is from within the 
dependency camp as a whole that some guidance must be found.
Within dependency two basic versions can be discerned: 
the extreme version with these features: external economic 
determination of internal socio-economic processes; 
political independence nearly meaningless; usually in our 
times, one general form of dependence contingent upon one 
basic international imperialism (rather than the "four 
pillars" Leninist concept implying diverse rival 
imperialisms); inequality imposed; in sum, no development 
possible under capitalism; and the moderate version in 
which: the local ruling classes were and are as exploitative 
and as dominant as is economic imperialism in the other
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version; political independence creating social and 
political complications and ambiguities, not excluding class 
antagonisms and internal political maneuvering; different 
types of dependency; in sum, inequality built into a system 
of interacting national and international forces that allow 
some margin for capitalist economic development. (Table 5) 
The former version is global in scope and historically 
dilated; the latter is founded on the relatively limited 
model ideally but not necessarily embodied by some Latin 
American countries and their histories. If we assume the 
validity of the moderate version, then dependency tolerates 
a wide choice of ideological stances, which brings it into 
close proximity to "third-worldism" and could even be its 
most apposite expression. There are various obstacles to 
this assumption.
Some alleged "dependentistas", in particular, so far in 
our analysis, those in its radical Latin American wing, 
share on all points the fundamental criteria in the extreme 
version, albeit in a Latin American context, and they are 
reluctant to make a distinction between dependency and long- 
view economic imperialism. This has led some committed 
writers like P.J. O'Brien and A.G. Frank (and some detached 
critics like C. Abel and C. Lewis) to insist on "dependency" 
as a kind of Latin American school of thought on historical 
and contemporary capitalist imperialism or international 
capitalism, which for the committed are virtually
indistinguishable tags. This classification has gained
considerable acceptance. It is, however, subject to some
important strictures. If dependency is fundamentally a 
theory on capitalist underdevelopment, then its specifically 
Latin American affiliation or origin is not really crucial 
to its meaning or its import, unless besides it were 
postulated that Latin American underdevelopment constitutes 
a special category of its own, and this is not something 
that any of the previous writers would probably dare affirm, 
and even if they did, we would have to go back to the fact 
that dependency theorists themselves, even moderates like
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Cardoso and Faletto, do not claim any special traits for 
Latin American underdevelopment. Finally and probably 
conclusively, the adoption of the dependency category as 
synonymous with economic imperialism in all its historical 
and contemporary forms far beyond Latin America's geographic 
and ideological bounds means that, quite aside from the 
term's rigorously Marxist/Leninist lineage, it refers to a 
world-historical condition and it expresses a global 
analytical approach to under-development, its origins, and 
its history. What this connotes is that the specifically 
Latin American elaboration of dependency offered by Cardoso, 
Faletto, Sunkel, and others, is perhaps not universally 
valid but applicable in different specific socio-historical 
circumstances observed mostly in Latin America but not 
necessarily definable exclusively by the condition of 
underdevelopment, or at any rate, that it is simply less 
universally applicable than the other version of dependency. 
In other words, the only restrictive categorization of 
dependency is the one to which the concept and the general 
theory least applies, and it could justifiably lead, from a 
Marxist perspective, to an intellectual impasse. Of the 
analytical trends we posited initially, the Baran/Frank view 
and the Latin American radicals all seem to have a more 
valid claim on the idea of dependency than the moderate 
Latin American version. This seems even likelier from the 
leftist affiliation of Cardoso and Faletto, which has made 
their ideas especially vulnerable to Marxist economic 
imperialism criticism, and from G. Palma's painstaking but 
probably nugatory efforts, which we shall consider later on, 
to rescue the dependency designation from its simplistic 
over-use by revolutionary radicals. In the final analysis, 
dependency was and remains a radical anti-capitalist concept 
in its rightful context of neo-Marxist thinking on 
international relations, and the attempts to moderate its 
implications have not really been widely or consistently 
followed. The concept carries a momentum of its own which
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same category as the general long-term view of economic 
imperialism.
THE "PERIPHERY" CRACKS OPEN AN IDEOLOGICAL "CORE"
The perceptions and theories that both interpreted and 
affected the relations between, first, the West and the rest 
of the world’s cultures and, afterwards, the relations 
between the advanced and the backward countries were, as we 
have seen, unmistakably Eurocentric in nature. This applies 
to pre-19th century perceptions of cultural differences, to 
the over-arching concept of Eurocentrism, and to the early 
theory of economic imperialism. The cultures and nations 
that orbited around the West and around the developed core 
of the capitalist world system willingly often meekly 
adopted Eurocentric attitudes and ideas. This usually 
involved a process of internalization of Eurocentric 
attitudes which in the case of Latin American intellectuals 
was nearly spontaneous after a centuries-long connection 
with Spain and the rest of Western Europe and resulted 
sometimes in aberrations like intra-cultural racism; and in 
the case of even those colonies with their own strong 
cultural identity, like India, led to the adoption of 
Western attitudes conducive to modernization, as in the 
early 19th century Bengali educational movement founded by 
R.R.M. Roy or in the critical viewpoint of a historian like 
Sir J. Sankar.170 The Latin American historical process can 
be described as a perfectly natural if lagging effort to 
follow in the West’s footsteps, although one should not 
exaggerate on this point as the histories of Argentina and 
Uruguay are proof that at times it was possible to keep 
almost in step. The global diffusion of Marxism after its 
co-option of the theory of economic imperialism and 
especially after the triumph of Bolshevism in Russia, 
resulted in the assimilation by intellectuals in the less 
developed nations of yet new basically Western ideas which 
they adopted to their own ends and needs. Here again we 
should not, in the case of Latin America, make too sharp a 
separation from the West, for after all Argentine late-19th
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century socialism was begotten by European immigration, was 
fostered by that country's considerable economic progress, 
was in line with the mainstream doctrines of the Second 
International, and even in thinkers like J.B. Justo accepted 
the necessity of foreign capital for economic development. 
In general, however, the coming of Soviet communism fostered 
the acceptance of new instruments of analysis for the
interpretation of social reality in the backward lands. In 
the larger European Asian colonies Marxism prospered through 
an alliance with home-bred nationalism. In the pen of a 
Latin American intellectual like Mariategui it became a 
creative tool, but, as in the case of the symbiosis 
communism/nationalism, Mariategui arguably did not innovate 
and his importance lies in his extraordinary ability to give 
patterned shape to a reality that others had been either 
ignoring or seeing in bulk, as when, for instance, the 
misery of the Peruvian Indians and peasants was seen to be 
either of their own making or an offensive manifestation of 
callous social injustice. All in all, the West taught other 
cultures and nations how to see and how to discern, and 
these peoples did it well but did not do it originally.
There were few, if any, contributions from the periphery to 
the core.
This starts to change after WW2. The West itself 
changes. Through the pressures of decolonization and the 
strong global appeal of communism, aside of course from its 
own internal spontaneous reassessment of its world role, it 
steps down from its subjective Eurocentric eminence and it 
transforms the old category of culturally backward into the 
new enlightened one of economically underdeveloped with a 
new academic discipline to go with it. But whereas before 
the West monopolized the art of teaching and the contents of
the textbooks, the periphery now begins to make valid
contributions; it does not just assimilate, and this happens 
progressively in connection even with old Eurocentric 
concepts. Development economics, which could conceivably be 
interpreted as a cleaned-up, "decontroversialized" version
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of Eurocentrism in the tradition of the "bland face” 
presented by interpreters of the development of the West 
such as Weber and Schumpeter, was in truth a joint 
intellectual venture between the developed West and some of 
the more advanced countries in the developing world. Latin 
America had in practice "pre-tested” all its developmental 
postulates and, in the figure of R. Prebisch, had given them 
authoritative sanction as well as the benefit of its 
experience. India too had experienced some degree of ISI 
and had its own brood of development economists and ideas. 
If ISI was a set of trial-and-error policies imposed on 
Latin America by the force of world events (two world wars 
and one depression), which was later elevated by development 
economics to the rank of doctrine, heavy industrialization, 
the "logical” move after ISI, was given its justification by 
Mahalanobis on the basis of "externalities” plus the example 
of Soviet economic planning. In Western academic circles, 
economists of colonial extraction were actively contributing 
to development studies, as was the case of the Nobel- 
laureate West Caribbean-born Sir W.A. Lewis, one of the 
recognised pioneers of development economics, and of the 
more economically orthodox Burmese economist H. Myint.
The entrance of the Third World into the intellectual 
inner sanctum of Marxism was mostly barred when development 
economics was in its prime, in part at least because from 
being a sophisticated Western ideology it had been 
transformed into a Stalinist dogmatic fief where deviation 
or innovation was literally a crime. Outside of the USSR, 
there was a great deal of Marxist theorization and debate 
that was pertinent in one way or another to the Third World, 
but only in a distinctly Eurocentric, indirect fashion: it 
contained "implicit” applications, it "suggested” or 
"insinuated” approaches and angles of vision, the more 
apposite proposing an "unorthodox” and "formalistic” version 
of Marxism, which was ideally manifested in the Marxist 
conceptual transpositions in Baran, Frank and others. 
However, even the influential Baran model of underdeveloping
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world capitalism was ensconced amidst his élucubrations on 
the structure and the mechanics of advanced capitalism and 
his criticism of Soviet practices. The Third World finally 
managed to enter the field of Marxist theory through two 
crevices: the rise of third-worldism itself, in the flesh in 
Bandung and Belgrade, in theory in the works of such 
representative spokesmen as Nehru and Krumah, whose 
ideological "amorphousness" propitiated a rapprochement with 
Marxism; and the gradual and not always complete emergence 
of Latin American radical thinking from its Stalinist 
fealty.171 The breakthrough en masse came in the late 60s 
— the list of names and works can be drawn up from the pages 
of this dissertation— , and from then on Third World Marxism 
has flourished unabated even if, as we shall see, some of
the more relevant Marxist work on underdevelopment is still 
being done, inevitably perhaps, in academic institutions in 
the capitalist centre. The point is that a core, as has 
happened before in history, was cracked open and a tendency 
of thought was widened or modified. Global economic
integration, the "one world" that both imperialism and anti­
imperialism envisioned from different optics during the 19th 
century, finally corroded the ligaments of ideological 
"monopolies" and "cartels".
The reasons for the passionate almost violent
assumption by the Third World of Marxist ideology and 
Marxist instrumentalities are easy to identify: its own
material and intellectual progress even under colonialism 
had prepared it to theorize about itself with a certain
margin of freedom from strictly Western moulds; historical 
Western models about the Third World, such as economic 
imperialism, had been as much or more about the West than 
about the Third World and were in need of renovation; and 
the spread of political independence and the development of 
political forces in the Third World had readied the terrain 
for the transplantation and the flourishing of ideologies. 
These reasons, be it said en passant, were as valid for 
developmentalism as for Marxist theory. In the case of
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Latin America, that singular heteroclite world, the question 
should perhaps be why it had not pursued with more vigour 
its own individuation, or why it had taken it so long to 
come to its own summations, why, for instance, it had not 
seen fit, in inventing development-alism avant la lettre to 
package it for the world at large. Perhaps again it was the 
pride and the leaden hand of internalized Eurocentrism. 
When all is taken into account, these theories grew rank in 
the Third World not so much because they concerned the Third 
World, which they in fact most directly did, but because 
whether on the right or on the left they were basically 
political, and since the world had evolved into two battling 
ideological camps, there were interests and tendencies in 
the Third World ready to adopt them and work on them and 
with them enthusiastically. It remains to be seen how far 
Third World theorization really strayed from its Western 
models and the other ideological constraints from which it 
was trying to escape.
S. AMIN’S "TELESCOPE" AND A. EMMANUEL’S "MICROSCOPE"
Even as we take leave of Latin America, it will only 
seem like a fictive parting because by the start of the 70s 
world Marxism theorization, again leaving the USSR to one 
side, was virtually if far from homogenously interlinked 
through a thick bundle of conceptual capillaries not unlike 
the cabling in a telephone exchange. The not negligible 
difficulties here are, as any linesman will explain, finding 
which wire goes into which socket. The groupings we are 
going to arrange will be based on the recurrence and 
affinities of basic ideas and arguments, on geographical 
location (confessedly today the flimsiest of criteria), and 
even on names and titles in bibliographies. These criteria, 
however, are not self-contained and it will be necessary 
from the start to do some hopping about between and amongst 
them.
There is perhaps no better illustration of the inter­
connectedness of Marxist currents than the ideological and 
analytical links between Frank, S. Amin, and the Tunisian
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economlst A, Emmanuel (the last two writing in French), 
through the mediation of a broad idea of dependency and a 
shared foundation of Marxist/Leninist convictions. Frank’s 
shift from emphasizing dependency to concentrating on world 
accumulation, which signified transcending Latin America in 
order to gauge the advantages that the centres of capitalism 
derived from dependent economies— theoretically then a 
reorientation of research within the same system— was 
logical and necessary. Even though Amin’s studies of 
capitalist accumulation anteceded Frank’s, and were 
published fully eight years before these, they seem on the 
whole less crucial as a continuation of the analyses in his 
1955 doctoral dissertation. Amin can be considered a 
pioneer in the Third World invasion of Western ideological 
fiefdoms, but his further contributions, despite their 
volume and the acclaim from various Marxist quarters 
(including Mandel and Frank but not noticeably Wallerstein), 
were something of an anti-climax. They are contained in two 
works, both published in English by Monthly Review Press in 
1973: Accumulation on a World Scale (originally in French 
from 1970) and Unequal Development (ibid 1973).
In his dissertation, Amin had explained how capitalism 
during the 19th and 20th centuries prevented the development 
of societies with "non-capitalist structures". Aside from 
referring to the social, economic, and psychological 
features of the latter, he did not explain how the original 
differences in development came about, and he did not in any 
way connect the birth and evolution of Western capitalism 
with the economic retardation of the rest of the world. In 
the first of his two subsequent works, there was little 
change from this fundamental historical perception, but he 
did shed the notion of "psychological structure"— which, in 
fairness, he had not unduly underscored in his dissertation 
— and he incorporated some new ideas into his intellectual 
baggage. There were also some changes of emphasis and of 
priorities. While before he had not perceived development 
economics per se— perhaps because the policies it envisioned
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coincided with his own, and he repudiated the essential 
possibilist persuasions of developmentalism— he now 
recognised it and consigned it to a sub-heading of 
"marginalism", which was in line with his new radicalism. 
The latter consisted in, among other things, the importance 
he attributed to the transfer of surplus from the periphery 
to the centre of the capitalist system and in his adoption 
of the formula of the development of underdevelopment. But 
these accretions did not mean exactly the same thing as in 
Frank although they were part of a similar (though in Amin 
less boisterous) ideological and political rhetoric. The 
transfer of surplus was indeed related to accumulation in 
the centre, and it was intrinsic to the mechanics of the 
world capitalist system, but it did not have the cruciality 
and indispensability with which it had been endowed by 
Frank. And the development of underdevelopment referred to 
a process that had started with the Industrial Revolution 
but did not go back earlier than the 19th century. It was 
more accurately the obstruction of development or, as he 
himself wrote, the "blocking of transition" from "pre­
capitalist formations"— the phrase he now used in lieu of 
"non-capitalist structures" or of mode of production— to 
"autocentric" development.
On the specific issues of accumulation— on which Frank 
had at least clear definitional perspectives— , he 
introduced some rather dubiously Marxist explanations. He 
identified "accumulation" with "expanded reproduction", but 
he described the exploitation of underdeveloped countries 
through surplus transfer as "primitive accumulation" in the 
sense of emanating from pre-capitalist formations, and this 
had the effect of demoting the importance of the periphery 
to the dynamics of the centre. (Frank also used this 
connotation, undoubtedly in Amin's wake, but he did not give 
it more than secondary value.) Even though Amin
acknowledged that capitalism in our days introduced high- 
technology industrialization into the exporting sectors of 
underdeveloped economies with a view to its lower labour
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costs, he put the brunt of surplus transfer on unequal 
exchange, but he discarded the Prebisch thesis, which he had 
used in the dissertation, in favour of Emmanuel's less 
empirical, Marxist, and class-oriented analysis. He 
elaborated further the sketcy outline he had suggested in 
his early thesis on the evolution of capitalism from a 
robust competitive youthful phase in which the export of 
goods to the periphery was the norm, to the monopolistic 
phase where the export of capital to stave off the tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall took a place of equal 
importance next to unequal trade in goods. Finally, in 
considering the "forces that adjust the periphery to the 
needs of accumulation in the centre", he delved deeper into 
the question of capitalist economic cycles, or the 
"conjuncture", in his own terminology, and how they affected 
the Third World, and once again he arrived at a conclusion 
that was at the furthest possible remove from Frank's 
original hypotheses: that it was not the depression but the 
prosperity phase that permitted "secondary growth" in under­
developed economies, although in general he adhered to his 
fundamental and very likely thesis that since underdevelop­
ment was not "dynamic" the cycle curve in the periphery was 
more attenuated than in the c e n t r e .
Amin had still not explained how it was that the West 
had forged ahead of the other cultures of the world— a 
problem to which Baran and Frank had responded by 
stipulating that spontaneous development had been stifled by 
world-historical capitalism— , so in Unequal Development he 
devised a quaint theory which described non-Western cultures 
as "tribute-paying formations" characterized by a 
concordance or compatibility between non-despotic social 
organizations and productive forces. In Europe, on the 
contrary, feudalism, despite or because of its violent 
history, had not achieved such harmony and thus had let 
loose economic forces leading to capitalism. In this work, 
Amin managed the astounding feat of sounding more radical 
than ever yet at the same time making the economic
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contribution of the periphery to the centre qualitatively 
marginal. He reaffirmed the "autocentric" development of 
the West, which contradicted the long-view dependency 
outlook— although he did retain the term dependence to 
describe the post-WW2 relations between centre and 
periphery— , and more importantly he virtually negated that 
the periphery was indispensable or vital to capitalism in 
its evolution from competition to monopoly to its present 
"technological" phase. For example, he said the following 
of the monopoly phase of capitalism: "This model reflects
the essence of the system. It leaves out of account 
external relations, which means not that the development of 
capitalism takes place in a self-contained national 
framework but that the essential relations of the system can 
be grasped without taking account of these relations. 
Moreover, the external relations of advanced regions, taken 
as a whole, with the periphery of the world system are 
quantitatively marginal in comparison with the flows that 
take place within the centre; besides, as we shall see, 
these relations are a matter of primitive accumulation and 
not of expanded reproduction." What was more, monopoly 
capitalism could actually mitigate "conjunctural 
fluctuations" and could produce "a stable state of quasi­
full employment", and the role of underdeveloped countries 
in the scheme, in the case of the cycle, was to facilitate 
"the moment of recovery by providing additional outlets for 
the exports of the developed countries". He still clung to 
the idea that the periphery had been used historically by 
the capitalist centre for the absorption of surplus in its 
competitive phase and to prevent the fall of the rate of 
profit in its monopoly phase, yet if capitalism was 
"autocentric" and if it guaranteed full employment through 
monopolistic "planning" to which the periphery was 
unessential, how and why did imperialism arise? The 
astounding answer he gave, on the authority of Lenin, was: 
"The essential reason for the extension of world trade thus 
lies in the inherent tendency of capitalism to expand 
markets, and does not arise from any need for absorption of
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surplus, either in the period of competition or in that of 
the monopolies," In other words, it appeared because Lenin 
said that it was natural for capitalism to create
imperialism.
The final image that one derives from a study of Amin's
theories is that of a system in which the periphery is of
marginal importance to the centre but the centre is
handicapping for the periphery, and although Amin does not
explain why the centre's influence can be so negative and so
overwhelming, he comes up with a class-struggle paradigm in
which the bourgeoisie at the centre is exploiting the
proletariat all over the world and the only valid theory is
one of national liberation with a programme of economic
development based on delinking from the world market,
balanced growth, and planning. Ironically, therefore, his
view of the operation of the world capitalist system, in the
light of his attribution of a marginal role to the
periphery, is unmistakably tainted with the marginalism he
so profoundly despises. Unfortunately, too, Amin's
generalizations about Third World societies— which are
crucial at every step in his analysis, and which were
encapsulated in a 1979 essay by J. Gurley enumerating its
main traits as 1) agrarian capitalism, 2) merchant
bourgeoisie, 3) large burocracies, and 4) incomplete
proletarianization— were only marginally viable, and
probably as distorting as Frank's Latin American point of
view, which Amin had earlier criticized along with the
dependency outlook he later himself adopted in form if not 
1 73in substance. Was Amin, when all is said and done, a
dependency author? Or should he be put in a special 
category with Frank and Wallerstein as O'Brien suggests? He 
himself would probably not have turned down the dependency 
appellation, and he undoubtedly deserved it, because,
although one basic side of the dependency equation— the 
cruciality of the peripheral contribution to the development 
of capitalism in the centre— is downgraded in his work, what 
remains— the obstruction of development in the Third World
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and the radical political stance— sufficiently justified his 
immersion in the broad meanderings of the dependency flow.
If Amin had used a medium“range "telescope" on
accumulation, A, Emmanuel employed a high-resolution
"microscope" under which he put the microbic slide of
unequal exchange, which was originally known as the
hypothesis on the uneven terms of trade between the centre 
and the periphery of the capitalist system. Amin had relied 
on the Prebisch/Singer thesis in his doctoral dissertation. 
He had accorded it a recognition tinged with reluctance 
because of its developmentalist affiliation and because of 
its merely empirical, as opposed to ideological, foundation. 
Emmanuel compensated for these shortcomings by transforming 
the Prebisch/Singer hypothesis into a Marxist theory on 
international surplus transfer and on the letter's effects 
on the classical or orthodox Marxist definition of the class 
struggle. He did not entirely forsake the empirical basis 
of the developmentalist thesis, but he took it as given and 
irrefutable— which was certainly not the case— and he made 
empirical debate irrelevant, at least in the Marxist camp. 
In other words, he was not interested, as Singer was, in 
proving statistically that prices of primary products tended 
to decline while those of manufactured goods tended to 
increase— and he snubbed the Prebisch/Singer effect by 
putting it literally "on the fringe" of his own central 
position— , but in creating a tool of analysis with which 
the Third World could argue conclusively and sub specie 
aeternitatis, so to speak, that "unequal exchange" between 
rich and poor countries was inevitable, pre“ordained by the 
manner in which these separate entities functioned and 
established their trade relations, more or less analogously 
to the relations between capitalists and workers.
In order to do this, he needed two hypotheses: 1) free 
movement of capitals, and 2) responsiveness of wages to 
productivity in the developed countries and their 
unresponsiveness in the Third World ("fixed wages" 
hypothesis), or as he put it: "Instead of equal wages and
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unequal rates of profit, I adopted the assumption of unequal 
wages and of profits subject to standardization and tending 
to equalization." Why the latter hypothesis? Because 
Emmanuel needed to prove that what were being exchanged in 
the international market place were equal values, and for 
this it was necessary to show that the organic composition 
of capital in the Third World (mechanisation, automation, 
call it what you will) was on a par with that of 
industrialized countries at least. Besides it allowed him 
to put down the Prebisch thesis as dependent on "income 
elasticity of demand and non-uniformity of technical 
progress", which were unreliable contingencies from the 
point of view of Marxist analysis based on the "value of 
labour power". Having done this, the burden of Emmanuel's 
demonstration fell on the second assumption (fixed wages). 
This had to do with the better bargaining position of 
workers in developed economies and in effect it meant that 
these workers were profiting from the labour of their 
proletarian brothers in the Third World. As there cannot 
exist an absolutist Marxist doctrine which does not evoke 
another absolutist Marxist doctrine, C. Bettelheim took up 
arms for the former (and, incidentally, for the intelligence 
of exploiters) and wrote in rebuttal: "The capitalists, who 
cannot be accused of not knowing how to do their sums, are 
not deceived: they know that, generally speaking, it is more 
profitable to exploit the proletarians of the industrialized 
countries than their brothers in the poor countries." It 
was not made clear by Bettelheim, who subscribed to a 
straightforward view of imperialism, why, if the rate of 
exploitation in industrialized economies was higher than in 
underdeveloped ones, capitalism did not industrialize the 
Third World and thus try to maximise its extraction of 
surplus, but such logical considerations would not doubt 
have been out of place in what amounted to a very 
specialised debate circling about a core of self­
contradictory Marxist s e m a n t i c s . ^74
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W. RODNEY AND THE THROTTLING OF AFRICAN NATIONHOOD
If the affiliation of Amin and Emmanuel to dependency 
theory can be considered marginal, with W. Rodney we go back 
to the mainstream of dependency and the roots of economic 
inequality. Rodney was a historian's historian. From all 
evidence he was a generous self-sacrificing man, a Guyanese 
black writer who spent much of his short life teaching in 
Dar-es-Salaam, in a corner of the African continent that he 
loved passionately, and who was killed at 38 years of age in 
his own country by minions of a pseudo-revolutionary regime 
which he opposed. He left a sadly brief but admirable 
oeuvre including the posthumous A History of the Guyanese 
Working People. 1881-1905 (1982), an international paradigm 
for works in that genre, faultless in research, equanimity, 
and style. He also tried to prove in How Europe 
Underdeveloped Africa (1972), one of the fundamental 
corollaries of the long-view economic imperialism 
hypothesis: that the economically backward cultures and
peoples of the world could have evolved to modern nationhood 
by their own means without the crippling trauma of 
colonialism. Rodney did not, despite the title of his book, 
principally claim that they would all have industrialized in 
strict accordance with Western patterns or acquired the 
dimensions of European economies, although he did not rule 
this out either, but only that European colonialism scotched 
their chances for an independent political evolution. To do 
this he had to demonstrate two things: that the potential 
for evolving was there, specifically in Africa, and how it 
was that Europeans went about extirpating it.
Concerning the pre-colonial ages of African history, he 
made the following assertion: "The assumption that will
underlie this study is that most African societies before 
1500 were in a transitional stage between the practice of 
agriculture (plus fishing and herding) in family communities 
and the practice of the same activities within states and 
societies comparable to feudalism." To prove this he 
described the historical features of African societies from
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the "coming of iron, the rise of cereal-growing and the 
making of pottery" In the first centuries of our era to the 
production of crafted leather by the Hausa and the Mandlnga, 
of Guinea cotton, of Katangan and Zambian copper, of Sierra 
Leone Iron, and of many other manufactures, and from ab 
origine communallsm to social stratification and the birth 
of kingdoms and royal lineages, best represented perhaps by 
the Tlgrean and Amharlc ruling class In the Ethiopian Empire 
but also present In the empires of Ghana and of Mall, the
states of Bunyoro-Kltara In the Interlacustrlne zone, the
culture of Zimbabwe, and other formations, not to mention 
Moslem Egypt and the Mahgreb. Europe's mastery of 
navigation and Its relative economic and political advance 
on Africa made this self-sufficient and gold-poor continent 
a part of the Incipient world system during the 16th century 
by Incorporating It Into a classic triangular trade pattern 
Involving the purchase of cotton goods In India to be 
exchanged for African slaves who were then used In the mines 
of Spanish America to produce silver to finance the cycle 
all over again. Here Rodney adopts the summarlst rhetoric 
of antl-lmperlallsm to affirm that "Europe allocated to 
Africa the role of supplier of human captives to be used as 
slaves In various parts of the world". However, he was
obviously not unaware that Africans themselves were the
actual purveyors of slaves to European traffickers, and he 
countered by citing Instances In which African states either 
preferred "normal" commercial relations with Europe as In 
Kongo at the beginning of the 16th century or were forced 
Into slave trafficking as In Dahomey In the 1720s. Slaves, 
he claimed, were often taken by war-llke expanding societies 
who would use them as an Internal labour force and 
eventually Integrated them Into themselves. These societies 
entered Into the slave-trading circuit under the external 
pressures of the growing and hungry world capitalist system. 
The profits from the slave trade fuelled the growth of ports 
like Bristol, Liverpool, Nantes, Bordeaux, and Seville, 
which later emerged as manufacturing centres significantly 
Influential In the advent of the Industrial Revolution.
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Another claim that Rodney made was that racism was in a 
critical sense a "superstructural" product of the capitalist 
mode of production's absorption of Africa through the slave 
trade. But he was much too sensible to put it all down to 
Marxist jargon: "The simple fact is that no people can
enslave another for centuries without coming out with a 
notion of superiority and when the colour and other physical 
traits of those peoples were quite different it was 
inevitable that the prejudices should take a racist 
form."175
Despite the impact of capitalism and the degradation 
caused by the slave trade, Africa's internal evolution did 
not come to a stop when relations with the West started. 
Rodney's programme is above all a relentless refutation of 
the old Hegelian thesis that non-Western cultures have no 
history. He wrote: "The regions of Yorubaland, Dahomey, the 
inter-lacustrine kingdoms and Zululand...are examples of 
leading forces in the political development which was taking 
place in Africa right up to the eve of colonialism." But 
the undeniable trend of inter-cultural relations showed that 
the "slight difference (in development) when the Portuguese 
sailed to West Africa in 1444 was a huge gap by the time 
that European robber statesmen sat down in Berlin 440 years 
later to decide who should steal which parts of Africa. It 
was that gap which provided both the necessity and the 
opportunity for Europe to move into the imperialist epoch, 
and to colonise and further underdevelop Africa." In doing 
this Rodney threw Marxism/Leninism to the winds and espoused 
a thesis not unlike the Landes theory on historical 
imbalances, which may seem odd in such a punctilious Marxist 
as he was unless one understands that above all his 
interpretation of African history is both African and 
commonsensical, and this is, we think, what gives it a 
special place in the ideological congress of dependency and 
economic imperialism. The discordant note throughout his 
book is that he keeps falling back on such "reifications" as 
"capitalism assigned" or "imperialism decided", which brings
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to mind the Cardoso/Faletto description of external forces 
and constraints as a "metaphysical" relation, although it 
could be argued that in the case of Africa the margin for 
external decision-making was much greater than in the case 
of Latin America and in that sense at least some of Rodney’s 
metaphors are not entirely inaccurate.
For the imperialist phase of African history, Rodney 
elaborated a ledger with an entry for "Africa's contribution 
to the capitalist development of Europe" and another for 
"Colonialism as a System of Underdeveloping Africa". The 
first entry is a "standard" catalogue, in the 
Galeano/Jalee/Nkrumah sense, of economic penetration,
expropiation and exploitation of African economies by 
Western capitalism under the aegis of colonial rule. It 
proves, if proof were needed, that colonialism was 
profitable and in many more ways than macro-statistics about 
investment and trade can show, because the fact of the 
matter was, and Dr Rodney made it perfectly clear, that 
colonialism was not just a matter of having and 
administering colonies but a two-way system with
consequences for the colonialized (mostly bad) and for the 
métropoles in themselves and as present in Africa (mostly 
"good"), and Rodney made no bones about the fact that, yes, 
definitely, European workers and European middle-classes
benefited, and benefited royally as groups, wittingly or 
unwittingly, from the sweat and the suffering of the African 
people. The second entry pretends that, on top of economic 
exploitation, which was at the base of everything else, 
colonialism did almost nothing to attend to Africa's socio­
economic and educational needs, and that it did nothing 
constructive towards the creation of independent states but, 
on the contrary, drew arbitrary boundaries, divided to rule 
within them, and exacerbated the ethnic rivalries which
would have been subsumed under an internal process of 
autogenetic integration, the same rivalries which are now 
used as examples of Africa's lingering backwardness. "So 
long as there is political power", he cried, "so long as a
- 322 -
people can be mobilized to use weapons, and so long as a 
society has the opportunity to define its own ideology, 
culture, etc., then the people of that society have some 
control over their own destinies, in spite of constraints 
such as those imposed as the African continent slipped into 
orbit as a satellite of capitalist E u r o p e . Rodney's 
catalogue of grievances is a summa contra gentiles that far 
transcends the works of Fanon, Cabral, and Memmi, to whom he 
of course gave all due credit, as he also did to European 
Africanists such as B. Davidson, H. Labourit, and B.M. 
Fagan. Rodney's overview loads the dice, for after all it 
was a loving work of redress, and much of his reasoning is 
contraf actual, but the case he made deserves more 
recognition than a mere benefit of the doubt.
A.K. BAGCHI AND THE DENIAL OF PERIPHERY FROM A HISTORICAL 
DEPENDENCY PERSPECTIVE
One theorist who belonged broadly in the Marxist 
economic-imperialism tradition, but who, unlike Amin, 
roundly rejected the dependency tag, was the Bengali A.K. 
Bagchi. No Indian could ever think of his country despite 
its long colonial experience as a puppet or a sham. India 
is too big, too varied, and too complex for that. It is 
also miserably poor even in its giant capitalist Bombay 
heart, not to mention Calcutta, where A.K. Bagchi lives and 
works. Bagchi however is too shrewd, like his Moslem 
compatriot I. Habib, to believe that on its own India would 
have grown to rival Great Britain. "For understanding the 
development of Third World countries", he wrote in The 
Political Economy of Underdevelopment (1982)— a title which 
seems to echo Baran's main work on capitalism— , "the 
delineation of non-capitalist modes of production and social 
formations is essential. For, at the time European merchant 
adventurers 'discovered' the Third World countries, the 
latter generally had not become capitalist and were not on 
the path of transition to capitalism". Even if they had 
been, however, once capitalism had come into contact with 
"lagging societies", these could no longer have been able to
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follow their own autonomous paths because relations were 
created that favoured mercantile capitalism, promoted 
international exploitation, and begat "modes of extraction" 
of surplus from peasants and artisans that survived beyond 
the maturity of industrial capitalism in the West: "Even
when native capitalists succeeded Europeans in Third World 
countries, many of these methods of extraction of surplus 
from peasantry and semi-free labour were kept alive, at the 
same time as capacity was being built up in modern 
mechanised industries. Thus there is no neat succession of 
stages of mercantile and industrial capitalism in Third 
World countries." In the colonies these imbalances and 
distortions were part of imposed methods of external 
oppression, and in countries like those of Latin America, 
they were the outcome of enforced free trade policies. In 
both groups, "much of the investible surplus was transferred 
overseas, so there was a shortage of funds available to 
entrepreneurs who might venture into the field of 
manufacturing catering to the home market." Bagchi 
subscribes fully to the thesis of the deindustrialization of 
the Third World in the sense both of the destruction of 
handicrafts and of the prevention of industrialization 
through, among other means, the creation of railway-and-port 
enclaves which propitiated onerous competition from external 
capitalism. Industrial capitalism "is not a system that can 
be simply diffused through countries like, say, literacy", 
and capitalism in general is "a deeply unequal system of 
domination of one class by another, of one nation by the 
ruling class of another". Historical underdevelopment is 
the result of the unfair advantage that capitalism, which 
emerged decisively in Europe from the entrails of feudalism, 
took of less advanced cultures and economic formations and 
of some of the implants that it carried to foreign soils. 
Once the system was in place, the Industrial Revolution and 
the blockage of development beyond its strictly Western 
confines through continued exploitation and the perpetuation 
of non-capitalist modes of production, were its logical 
complementary offshoots. So far this sounds like the usual
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dependency fare, but the give-away to Bagchi's difference is 
the significant fact that he never once uses the bipolarity 
core/periphery in his analysis. He skirts this possibility 
in his summary presentation of the failure of ISI in Latin
America, but even here he insists on relying on the more
comprehensive notion of capitalist forces at work both
nationally and internationally.1^7
Bagchi's text continually does a tight-rope act between 
the pull of economic imperialism and the tug of internal
social contradictions. It finally lands squarely in 
the national arena of competing forces for and against
development when he shifts his attention to rural and urban 
class analysis, and it is here that one realises that, after 
all is said and done, when the colonial night eventually 
receded, what was left operating was not so much neo­
colonialism or neo-Marxist/Leninist imperialism as a reality 
corresponding to pure undiluted social Marxism and its up­
datings on class analysis by Lenin and by Mao Tse-tung. "At 
the top of the capitalist pyramid in trade, industry and
finance is native big bourgeoisie", Bagchi said but without 
putting all his eggs in one basket, because "in many fields 
foreign capital still rules the roost". The experience of 
India, where effective economic decolonization started 
during the inter-war years as shown by native efforts at ISI 
as a result of Britain's declining economic strength, seemed 
to underlie this perception. Bagchi did not at any time
abandon the idea of economic imperialism (an expression he
himself never used for he is a tried-and-true neo-Leninist), 
but the unmistakable change of emphasis is there nonetheles: 
local bourgeoisies fight to drive out foreign capital, even 
to monopolise production; transnationals encroach and 
manoeuvre but they do not succeed automatically as they do 
in most dependency texts. Bagchi admitted readily that
after independence India effectively if incompetently in a 
succession of five-year plans took over the running of its 
economy, not to be sure for the benefit of its people but of 
the capitalist system, for, as in Pakistan Mahbub ul Haq
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told President Ayub Khan, planning is not for reducing 
inequality but for maximizing the surplus and the rate of 
growth. For Bagchi, capitalist development, even with the 
iron fist of the state behind it, is a vain hope, for even 
in its realization it will only mean more inequality and 
more injustice. In the Third World, as anywhere under 
capitalism, what counts is how society is structured and how 
social struggles eventually decide the route that economic 
development will take. For him the development dilemma of 
most Marxist dependency authors does not exist. A.K. 
Bagchi, from a "periphery" that is a virtual denial of the 
idea of periphery, proclaims that the world process of 
capitalism is a constant reproduction of itself until it 
becomes in effect one system with artificial frontiers. The 
entire underdeveloped capitalist world today is moving, 
though not smoothly to be sure, towards the pristine Marxist 
model after having purged itself, as India did, of the 
relatively short-lived colonialist interlude. Other Indian 
Marxists, such as K. Ray, the editor of the Bombay-based 
Political and Economic Review, would probably nod knowingly
and patiently.178
WESTERN SYNTHESES ON ECONOMIC-IMPERIALISM THEORIES
One of the West's main contributions in the field of 
economic-imperialism studies during the late 70s and early 
80s lay in summarizing, inter-relating, and criticizing what 
had been achieved historically until then in the realm of 
theory. G. Kitching (1982) and P.W. Preston (1982) essayed 
from different perspectives to find common grounds for 
discussing the relative positions of developmentalism and 
Marxism on Third World structures and processes. Preston 
opted for a hotch-potch "theories of development" approach 
yielding some rather contestable Procrustean
classifications. Kitching contributed to the "dependency 
debate" by positing links between development theory and 
dependency, but he is principally interesting for a curious 
if uncertain light he threw on a rapprochement between 
Russian populism (narodnism), economic development, and
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dependency. The common denominator here seemed to be the 
Russians’ dread of losing their national soul through 
cultural dependence and the modern dependent1stas quasi­
mystic abhorrence of economic dependence. Russian populists 
were driven to oppose industrialization preferring instead 
"a society and economy in which small-scale agricultural 
producers (peasants) and non-agricultural producers 
(artisans) remain in a large majority". The neo-populist 
Chayanov had some influence in Soviet Russia, thanks to 
Bukharin’s eminent standing in the 20s, but Stalin put paid 
to all agrarian pipedreams through forced collectivization. 
Kitching perceived in our times sparks of populism in Latin 
America and in Nyerere’s Ujamaa, a kind of Tanzanian rural 
"extended family" socialism, but especially in the "small is 
beautiful" philosophy of E.F. Schumacher and M. Lipton. 
That Latin Americans would make mincemeat out of this was 
understandable to Kitching for whereas Russian populists in 
their time had something to fall back on within their own 
culture, Latin Americans had nothing to look for outside of
industrialization.179
More ambitious efforts to categorize the teeming 
branches of economic imperialism theory were embarked on by 
R. Owens and B. Sutcliffe in tandem editorship (1972), M.B. 
Brown (1974), and A. Brewer (1980). Owens and Sutcliffe 
put together a wide-net anthology of analyses, to which T. 
Kemp (himself author of the 1967 neo-Leninist book Theories 
of Imperialism). Brown, H.-U. Wehler (the recognized expert 
on German social imperialism), R. Robinson, Magdoff, P. 
Patnaik, A.S. Kanya-Foster, T. Hodgkins, R.W. Johnson, J. 
Stengers, and D.C.M. Platt contributed in a not unfair 
balancing act, and they appended an exhaustive (for the 
period) commentated bibliography on theories of imperialism 
divided into these categories: Marxist (in turn subdivided 
into three time sequences: up to 1914, 1914-1945, after
1945), non-Marxist economic theories, and non-Marxist 
political theories. Pertinent to our own survey, the only 
dependentista they mentioned in the bibliography was R.M.
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Marlni, M.B. Brown started his deep commitment in the field 
with a work from 1963 in which he defended a historical
continuity between the British Empire and the Commonwealth 
of Nations as an informal structure conducive to 
international equality within the wider context of the world 
capitalist system, but by 1974 his interest had centred on 
Third World policy statements and on an analytical non-
Marxist approach to the concept of imperialism, which he 
used in the wide sense which we attribute to long-view
economic imperialism or dependency: "The concept has thus
been associated with an unequal economic relationship
between states, not simply the inequality between large and 
small, rich and poor trading partners, but the inequality of 
political and economic dependence of the latter upon the 
former." Brown's system of categories relied on three 
heterogenous paradigms: Marxism, Schumpeterean liberalism,
and what he described as neo-mercantilist Keynesianism, 
which roughly corresponded, the first two, to "disharmonie" 
and "harmonic" perceptions of capitalist development, and 
the third, to an eclecticism rejecting "both the inevitable 
conflicts of the Marxists' capitalism and the harmony of the 
unregulated classical liberal capitalism".
From a highly critical stance. Brewer too did a 
creditable review of economic imperialism theory reposing on 
the original Marxist concepts which had served as the 
ossature of all later constructs: capitalist mode of
production, primitive accumulation, world market, and anti­
colonialism. But Brewer knew that Marx had not formulated 
strictu sensu a theory of economic imperialism of his own 
(such as the Marxist-derived theories of Luxemburg, 
Hilferding, Bukharin, and Lenin, all of which Brewer 
analyzed), and he made clear the transpositional use that 
Baran and Frank made of the idea of "primitive 
accumulation". It could be valid, he said, but it is not in 
Marx. Brewer made a pellucid, no-nonsense division in 
Marxism: "Marxist theories of the development of capitalism 
on a world scale tend to fall into two groups. There are
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those that concentrate on the progressive role of capitalism 
in developing the forces of production, and conversely those 
that present capitalism as a system of exploitation of one 
area by another, so that development in a few places is at 
the expense of the * development of underdevelopment' in most 
of the world". The former view was that held by "classical 
Marxists", "from Marx himself to Lenin and his 
contemporaries"; the latter was the Frank/Wallerstein 
"response to the failure of capitalist development in many 
parts of the w o r l d . I n  proposing this stark distinction 
Brewer pointed out the "progress dilemma" which besets much 
Marxist thinking on issues of economic backwardness. What 
was "progress" for Marx? Certainly not the "progress" of 
development studies, so that when Marxists denounce 
capitalism for denying the Third World its right to
"economic progress" they are in a sense admitting what Marx 
himself would not have stomached in his time: that
capitalism could actually create welfare and promote social 
justice. Lenin went even further in his rejection because 
he was not even amongst those who considered capitalism
"progressive", "progress" and "progressive" being of course 
different ideas since the latter term could signify, as it 
did in Marx, a step forward or the promotion of a step 
forward though not necessarily a satisfactory step in
itself.
In a merciless but blatantly unfair 1977 criticism of 
dependency, the American Marxist theoretician R. Brenner
cornered Frank's theory into the conclusion that, in
emphasizing the unjust relations of exchange between
developed and underdeveloped countries, it was in the event 
a defence of ECLA developmentalism and of third-worldism in 
general. This was carrying dependency-bashing to
unreasonable extremes, since Frank denied developmentalism 
outright and was always rigorous in advocating radical
change directly from underdevelopment to socialism by way of 
anti-imperialism, a strategy which had impeccable Leninist 
credentials. "Orthodox" or, in Brewer's terms, "classical".
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Marxists sidestepped this conundrum by arguing that 
capitalist development was inherent in the dialectics of 
class struggle and of socio-economic change, to which 
international capitalism would contribute in one way or 
another, but that the change did not portend a basic 
improvement in social conditions or in the intensity of 
economic exploitation. This argument, however, did not 
obviate the fact that contemporary capitalism cannot be 
compared to the monstrous system that marx had taken apart 
and denounced. These Marxists were banking on the very 
long-run exacerbation of the world-wide incompatibility 
between capitalist relations and capitalist forces of 
productions, but in the meantime they could not deny that 
capitalism was not exhausted, even as it tolerated the 
subsistence of underdevelopment, and thus they had to 
swallow in their MOP and class-struggle pot pourri traces 
and even floating chunks of dependency diatribe. The 
interplay of these dilemmas was of the essence in the 
dependency debate that, during the 70s, was going on 
exclusively in the Marxist camp, but before we get there we 
have to round out our consideration of dependency theory 
with perhaps its most finished manifestation in the work of 
I. Wallerstein, and we have to expound the contents of what, 
in our opinion, is the main if tardier event in the 
dependency debate: the confrontation between dependency and
developmentalism.182
F. BRAUDEL AND I. WALLERSTEIN: THE CONTENTIOUS TWINS
On entering the numerous productions of I. Wallerstein, 
two clarifications on sources and reciprocal influences are 
in order: in connection to A.G. Frank (and through him to 
dependency) and in connection to F. Braudel. Why Frank and 
dependency who seem quite the opposite of Wallerstein's 
patient piece-by-piece "deconstruction" of the economic and 
political historical cycles of Western Europe? Wallerstein 
included Frank in the bibliography of his fundamental 1974 
The Modern World-System, and he seems to share with him the 
idea that, despite marginal differences in the way relations
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of production were organized in the different parts of the 
world coming under European hegemony or control after 1450, 
the general picture was that of a fully functional 
capitalist world-economy. They also coincide, therefore, 
and with some precedence on Frank's side, on the use of the 
core/periphery archetype. However, for Latin America 
Wallerstein relied on Furtado and other Latin American 
writers more often than he did on Frank and of course 
core/periphery derives not from Frank, who is sparing in his 
use of these concepts— perhaps out of the intention to set 
himself deliberately apart from anything smacking of ECLA 
and developmentalism— , but from Prebisch. Perhaps the 
focal point of convergence between Wallerstein and Frank 
lies in the strict equivalence between the verbs "under­
develop" (which is Frank's neologism) and "peripheralize" 
(which is Wallerstein's), but in all justice to say that 
Frank influenced Wallerstein significantly is like claiming 
that an engine can run on water. Whatever else he may not 
be, Wallerstein is literally a historian.
This is not so in the case of Wallerstein and Braudel, 
for here we actually have substantial intellectual 
reciprocity and meaningful formal concordances. Despite the 
misapprehension of some intelligent readers, like Bagchi, 
for example, who seem to think that it was Wallerstein who 
primarily influenced Braudel— perhaps from the fact that 
Wallerstein published his first major historical work in 
1974 and Braudel the crucial last two tomes of his trilogy 
on capitalism in 1979— , Wallerstein is justifiably the more 
recognizant to the other of the two. Apart from using him 
as a basic source in his historical and economic analyses, 
Wallerstein freely admits that it was Braudel who set him on 
the spoor of the idea of "world-system" by impressing on him 
the fundamental lesson that the unit of research into 
economic history must be the "world economy" and not its 
individual parts, a lesson which, however, as we shall see, 
he seems to have boiled down to a synthesis that is 
profoundly un-Braudelian. As if to leave no doubts about
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his debt to Braudel, in which he shows an admirable lack of 
egolatry, Wallerstein dedicated the second volume of The 
Modern World System (1980) to Braudel, and he named after 
him a centre for economic and historical studies that he 
heads in the State University of New York at Binghamton. On 
the other side of the debit ledger, Braudel no less 
generously recognized Wallerstein's influence on various 
definitely major issues. It is these which we should like 
to explore in some detail.1^3
There is, first of all, the question of Anglo-French 
nomenclatural equivalences of, on one side, "world empire" 
and "empire-monde", and on the other, "economie-monde", 
"world economy", and "world-system". To these last Braudel 
adds, significantly at the start of a discussion of all 
these categories, the notion of "économie mondiale", which 
he defines with a quote from Simonde de Sismondi, a Swiss 
political economist who died in 1842: "Le genre humain ou
toute cette partie du genre humain qui commerce ensemble et 
ne forme plus au-jourd'hui, en quelque sorte, qu'un seul 
marche." Was this Braudel's subtle dismissal of
Wallerstein's "world-system"? Was he implying that
Wallerstein was flogging a dead horse? Let us see. There 
are between them only minor potential disagreements on the 
definition of "world empire" and "empire-monde". They are 
different names for the old "oriental despotisms"— the 
Persian, the Moghul, the Chinese, et al— , whose definition 
was that they stuck their political tentacles on all their 
cities and provinces, sucked surplus unto themselves, and 
stifled private economic initiative and development. 
Neither Braudel nor Wallerstein have any doubts that therein 
lies one of the long-term roots of economic inequality 
between the West and the other major civilizations of the 
world. "En gros", Braudel explains, "les empire-monde, 
comme les appelé Wallerstein, sont sans doute des formations 
archaiques, des triomphes anciens de la politique sur 
1'économie... On pourrait dire aussi bien qu'on est alors en 
presence d'une command economy, pour suivre la leçon de John
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Hicks, ou d'un mode de production asiatique, pour reprendre 
l'explication demode de Marx." Braudel on this point 
appears to quibble with Wallerstein on whether pre-18th 
century Russia was, as the latter pretends, an "external 
area", that is, a "world empire" that was later forcibly 
integrated into the "world economy" from outside, or as 
Braudel would have it, a "world economy" in itself that 
gradually merged of its own into capitalism. This quibble, 
however, is turned by Braudel into a major discrepancy. He 
accepts volontiers the Wallerstein core/periphery schema for 
his own concept of "economie-monde": "Toute economie-monde
est un emboitement, une juxtaposition de zones liees 
ensemble, mais a des niveaux différents. Sur le terrain, 
trois aires, trois categories au moins, se dessinent: un
centre étroit, des regions secondes assez developpees, pour 
finir d'énormes marges extérieurs. Et obligatoirement les 
qualités et les caractéristiques de la société, de 
1'économie, de la technique, de la culture, de l'ordre 
politique changent selon qu'on se déplacé d'une zone a 
l'autre. Nous tenons la une explication a très large 
portée, celle sur laquelle Immanuel Wallerstein a construit 
tout son ouvrage, The Modern World-System (1974)." Now, 
since Wallerstein actually posits four areas— core, 
periphery, semi-periphery, and the external area— it follows 
from the above that Braudel, for one thing, does not accept 
either one or the other of the last two categories, and 
since the penultimate is the least essential of the four—  
the "external area" is necessary for the existence of a 
precise periphery, or else everything outside of the core 
would be either a general undifferentiated periphery or an 
external area— then he must be excluding the idea of semi­
periphery, which nevertheless plays a highly significant 
role in the Wallerstein system in two ways: historically, in 
the building up of the core by positing the existence of 
what he calls a "conveyor belt of surplus", and for 
contemporary political analysis, in providing a functional 
justification of the idea of "subimperialist" states, sort 
of outposts of the core serving to consolidate regional
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capitalist domination. In a sense, of all the Wallerstein 
world-system categories, the most germane to the system, the 
one which exhibits the greatest degree of "structurality" 
and purpose, and in any case, the only one exclusive to his 
system, is that of semi-periphery, and therefore Braudel's 
rejection is no mean move. But the differences go much
deeper.184
Braudel firmly reproaches Wallerstein the rigidity and 
the shortsightedness of his system: "de ne pas avoir a
travers les barreaux de sa grille observe les realites
autres que celles d'ordre économique"; and even more 
importantly, of not having for his world-system "une unite 
temporelle de reference". The latter is a strange reproach 
for a historian to address to another historian, when both 
tacitly deal in "temporal references", and what we think 
that Braudel meant was that Wallerstein's historical world- 
system, which does not take enough account of politics and 
other social forces, also came into the world fully formed, 
with all the formal attributes of reason and will but
incorporeal and without a process of gestation, as if
instead of armour-clad Athena, Zeus' brain had produced 
another brain. Braudel makes light of Wallerstein's rigid 
typologies in his discussion of large economic cycles: "Dans 
ces trois cas (montée, crise, descente), il nous faudrait 
classer et diviser selon les trois cercles de Wallerstein, 
ce qui nous donne deja neuf cas différents, et comme nous 
distinguons quatre ensembles sociaux— économie, politique, 
culture, hiérarchie sociale— nous arrivons deja a trente-six 
cas. Enfin il est a prévoir qu'une typologie reguliere nous 
fausserait compagnie; il faudrait, si nous avions les
renseignments idoines, distinguer encore selon des cas 
particuliers très nombreux. Nous resterons prudement sur 
les plan des généralités, discutables et fragiles qu'elles 
soient." Or he scrambles Wallerstein's inflexible order and 
instead of the core controlling the periphery he makes the 
tongue-in-cheek suggestion that in pre-industrial France it 
was a case of "L'intérieur conquis par la peripherie". The
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crux of the matter Is that Braudel simply does not admit, 
despite his courteous protestations, the imposition of a 
grill-like division on history and on the world, nor a rigid 
linear evolution from one European core to one growing 
world-economy which eventually culminates in today's almost 
granite-tough world-system, as Wallerstein would have it, 
give or take a bump here, a bump there along the road. For 
Braudel, apart from the fact that history, like life, does 
not accept ideological constraints, the world economy, his 
own economie-monde, which is basically a large 
international, usually maritime, network of trade, grew from 
different European Medieval "world economies" not according 
to some internal infallible logic conducing from dispersion 
to aggregation, or from core to expansion, but from shifts 
in the position of the centre resulting from geographical 
conditions, the accumulation of advantages, favourable and 
unfavourable political circumstances— Spain, for example, 
had to bleed itself economically in the Low Countries during 
the 16th century in order to keep civil war away from its 
frontiers, dixit Braudel— , rivalries and warfare, "in 
brief", the myriad forms and manifestations of history from 
which neither caprice nor some degree of hazard were absent. 
Braudel would not have emphasized the latter, as in the 
other direction he denied that capitalism was "rational", 
but unlike Wallerstein's world-system his own historical 
approach would not have excluded them either.
The key concept in Braudel's view is not 
"unpredictability" but "complexity", and "complexity" is 
something that "world-system" tried indefatigably to reduce. 
Other than the process of history, which is full of hitches 
and contradictions, economie-monde has no further meaning 
for Braudel. Its representation at any one point in time 
has only a faint resemblance to the all embracing 
core/periphery pattern than Wallerstein etches on world 
economic history, which is beyond the facts of history the 
meaning of history itself. In this summary telling 
Braudel's methodology could itself seem schematic— which is
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not the case, as a reading of the sources will readily 
reveal— , but even so it is far less constricting than 
Wallerstein*s. In the end if Braudel and Wallerstein are at 
odds, it is because the letter's world-system, when all is 
taken into account, is basically a restrictive political 
tool. For Braudel, who was not inclined to play politics, 
economie-monde was just another open-ended instrument of 
historical analysis, and the core/ periphery binomial was a 
convenient if self-evident imagic representation of the way 
large economies, whether national or international, tend to
organize themselves.1^5
THE HISTORICAL STUDIES
Wallerstein*s work can be separated into three main 
component themes: Africa, the history of the world economy, 
and world-system. Some believe that it also contains a 
political strategy which can only be described as a vague 
thrust towards socialism. All in all, Wallerstein*s is the 
most thorough contemporary exploration and explanation of 
the origins and perpetuation of international economic 
inequality. We have seen, in general terms, his filiation 
to the ideological scheme of core/periphery dependence. 
However, he does not use the ideological category of 
dependency or economic imperialism, even if his entire 
approach seems to derive ultimately from a dependency view. 
Therefore, we shall have to make his connection to 
dependency as explicit as possible. Curiously enough, as an 
Africanist, which Wallerstein mainly was during the 60s, 
there is nothing in his work that even vaguely resembles 
dependency theory, so that after reading his world economy 
and world-system analyses— which is usually what most 
everyone does first— , the 60s Wallerstein seems almost 
alien to his 70s and 80s intellectual persona: the emphasis 
is always on internal political processes rather than on 
external dependence— except of the crudest colonial sort, 
which at any rate is subordinate to his interest in 
independent Africa— , and there is even the hint that he 
might not have agreed with Rodney's theory of imperialism as
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the throttling of African potential nationhood. This 
changes "abruptly" with the appearance in 1974 of The Modern 
World-System. This is a subtle, well-argued and elegantly 
constructed analysis of practically all of the major issues 
on the emergence and almost immediate outward expansion of 
modern Western capitalism, on the growing importance in 
world capitalist rivalries of politics and the burocratic 
state (after the failure of Spain's attempt to create a 
world-state within the incipient but already larger world 
economy), and on the effects of these processes on the 
European "peripheries" and "semi-peripheries". The basic 
functional result of the expansion and influence of 
capitalist forces was the creation of three hierarchical 
areas with different socio-economic structures and markedly 
uneven economic and political power: the core, which in
effect determined the roles of the others, characterized by 
wage labour and self-employment; the semi-periphery, where 
share-cropping predominated and which served to transfer 
surplus value to the core; and the periphery, in which 
slavery and "feudalism" were the dominant forms. Some of 
the issues he raised were the feudal roots of capitalism, 
the tight meshing of the discovery and settlement of Iberian 
America with the internal necessities of Western European 
economies, the causes of the ultimate failure of Spain, the 
approximate dating of the definitive launching of the world 
economy, and others. On most of them he superimposed his 
core/periphery pattern, by which means it was explained how 
Spain lapsed from being a core area to a semiperiphery and 
how Poland through a political failure of nerve was 
converted into a periphery functioning as granary for the 
core,186
Six years later, although by then well immersed in what 
Worsley called "world-systematics", and so with a lesser 
impact than his previous volume, Wallerstein published the 
second part of The Modern World-System, The outlook was the 
same as before: "The argument of this work", he explained, 
"is that the modern world-system took the form of a
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capitalist world economy that had its genesis in Europe in 
the 16th century and that involved the transformation of a 
particular redistributive or tributary mode of production, 
that of feudal Europe (Braudel's economic Ancien Regime), 
into a qualitatively different social system. Since that 
time, the capitalist world-economy has (a) geographically 
expanded to cover the entire globe; (b) manifested a 
cyclical pattern of expansion and contraction...and shifting 
geographical locations of economic roles (the rise and fall 
of hegemonies, the movements up and down of particular core, 
peripheral and semiperipheral zones); and (c) undergone a 
process of secular transformation, including technological 
advance, industrialization, proletarianization, and the 
emergence of structured political resistance to the system 
itself— a transformation that is still going on today". He 
had by then elaborated fully his "world-system perspective" 
which he said "is based on the assumption, explicitly or 
implicitly, that the modern world comprises a single 
capitalist world economy, which has emerged historically 
since the 16th century and which still exists today. It 
follows from such a premise that national states are not 
societies that have separate, parallel histories, but parts 
of a whole reflecting that whole. To the extent that stages 
exist, they exist for the system as a whole. To be sure, 
since different parts of the world play and have played 
differing roles in the capitalist world economy, they have 
dramatically different internal socio-economic profiles and 
hence distinctive politics. But to understand the internal 
class contradictions and political struggles of a particular 
state, we must first situate it in the world economy. We 
can then understand the ways in which various political and 
cultural thrusts may be efforts to alter or preserve a 
position within this world economy which is to the advantage 
or disadvantage of particular groups located within a
particular state".1^7
To explain the evolution of Wallerstein's analysis 
through an analogy with his socio-historical categories, if
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his World System 1 was the "periphery" of his own 
ideological system, World System 2 was the "semi-periphery" 
in that it showed how the central West European capitalist 
states (the Netherlands, England, and France) warred among 
each other for supremacy within the world economy and at the 
same time incorporated into the system in subordinate 
stations vast areas of the planet. Some of the crucial 
issues here were the establishment of mercantilism in 
England and France as a response to Dutch commercial 
competition, the rise of British naval supremacy as against 
France’s inward-looking "gigantism" (a definitely Braudelian 
conceit), the world-system "necessity" of "peripheralizing" 
India, and the painstaking contortions that were involved 
in trying to make Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, and Austria fit 
the core/periphery pattern. The most significant change 
from one volume to the next was that the process at the core 
and the process of the core’s action on the periphery and 
the semi-periphery were given equal treatment, almost with 
the precision of a time-piece.
The third volume of The Modern World System (1989), 
which covers the period from 1730 to the 1840s, was as 
brilliant and as tendentious as the previous ones, and in 
line with our analogy, it carried the elaboration of his 
interpretation of modern history one step closer to its 
culmination, or core, which is today’s capitalist world- 
system. Here again Wallerstein’s method consisted in the 
application of rigid patterns and categories on the events 
of history with the backing of profuse scholarship and 
copious quotes. Since his contention has always been the 
decisive, determinant character of the world economy over 
and above the processes of individual national entities, he 
reasoned, one, that the Industrial Revolution was a misnomer 
for Britain’s strategic and commercial advantage over 
France, its only rival for world hegemony, because there was 
no real, verifiable economic superiority of one over the 
other; two, that the advantage stemmed from sea-power and 
was expressed in the Treaty of Paris, which concluded the
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Seven Years' War; and three, that the French Revolution was 
the unavailing French attempt to offset politically 
Britain's external advantage (although it set the pattern 
for all future "anti-systemic" enterprises). In line with 
his anticipations, he described how Russia and the Ottoman 
empire were peripheralized and how economic conjunctures 
determined the course of events in the European American 
empires, in particular efforts at consolidation and the
independence m o v e m e n t s . Wallerstein's amazing erudition 
cannot, however, disguise the parti pris and the 
selectivity, which are evident from these considerations: 
one, all the conclusions are more or less foreordained
(despite the appearance of inductive reasoning); two, all
analyses follow the same interpretive pattern and fit into 
standardised conceptual categories; and three, specific 
issues are always dealt with inside wider categories and 
there is no evidence of original, empirical research.
Throughout his historical studies, Wallerstein used broadly 
Marxist (in the sense of admitting the concepts of MOP and 
class struggle in a vague, imprecise manner), broadly 
economicist guidelines; in his depiction, the figures of 
history are indistinct passing shadows easily upstaged by 
political forces (strong but disincarnate motivations); and 
as between political and economic forces, the first have the 
upper hand when the second either weaken or momentarily 
drift, although generally they really can not be 
distinguished. Capitalism goes everywhere and does anything 
it wants to, but it must submit to the estimate of the costs 
of opportunity, so that in the end Wallerstein's analyses 
resemble nothing better than a theory of historical
marginalism.189
"WORLD-SYSTEMATICS"
The phase of world-systematics proper, that is, 
Wallerstein's use of the "world-system perspective" in a 
mainly contemporary frame, commenced with his editorship in 
1975 of the book World Inequality, and includes The 
Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (joint editorship
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with P.C.W, Gutkind in 1976), The Capitalist World-Economy 
(1979), Processes of the World-System (with T.K. Hopkins, 
1980), World Systems Analysis (with Hopkins, 1982), and The 
Politics of the World Economy (1984). What have these works 
contributed to the results of the previous historical 
studies and how have they extended if at all the analytical 
range of the concept of world-system? Aside from an essay 
on the incorporation of Africa into the world economy, 
Wallerstein*s main concerns appear to have been eliciting 
the implications of his historical researches and their 
application to contemporary situations. Accordingly, he has 
tried to hone his repertory of concepts, he has thrown 
bridges towards and crossed swords with other "systems" of 
Third World conceptualization, and he has analysed 
contemporary political phenomena, in which area he has even 
dabbled in futurology. "To peripheralize" has definitely 
come to mean "to underdevelop". "Peripheral" and "core­
like" economic forms refer to the Marxist categories of 
"non-capitalist" or "pre-capitalist" modes of production, 
which is an ingenious way of sidestepping the brain-wracking 
problem of "hybrid" economic formations or of reconciling 
the coexistence or cohabitation in one economy of 
"feudalism" and capitalism. Western development studies 
took this in stride with the dual-economy model, but it 
remains a conundrum for the Marxist faithful. Without 
getting into a tizzy, world-systematics simply states: 
"Looking at the world-economy as a whole, some states are 
clearly 'in-between* in the core-periphery structure, in 
that they house within their borders (in adjacent but often 
unrelated sectors) both peripheral processes in relation to 
core states and core-like processes in relation to adjacent 
peripheral states." "Semi-periphery", which Wallerstein 
introduced to account for the parts of Europe which were 
"underdeveloped" historically in relation to the European 
core, he stretched to cover "sub-imperialism". This concept 
he attributed to A.D. Roberts who in a 1962 article noted 
that "in the establishement and extension of colonies, an 
imperialist power often made use of one local group [the
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Baganda, in this case] to help it rule over other local 
peoples”, but in fact it probably derives from Marini who 
had passed it on first to Frank. In his first confrontation 
with rival "systems" on "world equality" in 1975, 
Wallerstein lumped development studies and Marxism (mostly 
of the Soviet variety) into one "developmental category" 
which he characterized as unilineal and dogmatic in contrast 
to his own approach. In a later essay (1982), he modified 
his own dogmatism and acknowledged "world-system" debts to 
development economics (Prebisch and ECLA, Myrdal, and 
Nurkse, for unequal exchange, "the principle of circular and 
cumulative causation", and "vicious circle of poverty", 
respectively), and to Marxists like Baran, Frank, Marini, 
and Emmanuel. But the purpose of this exercise really was 
to show that they all could be subsumed under the category 
of world-system analysis, so it really was not a genuine 
attempt at a synthesis except in his own terms.
In the same article in which he made these qualified 
concessions, he gave what is perhaps the final definition of 
world-system as it enumerated exhaustively all its basic 
components: division of labour, which rubricated core-
periphery, semi-periphery, unequal exchange, and capital 
accumulation; state system, including imperialism, hegemony, 
and the opposition bourgeoisie-proletariat; cyclical 
rhythms; and secular trends, such as "commodification" and 
mechanization. In his forays into political analysis, he 
has made controversial affirmations such as that the 
communist nations as a whole form "a collective capitalist 
firm" or that they are integrated as a semi-periphery into 
the world-system— which just might turn out to be his most 
brilliant coup in this area— , and that movements of 
national liberation tend to end up in an even lower rank in 
the system. For these ideas he was roundly criticized by 
Worsley, who objected to his integrationist core/periphery/ 
semi-periphery model both in its application to the 
capitalist-communist blocks division— which Worsley accepts 
as valid— and in its application to the Third World, where
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Worsley says it underplays the "non-capitalism dimension" 
and the "quite distinctive kinds of capitalism and the 
phases of development". Wallerstein*s prognostications are 
of the sort: "Finally, I expect the world-economy to take a 
marked upturn once again the 1990s", a self-assurance hardly 
justified by his assertion in 1975 that "most conservatives 
decline to fly the banner openly but hide their conservative 
ideas under the mantle of liberalism or occasionally even 
Marxism",190 The one area in which Wallerstein could have 
made a contribution to dependency different from those of 
Baran and Frank, who considered the Third World en bloc or 
as manifesting homogenous processual patterns, was in the 
specific contemporary effects of the world-system on the 
internal processes of individual countries in the Third 
World. However, he has in the main limited himself to wide 
historical research and to general considerations on the 
mechanics and the features of the world-system as a whole, 
although the books he has edited by himself or in 
collaboration do contain numerous articles which attempt to 
relate the particular of national or regional situations 
with the general of operative world-system forces and needs.
The principal motivation of this dissertation has been 
to elicit from different ideological systems and sources 
what we call theories on the origins international economic 
inequality as manifested principally in the per capita 
income differences between the developed and the 
underdeveloped blocs of nations. To defend these
elaborations, which frequently depend on deductions and 
inferences, we have had to establish often complicated 
groupings and affinities. In criticizing the resulting 
formulations we have referred indistinctly to their internal 
inconsistencies and to historical facts, sometimes by the 
method of reductio ad absurdum (into which irony inevitably 
creeps). In the case of Wallerstein, we have a triple 
obligation: we have to prove conclusively his affiliation to 
the economic imperialism or dependency school, we have to 
place his specific outlook in a critical light, and we have
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to deal with his reading of the historical facts, and in 
addition do all these things at the same time. The 
ideological criticism shall be undertaken with the proviso 
that it forms an advance on the special sub-section of the 
summatory general critique of dependency theory. In the 
examination of his historical interpretations, which can 
hardly be avoided in dealing with a fundamentally historical 
oeuvre (unlike that of most other dependency theorists), we 
can rightly feel as if we were coming up against a universe 
of propositions that can not be dealt with adequately for 
two reasons: one, the multiplicity of themes and issues
involved, and two, the length of time and space it would 
take in an already over-extended dissertation, which is far 
from complete at this point. Therefore, we have to confess 
that the best that we can expect to achieve in this specific 
connection is a selective critique of some of the 
fundamental attitudes and assumptions in his analysis, and 
hope that this procedure will not seem too selective.
THE QUESTION OF INTENTIONALITY
With regards to Wallerstein's ideological collocation, 
there can hardly subsist any doubts about his allegiance to 
the transpositional or free-wheeling form of Marxism we have 
encountered so often before in our analyses of dependency 
theory. The use of terms such as "commodification" and 
"surplus transfer" tend clearly in that direction. 
Wallerstein believes that colonial exploitation contributed 
crucially to the accumulation of surplus needed for the 
economic advance of core nations. From his Europe-centred 
world-historical analyses, he also perceived accumulation as 
resulting from the wage-inflation lags periodically 
affecting European core economies, but this does not alter 
the role he attributes to colonialism in the general process 
capitalist accumulation. Nor has he, any more than other 
theorists, more than vague statistical surmises on which to 
base his assertions on the enforced contribution of colonies 
to European development. Again in the same general line, 
his world economy (though not Braudel's economie-monde) was
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the result of Western economic expansion whose repercussions 
can be summarized under his concept of "peripheralization". 
In fact, it can be argued that with Wallerstein we have 
reached the apogee of what we call "schooling by- 
terminology", in this case not from the outside but from the 
bowels themselves of dependency theory, for it is only in 
their respective verbalizations that it is possible to 
distinguish the operations of Wallerstein*s world-system 
from those of other economic imperialism doctrines. In his 
own version, however, any more valid than other dependency 
formulations? (Table 6)
Let us take the fundamental concept of periphery. 
Prebisch used it in the comprehensive sense of non­
industrialized economies, and dependentistas after him used 
it to denote the underdeveloped world. Even in these 
instances there were ambiguities, because Australia and New 
Zealand, which are not underdeveloped, hence not "periphery" 
in dependency usage, certainly could not be considered 
"core" in the Prebisch sense. Japan, who could hardly be 
part of the "core" after WW2, was certainly not "periphery" 
even then. Afterwards Japan too became "core", but "core" 
in which sense: in itself as a Far Eastern "core", or
"core" in being part of the OECD, but not of the EEC? On 
the other hand, much dependency argumentation derives 
directly from Lenin, but "core" does away in one fell swoop 
with the letter's "four pillars" formula. Even granting 
that some of these objections can be explained away easily 
enough ("core" in our technological era, for instance, has 
no geographical limitations; not all dependency writers use 
the concept of "core"; and so on), the underlying ambiguity 
of the concept still remains, because, as we have said often 
before, "core/periphery" are conceptual archetypes or 
paradigms, like "progress", "inequality", and "dependence" 
itself, and they can be employed in any number of unspecific 
even inconsistent ways. Wallerstein did try to give them 
some specificity and in this sense he coined the 
intermediary link between core and periphery that he called
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TABLE 6
SCHOOLING BY TERMINOLOGY (THE FORCES AND PROCESSES OF 
HISTORY ACCORDING TO FRANK AND WALLERSTEIN)
Frank Capitalism as an active historical agent 
makes decisions in terms of economic 
motivations•
It imposes exploitative MOPs in Latin 
America.
It transfers surplus from non-Western 
lands to the West and it "underdevelops" 
the Third World.
Today it "super-exploits" the Third World 
and fosters "sub-imperialism".
Wallerstein The "world-system" as an active historical 
agent, whose centres have shifted since 
the 15th century, creates world division 
of labour (core/semiperiphery/periphery).
- It "peripheralizes" the "external areas".
Today it assigns roles and functions in 
the system and determines or influences 
processes within the individual units of 
the system.
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"semiperiphery". Even so, he does not dissipate the haze 
that hugs these concepts as if they were a cerebral bog. 
"Periphery" in Prebisch connotes a "placing" or 
"positioning" which can be traced with a pencil on a map 
(though not evidently isolating it), but in Wallerstein it 
is essentially a condition of backwardness. The limits of 
his world-system (or world economy, another ambiguity he 
cossets copiously) are defined over the centuries by the 
expanding frontiers of periphery. Up to the late 19th 
century, there was still some room outside of that circle 
and he classified it as "external area", also of course 
economically backward, but if periphery is a condition, what 
distinguishes the "periphery" from the "external area"? 
Certainly not colonialization because then Latin America 
would not have been "periphery" during most of the 19th 
century. Trade with the core, then, on the core’s terms? 
But Europe had been trading actively with Africa since the 
rounding of Mogador in the 15th century, and Wallerstein 
explicitly considers Africa an "external area" until the 
advent of late 19th century imperialism. A quantum-leap in 
trade perhaps? But does Wallerstein have the figures to 
back up this claim? He does not. What he says is that
before 1750, European trade with Africa had been in luxuries 
and that it was only after Europe, or the world-system 
(another ambiguity), became interested in African cash- 
crops, that it gradually incorporated Africa into the
core/periphery magic circle. But and but again: were slaves 
luxuries in the world economy? What were those "valuable" 
cash-crops he mentions: yams, millet, peanuts, palm-oil? We 
suspect that Wallerstein's construct here obeys above all
the need to square Britain’s opposition to the slave trade,
which can not easily be explained on purely economic 
grounds, with his own Marxist dependency or economic- 
imperialism outlook. At any rate, the distinction between 
periphery and external area is by no means as clear as he 
pretends it is.^^l
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Concerning the idea of "semi-periphery", which again is 
hard to distinguish from "periphery" itself, what purpose 
does it serve? Wallerstein originally "discovered" it in 
Spain’s decline when the forces of the world economy 
overwhelmed its inadequately organised political structures. 
But why not just say that it was "peripheralized" by the 
core? Obviously we have here a pure case of reasoning from 
hindsight. Spain could not be placed on the same footing as 
the non-European periphery because it was never under­
developed in the contemporary sense of the term, so its 
relatively backward condition had to be given another 
explanation. Thus was "semi-periphery" born, somewhat we 
would say in the way that "Fourth World" was invented by the 
World Bank, not however to explain a condition slightly 
superior to underdevelopment, as in the case of Spain, but a 
condition at the lowest extreme of underdevelopment. 
Wallerstein insisted on this concept in World System 2 where 
he used it to explain the historical ups and downs of 
Sweden, Prussia, and Austria. Yet all these nations 
developed and have become "core", and their "semi-peripheral 
status" seems to have been either ephemeral or fictitious, 
which raises the core question of how valid it is to 
generalize or conceptualize on the basis of conjunctural or 
transitory historical situations. Even for the origins of 
the structure of the world-system, the European "semi­
periphery" is a contradiction in terms because it flaunts 
Wallerstein’s own insistence on one world-system, one 
process of accumulation, in brief, one unit of historical 
analysis, to the extent that all of Western Europe, 
including Wallerstein’s "semi-periphery", as Braudel 
emphatically contended, participated in the development of 
Western capitalism.
Wallerstein admitted in 1982 that "semi-periphery" was 
"a still rather debatable thesis", but, after making a stab 
at giving it some kind of contemporary relevance in its 
assimilation to "subimperialism", he ended by saying rather 
circularly: "The argument is that it is a necessary feature
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(for both economic and political reasons) of a basically 
triadic world-scale division of labour among, now, core 
states, semi-peripheral states, and peripheral areas." But 
is it clear that this "triad" was also a "necessary feature" 
of pre-19th century European history? To close, finally, 
with the ultimate characterization and justification of 
Wallerstein*s three fundamental socio-historical categories 
in terms of the different forms of labour exploitation 
within them— wage labour at the core, coerced share-cropping 
in the semi-periphery, slavery and serfdom in the periphery- 
-, is this not the feature in his schematization of history 
that is most resistant to verification and that therefore 
offers the easiest avenue to refutation? On what empirical 
basis can he place his modern history classification of such 
countries as Spain and Sweden, Poland and the Ottoman 
Empire, or even the different parts of the Spanish-American 
colonial empire? Serfdom in Poland perhaps— though no more 
than in Russia which he introduces into the world-system as 
a semi-periphery— , but primarily cash-cropping in Sweden? 
And where in Spain’s semi-peripheral condition would he 
place the Basque Country and Catalonia where historically 
small non-allodial holdings have been the norm?^^^
The measure of a true economic-imperialism system of 
historical analysis resides in the attribution of an 
impersonal intentionality to the economic currents and 
forces that, above all other influences and circumstances, 
shape the inter-related history of nations, or what Marxists 
themselves, and Wallerstein with them, call "reification". 
Notwithstanding his lofty attitude of impartial scholarship, 
Wallerstein does precisely that to an extreme that few 
historians have dared, or at least, general historians of 
his eminence. He affirms that the settlement of Spanish 
America was the result of Europe's hunger for bullion. This 
was in taking part in the debate on whether it was gold and 
silver from America that promoted European inflation, or 
European economic growth that required bullion. 
Wallerstein, of course, favoured the latter thesis. Did he
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do it, though, on the basis of probatory evidence, or from 
the necessity to systematize from the assumption of the 
prevalence of large purposive economic forces in the world 
economy over, say, the fiscal needs of the Spanish crown? 
His arguments at any rate consist mainly of quotes from 
other historians. Conversely, he claims that mercantilism 
acquired "force and coherence" as English (and French) 
nationalist policy during the economic recession in the 17th 
century to foil the aggressive Dutch commercial hegemony and 
he fails to acknowledge Braudel's insistence that 
mercantilism was more likely born with the modern nation­
state, in other words, that it was as much a political as an 
economic imperative and, as such, it long antedated the mid- 
17th century Cromwellian navigation laws.1^3 Why the 
discrepancy between mentor and pupil? We think that it is 
because the Braudel thesis overturns Wallerstein's neat 
schema in which contraction leads to competition which leads 
to mercantilism, and insinuates the possibility that a 
tendency to market closures from the 16th century could have 
actually produced contraction and competition later on. 
Between closure (a political act) and recession (an economic 
event) as causes, Wallerstein would naturally incline 
towards the thesis that confirms his belief in the 
determinative character of historically cohesive economic 
forces.
But where Wallerstein goes the limit in his 
personification of economic forces is in his treatment of 
the commercial relations between Europe and the rest of the 
world. In the specific case of India, he accepted the 
quasi-legendary thesis (originally enunciated by Pliny) of a 
millenial imbalance of trade between Europe and the East in 
favour of the latter that had to be compensated with a 
constant outflow of bullion. This situation, according to 
the Wallerstein scenario, obtained until well into the 18th 
century, and signified, in his restrictive definition of 
peripheralization involving incremental trade or outright 
colonial annexation, that India was still an external area
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to the world-economy, one of whose functional norms was that 
bullion (the ultimate concretion of surplus) had to flow
from the periphery to the core and not the other way around.
Europe's rapidly advancing industrialization required an 
expansion of markets abroad and after 1750 it was "decided" 
that India "would have to be peripheralized" and it was at 
that time "that the British began the political conquest of 
India and its peripheralization". Statements like these, in 
which motivations and purposes are blandly bandied about 
when and where they are needed to fulfill a preconceived 
schema, present so many loopholes and dangle so many
unanswered propositions that one gets the impression that, 
in spite of the myriad authorities he cites and in spite of 
the complexity of his intellectual edifices, Wallerstein 
came no closer than Baran did, in what seem like the remote 
somewhat innocent beginnings of the general economic- 
imperialism hypothesis, to explaining how it was that the 
West underdeveloped the world. The nagging question of 
conscious intentionality, of how world-historical economic 
forces could act with so much prescience and such unerring 
rationality, and of how the complexities and contradictions 
of the contemporary world-system can be explained as a
result of such an apparently self-winding and smooth-running 
mechanism, is not really answered by Wallerstein's casual 
allegation that "If things are, in fact, going along the way 
one wishes, one does not have to intend to do things" (can 
one separate the rationality of such a system from
intentionality?), or his distinction between "short-run and 
long-run intentionality", in which the former is what counts 
in history (was the clockwork-like world-system then the 
product of a long concatenation of "short-run
intentionalities", as if the clock had been put together by 
a line of perfectly synchronized watchmakers over many 
generations?).194 can be said for Wallerstein that in
exploring so minutely the issues in the history of world 
capitalism he at least defined an agenda on which
researchers of his persuasion can set to work to their
hearts' content, and this was like inaugurating an entirely
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new era in the history of dependency theory. It may not be 
the final answer to the problems of economic inequality, but 
it certainly puts flesh on the bones of Baran's long-view 
outline.
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CHAPTER 5
THE OVERTHROW OF THE ORTHODOXIES AND THE PROGRESS OF THE 
WEST
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By the late 60s reality was proving fractious to the 
implementation of Western developmental techniques and 
strategies in the Third World. The onset of disillusion in 
developmentalism can be detected in three directions: the
persistence of poverty, the failure of theory to conceal the 
"rot", and the proposal of non-reducible practical 
alternatives. In 1958 the Pakistani development economist 
N.Islam observed that foreign investments from developed 
countries did not have the same results or produce the same 
benefits when they were made in India as when they were made 
in Canada. In the latter case the returns, which were 
marginally less good than those in India, tended to stay in 
the economy, but the profits from investment in India were 
quickly withdrawn or repatriated. There were different 
explanations for this. The one Islam suggested went: "It
has also been seen that political association, no less than 
socio-cultural similarity between the debtor and the 
creditor countries, was an important factor in international 
investment." It was an under-stated, eminently objective 
way of saying that "blood is thicker than water", or that 
"Anglo-Saxons" tend to flock together; and it is probably 
one of the explanations for the River-Platean economic 
decadence after WW2, when the sources of British capital 
definitely dried up for Argentina and Uruguay and American 
capital thought it saw green pastures in the Western 
Pacific, not just Japan, which was a virtually obligatory 
investment market for political reasons, but also in the 
English-speaking, politically-stable ex-dominions of 
Australia and New Zealand. It did not matter that the River 
Plate region had been traditionally very profitable or that 
India's vast market beckoned: American and British capitals 
though perhaps more productive there felt more comfortable 
elsewhere.
Islam's observations went against the soul of homo 
economics, but they were fairly sound, and as development 
economics amassed disappointment upon disillusion, the 
realization that results do not always ensue upon rational
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policies began to seem more and more inevitable. There was 
the Bauer riposte that homo economicus suffers lung 
paralysis in the presence of a burocrat, but in fact Islam’s 
figures covered the period from "the turn of the present 
century up to the early 1940s", that is to say, when 
investors in India did not have to contend with independent 
up-starts or Soviet emulators like Mahalanobis. Equally 
irrational and incontrovertible were the implications of 
T.Caplow's question-title of 1971: "Are rich countries
getting richer and poor countries getting poorer?" How 
could it be that after a quarter century of development 
policies, development was not taking strong root in the 
Third World, whereas it had sufficed less than a decade of
the Marshall Plan to get Europe on its feet and on the road
to prosperity? However dismaying this sounded, the evidence 
was there, and it was being assembled on the double by 
development economics itself. In 1969, D.Seers put in 
parenthesis the concept of economic development saying: "The 
questions to be asked about a country’s development are 
therefore: what has been happening to poverty? What has been 
happening to unemployment? What has been happening to 
inequality? If one or two of these central problems has
been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would
be strange to call the result ’development’ even if per 
capita income has doubled."^95
I.Adelman and C.T.Morris probably established a 
milestone of sorts in a 1973 monograph in which they said 
from square one: "Indeed it has become clear that economic 
growth itself not only tends to be accompanied by actual 
declines in political participation but is one of the prime 
causes of income inequality." This was a classic case of 
hitting two birds with one stone: the standard objectives of 
economic development and the hopes of modernization theory 
insofar as these included democratization. These authors 
were, however, alluding to a problem of redistribution of 
gains, and it could be countered that, nonetheless, growth 
had occurred, specifically in Brazil, on which country they
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had based much of their argumentation, and that eventually 
redistribution would take care of itself, as had been the 
case of the industrialization of the West, But such was 
probably not to be expected. C.Elliott and F, de Morsier 
published in 1975 a related study of Africa, aptly titled 
Patterns of Poverty, in which, as far as it went, all that 
had transpired after independence and in consequence of 
development policies was the entrenchment of privilege and 
of poverty. The rural-urban migration had not lessened the 
burden of inequality in the countryside, and in the cities, 
the few privileged, composed of property-owners, the 
burocracy, and the full-time employed in services and 
manufacturing, kept the majority out of jobs rather than 
producing to create more work. The system, though perhaps 
more than usually unfair in Africa, was grosso modo valid 
for the rest of the Third World. Here then were neither 
growth nor prospects for social justice.
H.W. Singer’s ever-verdant faith in foreign aid—  
perhaps also from the fact that he singled out technology as 
the "core of the problem" and in one wave brushed away the 
bristling complexities involved— , let some hope shine 
through in a work he published with J.A. Ansari in 1977, 
Rich and Poor Countries; but M. Todaro’s ambitious synthesis 
the same year left very little room for illusions about the 
achievements of development economics, and this despite an 
exhaustive analysis of its theories and its policies that 
gave it all conceivable intellectual benefits, even to 
disciplinary respectability in face of orthodox economics. 
To start with, he admitted that given certain distortions 
easy to maintain and prolong (artificially low agricultural 
prices, for instance), you could have equilibrium with mass 
urban unemployment. Theoretically, underdevelopment could 
last forever. His distinction between growth and
development, with which he virtually jettisoned percentages 
as a measure of economic performance, meant in effect that 
social targets displaced industrialization as the main 
concern of development policy. Todaro’s "retreat" in the
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name of development economics led him towards two 
rectifications: a better balance between the rural and the 
urban sectors, and more emphasis on outward growth. This 
did not imply that he was joining the laissez faire camp, 
but it was nonetheless a mea culpa coming from so committed 
a development economist. It also gave succour to the 
philosophy of "basic needs" with its emphasis on social 
rather than strictly economic goals. By contrast with 
Todaro's systemic approach, other critiques went for 
specific targets in the mechanics of development. Aid, on 
which Singer banked, was dismissed by B. Sutcliffe in 1971 
as the transfer of "some resources from rich countries to 
poor" ones and as "a very temporary process". And in 1976 
Mahbub ul Haq lambasted planning for being "a numbers game", 
applying excessive controls, having "investment illusions", 
following "development fashions", remaining divided from 
implementations, neglecting human resources, and favouring 
growth without j u s t i c e . 1^7 Again, this was rectification 
but not recantation. These critiques were not the all-out 
contempt of a Bauer or a Viner and they came from within 
development economics itself, although they were no less 
thorough for all that as they questioned the validity of the 
original "four truths" of development economics: statistics, 
the dual-model, industrialization, and planning.
THE MEANING AND ORIGINS OF "BASIC NEEDS"
The "rot", in the sense of "unsoundness", could not be 
dissimulated by some of the general and technical works that 
were being produced, not in themselves uninstructive or 
useless by any means— such as Sutcliffe's absolutely deadpan 
and faultless review of all that had been said and written 
on Industry and Development (1971), or F.Stewart's attempt 
to salvage the principle of labour-intensive, marginal- 
choice industrial development in Technology and 
Underdevelopment (1977)— , but which were rather nugatory in 
light of the pronounced limping of development economics 
over-all. Towards the end of the 70s, in what seemed like a 
desperate, flung-arms attitude, the World Bank hived off a
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"Fourth World” from the bosom of the Third. The countries 
that by rights, or by misfortune, fell Into this category 
were so poor that they stood beyond the pale of the usual 
development remedies, which by Inference let these stand for 
the rest of the Third World. They were predominantly 
agricultural, very low-lncome countries for which new small- 
scale social strategies could be devised. This constituted 
an effort to Impugn the purported unity of the Third World, 
although It was not totally original as It was Implicit In 
the writings of Kuznets and others who had cautioned decades 
earlier against the tendency to consider the Third World as 
a homogeneous mass. However, the receptivity accorded the 
Idea In the 80s, which resulted In the convocation of 
assemblies proclaiming that the "Fourth World Is the world 
of human scale", had to do with the previous emergence 
within development studies of alternative methods and 
approaches to the seemingly endless misery of 
underdevelopment.
The humblest yet the most trumpeted of those 
alternatives was baptized "basic needs. Arndt traces "basic 
needs" to the concern of planners In the Third World, 
starting with India In 1962, to provide a "minimum Income 
for the poor" by channeling a substantial part of growth to 
the "bottom decile of Income distribution", but these 
provisions were really part of conventional growth 
strategies and policy projections. "Basic needs" as such— a 
phrase first used In passing by D.Seers In 1969 and M. ul 
Haq In 1971, according to Arndt— acquired profile In the ILO 
World Employment Conference In 1975, convened by Initiative 
of L.Emerlj. "* Basic needs'", wrote Arndt, "became the 
central theme of the conference document, published In 1976 
under the title Employment Growth and Basic Needs, and In 
just two or three years this theme was the subject of a very 
large literature." In that document, "basic needs are 
defined as the minimum standard of living which a society 
should set for the poorest group of Its people", and should 
cover "the minimum requirements of a family for personal
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consumption: food, shelter, clothing”, as well as "access to 
essential services, such as safe drinking water, sanitation, 
transport, health and education", and an "adequately- 
remunerated job for everyone wishing to work".^^^ Exactly 
what the originality of these objectives was, apart from the 
insistence on the qualifier "minimum", is not made clear by 
Arndt, as it presumably was not by the authors of the 
report. In truth, the significance of "basic needs" was not 
so much in what it put forward in the way of policies as in 
what it revealed about trends and outlooks within 
development studies in the 70s. We would also suggest that, 
without neglecting the contribution of the ILO, bearing in 
mind that the phrase "basic needs" had already been coined 
and that anyway, like "development" and "social justice", it 
qualifies for the category of conceptual archetype, its 
roots and its implications are a little more complex. 
Concerning its origins we should like to refer to 
E.F. Schumacher, to the fieldwork of K.Hart, and to the 
theoretical work of M.Lipton.
Schumacher, who had been immersed in development issues 
since the 30s and who had later been involved with I.Ilyich, 
one of the co-sponsors of the Fourth World assemblies of the 
early 80s, in 1973 wrote the book Small is Beautiful, one of 
the classic social texts of the decade. It reflected the 
"back-to-nature" philosophy that had come into vogue during 
the 60s, not insignificantly on the back of hippy 
messianism, and it expressed the increasing fear that 
industrial civilization was out of control polluting the 
environment and bringing depredation with each one of its 
"advances". Another important text from the same "school" 
was The Limits to Growth, produced by the international 
organization of intellectuals called the Rome Club. It was 
attacked by J.Symons and others for underestimating the 
potential for renovation of capitalism. The pushy free- 
enterprising 80s have shouted down much of the clamour for 
"smallness", but in its time it contributed to steering 
development studies away from its lingering tendency to
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concentrate on industrialization as the one and only answer 
to the development needs of the Third World.
K.Hart was an anthropologist working in Ghana when he 
took up and illustrated the idea of "informal sector" in 
1973. It applied to a type of economic activity in 
underdeveloped societies which thrived among the urban poor 
and was characterized by "ease of entry, reliance on 
indigenous resources, family ownership of enterprises, 
small-scale of operations, labour-intensive and adapted 
technology, skills acquired outside the formal school 
system, and unregulated competitive markets". Its most 
common manifestations in Third World cities were the street- 
hawkers and the corner stands. Meier gave it a rather 
pompous definition: "For analytical purposes, it may be most 
incisive to define the informal sector as simply that sector 
in which the returns to labour, whether or not in the form 
of wages, is determined by the forces of demand and supply." 
The idea of the informal sector was widely adopted, 
appearing as late as 1985 in Worsley, as a viable instrument 
for economic improvement among the deprived, complementary 
to the macro-tactics of development economics, which never 
seemed to trickle down enough to the masses.
Hart had deliberately restricted his field of vision to 
one aspect of underdevelopment, that of the make-do 
struggling of the urban poor. It took an academic viewpoint 
to raise this modest but fertile descriptive approach to the 
stature of a theory and methodology. This was in essence 
what M.Lipton did in his influential 1977 book Why Poor 
People Stav Poor. He did not take underdevelopment as one 
large problem requiring one over-all solution. He did not, 
for instance, take up the study of industrialization or of 
trade strategies, but went into underdevelopment and 
dismantled piece by piece and from all conceivable angles 
the dogma that development requires urbanization and the 
transformation of villages into farm factories. It was not 
just a question of restoring a balance between rural and 
urban growth, or of articulating better the two sectors, as
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some revisionist literature, such as Islam's Agricultural 
Policy in Developing Countries (1974), advocated, but of 
actually taking things as they were and improving them, of
respecting the predominantly rural order in most
underdeveloped societies, and protecting and stabilizing it 
through the conservation of skills, the alleviation of 
fiscal impositions, the stimulation of production, and the 
rational adjustment of prices mainly through the market. On 
behalf of this position, Lipton argued that urbanization had 
been a fiasco, in fact, "pseudo-urbanization” because of its 
impermanence. Underlying the entire edifice was the myth of 
industrialization schemes based on "savings" from the
countryside. At bottom his reasoning stemmed from the
simple fact of the failure of industrialization and with it 
the bankruptcy of the conventional wisdom of development 
economics.199 At different ends of the rural-urban
spectrum. Hart and Lipton coincided in that "development" 
was not so much a question of innovating on a large scale, 
whether through industrialization or through the reformation 
of "old ways", as of working with the imperfect clay to hand 
and shaping humble but serviceable pottery with it. This 
became one of the crucial elements in "basic needs".
Streeten, a down-to-earth theoretician who had always 
tended to look for the booby-traps that development theory 
inadvertently stepped on, but who, nevertheless, as late as 
1975 had been wrestling with the paradoxes of Third World 
industrialization, became one of the most zealous advocates 
of "basic needs". With N.Hicks in. a 1979 paper, he
presented a succint rationalization of it: "The
disappointment with GNP per head and its growth has lead to 
greater emphasis on employment and distribution. But it was 
soon seen, on the one hand, that unemployment in the sense 
in which the term is used in the developed countries was not 
the problem in the developing countries and that, on the 
other hand, redistribution from growth yielded only meagre 
results. Furthermore, it is clear that mass poverty can 
coexist with a high degree of equality, and reductions in
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absolute poverty are consistent with increases in 
inequality. The concern has shifted to the eradication of 
absolute poverty, particularly by concentrating on basic 
human needs." The rest of the article was devoted to an 
exploration of just what were "basic needs" and how they 
were to be met, and to criticizing the so-called "income 
approach" to the alleviation of poverty. The measuring rods 
used were health, education, food, water supply, sanitation, 
and housing, whose supply or availability were largely in 
the domain of public services, including transfer payments 
and other redistributive measures. "In a sense", concluded 
the authors, "life expectancy is a kind of weighted 
'composite* of progress in meeting physiological basic 
needs." As to the policy of raising income, which was 
tantamount to the ultimate goal of standard development 
strategies, they attacked it, along with such things as 
disease-spreading "hydroelectric dams and irrigation or
drainage schemes", for either involving more social costs 
than benefits or for not attending to the satisfaction of 
real needs, such as when income increases were "spent on 
food of lower nutritional value than previously consumed". 
Did they have in mind a form of alimentary regimentation? 
Some "basic needs" speculation actually entertained such 
extreme possibilities. D.Seers, who, like Streeten, was
closely associated with the World Bank, was frightened in 
1972 by prospects of inequality and poverty into the 21st 
century and envisaged an alternative "world scenario" with 
"strong and more independent nations... restricting foreign 
political and cultural influences, and therefore limiting 
economic contacts". It would be a matter, as Lipton also 
expected, of building development on "local traditions".
The sort of industries that Seers contemplated would
manufacture practical inexpensive goods such as hoes and 
bicycles. The concept of development in all this was either 
infrequently employed or given a meaning alien to the daily 
literature of development economics. It did not have to do, 
for example, with trade between the industrialized and the 
non-industrialized nations, or even with trade exclusively
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between the latter, but with self-reliance, with making do, 
like Hart's informal sector, with what you had. Shades of 
Maoist Chinal^OO
"Basic needs" literature grew for a while during the 
early 80s. R.Sandbrook in 1982 stated frankly that rescuing 
the poor took precedence over economic growth because it was 
a moral obligation. He was in favour of work-making and 
communal projects. In a 1984 review of two Streeten books. 
First Things First and Development Perspectives, Lipton 
sounded very optimistic about the "basic needs" approach. 
Did it work, he asked? "The answer depends on four main 
issues... First, can basic needs be measured and defined in a 
way that enables policies to be targeted on the needy? 
Second, can need be linked to economic demand? Third, can 
the cost of meeting need, especially the cost to the 
powerful, be contained? Finally, what is the relationship 
between meeting needs and achieving growth and development?" 
The answer to the first question was a definite yes. The 
answer to the second implied two additional questions: would 
greater productivity among the very poor (for that was a 
part of satisfying "basic needs") be met by insufficient 
demand, and if not, would the price of essentials rise? Not 
"if poor people supply and demand their own needs, in more 
or less self-sufficient economic units, from family farms 
through villages to nations". The costs of "basic needs" 
policies obviously had to come from cash-strapped Third 
World resource funds, but they were not really very high 
seeing as how those policies often relied on cooperation at 
the communal level, as in the example he gave from India: 
"Translated into antyodata, it has meant in India village 
meetings to identify the five to ten very poorest 
households— followed by supervised lending to help them buy 
and manage productive assets: a few goats, a few carpenter's 
tools, at most simple-fishing equipment or a cyle-rickshaw." 
Finally, on the question of growth: "At the level of the
individuals and of nations, there is convincing envidence 
that better health, nutrition and education are associated
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not only with greater happiness but with improved economic 
performance."201 How different was this, however, from what 
Rosenstein-Rodan had written when he preached "social 
overhead" in the 40s? As we said, it really was not the 
contents that mattered, which after all only reflected what 
was going on in the Third World, but the angle of vision of 
development studies, which had been dramatically re-oriented 
as a consequence of the disillusioning 60s and 70s.
There were other alternatives in the 70s besides "basic 
needs" to orthodox development policies. In 1978, 
H.Leibenstein expounded the notion of "x-efficiency" as one 
of the benefits to be gained by a country that accepted the 
challenge of competing in the world market. The "gang of 
four" were doing exactly that from the fringes of far 
eastern Asia, but their achievements were not yet 
spectacular enough to overshadow the OPEC "success story". 
The time of export-substitution industrialization would come 
in the next decade. In the meantime, other trends were 
becoming visible in the Third World. The affluence of Third 
World oil-exporters was virtually financing the cause of the 
NIEO, even though, according to the predominant opinion in 
the West, the hardest struck by the successive oil crises of 
the 70s were the poorer of the Third World nations, which 
presumably implied a de facto absence of solidarity within 
that bloc.202 Since it had first been adumbrated in the 
non-aligned conferences of the 60s, the NIEO had become the 
main theme at UNCTAD and at international gatherings such as 
the North-South dialogue held in Paris in 1975 (North-South 
being a new catchy designation for development- 
underdevelopment). When all the rhetoric lifts, what 
remains of the NIEO is the remarkably constant Third World 
exigence that it be offered "fair" prices for its 
commodities, which the first world was not about to do in 
the 70s when it was being squeezed without tenderness by 
even such loyal Third World oil producers as Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. In any case, the NIEO was not really an alternative 
to development economics, but a logical projection of state-
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orchestrated development strategies on international forums. 
The state in the Third World, which had always been the 
impresario of developmentalism, was simply making its case 
heard by brandishing an oil shillelagh. NIEO meant 
something more than what the formula actually expressed. 
Like "informal sector" and "basic needs", which adverted to 
a tendency bigger than themselves, it made it very clear 
that the epicenter of development studies, whatever the West 
did or said, had passed to the countries of the Third World 
itself. The Third World had about all the theory it needed 
from the West and what it wanted now were results, concrete 
progress towards greater international equality. In the 
West itself. Singer, Hoogvelt, and many others were 
assiduous propagandizers of the NIEO. Finally, there had 
been for a long time another alternative to development 
economics, one which had been proposed both from the West 
and Third World, but it was an alternative one remove away 
from a complete rebuttal, and it is mainly as a critique of 
development economics that we meet dependency again in the 
context of the so-called debate that bears its name.
THE DEPENDENCY DEBATE
What exactly is the dependency debate? When did it 
start? Is it still going? To start with, there was not one 
but various dependency debates. In one sense, it was an 
ideological struggle against dependency theory by Marxists 
who decried its neglect of the concepts of MOP and of class 
struggle, which they tried to make central to the 
understanding of underdevelopment and of its origins and 
future evolution. In another, it was an inevitable face-off 
between developmentalism and dependency. The first and 
earlier debate, which was mostly a one-sided critique, is 
crucial to the course that Marxist theory has taken in the 
80s, but the latter debate, though perhaps less easy to 
define, has a larger context, a wider audience, and probably 
greater over-all academic implications. Also, it
represents, in the context of this dissertation, a 
culmination in the two parallel intellectual processes of
— 365 -
theorization on the issues of international economic 
inequality that we have been following, and as such we shall 
give it pride of place.
What it was not is easier to say that what it actually 
was. It was not an organized, on-going discussion following 
certain rules of procedure in certain specific venues that 
started on such-and-such a date. In fact, the only "places" 
where it appears to vaguely conform to this model is in the 
pages of certain books and journals— such as the Latin 
American Research Review, the 1984 edition of Meier's 
Leading Issues in Economic Development, and Abel/Lewis* 
Latin America: Economic Imperialism and the State— , where 
dependency and anti-dependency opinions are yuxtaposed and 
discussed. In only one case that we know have the opponents 
actually addressed and refuted each by name on specific 
issues and that was in the rather acrimonious confrontation 
in the pages of the above mentioned journal between D.C.M 
Platt and the Steins. Outside of this the debate was a 
matter of hither-and-yonder pronouncements, broadsides and 
snickers from either side. In this sense, it is still going 
on with much less fury than it had at its climax which was 
probably around the early 80s.
What in this "debate" leaves no place for ambiguities 
is that it was, is, and perhaps, in some way or another, 
will continue being, an issue-less clash between "Western" 
and "Marxist" opinions on how to interpret the origins of 
underdevelopment and ultimately on how to go about 
overcoming it. And what the "debate" or "debates" actually 
achieved was to bring together in a sporadic, touch-and-go 
manner the views and the positions on either side. It could 
also, and perhaps more accurately, be interpreted as 
developmentalism becoming aware of the Marxist dependency 
critique. The concept of dependency, which, as we have 
seen, has Marxist credentials going back to Lenin at least, 
did not figure at all in the early phases of development 
economics, and this is perfectly understandable since, 
whereas dependency was a vague archetypal designation for
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the condition of the weaker nations in the capitalist world 
economy, development economics involved then a vigorous and 
promising new approach to the relations, both actual and 
conceptual, between the developed and the underdeveloped 
countries, far more interesting and original than the 
Stalinist nostrums of the early post-war years. The ex post 
attempts to make of Prebisch a proto-dependentista have 
always had to contend with the facts that he never was a 
Marxist and that he most definitely was a ’Western” 
development economist from beginning to end. Dependency 
theory gradually acquired its proper contours when it began 
during the 60s to shed its deja vu air of political 
propaganda in a wrapping of dusty theorization, in the work 
of thinkers in the West and in the Third World, especially
but not exclusively in Latin America.
The commonplace Western explanation of the rise of 
dependency theory is that it was a reaction in the late 60s 
of Latin American intellectuals to the failure of ISI. 
According to Seers, ”The realization that import 
substitution created new, possibly more dangerous, forms of 
dependence converted the ECLA 'structuralists' into 
'dependency' theorists." The implications is that formerly 
committed Latin American development economists suddenly in 
the 60s became ranting Marxists. It is shared in essence by 
O'Brien, Fieldhouse, Streeten, R.Thorp, Arndt and others. 
Arndt, for example, has this to say: "Dependency as the key
problem of underdevelopment, at least in Latin America, was
taken up and adumbrated by many others who were not Marxists 
or advocates of revolution. It served well to express both 
the frustration felt by Latin American intellectuals about 
the failure of capitalism in Latin America to match its 
achievements in Europe and North America, and the resentment 
of the overwhelming power and presence of the US." However, 
the facts of the contemporary history of dependency theory 
simply do not corroborate this explanation. The vast 
majority of dependency theorists from Baran to Frank and the 
Latin Americans and on to Wallerstein were Marxists critical
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from the start of capitalist models of development. The 
Venezuelan writers from the early 60s that we alluded to 
before were Marxist dependency theorists in full, and they 
certainly entertained few hopes about capitalist 
development. The same thing can be said of Marini, dos 
Santos, Hinkelammert and other socialist critics, and of 
Halperin-Donghi and Galeano among historians in one way or 
another affiliated to dependency. None of them were 
"convinced" from anything else to dependency, and they did 
not have to be because they had a long tradition in Latin 
America itself from which they could take a legitimately 
Marxist definition of dependency.^03
Frank, who was not Latin American, got his own version 
of dependency, as such defined by him and as such accepted 
by the majority of commentators, from the "Monthly Review 
school", which included a phalanx of adamant anti­
capitalists, and Frank himself created a "dependency school" 
from his teaching posts in Santiago de Chile, not exactly 
"dependent" on ECLA. The incidence of the failure of ISI on 
Latin American dependency theorists cannot be denied 
entirely, but rather than fundamentally motivating, this 
experience was principally "more wood for a fire" that had 
been burning before, with the additional uncertainty that it 
is not possible to say with precision when it was exactly 
that ISI had failed. Some of the equivocations around the 
use of the term "dependence" come from the resounding 
"early" use of it made in works by Cardoso and Faletto and 
by Sunkel. But Cardoso and Faletto were at least Marxisant 
and to complicate matters they were not entirely disabused 
about the possibilities of capitalist development and 
therefore can hardly be described as "motivated" by the 
failure of ISI. On the other hand, dos Santos, who was 
decidedly Marxist and anti-developmentalist, is credited by 
Palma with having presented the "earliest" and the best (if 
somewhat circular) version dependency theory. That leaves 
Sunkel/Paz, and perhaps others, as the embodiment of ECLA 
disillusionment with ISI, as per the Western scenario, but
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they certainly are not considered anywhere as typical
dependency writers and their vague invocations of more
economic interventionism in underdeveloped economies, like 
Cardoso and Faletto*s carefully modulated endorsement of 
socially distorting capitalist growth (of the sort denounced 
by Adelman and Morris), could rightfully be considered an 
intellectual sideshow in the wider mis en scene of 
dependency theory.
A STANDING TARGET THAT HITS BACK
Development economics was a standing target for Marxist 
dependency theory. Between the two there were no "grey
areas" where issues could be discussed with some hope of 
consensus, except on the reality of underdevelopment itself. 
The tries that have been made to somehow "assimilate"
dependency and development studies— notably by Preston, 
Roxborough, Meier, Kitching, and Streeten— are not in our 
opinion too convincing. Preston*s intricate categorizations 
and Streeten*s "litmus-based" teams of "blues" and "reds", 
yield some kind of "order" in Third World theorization only 
if one aspect of thinkers such as Frank or Amin is taken out 
of its wider ideological context. To pretend that they can 
be lined up in the ranks of Western development research 
because they favour de-linking underdeveloped economies from 
the capitalist international economy, which is what 
relatively orthodox development economists such as Singer, 
Furtado, Sunkel, and Streeten have sometimes favoured, is to 
forget that Frank and Amin were always intent on a 
repudiation of developmentalism lock, stock and barrel. 
Roxborough and Kitching simply assume that dependency can be 
studied as theories on underdevelopment without 
qualifications. But Marxists, if only from the fact that 
they consider their work "scientific" and all the rest 
"ideological", do not submit to "assimilation". And besides 
the awareness of incompatibility is probably mutual. 
Development studies took tardy notice of dependency. It was 
only in the 1984 version of his large compilation on 
development issues, which first appeared in 1964 but went
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through editions in 1970 and 1976, that Meier included a 
section on dependency. By then, in its form as the long­
term general theory of economic imperialism, dependency had 
been around for over two decades at least, and its criticism 
of development studies had been eliciting ripostes for some 
years before from the affected, some contemptuous, some 
hurt, but none too gracious or willing to compromise. 
This immovable, long-lasting and irreconcilable antagonism 
between the two sides forms the basis of the debate.
One of the first reactions against dependency by a 
development economist was uttered by D.Lehman in the 
"Introduction" to a collection of essays he edited in 1970 
on the crisis within development studies. He turned the
tables on the critics from the left and stated flatly: "The
symptoms of crisis should rather be seen in the failure of 
the self-styled critical, radical and alternative approaches 
to generate a new theoretical apparatus", and he dismissed 
the "thunderous language" of dependentistas by diminishing 
it in comparison with "Jonathan Levin's classic Export
Economies. published in 1960". The truth here, however, is 
that the Levin book he cited is a static and circular 
analysis whose pretension to originality lies in the claim 
that "No comprehensive picture of export economies" (in 
itself a misnomer for raw-material exporting economies) 
existed in 1959. This was to ignore much of the literature 
of "orthodox" and "non-orthodox" development economics. On 
the part of Lehman it also meant either than he had not read 
much dependency literature or that if he had he had chosen 
to disregard it. The famous 1975 O'Brien essay on
dependency, which was descriptive and sympathetic and gave 
such impetus to the general use of the term, did not, as did 
his 1985 "re-visit" to dependency, confront it with its 
critics, and in particular he took little notice of the 
carpings of "Western" students of development. These were 
becoming quite sharp by the late 70s and they did not
emanate exclusively from academics in the developed 
countries. The Indian economist S.Lall in a 1975 paper took
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the Idea of dependence to mean underdevelopment, no more and 
no less, and from that angle went on to argue that since 
some highly industrialized economies, by definition non­
dependent, also were dependent in crucial ways, then either 
they were not developed or dependence said and explained 
nothing about underdevelopment except "to pick off some 
salient features of modern capitalism as it affects some 
less developed countries and put them into a distinct 
category of d e p e n d e n c e " . ^04 in other words, like
Eurocentrism's claim that the West was superior because it 
was, dependency theory was saying that dependence created 
underdevelopment because it did.
The Chilean G.Palma's participation in the debate is 
significant in that he made two attempts, one in 1979 and 
another in 1981, to define dependency as a method "to 
analyze peripheral societies through a 'comprehensive social 
science', which stresses the socio-political nature of the 
relations of production; in short, the approach is one of 
political economy, and thus an attempt to revive the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century tradition in this 
respect". His praise for "dependency" research by Laclau, 
Sunkel, and Singer and his criticism of Frank and dos 
Santos, were proof of where he stood in the debate, and it 
also signified that he was trying hard to make a non-Marxist 
approach to dependent development workable. But he was not 
anti-Marxist: he accepted in fact dependency's Marxist
origins and he even criticized Frank, via Brenner, because 
of his "un-Marxist" point of view. His opposition was to 
Marxist dependentistas who did not grasp "the specificity of 
the historical process of the penetration of capitalism into 
the peripheral countries, and only condemn its negative 
aspects, complementing their analyses with a series of 
stagnationist theses in an attempt to build a formal theory 
of underdevelopment. These analyses are mistaken not only 
because they do not 'fit the facts', but because their 
mechano-formal nature renders them both static and 
unhistorical. Such writers have thus developed schemes that
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are unable to explain the specificity of economic 
development and political domination in the backward 
countries; indeed, their models lack the sensitivity to 
detect the relevant social processes, and are unable to 
explain with precision the mechanisms of social reproduction 
and modes of transformation of these societies." What he 
was doing was criticizing the contemporary long-view of 
economic imperialism, as it was espoused and applied by 
dependency thinking in Latin America, from the point of view 
of Marxist sociology with its reliance on changing relations 
of production through class conflicts, so that his position 
seemed somewhat ambiguous: on the one had, he was a
developmentalist with Marxist leanings; on the other hand, 
as Marxist in the same general situation as Cardoso and 
Faletto and even Sunkel, he associated himself with 
dependency ("In so far as we are concerned with the 
dependency school").^05 Palma by rights belongs in the 
mode-of-production camp, and if we place him with an 
equivocal developmentalist stance in the dependency debate, 
it is because he himself chose that station by defining 
dependency in a manner that went against the grain of 
fundamental dependency thinking.
The 1981 Palma essay was part of the Seers-edited
Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassessment, and this was
clearly and specifically an answer to dependency criticism 
of development studies, as Seers’ "Introduction" made 
explicit. In it he said that "dependency" stemmed from 
"structuralism"— the explanation of Latin American inflation 
as the result of supply inelasticities — , in the face of 
"widespread political pressures for development". What 
brought "structuralists" and "dependentistas" into one fold, 
or what made "dependentistas" out of "structuralists" (the 
two possibilities existed in Seers' rendering of the
process), was that both points of view held "that the 
underdevelopment of Latin America was due to its reliance on 
exports of primary products, which were subject to terms of 
trade that both fluctuated in the short-term and
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deteriorated in the long (the Preblsch-Singer thesis)".
Seers did not endorse, or entirely deny the way Balassa and 
others did, that possibility. He attributed the little 
headway that dependency had made in Western developmentalist 
circles to the view of "mainstream" economists that it 
lacked "rigour". He himself deplored "a great deal of 
writing in the dependency field" for its rather "low 
professional quality" and for partaking of the "shocking 
habit of ideologically-committed social scientists of all 
schools, picking out whatever evidence fits one's theories 
and ignoring the rest". He shared M.Bienefeld*s and
D.Evans' contention, expressed in one of the essays in the 
book, that dependency "raises the right questions", but 
Seers put the burden of coming up with the right answers on
dependency by pointing out that the example of NICs like
Singapore, South Korea, and Brazil, that could not be 
treated "as a temporary, limited exception", flatly
contradicted the basic dependency tenet about "the limits to 
capitalist development in the periphery". NICs was a phrase 
of wide acceptance designating a special slot within the 
concept of underdevelopment. From it would in turn be 
portioned off today's "gang of four" or "four Asian dragons" 
as the collective designation of the four Asian economies 
that in the general opinion of economists have definitely 
broken out of the underdeveloped mould. The surge of these 
"dragons" would become in the 80s one of the main
happenings, perhaps the central one, in the field of 
development studies. It is certainly at the root of the 
resurgence of the neo-liberal, neo-classical stance that 
today dominates development economics— if it is still
possible to speak of one such given that the now dominant 
trend has always in the past denied its relevance— , and 
Seers was certainly right in underlining the issue, although 
he was not the first to do so, nor the only one doing it at 
the time. The other argument that Seers used to put 
dependency on the the defensive was that in order for it to 
be pertinent it would have to "embody empirical content". 
Here then was an unmistakable rejection of dependency in the
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thick of the debate from the point of view of development 
studies, and one that seemed fairly final despite Seers use 
of the distinction between dependency schools, with Palma, 
Cardoso, and Sunkel on one side, and Baran and Frank on the 
other. The "de-linking", "semi-autarkic" model of the 
latter was definitely in question, entitled to its 
ideological framework but not deserving of much scientific 
respect; the former attitude was promising but it remained
under observation.^^6
The 1985 O'Brien overview of dependency contained a 
review of the work that was being done in Latin American 
dependency studies. Most of it was either a refutation of 
radical dependency or a defence of the anti-imperialist 
"liberationist " line. Some of it was of the Marxist 
sociology school. O'Brien himself had a hard time trying to 
reconcile the latter approach and dependency, which involved 
a stinging critique of Cardoso and F a l e t t o . ^07 The real 
dependency answer to development studies could be found in 
Wallerstein's world-systematics and in the "discussion 
papers"— sections of his resolutely anti-capitalist Crisis 
books with titles such as Development of Crisis and Crisis 
of Development (1979) and Long Live Transideological 
Enterprise: The Socialist Economies in the Capitalist
International Division of Labour and West-East-South 
Political Economic Relations (1983)— that Frank was putting 
out from East Anglia University, perhaps in response to the 
output at the Institute of Development Studies at Sussex 
University, where Seers, Sunkel and others were based. If 
anything, all this made the divide more manifest and the 
debate even more hopeless.
A HISTORICAL DEBATE: D.C.M. PLATT v THE STEINS
In the historical field D.C.M. Platt, who had taken 
unto himself the role of number one dependency-basher, wrote 
"an historian's objection" to dependency in a 1980 issue of 
the Latin American Research Review. Unlike Seers who 
initially gave dependency the benefit of the doubt on the 
question of whether or not it was ideological and void of
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sclentlfic content, Platt took as definitive the definitions 
of dos Santos and O'Brien to the effect that dependency 
meant the external conditioning of Latin American economies 
towards underdevelopment, which is the nec plus ultra 
statement of its ideological stance. He further accepted 
Stanley and Barbara Stein's Colonial Heritage of Latin 
America as being the best concrete historiographical
expression of that definition (which, obiter dicta, was not 
at all warranted as the Steins were actually stating in 
summary form, and in English, long-held Latin American
opinions). He summarized it thus: "Latin America, colonial 
and national, was from the first drawn into the 
international economy as an exporter of foodstuffs, raw 
materials and precious metals, and as an importer of capital 
and manufactured goods." Platt's answer was to say that 
Latin America was of no interest and of no concern at all to 
the capitalist international economy and so could hardly 
have been forced or even prodded into a situation it 
considered harmful and did not want. "Spanish America", he 
wrote, "during the first half century of political 
independence, stood outside the currents of world trade and 
finance. Europe traded with itself, with its existing 
colonies, with its traditional suppliers, and with the US.
European capital was fully engaged in British and
continental finance, principally in railways; when it 
crossed the Atlantic, it found a home in the US." What then 
prevented Latin America from industrialising and relegated 
it to the lowly role of supplier of farm produce and raw 
materials to the powerhouses of capitalism? "The obstacles 
to autonomous industrial growth were formidable. Latin 
America lacked skilled labour... suffered from endemic 
shortage of industrial fuels...Domestic markets were small 
and scattered...Exploitable raw materials were in short 
supply...Capital was scarce...With handicaps such as these, 
domestic manufacturing was slow to develop in Latin America 
with or without the machinations of the metropolis." In 
brief, Platt contended that "Latin American economies in the 
19th century were shaped by domestic circumstances" and not
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by the manipulation of "planned requirements" from abroad. 
The origin of production for export was to be found In the 
"supply of the home market, and It was on this home market 
that the whole structure of railways, of public utilities, 
and of city modernization was built". The only valid use 
for him of the dependency cognomen was for the "banana 
Republics" and for such cycles as "the quinine boom In
Colombia, Bolivian tin, Amazonian rubber", which hardly
mattered to world trade or finance.
The Steins, who had the right of reply In the same 
Issue of the journal, picked at Platt's figures to show that 
In the period 1820-50 Latin America ranked "close" to the US 
as Importer of British goods. But It was not so much on 
global statistics that they based their answer to Platt as 
In the decisive quality of the Influence of International 
trade In shaping the regional, outwardly-oriented vocations 
of Latin American economic activity. Argentina's cattle and 
raw wool exports were the consequence of a monopsony
situation provoked by a combination of the closing of the
Bolivian markets, which led to the relocation of ranching In 
the Buenos Aires region, and of endemic political unrest In 
the Interior. The British were In a position to be the sole 
buyers of local production and they made sure that the 
patterns of production and trade did not change. In the 
case of Mexico, the Steins showed that the pattern of 
exports, mainly silver, varied as little, from the colonial 
situation to Independence, as the pattern of Imports from 
Britain, mainly yard goods, which were "the major factor In 
the containment of the Mexican artisan and fledgling 
Industrial cotton manufacture". This line of argumentation 
constituted a remarkable Illustration of how consistent over 
nearly a century were the Insights and positions of 
economlc-lmperlallsm theory since Hobson had first given It 
coherent form and Included In It the thesis of the de­
industrialization of India through the Import of cotton 
woves. An external arbiter In the dispute could easily have 
pointed out that whereas Platt's criticism of dependency was
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statlstlcal, forthright, and simple, the Stein's counter­
block to it was convoluted and dispersed. It involved 
complex historical and geographical differentiations, 
unsuited to polemics over numbers, and they themselves put 
the finger on the issue: "It is not primarily the facts that 
are in dispute in the present controversy", and this too 
would have seemed perfectly obvious to an impartial 
observer. For trade and financial dependence to occur— and 
Platt did not dispute this but the determining character of 
the dependence— it was not necessary for the centres of the 
capitalist system to employ themselves fully: if sufficient 
interests were involved, they could make it happen and with 
it economic retardation as well. Latin American economies 
were no match for Britain's. The means were simply 
proportionate to the ends, and therefore Platt's statistics 
did not prove that British capitalism had not contributed to 
the international economic role of Latin America. Platt's 
insistence that Latin America was absolutely on its own 
during the 19th century— as he claimed in a further razzia 
into dependency territory in 1985, "hardly anybody outside 
Spanish America cared one way or the other for Spanish 
American politics, trade and finance"— led him to affirm in 
exasperation that Latin America's underdevelopment was Latin 
America's own doing (as when, for instance, it utilized 
foreign capital to finance wars and "political railways"), 
and this, which had to do with fundamental ideological 
choices on the question of the origins of underdevelopment 
and economic inequality, was basically what kept "Western" 
and dependency historiographies miles apart and made the 
"dependency debate" a "dialogue between the deaf".208 
Ironically, Platt's exasperation offered a curious parallel 
to the way some Latin American dependency theorists 
despaired of capitalism and brought out, in response to the 
ills and frustrations of the underdeveloped condition, the 
deus ex machina of socialist development and even the 
concrete alternative "socialist" model embodied in the USSR 
and other communist nations.
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THE GENERAL CRITIQUE OF DEPENDENCY
The orthodoxy of development economics was elaborated 
with specific targets in mind. The acid test of its 
efficacy was reality Itself: how good were Its policies and 
recommendations for achieving economic development In the 
Third World? The results flunked It and It turned to the 
study of the ways and means of alleviating poverty. Its 
rather circular propositions (public services, 
redistribution, communal projects) have had no greater 
Impact than they would have had If they had not been 
formulated. For "basic needs" there have always been "basic 
responses", and exhortations can hardly masquerade as 
solutions. Dependency, however, can be a rather slippery 
customer In the context of the world capitalist economy, 
because It can always retreat Into the "bunker" of saying 
that Its "revolutionary solutions" have not been adequately 
tested or have been sabotaged by reactionary capitalist 
forces. It can still go on denying validity to the Western 
contention that underdevelopment and economic Inequality 
have endogenous causes and It can go on proclaiming that 
both were caused and are being perpetuated by economic 
Imperialism, or whatever other name or phrase Is used In Its 
stead, be It dependency, world-system, or simply capitalism. 
Dependency, therefore, can only be judged as a theory. How 
well does It function as such? There are two sides or 
aspects to It: an explanation of the historical expansion of 
the West and of all that It entailed. In particular both 
formal and Informal colonialism; and a theory on the origins 
of economic Inequality among cultures and nations. In other 
words, an "etiology" of capitalist world expansion and a 
"pathology" of Its consequences.
As a theory on colonialism It probably works better 
than political and other explanations. As between the 
notion that British colonialism In India was somehow 
humanitarian and the charge that It acted on the search and 
expectation of profits, there Is really little to choose. 
Dependency as a theory on the origins of Inequality Is
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another matter. Dependency thinkers agree on one point with 
other historians and analysts, and they raise two special 
Issues. The point of all“round agreement or consensus Is 
that despite lnter“cultural comparabilities before the start 
of European expansion— In fact, the basis for Interpreting 
Inequalities— , the seeds of Inequality were there to begin 
with: the West had the upper hand In Its dealings with all 
the other civilizations and cultures. Baran makes It a 
basic point In his pioneering analysis. Rodney speaks of a 
gap In development between Europe and Africa. Bagchl even 
admits that Mughal India was not developing towards 
capitalism when the British arrived, and he has the backing 
of no less an authority than Habib. The Steins, and all 
Latin American dependency historians, uphold the thesis that 
Latin American Independence was not much of an Improvement 
over the previous situation of colonial economic subjection. 
Needham, the modern historian who comes closest to 
contesting the superiority of the West, and who Is no closer 
to dependency than a Manchu mandarin to a Hunan peasant. In 
the end has to find reasons for Chinese stagnation and
wllly“nllly posits the existence of a Chinese threshold that 
no culture except the West ever crossed.
Where dependency goes Its own way Is In pretending that 
the ah origine Inequality was not very pronounced and could 
have been mitigated or even entirely bridged If the West had 
not Interfered with and Inhibited the spontaneous process 
towards nationhood and economic development that was In ovo 
In each culture that It affected or subjugated. At the very 
least, a thinker such as Bagchl affirms that the West
retarded the process, and at worse, as In Rodney, It
actually crippled and hand“tled an entire continent. In the 
case of Latin America, Western capitalism actuated all the 
levers and exerted all the pressures needed to keep It In a 
condition of stunted development. Dependency, as well as 
some non“dependency, historians point to countless signs of 
cultural achievement and self“rellance as proof that If It 
had not been for European colonialism and Imperialism It
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stands to reason that non-Europeans would have been capable 
on their own of the same economic achievements, from 
capitalism down, as Western civilization. For some, the 
idea that capitalism was a block to progress is profoundly 
un-Marxist, but since Marx and Engels blew hot and cold on 
the subject of inter-cultural inequalities, and since their 
fundamental ethical position was anti-colonialist and 
egalitarian, dependency theorists and historians are 
probably justified in thinking that the legitimacy of their 
Marxist affiliation can not be gainsaid.
The special issues then that their collective works 
raise are: did the colonialist dependence of non-Western
societies actually inhibit a previous economic process of 
accumulation that was gradually evolving towards capitalism 
and economic development? And did political subjugation, 
i.e. the throttling of spontaneous nationhood, and informal 
imperialism, prevent any further progress along that road, 
or alternatively, would political independence have made any 
difference in the long run to the creation of the
underdeveloped Third World? Since neither capitalism, in 
the sense of what Braudel calls the world of high-profit 
commercial enterprise, which involved expansive maritime 
trade networks from at least the 13th century, nor the
Industrial Revolution, could have happened without the 
accumulation of surplus, the first question can be broken 
down into three component parts: did a surplus exist in non- 
Western cultures? Was it being put to productive use? And 
did its expropriation by Europe contribute decisively to its 
own growth? From the evidence of commerce all over Asia 
before and after the arrival of European traders and 
colonizers, the existence of an exportable surplus can 
hardly be denied (although this may be questioned in the 
case of Africa during the 17th and 18th centuries, when much
of the trade going on was in human lives). Serious
dependency historians (in India, for example) are not sure 
that the surplus was going mainly into the circuit of 
production at the time that Western military and commercial
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technologies incided on other cultures, but all dependency 
historians agree that after this happens, and after the 
process of colonialism got seriously under way, the surplus 
most definitely flowed into the trade circuits of capitalism 
and eventually into the making of the Industrial Revolution, 
For them, with or without sufficient statistical proof (most 
often without it, because it simply does not exist one way 
or another), the surplus from America, from Asia, and from 
Africa reappears in increasing Western profits and in 
Western productivity, which are in fact the proof of its 
expropriation and transference. In other words, the growth 
of inequality is the basis of the dependency presumption 
that inequality was produced by capitalism as part of a 
continuing historical pattern. The more extreme dependency 
interpretations even affirm that the industrialization of 
Europe could not have occurred at all without surplus from 
non-European lands, and this too is assumed from the size of 
the development gap that resulted after the 18th century.
The trouble with these theories lies in that, if 
historical reasoning can be reduced to a game of building- 
blocks of this kind, where what counts are portmanteau 
concepts, like surplus and accumulation, and large 
comparisons and generalizations, then history can easily be 
turned against them, Europe's development, the inception of 
capitalism itself, began before overseas expansion. 
Primitive or primary accumulation, a prize Marxist-derived 
concept to explain the Industrial Revolution, is now thought 
to have been less significant than it was believed in the 
past. Rather than the result of one "big push", to which 
captive colonial muscle gave a decisive shove, 
industrialization is seen as the product of an accumulation 
of many individual events and forces over centuries of 
history resulting in something akin to the critical mass in 
a nuclear reactor. The intensification of colonialism, at 
any rate, did not ensue until after the Industrial 
Revolution, and even Rodney's dense compilation of African 
contributions to European development can not disguise the
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fact that they are mostly marginal and non-essential. Even 
slavery, which furnished so much of the labour for European 
plantation economies in the New World, was defined as a 
"luxury" traffic by Wallerstein, a transparent exaggeration 
which, nevertheless, admits the possibility of debate on the 
issue of its economic importance to the West. Dependency 
arguments based on the big concept of surplus are conclusive 
neither in the sense of explaining the origins or the 
persistence of inequality, nor in elucidating why and how 
the Industrial Revolution came about.
If one insists on the statistical proof of dependency 
arguments that Western expansion contributed crucially to 
the development of Europe and its industrial breakthrough, 
we come up to either a dearth of evidence or back again to 
mere surmises such as those involved in the use of the 
concept of surplus as an instrument of broad historical 
interpretation. There are no statistics in Baran, Frank, or 
Wallerstein indicating the amount of surplus extracted by 
the West from its peripheries, and therefore, there can be 
no precise correlation in their works between that surplus 
and the conjunctures in Europe's process of development. It 
seems more than likely that silver from the conquest of 
America fuelled West European economy activity and the 
commercial and financial rivalries between the advanced 
capitalist networks of England and Holland. Is it deducible 
from this that the process leading to England's 
industrialization was given a necessary impetus, or even 
that it was accelerated, by the arrival of American bullion 
at the precise speed that it showed historically? Or would 
it not have occurred the way it did and when it did even in 
the absence of colonialist booty? The latter question in 
truth cannot be answered or even explored because one cannot 
separate the economic history of the modern world into 
discrete compartments, but one cannot, in all fairness, go 
to the other extreme and postulate a necessary seamless 
relationship between the long history of European capitalism 
and the shorter history of Europe's gradual, very gradual.
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absorption of the wide world starting in the mid-15th 
century. There is no statistical basis on which to posit 
such a thing.
The respectable I,Habib provides perhaps the closest 
approximation to a statistical grounding for the thesis, 
which he bases on Marx, that the "drain of wealth from India 
was essential for the genesis of industrial capitalism", 
when he argues that "it might have amounted" (including also 
that from the West Indies) to "say 4,8 percent" of British 
national income in 1801, and this, in spite of its seemingly 
small size, "would still have equalled 70 percent of the 
British annual net domestic investment". This argument, 
however, aside from the complex assumptions behind it— on 
the breakdown of that wealth into consumption and 
investment, on the ultimate destination of the latter, even 
on the accuracy of its estimations— , would seem to 
indicate, as often in dependency literature, more a program 
of academic research than a finished thesis on dependency 
relations. Habib remits the opinion of the Marxist M.Dobb, 
which he does not share, that "the exploitation of the 
colonies appears as an element of mercantilist policy rather 
than as a source of primary accumulation". Habib's (or 
Dobb's) distinction is not very clear in that there is no 
reason to suppose that trade relations could not have been a 
source of accumulation on the same footing as the direct 
appropriation of colonial wealth. In any event, the 
allusion to mercantilist trade policies opens up a residuary 
distinction on which to put dependency arguments on 
colonialist surplus on a more plausible foundation. There 
can be direct appropriation through conquest, and there can 
also be indirect appropriation through enforced unequal 
trade relations, and it is to these that Marxist historians 
in Britain seem to incline in their examination of the 
relationship between English industrialization and English 
colonialist policies. C.Hill says explicitly, perhaps 
conclusively: "It is difficult to establish any direct
connection between wealth amassed in the plunder of India
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and other colonies and the capital which financed England’s 
industrial revolution", a somewhat ambiguous statement 
which, however, he had qualified before by saying that "An 
essential prerequisite for industrial revolution was large 
and stable colonial monopoly markets". And Hobsbawn 
counterpoints: "Behind our industrial revolution there lies 
this concentration on the colonial and ’underdeveloped’ 
market overseas, the successful battle to deny them to 
anyone else."^09 These much more modest claims are perhaps 
as far as serious economic-history research would probably 
allow dependency theory to go in its quest for the proof of 
its affirmations on the origins of international economic 
inequality. But they mainly reinforce the assumption that 
inequality was the pristine condition of the relations
between East and West, and they hardly explain the ultimate 
causes of the economic world hegemony of the West.
THE BLESSINGS OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
If only because the thorniness of the issue is more 
manipulable, dependency stands on much more solid ground 
when it claims that Western colonialism and imperialism
throttled incipient independent nationhood in Asia and
Africa. The historical evidence is also more abundant. 
Morocco, Egypt, and Persia are examples of countries that 
had enjoyed sovereignty or had short-term potential for
modern nationhood before they were occupied as colonies or 
converted into semi-colonies by Europe. Alternatively,
Thailand, Afghanistan, and Liberia, on distinctly different 
levels of cultural evolution, managed to attain the
condition of relatively modern nation-states without 
permanent overt colonialist tutelage. This line of
reasoning, however, leads to embarrassing or unaswerable
questions such as: would the East Indies ever have become 
Indonesia without Dutch rule? Or India what it is without 
the Raj? The answers would have to be purely contrafactual. 
Evidently, in the course of time and even if only through 
what economists call the "demonstration effect", every non- 
Western territory in the planet would have become a nation­
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state, and evidently as well, the resulting colour-scheme in 
the map of the world would have been different from the one 
we have now, but more significantly: would it have made any 
difference as far as today's international economic 
inequality is concerned? Does political independence 
contribute to development, and does its absence invariably 
produce underdevelopment? The dependency thesis, which 
Rodney expressed with more force than any one else, is that 
with political independence the colonialized nations of the 
world would have had a fighting chance, and that therefore 
if Europe so ruthlessly denied them that chance, it must 
have been because of the commesurate size of the benefits 
that it was deriving from them and the fear of losing its 
hold on those benefits.
Bairoch, in an examination of the "myths” of 
colonization and underdevelopment, has honed the issue to 
fine cliometric sharpness: how have colonialism and
independence affected manufacturing production and per 
capita GNP in the Third World since 1750? His figures, 
whose sources are not entirely clear and whose reliability 
he himself admits is "far from perfect", indicate that in 
1750, both in industry and in per capita GNP, the future 
Third World either level-pegged or surpassed the West, but 
starting in the following century, manufacturing in the 
Third World declined to a low of 6,5% of world production in 
1953, while per capita GNP remained almost unchanged between 
the two dates, showing an insignificant 8% gain as compared 
to an increase of 479% for the developed countries. From 
1953 to 1980, manufacturing in the Third World increased 
almost 7 times and per capita GNP went up by 87% from 1950. 
Clearly, the West does seems to have de-industrialized the 
Third World and the demise of colonialism seems to have 
stimulated economic growth. However, Bairoch's GNP figures 
for Latin America show that from 1750 to 1860 there was 
almost no change, that from 1860 to 1950 there was an 80% 
increase (compared to 225% for the West), and that from 1950 
to 1980 there was another "hefty" gain of 64%. Bairoch is
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sceptlcal about the significance of his figures on the 
contemporary evolution of the Third World (he thinks they 
are too optimistic), but even if from the aggregate series 
we accept the "logic" that colonialism underdeveloped and 
independence fostered growth in Asia and Africa, why is that 
"logic" so unsatisfactory in the case of Latin AmericaT^lO 
Why did Latin America not develop after obtaining political 
independence, if that is all that development required? 
Rodney's emphasis on the absence of nationhood in Africa 
certainly can not apply to a world of independent nations 
such as Latin America. For Wallerstein the entry of the 
Third World into the world-system and its peripheralization 
(read underdevelopment) occurred by the door of 
colonialization. So why didn't decolonization lead to de- 
peripheralization? Within the theoretical rules of his 
system, that was certainly a possibility as the economic 
progress of such "semi-peripheries" as Austria and 
Scandinavia demonstrate.
The dependency answer to these objections is that Latin 
American independence was not real, that it was, in fact, 
economic dependence, arguably even worse than Spanish 
colonialist rule. But, one, there are no grounds for 
claiming that the Latin American republics did not enjoy 
full political sovereignty after independence, and two, 
economic dependence does not necessarily produce under­
development, and if anything the contrary: that dependence
can lead to development, has all the makings of an even 
likelier proposition. Argentina and Uruguay developed at 
the height of 19th century economic imperialism, and they 
"underdeveloped" precisely when imperialism, after WW2, was 
on the wane. Whatever else may be said of Africa and Asia, 
theorization on Latin American underdevelopment always seems 
to lead to Latin America itself. Does this then mean that 
dependency is a valid thesis for parts of the Third World 
and not for others? That it encompasses the colonialization 
of Asia and Africa but not that of Oceania and Australia, or 
that it stops short even of being fully applicable to Latin
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America? These possibilities are not contemplated by the 
theory itself, which is predicated on one capitalism, one 
world-system, one global set of historical motivations, and 
one related group of international patterns of action and 
reaction; and since it can not make all the facts of history 
fit these stipulations, then the exceptions leave dependency 
in tatters and it cannot be reasonably sustained that there 
is anything even approaching a fundamental underdeveloping 
model of dependency. Such being the case, negative 
implications start invading its theoretical structure. 
Because economic exploitation per se cannot be denied— for 
even Western historians admit that it is possible and even 
likely— , it does not follow that imperialist exploitation 
always operated in a rational, systematic, and deliberate 
way. And if deliberation cannot be proved, then it cannot 
be said that capitalism set out from its European shores 
with the aim of "underdeveloping" the rest of the world and 
creating inequality for its own benefit. But that it could 
conquer the world does mean that the inequality was there 
and that its causes were inside the cultures that had not 
been able to keep up with the West. It is even likely, 
although this is also absolutely contrafactual and
worthless, that with or without colonialism and dependence
the world would have ended up divided, as it is today, into
developed and underdeveloped countries. Admittedly a lot of 
unnecessary disruption and an incalculable mass of suffering 
would have been avoided, but then who is to say that the 
suffering would not have taken place in other ways and
through other causes?
In sifting the possible from the worthless, it would 
seem then that the most that dependency analysis can yield 
in exploring the origins of international economic 
inequality, on the assumption of inter-cultural 
comparabilities before the onset of European expansion, is 
that non-Western cultures and nations could perhaps have 
achieved a greater degree of political and economic 
development free of Western colonialist and in general
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commercial domination, although not without the
demonstration effect of Western civilization and not very 
likely to a state of advance industrialization, and that 
they contributed marginally, and mainly through unequal 
trade relations, to the industrial revolution. And the 
complementary claims of dependency that expansive Western 
capitalism developed internally by underdeveloping its 
external areas, are not sustainable on its arguments and 
evidence, although, in the case of the European dependencies 
in Asia, a valid claim can be made, and has been advanced 
with varying degrees of plausibility, that Western 
domination was in the balance more damaging than
constructive. But this latter claim is again strictly 
contrafactual and seems somewhat exaggerated in the case of 
Africa. The underdevelopment of Latin America as
exclusively a product of European and American economic 
hegemony, that is, excluding the possibility of crucial 
endogenous determination, although not contradicted in 
D.C.M. Platt's argument that Latin American was ex-centric 
to British economic interests as a whole, has not been 
demonstrated either globally or for individual Latin 
American republics.
To close the chapter on dependency, how far did Third
World theorization escape from its original Western womb?
The long-view economic imperialism model was given shape by 
Baran with materials taken from a Marxist tradition stemming 
from Lenin that went through a Comintern and a Stalinist 
phase, supplemented by contribution from Western Marxist 
sources. It incorporated a system of capitalist world-wide 
exploitation centred first on Western Europe and then on the 
US, governed by purposeful, self-regulating mechanisms and 
by forces embodying rigid, unvarying psychological 
principles and motivations. Withal it had a certain 
"aliveness", as if it were being run by an all-powerful 
intelligence or by a boardroom full of infallible corporate 
directors, leaving no place for errors or to chance, as in 
Wallerstein's depiction of the exact historical juncture
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when Britain "decided" to "peripheralize" India, not unlike 
a company’s decision to put a new production unit into 
operation. The practice of historiography along these lines 
is comparable to a mad hatter who fitted all his clients 
with the same hat-block, yet Third World thinkers mostly 
accepted it without substantial modifications. If changes 
there were, they tended to emphasize the irresistibility of 
the centre, the strength of its grip and the inclemency of 
its purposes, and the vulnerability and powerlessness of the 
periphery. Attempts to make dependency seem less fateful 
and less rigid, as in Cardoso and Faletto or in Palma, have 
been cast aside by hard-line dependency doctrine, and they 
themselves never managed to break loose enough from this 
tendency to really make a moderate dependency outlook 
workable. There is little leeway therefore to distinguish 
between "Western" and "Third World" dependency theories, and 
both find themselves at this point in time in a situation 
where, given the radicalism of their past commitments, they 
either recant or they go on saying over and over that the 
West underdeveloped the Third World and that capitalist 
development is a myth. Neither possibility augurs well for 
the future of dependency.
THE MARXIST MODE-OF-PRODUCTION ALTERNATIVE
Perhaps the greatest irony of the many we have 
discovered in this conjoint history of the confrontations 
between Western developmentalism and Marxist economic- 
dependency theory, is that both tendencies seemed to have 
very nearly reached the end of their tethers at about the 
same period, that is, the second half of the 70s and both 
likewise were faced by challenges to their previous 
prevailing from within their own respective camps. Again, 
both these challenges had actually existed from way back and 
what was happening at this time was their vigorous re­
insertion into the central current of study and debate on 
underdevelopment as a consequence of changing practical and 
theoretical circumstances. In the case of Western
developmentalism what arose to confront the dogmas of
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development economics was essentially the old neo-liberal, 
laissez-faire critique first formulated during the 
mainstream phase, which had been given new impetus by, one, 
the snags in the state-directed development strategies in 
the Third World, and two, the confirmation of that critique 
by the phenomenal growth of the free-enterprising economies 
of the Four Asian Dragons, all of which had put the Bauer 
approach— whose author was still very much alive and
kicking— back at the top of the agenda with the support of a
fresh cohort of fully committed volunteers. Unlike the 
early development economists, who occasionally indulged 
themselves in speculation on the far or near causes of
underdevelopment, the protagonists of neo-liberal, neo­
classical development economics— the title suits them badly 
and they reject it, but it still applies because their basic 
interest lies in the means of stimulating growth in the 
Third World— have turned their backs on this theme and
prefer to devote their intellectual energies to the 
denunciation of the "dirigiste" state, as D. Lai calls it, 
and to the demonstration that the market is the place to go 
for economic momentum, even for policy guidance. In general 
lines, this approach follows two tendencies: that of the
theorists of laissez-faire as such, among whom are Lai, K. 
Basu, R. Bideleux, W. Elkan, and Bauer himself, of course, 
and the strategists of export-substitution industrialization 
such as B. Balassa and J.W. Bhagwati. Lest it be thought, 
however, that the Four-Dragons example only works for neo­
classical development economists, it should be pointed out 
that the thesis that their development was the result of 
unadulterated laissez-faire liberalism has been criticized 
to good effect by J. Bergsman and N. Harris.^11
In the Marxist camp, the reaction against dependency 
was manifest in a strong tendency towards a mode-of- 
production, class-struggle approach to underdevelopment, and 
more to the point, towards the study of the development of 
capitalism in the Third World, which was perhaps better 
grounded than economic imperialism on the Marx/Engels canon.
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Frank’s iconoclastic and unimpeachably revolutionary 
exertions thrived while Latin America and the Third World 
were agitated by the centrifuges of rapid decolonization, 
social unrest, revolutionary change, and even the OPEC 
disruption of capitalist markets. The fortunes of
dependency have ebbed as the Third World has simmered down 
through exhaustion and economic crisis. But dependency came 
under fire from Marxists long before the tide of 
revolutionary socialism in the Third World had begun to 
subside. In 1970, E. Mandel wrote that revolution would 
come first to the imperialist states. The specificity of 
imperialism lay in that "it unites the world economy into a 
single world market, it does not unify society into a 
homogenous capitalist milieu". For him, however,
underdevelopment was the result of the "universal law of 
uneven and combined development", a grand pronouncement 
which allowed for a sneaking sympathy with dependency 
theses. Other Marxists were less complaisant towards the 
dependency neglect of the MOP and class-struggle paradigms. 
The French theoretician C. Palloix attempted in 1971 a 
Marxist representation of the world economy which came 
straight from Luxemburg in that international capital 
"required" the existence of national markets. There were in 
it certain superficial similarities to the world-system 
which Wallerstein would soon afterwards spring upon the 
academic world, but all resemblances between the two authors 
were conclusively confounded when six years later Palloix 
published a treatise devoted to the elaboration of one 
particular theme in his earlier work: class struggle and
capitalism on a world scale.^12
In the early 70s, another French Marxist, P.-P. Rey, 
used the concept of articulation of modes of production in 
order to adapt Marx's dynamic view of socio-historical 
change to pre-capitalist societies. In his scheme, 
capitalism first penetrated less developed societies in a 
subordinate station to the previous mode of production, 
created a different mode of production through articulation
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wlth it, and eventually would become the dominant mode of 
production. Exactly the same schema was used by H. Alavi in 
defining the Indian colonial mode of production, except that 
this author was not as self-assured as Rey in proclaiming 
that he had discovered a new intermediate mode of production 
different from capitalism. Since the colonial mode of 
production was not "completive"— because it was the 
"imperialist bourgeoisie" which modified the previous local 
mode of production and it was the same bourgeoisie which, in 
changing Indian society, pocketed the benefits— , he 
wondered whether it should not be considered, rather than a 
colonial, "an imperialist MOP that embraces a global unity". 
The similarities between these constructs and traditional 
Marxist interpretations of Latin American reality in terms 
of dual MOP formations could not be negated by the use of 
tags such as "articulation" or "colonial MOP", and this 
could be seen in the affinity to MOP analysis of E. Laclau, 
another orthodox Marxist with a quarrel with dependency. He 
disdained to engage in disquisitions which altered the 
original Marxist MOP paradigms and stated forthrightly that, 
in Latin America as elsewhere, feudalism came before 
capitalism and that Frank was purblind in not seeing the 
feudalist character of pre-capitalist Latin American 
societies.
In his analyses of world capitalism, Palloix had 
rejected the thesis of the imperialist importance of MNCs 
preferring instead the idea of the "self-expansion of 
capital on a world scale", and in his 1977 work, he relied 
significantly on the Marxist theory of value, from which he 
deduced that there was in international capital a "tendency 
towards the equalization of conditions of production and of 
exchange". This could be interpreted as another refutation 
of the Emmanuel thesis, and it went considerably further 
than the Bettelheim critique that exploitation was more 
intense in industrial societies than in backward economies, 
in saying that exploitation was the same the world over, or 
at least, was quickly heading in that direction. In fact
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this went even further than Warren later dared in trying to 
discredit the statistical evidence of underdevelopment, and 
the excess of ideology over empirical evidence showed. J. 
Weeks and E.Dore in 1979 attempted another refutation of 
dependency based on the Marxist theory of value, but they 
mostly kept well within the reasonable limits that their 
ideological partiality permitted. Their principal argument 
was that both Emmanuel and Amin, whom they chose as the most 
respectable spokesmen of the dependency thesis of 
appropriation-through-exchange, had confused value with 
exchange value, i.e. market prices, and at precisely the 
opposite extreme of Emmanuel, they affirmed that unequal 
exchange was simply inconceivable. They reasoned that in 
the international market place a mean price was established 
between products from different conditions of production, 
which meant that all producers received the same unit price 
for their goods, but that if some producers received more 
per labour/time spent on production it was due to their 
greater efficiency. Weeks and Dore, in a bow to one of 
dependency’s principal concerns, explained that 
international economic inequality resulted from the interest 
of merchant capital— which unlike reproductive capital was 
rewarded not according to labour/time but to costs of 
opportunity— in maintaining and reinforcing pre-capitalist 
production relations. In the end, however, the authors 
explained that merchant capital laid the foundations for 
capitalism and they reiterated the Palloix contention that 
under the bourgeois mode of production there was a secular 
trend towards the equalization of the rate of profit, which 
did not, on the other hand, "preclude the creation of 
’blocking’ forces which reinforce backwardness". Finally, 
in this review of Marxist dependency critiques, J.G. Taylor 
justified the introduction of transitional modes of 
production into Marxist theory with the assertion that Marx 
had never analysed "the combination of modes of production", 
for which reason he wanted to establish a "new theoretical 
framework" which would provide "a basis for analysing 
economic phenomena, the class structure, and political
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representation” •
SHAlZtD A Rôu. 8?
All these theoretical efforts • ^
P/2 û/it-EMî^  apart from the express intent in most of them 
to prove the deviations of dependency theory from Marxist 
dogma. They had, first of all, to deal with the hard nut of 
why capitalism did not seem to be displacing other modes of 
production in the Third World, which was the equivalent, in 
dependency and developmentalist terms (for once agreed on 
something), of why underdevelopment persisted in the Third 
World. The answer they, on the whole, gave was that the 
contrary was true, in other words, they avoided the issue, 
or simply denied that it was an issue. In fact, the only 
MOP theorist that has seriously grappled with it is the 
British Marxist N. Harris, in whose 1986 model— perhaps the 
closest anyone has come to a vindication of the much- 
maligned Warren thesis on imperialism— world capitalism, or 
capitalism point blank, and the Marxist "laws” on 
accumulation, on capital flows, on surplus value, and on 
class exploitation, function to perfection both in the 
developed world and in the underdeveloped countries. In one 
audacious swoop, Harris, who used the Gang of Four as the 
mainstay of his analysis (with Brazil and Mexico thrown in 
for good measure), managed to prick the dependency balloon, 
to debunk orthodox development economics, and to turn the 
tables on the neo-classic, neo-liberal school of 
developmentalists. "In sum”, he wrote, "the process of the 
dispersal of manufacturing capacity is a general phenomenon, 
not simply something restricted to the Gang of Four. It 
involved increasingly complex patterns of changing 
specialisation, interweaving different parts of the world 
unknowingly in collaborative processes of production. If 
permitted to continue— and it was quite unclear how it could 
be stopped— it bid fair to end— or at least render very much 
more complex— the simple picture of industry in more or less 
developed countries.” Dependency in his view was
transformed into capitalist inter-dependence, which in turn 
depends on the capitalist "laws” of capitalist economic
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development, not to "be confused with the conquest of 
hunger", and not on the will of individual capitalist 
forces, be they MNCs or entire national entities like the
USA itself.215
Another one of the problems of anti-dependency, 
orthodox Marxist theoreticians was trying to explain class 
struggle on a world scale and proletarian solidarity. The 
stumbling block here is the relatively simple observation 
that the natural setting for the class struggle is a 
concrete social situation, specifically society within its 
national bounds rather than abstract world society. This 
problem, like the problem of the origins of 
underdevelopment, was posed deliberately and specifically by 
dependency theory through its emphasis on international 
exploitation, and in facing these problems orthodox Marxism 
was virtually picking up a gauntlet that dependency had 
flung. On the issue of proletarian world solidarity, MOP 
theorists did exactly as they had done with regards to the 
evolution of backward economies towards the capitalist MOP: 
they either fudged the issue by claiming without evidence 
that it was there, or they telescoped it towards a future 
when all socio-economic tendencies within capitalism would 
mature; and on the issue of the origins of economic 
inequality, they likewise tended to look the other way, or 
fell back on the old chestnut of dual mode-of-production 
social systems that inexplicably went on functioning in 
niches within the capitalist world economy. In fact, on
this last issue it is not easy to distinguish between MOP 
and dependency theorists.
What Rey— who, according to A. Foster-Carter, is the 
most brilliant exponent of contemporary MOP theory as
applied to less developed countries— actually did was to 
substitute the dependency scheme, whereby the blocking of 
development was a formal feature between nations or between 
cultures, with the idea of the articulation of modes of
production, by which means he tried to demonstrate that in 
the relations between the advanced and the backward
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countries the necessary analytical references were not 
"reified" economic forces, such as those embodied in 
imperialism or dependency theses, but modes of production. 
The substitution of units of analysis, however, does not 
actually make dependency theses less valid, but it does 
allow for a process through which eventually capitalism can 
displace all pre-capitalist modes of production. What seems 
fairly evident is that in going back to MOP and class
analyses, which is what in effect has been happening to 
judge from the appraisals of non-Marxist observers such as 
Roxborough and Worsley, Marxism in our days has virtually 
given up on the question of the origins of economic
inequality and in this it is back again where Marx, who was 
not particularly keen on the subject, left things.^16 In 
the Third World, mode-of-production and class analyses
become operational once international economic inequality 
becomes palpable, or at least so it seems from the
historical perspective assumed by their users, who are 
mostly unconcerned about the origins of inequality, unlike 
dependency theorists, one of whose basic contentions is that 
they can tell when potential equality, in terms of economic 
and social progress, was cut short and transformed into 
stagnation or retrogression through unequal inter-cultural 
and international relations. Neo-Marxists can claim that, 
since they have never harboured any doubts on the equality 
of humanity, they see no reason to delve into the origins of 
economic inequality, and in this they may well be justified, 
but the assumption of equality does not obviate inequality 
itself, which for the Third World is as valid an academic 
issue as the study of the Industrial Revolution for the 
West. The fact that dependency probably elicits the wrong 
conclusions from its study of origins and consequences— that 
underdevelopment is more or less in the "natural" order of 
capitalist things and can only be surpassed through 
inequivocal revolutionary action— does not mean that no 
other conclusions are valid.
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THE SHORT- AND THE LONG-RUN VIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF EUROPE
Without necessary deterministic implications,
development and underdevelopment can be related as a 
vertical, mutual reinforcing continuum. This does imply 
one-sided advantages, and it would not, therefore, be amiss 
to consider the development of the West for illumination, by 
way of contrast, on the origins of underdevelopment. The 
historical fulcrum of Western economic development was, of 
course, the so-called Industrial Revolution, but there is 
more than one perspective in which to place it. As with the 
theory of economic imperialism, there is a short-term and a 
long-run view of the development of the West, The short­
term perspective centers on the origins, the 
characteristics, and the consequences of the Industrial 
Revolution, The long-run view frames the Industrial 
Revolution in a centuries-long process with a wide political 
and cultural sweep going back to the Middle Ages, The 
historians who assume the latter perspective are in the 
tradition started by Marx (adumbrated earlier by A.Smith) 
and pursued by Weber, Sombart, and Schumpeter, of studies 
and research into the general development of capitalism. 
Perhaps the most illustrious and influential contemporary 
long-run view of Western development was the one presented 
by F,Braudel, We have referred freely to his ideas in the 
section on Wallerstein in order to establish a difference 
between what we described as a closed ideological system and 
an open methodology in which there is no attempt to put all 
of reality under one's belt, so to speak. The aspect that 
now concerns us is Braudel as philosopher of capitalism and
chronicler of the development of the West and of the world 
217economy, '
In trying to comprehend capitalism, Braudel does not 
accept unreservedly or consistently employ the concept of 
mode of production, and his analysis can be defined as the 
unschematic search for the forces that within Europe 
propitiated capitalism and economic progress. For Braudel, 
when all is said and done, Europe is capitalism but
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capitalism also eventually entered into the large Western 
historical synthesis. Below capitalism, everything is 
économie, which embraces all productive activity involving 
interchange. Capitalism was not exclusive to Europe, but it 
was there that it reached its fullest elevation, and it was 
from Europe that it spread and absorbed all the other world 
economies, which were partly capitalist or proto-capitalist 
but had not managed to achieve the vitality and the 
assimilative capacity of Europe. In order to explain 
capitalism, rather than a straightforward definition, 
Braudel finally settles on an analogy to its evolution short 
of full-fledged industrialism: that of a three-storey
building with each floor containing economic activities of 
increasing degrees of intensity, complexity, and latitude. 
The ground floor is the level of a simple market economy in 
which farmers and artisans exchange produce and wares. The 
floor above is where competition takes place and implies a 
wider geographic setting with merchants travelling from 
market to market. The highest storey or level belongs to 
long distance commerce, a risky but extremely profitable 
activity whose practitioners try to establish arrangements 
that are a denial of the free and open competition 
characteristic of the other two levels. It is on the third 
level that capitalism resides, and it is on this level that 
the accumulation necessary for industrialism occurs. In 
other words, Braudel's view of capitalism is one basically 
of degree rather than of quality and his work can be 
legitimately read as, partly at least, a refutation of 
Marxist categories and methodologies. Braudel set the 
emergence and growth of capitalism on a triples foundation 
corresponding along general lines to his building analogy. 
First of all, there must exist an active and expansive 
market economy, which is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for progress. The second requirement is that 
society must give unqualified sanction to private 
accumulation and to the search for profits over a long time 
and at all stages of a capitalist progression. And finally, 
there must be commerce on a world scale. The latter is not
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the be-all, end-all of capitalism, because Braudel at this 
stage was still considering its pre-industrial phase, but it 
is "le passage obligatoire a un plan supérieur du profit". 
Europe reached the third storey in Braudel’s analogy because 
it fulfilled those three requirements. What happened 
elsewhere in the planet?^^^
Concurrently with the history of capitalism in the 
West, Braudel glances periodically at other cultures, or 
civilisations, as he prefers to call them. In all of them, 
the first two stages of économie were achieved, sometimes 
exuberantly and brilliantly, and in the case of India, there 
was even a partial, hesitant entry into the third level, but 
in none of them did society give its total unconditional 
backing to private accumulation and enterprise as it did in 
the West. What was even more damaging than withholding this 
sanction, the other cultures were stamped and bound up by 
political despotism, and this was what prevented capitalism 
from becoming an all-encompassing force. Despite its 
ruthless sway, despotism did not build up adequate defenses 
against external intrusions, and when the West brought to 
bear on it the brunt of its resources and abilities, it 
buckled and collapsed, utterly in the case of India. In 
Braudel’s view, Japan presented the closest parallels with 
Europe: it only lacked foreign commerce, which the Japanese 
ruling classes hindered and restricted, in order to keep up 
with the West. Paradoxically, Japan did allow an "ancient 
merchant capitalism" to flourish despite its own despotic 
trends and habits, a view in Braudel which seems to imply 
that progress requires above all else economic rather than 
political freedom and in addition that historically 
despotism is not the thoroughgoing and unvarying monster 
that Wittfogel portrayed. The most oppressive system of 
them all, to which Braudel attributed the worst rigours that 
Wittfogel described, was that of China, capable of emulating 
the West in every field but held back by its own perverse 
obstinacy in hobbling itself.^19
Braudel related Europe to the other civilizations
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through two distinct analytical motions: in one, which is
central to his outlook, he described how capitalism 
virtually made the West the most powerful of all 
civilizations or hochkulturen; in the other, he studied and 
explained the failure of the other societies to attain to 
full capitalist development. Only subsidiarily did he 
explore, as dependency historians mainly do, how it was that 
the West conquered and exploited other cultures. Despite 
the occasional approval that he gave to dependency 
arguments, what he presented was basically a disparity in 
economic vitality between Europe and the rest of the world, 
and in the end, probably the safest generalization that can 
be made from his work on the subject of economic imperialism 
is that the West did so much conquer and underdevelop the 
rest of the world as that it overwhelmed it with the sheer 
weight of its economic growth. If there is a flaw in all 
this, if despite the wealth and the brilliance of Braudel's 
vision, one emerges from it still not entirely satisfied 
that it embraces all that can be said about the inequality 
between civilizations, it is precisely because Braudel 
chooses civilizations as the final non-reducible units of 
his analysis and because he never steps behind his 
rigorously descriptive method and thus never asks how and 
why originally his historical units diverged so markedly in 
their over-arching social self-definition.^20
GRABBING THE NETTLE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPLANATION
In the first volume of Braudel's fundamental trilogy on 
economic history. Civilisation matérielle, économie et 
capitalisme, Braudel adverted to certain material 
disadvantages in non-Western cultures having to do with 
their environments, but he did not develop that idea any 
further. On the other hand, his assertions on the basic 
similarities of all higher cultures up to the 15th century, 
have a certain gratuitousness about them that is not 
dispelled by his fulsome description of pre-colonial Indian 
capitalism or of Arab commercial practices in the lower 
Middle Ages. He himself admitted that even in its pre-
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British heights capitalism in India left most of society 
outside its reach and influence. In order to examine the 
comparability of cultures before the advent of the 
Industrial Revolution, the economic historian E.L.Jones 
decided that he felt "bound to grasp the nettle of the 
environmental explanation". His approach to the task is 
direct, almost brutal in the way in which it clears the 
underbrush of lesser issues and goes straight forthe big 
trees. For Jones, by the time that Europe started expanding 
outwards, there was no question of parity between cultures: 
Western material advantages were uncontestable and decisive. 
His explanation for this ab origine inequality is two-fold: 
on the one hand, environmental circumstances amply favoured 
Europe, and on the other hand, despotism terribly 
handicapped Asia, which contained Europe's only real 
competitors. Whereas Europe's geography encouraged maritime 
trade and put it at a relatively safe distance from the 
depredations of the Central Asian hordes, Asia's "risk- 
profile" included periodic catastrophes which stimulated a 
high rate of reproduction resulting in overpopulation. The 
latter argument is crucial in Jones, who wrote: "This places 
the explanation of the difference in Asian and European 
levels of breeding and income squarely in the fertility 
response to different risk environments," But whereas in 
Europe "fruitful political variety, capital accumulation and 
trade all seem partly explicable as adjustment's to Europe's 
particular site and endowments", the ultimate geographical 
disadvantage of Asia was that it was open to invasions from 
the steppes and these established the despotisms that were 
so ruinous to its economic evolution, Jones harps on this 
theme more than on any other. He calls Asian governments 
"imposed, military despotisms", "regimes of conquest 
originating from the steppes", "alien, imposed military 
despotisms". Everything else fades in importance by 
comparison: natural and social disasters, overpopulation,
climate, geography, and location, Jones did a bit of throw­
away speculation on the possible connection between 
overpopulation and despotism but he did not pursue the idea.
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and this leaves a wide explanatory gap at the heart of his 
environmental theory on inequality.
The book in which Jones expounds these hypotheses is 
titled The European Miracle (1981). The "miracle" which 
Europe performed was that it managed to avoid despotism and 
to release its energy and creativity through technological 
and economic progress. With Montesquieu, Jones apparently 
believes that despotism is the commonest form of governance 
because it results from the unbridling of the passions. But 
these simple inferences leave his environmental ideas a 
shambles. They explain Europe's natural advantages over 
Asia, but only cursorily the "miracle" of Europe's political 
freedoms and of its states system. And they certainly do 
not explain the one crucial thing that needs explaining: the 
genesis and persistence of despotism all over Asia, for it 
leaves unexplained how it was engendered in the flat 
expanses of Central Asia where the subjugating hordes 
originated and how these hordes carried in them so 
pertinacious a vocation for despotic rule. There is in 
addition the objection to this theory that it does not apply 
to the origins of Chinese despotism (at least), which was 
certainly alive and flourishing before the Empire fell under 
the rule of Mongolian despots. There are finally serious 
observable flaws in Jones' analysis. His explanation of 
Asia's "overpopulation", if to start with it existed at all 
(for he offers no conclusive evidence on this score), is 
prima facie unconvincing. How can catastrophes, which occur 
only sporadically even in Asia, determine a constant rate of 
collective fertility? Or, turning the argument around, were 
not the magnitudes of the demographic disasters he 
chronicles a consequence rather than a cause of 
overpopulation? One feels inclined to say that with Jones 
we are back again with Bernier and Montesquieu and their 
emphasis on despotism as a cultural manifestation, but this 
would be unfair because Jones does put his finger firmly on 
environmental causation with as much scholarship as it is 
probably possible to muster in our times. He did not simply
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toy with the concept and he did not bury it under reams of 
qualifications. And this is important because if one 
accepts the principles of the psychological unity of 
humanity, the only valid explanation of inequality has to be 
environmental.
The trouble with environmental theorising on the 
origins of intercultural and international inequality is 
that ultimately the ground on which it reposes is shaky from 
the point of view of objective enquiry. We said before that 
there are two approaches to the study of the development of 
the West, both centered on the Industrial Revolution but one 
short-term, oriented towards the Industrial Revolution
itself, and the other long-term, oriented towards the 
origins and the process of capitalism. There is a third
possibility. It can be termed the "fate" or "original 
settlement" hypothesis, and it seeks the origins of
inequality in the remote past. Bosschere and Braudel hinted 
at this. So did A.W. Crosby and perhaps W.McNeill. Jones 
makes it explicit when he concludes, after discussing Clark 
and Piggott and McNeill on the ancient origins of Medieval 
farming: "On this archaeological perspective, therefore,
Europeanness lies in the form of the original settlement 
history." In other words, the ultimate environmental
explanation of inequality would have to go back to the time 
when the different branches of the human family spread over 
the Earth and occupied their respective portions of 
territory, each with its distinctive physical and climatic 
characteristics. After that each race followed its own 
environmentally determined destiny, mingling cautiously on 
the peripheries but keeping mostly to themselves, until 
Europeans, who had the pick of the world’s environments,
sailed out and, as Crosby puts it, started stitching the
"seams of Pangeae". And therein lies the rub.
The search for environmental causes can lead so far 
back in time that one could find oneself with next to
nothing in one’s hands. Jones cites one Ishida who wrote 
that "the lasting character of each people has its roots in
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the basic culture of the time when the people first came to 
being”. From this he explained Asian cereal-eating as a 
consequence of the graminivorous habits of a family of 
Australopithecines. Jones wisely refutes: ”At best
Australopithecus is a doubtful ancestor of Homo sapiens.”^22 
More to the point, it could be argued, following the bent of 
environmental theorisation, that it gains in force the 
further back in time the branches of the human family 
settled the different parts of the Earth, and indeed it is a 
commonly held paleontological hypothesis that mankind 
evolved in different places from his wandering ancestor homo 
erectus, perhaps over a milion years ago, certainly time 
enough for the environment to have imposed upon each branch 
any number of physical and sociocultural exigencies. There 
is evidence now, however, that homo sapiens might have 
finally emerged in one place, an African Noah's Ark so to 
speak, and from there spread to the rest of the globe. But 
even in this case, we are talking about a time span of 
nearly 100,000 years, plenty of time here also for all sorts 
of migrations, settlements, and environmental effects.%23 
If, therefore, the environmental hypothesis on the origins 
of inequalities does not gain or lose from the scientific 
research on the origins of man, there is little substance in 
it to sustain much speculation. Of what conceivable use 
then can it be? All we can really posit is that, in the 
absences of scientific proof of genetic racial 
superiorities, only environment can explain the modern 
inequalities between nations, and that these inequalities, 
from a very long-term perspective, were originally 
differences that came to be perceived as inequalities due to 
certain environmentally determined but transitory advantages 
in some cultures— the Chinese over the rest of the Far East, 
Europe over the rest of the world— , and that finally 
advantages and inequalities will eventually sort themselves 
out. In this sense, therefore, the idea itself of the 
origins of inequality is probably unresearchable and can 
only serve for clarification, comparison, and taxonomy, 
which has in fact been our principal interest all along a
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dissertation that has taken us on a round, nihil-novum trip 
from the ab origine perception of differences and 
environmental theory to international economic inequality, 
and back to the likely but nebulous environmental root-cause 
of human diversity, with culture in the form of despotism 
thrown in for good measure, the final irony in a journey 
that has delighted in them.
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What are the uses of our search for an explanation of 
inequality? We suppose that somehow in our enterprise there 
has always existed a desire to refute utterly and definitely 
all the conscious and unconscious manifestations of the 
belief in human inequality— from "ordinary" and "normal" 
racist thinking to extreme 19th century Eurocentrism to all 
the forms of cultural, political, social, and racial 
prejudices in our times, not as "totalising" as in the past 
but perhaps more subtle, more multifarious, and in some 
cases as entrenched as ever— , but we did not emphasise that 
issue because in the end human equality is something one 
either accepts and believes in or one does not. There is a 
grey area in which rationality inclines for egalitarianism, 
and the least we can say of our search is that it was imbued 
at all times with a spirit of rational inquisitiveness and 
impartiality.
What did the search finally turn up? For one thing,
it turned up a taxonomy or classification of different 
categories of Western approaches to inter-cultural and 
international differences and inequality from before the 
19th century to our times: perception of differences and
cultural relativism, extreme 19th-century Eurocentrism, and 
today’s developmentalist and Marxist outlooks, the latter 
itself divided into two different branches: dependency and 
MOP, class-struggle analysis. This taxonomy in turn has 
allowed us to categorize explanations on inequality into one 
pertinent and pertinacious motif, which is environment, and 
into two general classifications: endogenous and exogenous 
causations, which in some theorists merge into one combined 
theoretical outlook. (Table 7) These explanations proceed 
on the assumption of the essential unity of humanity and 
consequently of the potential economic equality of nations 
relative to certain well-defined social and economic 
standards.
Although it can be considered a theory in its own 
right, environment lacks sufficient specificity in that 
respect and generally figures as part of other, more
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TABLE 7
BASIC THEORIES ON THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY AND THEIR TEMPORAL REFERENCES
THEORIES SOURCES OF INEQUALITY ORIGINS IN
TIME
Developmentalism Environmental/
(e.g. E.L. Jones) Endogenous
Open-ended
Dependency Environmental/ 
Exogenous
15th to 18th 
centuries
Braudel Endogenous/Exogenous Long 16th
century
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coherent, more systematic formulations. Endogenous
causation is ideally exemplified in developmentalism, but it 
also figures in some forms of Marxist MOP-analysis, and both 
formulations tend to rely, in the last resort, on 
environment. Exogenous causation is strictly the domain of 
Marxism, mainly dependency theory but also in some 
instantiations of MOP analysis.
What can we infer from the above taxonomy? What has 
our appraisal in the thesis of those theories left us with 
in the way of a "summatory" explanation of international 
economic inequality? To put it very succinctly: the most 
controversial of those concepts is that of exogenous 
causation, and yet we have to conclude that colonialism, as 
per a broad reading of dependency, cannot be understood 
without its fundamental economic base, and likewise, that it 
is probably true that on the whole, as dependency claims, 
colonialism was more destructive than constructive. If it 
is not possible to establish beyond reasonable, persistent, 
and unresolvable doubts that economic dependency over the 
centuries after Europe began to colonialise the world 
produced underdevelopment by itself, and by itself alone, it 
is not possible either to escape the fact that
underdevelopment was the historical result of a process of 
global integration carried out by those culturally related 
nations that had gone ahead of all the others in economic, 
technological, and material achievements in general, and
were in a position to carry it through on their own terms.
If this process was not exclusively economic, it was most 
importantly economic in its origins, nature, and objectives. 
Having said all this, we must add that the Marxist outlook 
on the Third World, whether from a historical dependency 
perspective or as MOP and class-struggle analysis, is
generally misguided in theory and often irrelevant in 
practice. It is not a question of denying exploitation, 
which is the bottom-line definition of dependency, but of 
determining why exploitation in the West was compatible with 
development while so far seeming so detrimental to the Third
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World.* Endogenous causation, then, would appear to be 
sources of underdevelopment, and the specific circumstances 
making for inequality would seem to be cultural in 
character. Since, however, in the final analysis,
modernization, or in its non”reducible enunciation: the
inevitability of the lessening of historical and traditional 
cultural differences, is the universal norm and the
inevitable tendency of our times, endogenous causation would 
seem to have only a historically transitory validity: 
despite the appearance of perdurability, a more penetrating 
gaze perceives that the concept of differentiation tends to 
vanish as soon as one tries to grasp it firmly. 
Nevertheless, underdevelopment has a terrible force of its 
own, both in its operation and in its conceptual
representation, and the issues of progress are not so easily 
laid to rest.
One fundamental question keeps coming up: will
indiscriminate modernization, as it has sometimes in the 
past, wreak destruction without producing real economic 
progress and the end of inequality? To even consider a 
question of this sort, we have to define what sort of 
equality it is that we are referring to, or in other words, 
what are those "well defined social and economic standards" 
that we so casually mentioned before as defining relative 
equality? To make a potentially interminable disquisition 
quite brief, we think that they consist for all nations in 
an acceptable and dignified level of life, access to 
education for everyone, and the availability of help in 
times of trouble, be they economic crises or natural 
disasters. Dependency theory puts all its eggs in the 
basket of impossibility, that is, the active denial that 
such goals are achievable by underdeveloped nations under
***The industrialization of the Third Warld is in feet the only major outlet still open to 
Vfestem c^ talian. Wiether it will be undertaken depends on political variables. There 
is nothing in the irherent logic of the system \hich rodbdds it."
"The real question is not whether c^taUsn ejÿloits the underdeveloped 
ooLntries— of course it does and always has-dut it has not dene more to revolutionise 
them throng the mechanian of emloitaticn.. .Tfestem society never did esqxart the 
industrial Revolution to gpirinely backward areas, as distinct fim the lands of vhite 
Bjropean settlemaits." G.Schtheim, "Thperialian", in Cbrnimtary, ^  1970, pp.48 and 54.
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world capitalism. At this point in time, developmentalism 
is of two quarrelling minds: one mind says that economic
development in the Third World is proving very difficult and 
that the best that can be hoped for at present is the 
alleviation of extreme misery; the other mind says that, 
although development is not easy, it is possible if nations 
individually agree to abide internally and internationally 
by the rules of the market place. The first mind is, in 
effect, riddled by doubts and is probably covering them up 
by voicing platitudes. The second mind, in this
tangentially close to the Marxist mode-of-production 
outlook, points to what it sees as the fading frontier 
between development and underdevelopment in the living 
examples of the Asian and, with much less conviction, the 
Latin American NICs.
What are we to conclude? From our own research, can we
say that economic development is possible in the Third
World? The usefulness of environment for research and 
analysis does not mean that it is an insurmountable 
cause of continuing underdevelopment. We reject a blanket 
acceptance of dependency and reduce its usefulness to some 
marginal academic validity. And finally we believe that 
cultural differences in our times will not impede 
indefinitely the progress of modernization. Ergo, we have 
to conclude that economic development for the Third World is 
possible and likely. This conclusion seems virtually 
irresistible in view of our previous analysis that what we 
receive today are not so much inequalities as differences of 
relatively recent origin— somewhat like the differences 
between a sapling and an oak— , that are cancelling 
themselves out. Development and relative equality are then 
just a matter of time. Probably, however, a very long time, 
and they could conceivably never occur.
If we must be consistent, we cannot avoid applying to 
this view the same strict criteria with which we invalided
dependency assertions on historical determinism. The claims
that are being made for the Asian NICs have not been proven
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beyond doubt. Over them, especially South Korea and Taiwan, 
hangs the suspicion of economic development through Western 
political expediency. Assuming that the second mind of 
developmentalism is right, will Third World nations ever 
adopt systematically the economic policies that the 
capitalist West wants them to adopt? Marxism itself is 
probably not played out. It would be a foolhardy social 
observer indeed who came out and said flatly that 
Thatcherism and Reaganomics have put to rest the spectre of 
wide economic swings and deep economic crises under 
capitalism, in other words, that the collapse of capitalism 
is entirely ruled out during the incalculable time that it 
will take capitalism to develop the entire world, on the 
assumption that such a tendency exists even in face of a 
docile, amenable Third World, not exactly easy to conceive 
at this point. Finally, even the possibility of World War 
3, which now seems so hopefully receding— and everything in 
this scenario depends on the permanence of world peace—  
cannot be entirely discarded. The Soviets have been 
evolving internally towards a more humane and rational form 
of communism, but the West is intent on seeing that process 
as resulting from the pressures it exerted from without and 
is therefore not always forthcoming in support of Soviet 
liberalisation. An internal reaction in the USSR is 
possible and this could lead to an escalation of hardening 
attitudes. The imponderables and the uncertainties are too 
many for facile predictions and all that we can say, in 
conclusion, is that economic development and the end of 
relative economic inequality are possible, or at least, that 
there are no conclusive demonstrations against them in the 
theories that we have been assiduously chasing and 
dissecting.
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